Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Stephen Farry Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 13th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson]

My right hon. Friend makes a strong point. To be clear, the greater issue for us as Unionists is our place within the United Kingdom and our ability to trade freely within that United Kingdom in accordance with our rights under the Acts of Union. That is fundamental to us as Unionists. I understand why the hon. Member for Foyle and, indeed, perhaps the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) will argue strongly that the protocol should be retained. I have heard their arguments for that, but let us be clear: the Belfast agreement respects the right of Unionists to adhere to their position and to support and uphold their position as part of the United Kingdom. It represents for us a fundamental change that that is now threatened and, unless that is corrected and resolved, it means that our confidence in the agreement itself and its ability to protect our place in the United Kingdom is fundamentally undermined.

[Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)]

I think we all agree on the principle of consent as set out in that agreement, but does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that the one-sided approach taken by the Government and by his party is eroding support for the Union inside Northern Ireland and that, by contrast, finding a workable solution around the protocol would provide a soft landing, which might create a much longer perspective on the maintenance of the Union itself?

[Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson]

The hon. Gentleman started out this journey as someone whose party advocated that the protocol should be rigorously implemented. Now he has shifted to saying that it should be rigorously retained. He cannot say that the protocol is creating problems and then not come up with viable solutions to deal with that. I have heard his solutions, but they do not have cross-community support in Northern Ireland. What we are looking to do—I believe that what the Government have proposed is capable of achieving this—is to resolve the issue in a way that meets the needs of everyone.

The Government’s proposals meet the needs of the United Kingdom, so that the integrity of our Union and of our internal market is respected. They meet the needs of the European Union, in so far as it takes measures to protect the integrity of the EU single market, to ensure that goods at risk of entering the EU are dealt with properly by this country in a way that meets its requirements. The proposals enable the restoration of the political institutions in Northern Ireland so that the Belfast agreement can continue to be the basis upon which we move forward there.

I believe that what the Government are proposing is not one-sided, but reasonable, measured and fair. There is so much focus on how the Government are doing this that we have lost sight of what they propose to do. Any objective assessment of the Government’s proposals can only conclude that they are reasonable and fair in all the circumstances and that their overriding objective is to protect the very delicate progress that has been made in Northern Ireland under the Belfast agreement.

In relation to agreement, and this is important, we have heard much about the need to ensure that the UK maintains its honour and its international reputation. However, I remind Members that the Belfast agreement is itself an international agreement, and the protocol undermines that agreement. It is an agreement whose co-signatories are the Irish and UK Governments. There was an international agreement attached to the Belfast agreement that was co-signed by those two Governments, making it an international agreement of international standing—indeed, one that has been approved in many international bodies across the globe. Therefore the protocol, in undermining that agreement, is harming an international agreement, and that needs to be addressed.

The basis on which the political institutions were restored in Northern Ireland at the beginning of 2020, after a three-year period in which Sinn Féin left Northern Ireland without a functioning Government, was the New Decade, New Approach agreement. Again, that was an agreement concluded by and involving the British and Irish Governments. The right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith), the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland who was instrumental in bringing about that agreement, is in his place this afternoon. I remind the Committee that New Decade, New Approach—the basis on which my party committed to re-enter, and did indeed re-enter, government in Northern Ireland—included a commitment from the Government that they would protect Northern Ireland’s place within the UK internal market. That commitment was fundamental to my party deciding to re-enter government on the basis of that agreement, but it has not yet been delivered. Northern Ireland’s place within the UK internal market has not been properly restored. It is damaged by the protocol. It is impeded by the protocol. That is why in February this year I reluctantly took the decision to withdraw the First Minister from the Executive on the basis that other elements of New Decade, New Approach were being delivered, but the most fundamental element for the Unionist community was not being delivered. On that basis, we fought an Assembly election. My party obtained a mandate for the position that it has taken, and that mandate remains intact.

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[Michael Ellis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. “Urgent” does not necessarily mean “immediate”; it means, “As soon as we can reasonably and practically do it.” I think he knows that. I will come to article 16 in due course, but we are going as fast as we can given when the House is sitting.

Additional parliamentary procedures after Royal Assent would risk delays to the regime coming into force, and undermine the certainty and clarity that we are looking to provide through the Bill. That would risk undermining the aim, which we all share, of seeing an Executive back up and running and delivering for the people of Northern Ireland, and risk real harm to businesses and citizens.

[Stephen Farry]

Will the Minister give way?

[Michael Ellis]

If I may, I will make some progress. The amendment is well-intentioned, but I hope the Committee will understand that our priority as a Government is to proceed in a way that best supports the functioning of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement and its institutions, which in this case means giving certainty to the people of Northern Ireland that the regime we propose under the Bill will be in place as quickly as possible. That is why I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst to withdraw the amendment.

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[Michael Ellis]

I thank my right hon. Friend for making that point.

With your permission, Dame Eleanor, I will speak to amendment 25 and new clause 7 together, which are in the name of the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry). The Bill is designed, as I have said, to bring swift solutions to the issues that the protocol has created in Northern Ireland. These solutions are underpinned by the designation of elements of the protocol as “excluded provision”. Put simply, it is by excluding some elements of the protocol and withdrawal agreement in domestic law that the Bill is able to introduce, with the necessary certainty, the changes that are needed in Northern Ireland. By requiring the prior approval of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the amendments would undermine the ability to exclude elements of the protocol, and therefore undermine the entire operation of the Bill. That is unworkable. Because of the protocol, no Northern Ireland Assembly is currently sitting to pass the approving resolution that the amendment would require. The Bill as introduced aims specifically to restore stability in Northern Ireland, and a working Executive and Assembly. Therefore, in requiring the Assembly to approve the operation of the Bill, there is an essential flaw in the logic of the amendment.

As the hon. Member for North Down will be aware, the Sewel convention applies to this Bill, as it does to all Bills of this Parliament that intersect with devolved competence. I confirm that in the absence of functioning institutions, senior officials in the Foreign Office have already made contact with the head of the Northern Ireland civil service regarding legislative consent, and we hope to reach a positive solution as soon as the institutions are restored. By contrast, the amendment would allow the Northern Ireland Assembly to constrain the UK Parliament’s power to legislate, even if that legislation related to a reserved matter. That, of course, is wholly inappropriate under devolution arrangements. The Government will consult stakeholders in Northern Ireland, including Members of the Assembly, on the operation of the Bill during its passage and thereafter. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Stephen Farry]

The Minister has mentioned the word “logic” on several occasions and linked the necessity of the Bill to the restoration of power sharing. Does he recognise that there is a real danger in setting a precedent of linking the two together? Have the Government considered a scenario in which Sinn Féin reacts to the Bill and, very regrettably and irresponsibly, withdraws from power sharing? Where does that leave us? Are we any better off? Are we not in a different form of crisis?

[Michael Ellis]

I will come on to the hon. Gentleman’s question—forgive me; I was distracted. Would he reiterate his point?

[Stephen Farry]

I will happily do so. I am talking about a situation in which the Government have linked the passage of the Bill to the restoration of power sharing in Northern Ireland. I am asking on a point of logic: if a dangerous precedent is set by that, how do the Government respond to a situation where, as a reaction to the passage of the Bill, Sinn Féin, very irresponsibly and regrettably, walks out from power sharing devolution and leaves us no better off overall?

[Michael Ellis]

My understanding is that Sinn Féin is willing to go back in and has not set preconditions. That is the actuality of the position, rather than the hypothesis raised by the hon. Gentleman.

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Movement of goods (including customs): excluded Protocol provision

[Stephen Farry]

I beg to move amendment 24, page 3, line 3, leave out subsections (1) to (3).

This amendment removes the designation of Article 5(1) to (4) and Annex 2 of the Northern Ireland Protocol relating to movement of goods and customs, as excluded provision.

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Amendment 34, in clause 5, page 4, line 14, leave out “the Minister considers appropriate” and insert “is necessary”.

This amendment changes the threshold for giving a Minister power to make regulations under this Clause. The threshold is amended to make it objective rather than subjective.

Clause 5 stand part.

Amendment 35, in clause 6, page 4, line 29, leave out “they consider appropriate” and insert “is necessary”.

This amendment changes the threshold for giving a Minister power to make regulations under this Clause. The threshold is amended to make it objective rather than subjective.

Clause 6 stand part.

Amendment 15, in clause 24, page 13, line 16, leave out from “to” to the end of line 22 and insert

“House of Commons draft affirmative procedure”.

This probing amendment would apply “House of Commons draft affirmative” procedure in place of regulations on tax or customs matters being subject to annulment.

Amendment 16, page 13, line 27, leave out from “procedure” to the end of line 32.

This probing amendment would prevent Henry VIII powers (amending Acts of Parliament by regulations) being made on tax or customs matters using the “made affirmative” procedure.

Amendment 17, page 13, line 34, leave out “draft affirmative procedure” and insert

“super-affirmative procedure (see section (Super-affirmative resolution procedure: general provisions))”.

This probing amendment would replace draft affirmative procedure on tax and customs matters with super-affirmative procedure (see NC5).

Amendment 18, page 13, line 36, leave out subsections (7) to (9).

This amendment is a probing amendment removing the “made affirmative” procedure on tax or customs matters.

Clause 24 stand part.

New clause 4—UK-EU Joint Committee: reduction of sanitary and phytosanitary checks—

“A Minister of the Crown may not exercise any powers conferred by this Act until a Minister of the Crown has sought an agreement at the UK-EU Joint Committee on reducing sanitary and phytosanitary checks and laid a report setting out the details of those discussions before each House of Parliament and provided a copy of that report to the Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”

New clause 5—Super-affirmative resolution procedure: tax or customs matters—

“(1) For the purposes of this Act the “super-affirmative resolution procedure” in relation to the making of regulations subject to the super-affirmative resolution procedure is as follows.

(2) The Treasury or HMRC must have regard to—

(a) any representations,

(b) any resolution of the House of Commons, and

(c) any recommendations of a committee of the House of Commons charged with reporting on the draft regulations, made during the 60-day period with regard to the draft regulations.

(3) If, after the expiry of the 60-day period, the Treasury or HMRC wish to make regulations in the terms of the draft, the Treasury or HMRC must lay before the House of Commons a statement—

(a) stating whether any representations were made under subsection (2)(a); and

(b) if any representations were so made, giving details of them.

(4) The Treasury or HMRC may after the laying of such a statement make regulations in the terms of the draft if the regulations are approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.

(5) However, a committee of the House of Commons charged with reporting on the draft regulations may, at any time after the laying of a statement under subsection (3) and before the draft regulations are approved by that House under subsection (4), recommend under this subsection that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft regulations.

(6) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of the House of Commons under subsection (5) in relation to draft regulations, no proceedings may be taken in relation to the draft regulations in that House under subsection (4) unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.

(7) If, after the expiry of the 60-day period, the Treasury or HMRC wish to make regulations order consisting of a version of the draft regulations with material changes, the Treasury or HMRC must lay before the House of Commons—

(a) revised draft regulations; and

(b) a statement giving details of—

(i) any representations made under subsection (2)(a); and

(ii) the revisions proposed.

(8) The Treasury or HMRC may after laying revised draft regulations and a statement under subsection (7) make regulations in the terms of the revised draft regulations if the revised draft regulations are approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.

(9) However, a committee of the House charged with reporting on the revised draft regulations may, at any time after the revised draft regulations are laid under subsection (7) and before the revised draft regulations are approved by that House under subsection (8), recommend under this subsection that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the revised draft regulations.

(10) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of the House of Commons under subsection (9) in relation to revised draft regulations, no proceedings may be taken in relation to the revised draft regulations in that House under subsection (8) unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.

(11) For the purposes of subsections (4) and (8) regulations are made in the terms of draft regulations if the regulations contain no material changes to the provisions of the draft regulations.

(12) In this section the “60-day period” means the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the draft regulations were laid before the House of Commons under section 24 of this Act.”

This new clause sets out the House of Commons super-affirmative procedure for tax and customs matters.

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[Stephen Farry]

Amendment 24 would remove from clause 4 the measures that strip out the heart of the protocol, namely article 5, which relates to the management of the customs union and single market as they pertain to Northern Ireland, making it an excluded provision under domestic law. That, of course, would be a unilateral breach of the protocol, rather than working through negotiations to find durable solutions. The effect of that unilateral action would be to undermine Northern Ireland’s current unfettered access to both the single market and customs union for goods.

Fundamentally, there is no escaping the Brexit trilemma. When the Government decided to leave both the single market and the customs union, that required some form of interface to be put in place somewhere between the UK and the European Union’s economic zones, and that interface must be managed and mitigated as far as possible. The protocol offers relative opportunities for Northern Ireland compared with Great Britain, and they should be preserved and maximised. However, the protocol also poses challenges that need to be minimised.

The solutions must be mutually agreed, sustainable and legal. Northern Ireland businesses need certainty, and the only way through the process is negotiation. As someone who is at least a pragmatist or a realist on the protocol and who was a strong opponent of Brexit, I firmly believe that the European Union needs to be as flexible as possible, and that much more can be done in that regard—it is important that I put that on the record. At the same time, we must be brutally honest that the Government have been disingenuous in their approach to the negotiations over the past 12 months. Engagement has been extremely limited and, at times, counterproductive.

The Bill itself makes the prospect for negotiations even harder. Indeed, the passage of the Bill will probably make negotiations almost impossible. The European Union has been clear that it is tantamount to asking for negotiations with a metaphorical gun sitting on the table. By contrast, the key ingredients for progress are trust and partnership, but unilateral action undermines trust. Trust is central in two respects—first, to securing solutions in the first place; and, secondly, to ensuring their ongoing operation.

I want to highlight two particular solutions that are out there. A lot of Members have talked about them and, indeed, there has been a lot of commentary outside this Chamber as well. The first relates to red and green channels. On the surface, I think there is a lot of common ground between me and others from Northern Ireland, the Government and the European Union on something generally speaking along those lines. There is of course a major difference in the approach by which we get from A to B and reach such a conclusion, and I think that is the fundamental difference of opinion in relation to the Bill.

While Ministers keep saying that there is broad-based support for at least some aspects of the Bill, I am firmly opposed to achieving those through unilateral action, because that is not actually a genuine solution. We have to recognise that there may be some differences over the details of what this may look like in practice, and we need to be open, frank and honest about those. A green lane may not necessarily mean a fully open door; there may still need to be some degree of a risk-based approach to how that is managed. However, I think the essential concept remains that processed or final goods destined to remain in Northern Ireland should not be treated as something posing a risk to the EU single market or customs union.

The second aspect I want to focus on is a UK-EU veterinary agreement. It may be that we do end up with something that is very bespoke for the Irish sea interface, but I think we should focus on what should be the first preference, which is a UK-wide solution. The UK retains very high standards for agrifood, and they are de facto aligned with those of the European Union, but because the legal regimes do not align, we end up with barriers—frankly, needless barriers. That makes it much more difficult than it need be to manage movements across the Irish sea, but it also poses huge issues for the entire UK economy. In particular, the agrifood sector exports to the European Union—indeed, the European Union is by far the main export market for UK agrifood producers —and we are seeing a major shortfall in agrifood exports as a consequence of Brexit and the absence of a veterinary agreement.

People talk about what I suppose are the two polar opposite approaches to a veterinary agreement: first, there is the Swiss model, which is based on dynamic alignment; and, secondly, we have the New Zealand model, which is based on mutual recognition. The nature of New Zealand’s trade with the European Union, given the geography and a more limited range of products, will be different from that of the UK, which has its own requirements. Frankly, however, it is absurd that New Zealand has easier access to Northern Ireland for agrifood than the UK.

The Government face a choice between continuing to pursue the hardest of hard Brexits, especially on agrifood, when it makes no sense to diverge whatsoever, and being pragmatic and considering some form of veterinary agreement. That veterinary agreement may well end up being unique. It will be a UK-EU solution: it will not be the Swiss model or the New Zealand model, but something else. A veterinary agreement has the potential to reduce agrifood checks across the Irish sea by as much as 80%, and that would go a massive way to addressing the heart of the issue. Parallel movements could also address the pets issue, which has been a source of contention for many pet owners across these islands.

[Tony Lloyd]

On the veterinary agreement, an EU that has negotiated—in good faith, one assumes—with New Zealand and Switzerland, would negotiate in good faith with the United Kingdom. The point that the hon. Gentleman makes is a real one, but for many years, both the agrifood business and farmers have worked to the same common standards in the UK and the EU. We have not diverged so far, so could that not be part of rebuilding the trust that he spoke about?

[Stephen Farry]

Absolutely. I very much agree with the hon. Gentleman. He has been a strong advocate for a common-sense approach to agrifood movements, as have many Opposition Members as well as some Conservative Members. The Government keep telling us that there is no intention of diverging or lowering agrifood standards, so there is no benefit whatsoever to holding out against the logical solution of a veterinary agreement.

[Hilary Benn]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman completely about the need for a veterinary agreement. Is one advantage of an EU-UK veterinary agreement that it would deal with the objections that were raised earlier by some colleagues from Northern Ireland about Northern Ireland being a rule taker for things that it had not agreed? If an agreement is for the whole UK, and Parliament agrees to it, does it not remove that objection?

[Stephen Farry]

I very much agree with the right hon. Gentleman. Our first preference in all these matters should be a UK-wide solution, and only when that is not available, for whatever reason, should we consider something more bespoke for Northern Ireland. We are discussing the protocol, and I reiterate that this issue is very much in the interests of the entire UK agrifood sector, which is an export sector. Many Members talk with great pride about different industries in their constituencies, and all of those are struggling as a consequence of the impact of Brexit. I am labouring the issue of red and green channels, and the veterinary agreement, to point out that solutions are out there and that the measures in clause 4 and elsewhere in the Bill are not necessary. Solutions are there if people have the creativity and willingness to go out and grasp them, especially when that is fundamentally in the interests of us in the UK, as well as being of benefit to the European Union.

Reference was made previously to the Acts of Union, and I wish to clarify a couple of points in that regard as the situation changes over time. The Acts of Union of 1800 were between Great Britain and Ireland, and we are now talking about Great Britain and Northern Ireland, so that is one change we have seen via the Government of Ireland Act 1920, and the more recent Good Friday agreement, the Northern Ireland Act 1998, and the principle of consent, which is the bedrock of that. That is just a precursor, and while I agree fundamentally with the point just made—that our preference should be for a UK-wide approach and solution to some of these issues where possible—we must recognise none the less that Northern Ireland has always, from its inception, done things differently from the rest of the UK in economic matters.

Northern Ireland has always had devolved powers, right from its foundation, and on matters such as employment law or other issues it has had the right to diverge. Further to that, although I am not encouraging checks down the Irish sea, for various reasons throughout our history, including in wartime and other times of stress, there have been checks on certain movements across the Irish sea, including agrifood movements. Indeed, it is accepted practice that farm equipment is inspected. Ireland only really works as a single unit in terms of animal health, and before a lot of the controversy emerged around the protocol, that was an accepted fact for people from all backgrounds in Northern Ireland, as it was the most pragmatic way of doing things. In the same way, the single electricity market on the island has not been a source of debate, although it is a reality that Northern Ireland energy issues are distinct from those in Great Britain, and happen primarily on an all-Ireland basis.

To conclude, I will stress a couple of points. First, if the will is there, the means exist to resolve these issues without going down the route of unilateral action. Under the protocol, there is scope to progress a lot of those issues, including within the current negotiating mandate for the European Commission from the European Council. The question of medicines was progressed without a change in mandate, and the European Union went ahead and legislated for change. Secondly, issues can be addressed through supplemental agreements to the trade and co-operation agreement—the veterinary agreement probably fits that category best. A specialist committee has been set up for that purpose, so a vehicle exists to progress similar issues. While the UK Government have put forward their Command Paper, the European Union put forward its own proposals in October last year, and updated proposals last month.

If clause 4 remains as currently drafted, including the excluded provision, there will be a series of consequences—indeed, there will be consequences from the Bill itself—both for the UK and, in particular, for Northern Ireland. Those will include the undermining of the rules-based international system; setting a very bad precedent by breaching international law; and the risk of a very damaging set of EU retaliations, right through to a full-on trade war. Sadly, we are already seeing the consequences for UK academics and researchers who have been excluded from Horizon Europe. Research has been a real success story for the UK, so the costs are already clear in that regard—costs that are being paid for something that is not necessary, is unworkable, and is counterproductive.

For Northern Ireland, the effects of clause 4 will be as follows: it will undermine our access to the single market and the customs union. It will create more and more uncertainty for businesses as to the legal regime under which they are operating. It will pose dilemmas to members of the Northern Ireland Executive about how they conduct their duties. Finally—I say this with a degree of trepidation—it will beg the question of how and where the interface between the UK economic zone and the European Union economic zone will be managed. The answer to that question may well pose even greater challenges and difficulties.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate, Madam Deputy Speaker, and to follow the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry); I agree with some of what he said, if not, perhaps, some of his conclusions. I think that, of all the contents of the Bill, the Government are on the strongest ground when it comes to the clauses we are now debating, and that the EU could have found a way of agreeing with the UK Government how to fix this problem. In the protocol, it was agreed that Northern Ireland was in the UK customs territory, and only goods that were at risk of going into the single market needed to be inspected as they crossed the Irish sea. We ended up with the EU seemingly interpreting everything as possibly being at risk of going into the single market, which produced a ridiculous level of tests that would never be acceptable to the Unionist community of Northern Ireland and are doing the economic damage and causing the tensions we have seen.

It should be obvious and acceptable to both sides that it has been agreed that Northern Ireland will have a foot in both camps: a foot in the EU single market and the EU customs zone, and a foot in the UK single market and the UK customs zone. The only way to make that work is to accept that there is a porous border, where there is no way of exercising the usual level of control that the EU would insist on at its other single market borders around Europe. The key questions for everyone to focus on are these: what goods are we really worried about? What goods have a real risk of crossing that border without being checked—without having the customs declarations and the duty paid, or the various other checks that are required? Finally, how do we put in place measures that can mitigate that risk, and make people on both sides of the border happy that nothing is crossing that border that poses a real threat to the integrity of either market?

To be fair, the UK Government have been extraordinarily generous, not just at the Irish border but at the Dover-Calais border, by not introducing the checks we could have introduced and which we would expect to see at a normal border, because we largely trust goods that are in free circulation in the EU, even if they are not absolutely consistent with UK regulations, either now or in future, or perhaps there is a theoretical customs issue, even though we have a zero-tariff, zero-quota deal, and there may be some duty payable because of rules of origin. We have been extraordinarily relaxed in accepting that those risks are much lower than the risks of trying to impose the burden of huge amounts of checks.

Until we get the EU into the mindset of accepting the same position in relation to goods circulating in Northern Ireland, there is no solution, because at some point there will have to be a border with checks and processes somewhere. We know it cannot be on the island of Ireland. We accepted that trying to make the EU put the border between the European mainland and the island of Ireland would be a horrible situation that the Republic of Ireland could never accept and effectively mean that it had left the single market by mistake, which the Irish Government would never entertain. It always looked to most people that there was the prospect of a compromise by doing something down the Irish sea, where goods spend several hours on a ship allowing for inspections and for declarations to be made, but that it had to be done sensitively and only on the things that were really at risk, otherwise we would end up with the problem we have now, where the Unionist community will not accept it and there is too big a dividing line between the UK mainland and Northern Ireland.

I support what the Government are trying to do and some kind of red and green channel is the right solution. I think the problem we have is that we have extraordinarily little detail about how it will work and how we satisfy the EU that the data we think we can collect and give it is sufficient to get it in a place where it will not have some horrible overreaction. We have not managed to reach an agreement. In fact, I understand it will not even look at our database and the data we could share to see if it is enough to get it there.

We have what looks like a theoretically attractive solution that is the right end position, but we have no idea how to make it work on the ground. We are going from a position where it looked like the EU was going to accept trusted trader exemptions, where everything must be checked and declared unless we have pre-agreed that certain traders are trusted and therefore we can exempt them from it, almost to a position where, if I read red and green right, everything is exempt unless either the trader self-declares that he will go into the single market, or we presumably do some risk-based inspection and spot something that should have been in the red channel in the green channel. It is a stretch to think we will get the EU happy with that without its having serious trust in our internal identification processes.

Then there is the difficult scenario of what happens when somebody changes their mind: goods go into Northern Ireland to be sold in a Northern Ireland store, and then they get low on stock in the Republic of Ireland and decide they want to move them into the Republic. The goods will not have been checked and they will not have done the customs declarations. What will the process be? Where do they go to get the goods checked so that they can legally move them across the border? Or do they just move them, nobody ever checks it, it is all fine and that is that? Again, I would be surprised if we get the EU happy about that. We are going from a position where goods are in free circulation on the island of Ireland, to a position where goods may not be in free circulation on the island of Ireland. How do we fix that?

I urge the Government, as the Bill progresses, to publish the processes for exactly how that will work, and how we can have an effective international border and make the red and green lanes work, so that we can show we are really trying to identify the goods most at risk of cheating or abusing the rules to try to get around them. If we can do that, there is scope to negotiate with the EU and get to the end point that we will inevitably have to get to. Unless the EU wants no border at all or a border on the island of Ireland, it will have to make the system work. That has been apparent for the couple of years since we knew this was coming, but we need to have in place trust between the EU and the UK Administrations, and we need to have the working arrangements and trust between the Irish and the UK authorities in Northern Ireland, so they can work together, trust each other to do joint inspections and share information on a real-time basis—all those common working practices that we have not managed to get to, due to the tensions on both sides, and where we need to get to.

The question we have to ask is: does proceeding with the Bill help us to get towards negotiating a compromised, pragmatic end position or does it make that harder? Fundamentally, I suppose the Government’s answer will be, “We have tried to get the EU somewhere sensible on this matter for the past year or more and we have not managed it. So we will put in place these arrangements and the EU will have a choice: either come and work with us and get to the stage where you are happy with the processes that we have in place and the data we can share with you, or it is just tough—accept what we will offer you.” I sincerely hope, before we do this on a unilateral basis, that at least in this area, where it looks like a compromise should be achieved, we manage to put in place something that both sides are happy with.