Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Stephen Flynn Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 25th May 2021 Commons Chamber

The National Security and Investment Act would have been lost entirely at the end of the last Session if the upper House had insisted once again on our amendments providing for proper ISC scrutiny. We were not then, and we are not now, in the business of seeking to scupper legislation that helps to safeguard our national security, but that does not mean that this serious scrutiny gap can be left unresolved. In our forthcoming annual report, we shall therefore ask the Prime Minister to agree an update to the ISC’s memorandum of understanding, in order for it explicitly to include oversight of these matters. I trust that by the time we lay our report before the House, we shall finally be able to announce a positive outcome.

[Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure, once again, to follow the Chair of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), as I did during the passage of the National Security and Investment Bill. He speaks with great wisdom and experience on these matters, and the Minister would do well to heed such advice from his Back Benches. It is also a pleasure to follow the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), who also speaks with great experience in this field. I have been fortunate enough to sit on a number of Bill Committees with her, and it is clear that telecommunications is very much her forte.

Let us consider the Bill in a wider context, before I drill down on the new clauses. We are essentially looking at foreign investment in our critical, national infrastructure. In real terms this is not a new thing. We are all aware, I hope, of the ISC report from 2013 on that very matter, and Huawei, and its role within our infrastructure, did not necessarily come as a surprise to anyone. I read the Bill’s Second Reading with much interest. The Labour party was trying extremely hard to absolve itself of any blame in that regard, which made for light entertainment over the past evenings. Of course, the Government are just as complicit in that regard, and complicit with a small c, because they were not necessarily looking at things with the view that they have now.

From my experience in this House, the Government have not covered themselves in glory when it comes to this topic. When I came into this place in 2019, one of the first key issues that was talked about—aside from Brexit, of course—was Huawei’s role within the UK, and we have seen the Government flip-flop from one view to another. It is testament to the hard work of many Government Members that they got the Government to realise just how serious this topic is and, indeed, was in years gone by.

Although there are concerns, the only thing that has really changed in the many years since 2013 is the seriousness with which the Government are treating this matter, and that seriousness extends to my colleagues and me. As my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson) made clear on Second Reading and in Committee, we are supportive of the Government’s efforts in this regard, as we were with the National Security and Investment Bill, but there are a couple of areas where the Government still need to provide a level of assurance. Notwithstanding the remarks that have rightly been made in relation to scrutiny by the ISC, importantly we need to be clear that the Government are going to pick up the tab in Scotland for all the equipment that will now be made surplus to requirements. We cannot have a situation where that is not the case, because it is their actions that have led to the situation we are in. We also need to ensure that the replacement strategy is both safe and secure, so that we do not find ourselves in a situation such as this ever again.

Notwithstanding the justified security concerns that we all have, perhaps the key thing lies in and around the issue of telecommunications. As was referenced by the shadow Minister, although not in the same detail, there are around 1 million people in rural Scotland who do not even have access to 4G. Of course, telecommunications is reserved to the UK Government—it is the responsibility of the Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman), and he will be cognisant of the fact that the 4G roll-out has not been as good as it should be. We all want to see the 5G roll-out, to ensure that we are in as advanced a position as possible, but we must ensure that the same mistakes are not repeated. I would certainly welcome assurances from the Minister in that regard.

That leads me to the SNP’s amendment 1, which seeks to ensure that the Government consult in full with the Governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is vital that we have that link and that, while we remain a part of the United Kingdom, the UK Government work in partnership with the Scottish Government on such serious matters.

It will come as no surprise to the Minister that we are supportive of the new clauses tabled by Labour on ensuring that there is diversification, that there is parliamentary oversight and scrutiny, and that the ISC plays a key role. I would like to hear from its Members that they are equally supportive of the view that the devolved Administrations should play a key role in telecommunications.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

It is always a pleasure to return to old arguments and ensure that they are still live, and I intend to do just that. From the beginning, I have supported the process and initiative taken by the Government; it was not without struggles early on. I do not intend to go into the details, but I will refer to them. Back in 2019 and early 2020, it became quite a battle over whose advice was better. It seemed to me at the time—and, in a way, I do not blame the Government for this—that the National Cyber Security Centre gave the Government poor advice about the security risk, which was tempered by the Government’s need to go ahead and get 5G moving.

That is always the problem that we face. If organisations are to give Government advice on security risks, it must be completely separated on the basis that that is their advice; they must not temper it to suit the Government. We have seen that happen all the way through—it is not just this particular Government. They have made the right decision, and I will come back to that, but if we go back, this has happened also with Labour Governments and Conservative Governments of the past. Successive Governments have underestimated the growing risk that is coming particularly from China, but also from other countries. They were already aware of the risk from Russia.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Flynn]

I am a strong believer that brevity is a great charm of eloquence, so that is a statement that would be well taken on board by the shadow Minister in future. I was hoping for a power cut in Newcastle—I am being kind.

First, I place on record my thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson) for his partaking in the debate on Second Reading. He did us a great service in that regard. I also thank Josh Simmonds-Upton in our research team, who put a great deal of effort into the Bill.

This is a Bill that we will support. We will give it close scrutiny moving forward, and I hope that the Government will work on good terms with the Scottish Government moving forward in this regard.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I am going to suggest that as we go through the next motions, the Serjeant at Arms sanitises just the Government Dispatch Box in order for us to save a little time.