Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill (Second sitting)

Stella Creasy Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Do you want to come in on that question, Mr Reynolds?

Barney Reynolds: The provision is drafted in a very limiting and narrow way. It gives three examples of things that the court should have regard to when considering whether to depart from EU case law, and those three are pretty extreme instances. The first is that you are not banned. The second is a change in circumstances, but it is possible to make a departure under our system anyway if there is a change in circumstances. And the third is if we think that the retention of the EU case law decisions begin to affect adversely the development of our law. Again, that is pretty narrow. I do not think that the Bill as drafted is going to have a dramatic effect. In fact, I would even consider going further in the text by adding to those examples.

It seems to me that—this is true of the Bill as a whole—there is a tension here between lawyers wanting legal certainty, continuity and so on, which is all perfectly justifiable, and the fact that we are going through a constitutional change and need to effect that change. India has taken until only recently to get rid of its version of the Companies Act 1948, but that is a fellow common law country. We are moving from an alien legal system to our own, and our methods are different. The sooner we get on with it, the better.

That transition—this is just in the context of case law, and the same goes with the provisions—inevitably involves some element of change and some element of legal uncertainty. But I think our lawyers will coalesce with the judges around revised interpretations of provisions very quickly. I observe that, in terms of expanding the provision in clause 7(3), for instance, one of the key methods of interpretation that the EU adopts is its own version of the purposive method of interpretation, which of course—

[Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is hard to hear you. I wonder whether it is because you are between two microphones. I am sorry.

Barney Reynolds: One of the EU’s methods of interpretation is its version of the purposive method of interpretation, which we also have—we look at Hansard and so on when things are not entirely clear—but it is very limited in its use here. We basically go on the meanings of the words on the page, whereas in the EU, the purposive method, which they leap to pretty quickly in the courts, involves trying to work out the intentions of the legislators behind provisions. In the EU context, that includes ever closer union and various other purposes that are alien to our country and our system—as it now is, at the very least.

As I say, it seems to me that the sooner we get on with it, the better. Clause 7(3) is pretty anodyne. I would consider expanding it, and I would not get too troubled by the fact that moving from A to B—that is, where we are now to where we want to get to—potentially involves some element of legal uncertainty that would not otherwise arise. If we wanted perfect legal certainty, we would do nothing.

[Justin Madders]

Q As an aside, when I quoted Hansard when I was in practice, I usually felt that that was because I did not have much else to go on. I go back to what Sir Richard said about the cost to parties of litigating these references. A lot of the EU regulations are consumer or employment rights-based. Unless you are a member of a trade union or have legal expenses insurance, you are not likely to have the resources to litigate cases upwards. Will that create an issue regarding access to justice if some of these issues get taken up?

Sir Richard Aikens: It is difficult to say. I cannot give you express examples, of course, and I am concerned only with the process, rather than any particular provisions that might be tested. Here, after all, we are looking at the issue of what the case law says, and how the case law has interpreted any particular EU regulation, directive and so on. It may be rather more limited, but as soon as you get into litigation, there are costs. We cannot get away from that.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call Stella Creasy.

[Stella Creasy]

Q Thank you, Sir Gary. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon as much as it was this morning. This is a very interesting discussion about how we make law. You are talking about how case law then informs outcomes for our constituents. I am struck by the picture that you paint of the powers that might then fall to judges by default, without clear ministerial or parliamentary direction.

Perhaps Abu Dhabi, as part of an authoritarian state, is not the best example for us democrats of how we might wish to proceed. I wonder if you could talk a little bit more about some of the barriers created in the Bill for judges because of the lack of parliamentary scrutiny, and if there are other examples of legislation that you have seen that may offer us a way forward. Perhaps we start with Jack, as you look most interested by the question, then go across the panel.

Jack Williams: It is extraordinarily difficult to think of ways that the Bill tells judges exactly how and how not to do things. Ironically, one of the ways that the Brexit legislation is going is to codify almost into a civil system exactly how judges should interpret certain matters. The roles of the court are only in clause 7 provisions, which say in their own terms that they may have regard to certain things, but do not give a definitive list. Those that are listed are nudging towards departure, as I said earlier.

I do not think there is anything in the Bill that gives judges the power to preserve or save certain rights. What I would say is that it puts them in a very tricky political position because they will be asked to depart from case law and make all sorts of policy decisions. That is slightly ironic when a lot of the political discussions over the past few years have been to save judges from stepping into the political arena.

I very much agree with Sir Richard that the outcome of the Bill is to generate litigation, because the vast majority of the laws that come out of it will be secondary laws, which are susceptible to challenge. One will be arguing, for example in relation to clause 15, whether the similar objectives were being met by regulations that replaced the earlier retained EU law, and whether that has been met by the new rules. That is an incredibly difficult task, and one that could end up in lots of litigation. I think that we will end up with a lot more cases on those sorts of issues.

Sir Richard Aikens: I agree with what Jack said. As I read clause 7(7), the factors that the court must have regard to are not exclusive. In other words, they can have regard to other factors as well, which Parliament has not identified and has left to the judges to decide whether they might be relevant. So I would like to make two points. First, this is not exclusive, and it may well be that, in future cases, appeal courts will introduce other factors, maybe on a case-by-case basis, which are only relevant to that particular case, but there may be a development of more general factors, which, once you get that at a Court of Appeal or above level, will then tend to be repeated thereafter.

The second point, as has been made by both my colleagues already, is that EU case law necessarily involves a consideration of the way that the Court of Justice of the European Union looks at regulations and its previous case law. In my view, the CJEU is a much more active court in terms of both interpretation of EU instruments, to use the phrase that is in the Bill, and its previous case law. It tends to develop principles derived from both instruments and case law in a rather more positive way than the UK courts do. I can only speak for the English courts, of course.

The problem, therefore, that the judges are going to have to deal with is: do they carry on with that approach, as in the case law of the EU, or do they somehow retreat from that? Although they have got these factors here that are laid out, they do not really deal with that aspect at all. That, again, puts the judges in a difficult position, because they have not got the guidance from Parliament. They have got this body of law—the acquis of the retained EU case law—but do not really know quite how to push it on, or not push it on. I think it will make life quite difficult for the judges.

Jack Williams: As a footnote to that, on the Court of Appeal for the reference procedure, the Court will not even have decided facts, so it is quite ironic that what is being imported with the national reference procedure is like the preliminary reference procedure under EU law at the moment where you ask a court a legal question—an abstract legal question here—on whether to depart from retained case law. And yet, very unlike common law reasoning, one would not actually have a judgment from below with a factual position working out how the case law is applying to a certain set of facts, so it is even harder for the judges, because you are asking them a pure abstract question: should we depart as a matter of law from that EU case law without understanding the full factual matrix? That is very unlike common law reasoning where you incrementally grow and apply to the facts.

[The Chair]

Order. I have three colleagues bursting to get in and we have only about seven minutes left, so short answers to short questions, please.

Barney Reynolds: In short, I am not suggesting we follow another country. The court interpretation provision is unprecedented. Abu Dhabi created something from scratch. It was not a transition from what they have got, which was based on the French-Egyptian model, to the common law model. We should do our own thing that works for the UK, and using our methods. I agree with that.

I agree with my colleagues on the uncertainties that can potentially arise. As a lawyer, I think we need to be very careful about those. I am concerned with them. My solution is to expand clause 7 and the list of things that should be borne in mind in order to execute an adroit shift to our common law method in a way that does not involve interpretation too much. I do not think you can remove the necessity for judges to exercise interpretative powers to execute the shift. Ultimately, this shift involves trusting the judiciary, which I do. I am fine doing that, and I do not think that there is a shortcut or a way in which we can box people in so they cannot use any discretion and nevertheless get to the same place. We have to trust people to do it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Ghani]

Q I feel that this is the right time to correct the record, because I am sure that Dr Fox would not want to say anything inaccurate on the record. Earlier, you referenced a National Archives story in the press, Dr Fox. We do not often talk about leaks, but I think you said either that it was “uncovered” or that it was “discovered”. For the record and for the Opposition’s understanding, the Government commissioned the National Archives to investigate whether anything else needed to be explored, and the number of the laws still in force has not been verified. I do not think it is appropriate to continue to use misleading language about a story that has not yet been verified, or to leave people in doubt about where the work came from.

Dr Fox and Sir Jonathan, you are not comfortable with what the Bill proposes, but I get the feeling that you are probably just not comfortable that we are trying stop EU law continuing to sit on the UK statute books for ever without us having any power to amend it. Is that the case, or do you see a time in the future when it would be appropriate to move EU laws off the UK statute books? I will come to you first, Dr Fox.

Dr Fox: I reject that. I am up for change and quite embrace it. This was the purpose of Brexit, was it not? We should therefore get on with it. I do not object to your objectives; I object to the particular nature of the process and procedure by which you are proposing to achieve them, which is unduly risky.

If, for example, you do not find a regulation or a piece of retained EU law and so do not deal with it by next December, it will fall away. You cannot know the implications of that if you do not know about, and have not dealt with, the existence of the regulation—that is my concern. As I set out in our written evidence, I think you could achieve your objectives, and indeed my objectives, in a different way.

Sir Jonathan Jones: I agree with that. Plainly, I have no objection to Parliament changing any law it wants, be it former EU law or any other law. I am sure that the EU law that we inherited when we left the EU is a mixed bag, and that some of it is ripe for review and change.

Like Dr Fox, the difficulty I have with the Bill is twofold. First, it creates a huge amount of uncertainty as to what the law will actually be by the end of 2023 or thereafter, because there are no policy parameters on what might change, what might stay or what might fall away. That is quite aside from the risk you have heard about—that some law might fall away simply by accident, because it has been missed, which creates a huge amount of uncertainty for users of the law.

The second issue that I have difficulty with is the lack of scrutiny—an issue that I know you keep coming back to and that Dr Fox touched on—by Parliament itself of the process. In the Bill, Parliament is not being invited to consider particular policy areas or particular changes to the law; it is simply signing off on a principle and a process, and I would say that the principle and process carry with them all that legal risk as to what the outcome will be. Those are the difficulties that I have. It is not a difficulty with Parliament being able to change any law it wants, including former EU law, whenever it wants to; it is the process being followed that I have difficulty with.

[Stella Creasy]

Q Another question we could ask is whether it is reasonable for Parliament to ensure that Ministers know the consequences of their legislation. What the National Archives work shows is that that is possibly not the case with the Bill.

I say that as someone who this week received something I had never, ever received before—I wonder, Dr Fox, whether you can advise me if this is common: a ministerial correction to an answer to a written question. The written question was to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs about the application of the legislation to the Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (England) (No 2) Order 2006. Originally, Ministers told me that the order was not made under section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 and therefore did not fall within the scope of clause 1 of the Bill, but they issued me with a ministerial correction to admit that it did. Have there been other instances of Ministers not knowing the consequences of their legislation? What impact do you think that has on our ability to scrutinise legislation as parliamentarians?

Dr Fox: I cannot give you a number, but I am sure that there have been corrections of that kind. We also see that in respect of statutory instruments, where instruments have to be withdrawn and re-laid because of errors.

Clearly, one of our problems is that the complexity of law now, and the layering of regulations on regulations, coupled with inadequate scrutiny procedures, makes the whole scrutiny process incredibly difficult. Another problem is that the breadth of the powers in Bills which enable Ministers to take action, but do not define on the face of the Bill the limits and scope of that action, are very broadly drawn. That makes scrutiny incredibly difficult.

We also have amendment of legislation going through both Houses, and that adds layers of complexity. Particularly in the House of Lords, Members seek to introduce scrutiny constraints of the kind we have talked about in respect of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. That is just additional complexity, which then hits civil servants trying to work out which powers they should be laying instruments under, and which scrutiny measures apply. For people who have to interpret and implement the law, it becomes ever more difficult.

I hope that one aspect of the review process would be to simplify some of those areas, with things like consolidation and so on, to help the process. However, given the scope and scale, I do not think that can be done by December of next year.

[Stella Creasy]

Q Sir Jonathan, a similar question to you: what impact does that have on the ability of Departments to operate and, indeed, on Parliament’s ability to scrutinise, if it is not clear what legislation is effective? For example, the dashboard does not currently contain the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017, but that is a piece of European retained law that will have an impact on environmental concerns. In your experience, what is the impact on civil servants being able to advise Ministers and to provide information to Parliament? I note that Ministers told me that the dashboard is an authoritative but not comprehensive list of laws to be affected. What impact might those absences and omissions have on the ability of civil servants to do their job for us?

Sir Jonathan Jones: I am not in the civil service, as you know; I am on the other side, advising clients about what the effect of the Bill will be on their businesses and so on. This was always going to be a very complicated exercise, including for the civil service. We are leaving one legal order and, in one sense, we are out of it—we are free—but the legal constitutional consequences of that were always going to be very complicated, because we had this huge body of law that over decades had been integrated into UK law. We were not keeping a running tally throughout that time of the laws that we might one day want to change, because they had come from a particular source. They were enmeshed it all sorts of different ways with UK law.

As soon as we left, we had to begin the process set out in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which was about identifying what retained EU law needed to be changed in order for it to work operationally and technically. That was the process that was done with the 2018 Act, and it involved, as I think you have heard, many hundreds of sets of regulations to cure deficiencies in the language of that legislation. That was complicated enough, and it is possible that things were missed. There are certainly examples of some changes having to be made multiple times because they were not got right the first time.

That was complicated enough but at least, if something was missed, the law did not fall away altogether; it could be corrected later. What was being done then was an essentially technical exercise to keep the pre-existing law and to make it work as far as possible, in a way that provided continuity and certainty for users. What we are talking about now is an exercise of a completely different order. This is about changing policy, potentially getting rid of some laws and, in some cases, deciding what replaces them.

This is an immensely more complicated exercise even than the one that has already been done, and the civil service will not have started with a pre-existing list, however authoritative they are trying to make it. There is therefore a risk that as Departments perform an audit, or as the National Archives help with that process, additional laws will be found. There must be a risk that some will be missed altogether. If that is so, again as you have heard, the consequence of the Bill is that the law will fall away altogether on the sunset date, and you will not have the option of making a correction. Ministers, if they wanted to, would have to come back to Parliament with a Bill to replace or change the law. That is the complexity of the exercise.

[Mr Fysh]

Q I am very much in favour of injecting urgency into the process of transition from one order to the other, as you have described, and I am well aware of the complexity involved in that, which is one of the reasons why I have been making the argument for taskforces that involve more than just civil servants and Ministers in the process. I encourage Ministers to get very good advice from outside—from practitioners, and so on.

I have two questions. First, how else could you inject such urgency to get this done quickly, other than through what has been proposed? Secondly, we have heard a lot about the permanence of the falling away—this is your contention—of the laws because of the sunset, but is it not the case that in various clauses, such as clause 2(1), and clauses 12 and 13, there are powers for a restatement or reproduction of different things up until 2026 should it become necessary? Is that not an adequate safeguard mechanism should there turn out to be something that the taskforce approach, which should be very competent, has missed?

Dr Fox: On the latter point, yes—there is provision to extend the sunset through, as you say, to 2026, but that applies to the piece of retained EU law that you know about and are saving and assimilating, and that you will then have the option to amend later. The concern is that if you have not identified and saved it, it could fall away and you could then have that problem. There is also the prospect that you end up with a patchwork quilt of sunset dates, because it could be before 2026.

There are issues about at what point in that process, prior to December 2023, the Government would identify what they intend to do, either with the individual pieces of retained EU law or sections of retained EU law, which will introduce uncertainty. What we have proposed is to do that in a slightly different way: that is, take away the cliff edge where everything falls away—unless you choose to save it—and use Parliament as an ally in that process.

I completely understand the concern about internal inertia, particularly in the final two years of a Parliament and in these current socioeconomic conditions, where there are lots of capacity pressures. However, it seems to me that you could use Parliament as an ally by, instead of having cliff edge dates where legislation and law falls away, having dates in the process, possibly linked to your taskforces, where there are statutory reporting requirements to Parliament by Government Ministers and Departments and where Select Committees could be engaged in that process by scrutinising those reports.

You could set out what you want the Government to report on—what are their plans, what is their implementation timetable, what progress are they making, as with the EU withdrawal Act process for the statutory instrument programme; you could engage the National Audit Office in monitoring implementation of that; and you could have reporting. One of the things that wakes up permanent secretaries and others in the civil service is the possibility of having to appear before a departmental Select Committee and report on a lack of progress, or the fact that their plans are failing. Your model of taskforces to ensure consultation, coupled with statutory reporting requirements, through to a deadline of 2026 or 2028—whatever you choose—would be a better approach, because you could still achieve what you want to achieve but reduce the risk of missing something.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call Stella Creasy.

[Stella Creasy]

Q I thought the Minister helpfully set out a whole range of employment protections that are rooted in retained EU law when it comes to women’s rights. Removing the foundation of those laws that have been applied in UK law creates the legal uncertainty that you alluded to. The answer is therefore a commitment, clarity and a confirmation to all those who depend on these laws that, as the Government say, they are going to be retained. But exactly which ones are going to be retained? What is the point of this legislation if we are just going to delete everything and start again? Have you, the organisations that work on employment rights, had any confirmation or commitment about these specific pieces of legislation?

Tim Sharp: No, we have not had those conversations. We are still in the dark. We are really concerned about the array of rights that have been set out so far today. There are lots of health and safety laws as well and things like protection for pregnant workers—there are lots of protections—but, so far, we do not know. It seems we are taking a shortcut to an unknown destination.

[Stella Creasy]

Q Just so we are clear, the reason why that bank holiday entitlement exists in UK law is because EU legislation required it, and we have written proposals for bank holidays into law on the basis of EU legislation. If we remove that basis and that law is not retained, could an employer challenge the right of an employee in the next year to take a bank holiday?

Shantha David: Just to clarify, the 20 days are derived from Europe. The additional eight days were because, historically, those eight days were incorporated into the 20 days. To ensure that people had the additional eight days of bank holiday, they were allowed for under UK law, but it is contained within the same piece of legislation, which is where the confusion might arise.

[Stella Creasy]

Q In terms of my specific question, it seems we would be going down to 12 days. Could an employer challenge the right of an employee to take a bank holiday if the Government do not rewrite this piece of legislation?

Shantha David: I think it is worse than that, actually; we will not have the 20 days at all. We will have the eight days of bank holiday only if they are taken out of the current regulations, presumably, and put somewhere else. If the regulations go altogether, regulation 13A, which talks about the bank holidays, will go with them.

[Mr Fysh]

Q I am quite sure that the Government and their Ministers will be keen to ensure that the rights that people have enjoyed thus far are preserved. I cannot personally imagine a scenario in which they would not be careful about those things. I point out again that under clause 13(8), should anything inadvertently go that was not meant to go or have effects that were really bad, there is a power that could be used by a future Government to reproduce anything that was retained EU law in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. I just wanted to share my strong belief that that is not where the Government would go. I cannot speak for them, because I am not a member of the Government, but I would be amazed if there was anything different.

Shantha David: It would be helpful, though, if that were in writing. I am grateful for your words, but as a lawyer it would be helpful to have a full list of what is included. If that piece of legislation, say, is sunsetted and introduced at a later date, there will be workers who do not have access to those laws. That is a breach of access to justice as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I feel an amendment in Committee coming on.

[Stella Creasy]

Q I appreciate that this is something that people feel strongly about, because they are concerned for their constituents. Can the representative of the trade unions tell us what it was like when the Beecroft report came out? It talked about some of these issues, so if there is a concern to get not just a promise but a commitment in writing to protect these rights, would such an amendment be welcome? Would that be enough, given that Beecroft shows a direction of travel that this Government have previously considered?

[The Chair]

Let us not stray too widely into Beecroft, because we are considering this Bill, but an answer would be helpful if it is relevant to this.

[Stella Creasy]

But it is relevant as an element of employment rights.

Shantha David: The difficulty we have here is the speed at which this thing is happening. It is not about whether you want EU-derived legislation to exist; it is about being able to have a considered view on the employment provisions that exist for workers, and to ensure that employees and employers are not mired in litigation forever and a day. The costs of this are incredible, and I think that is not completely understood. The costs of litigation are profound. If there are to be clear exceptions, and if it is very obvious that certain employment legislation will survive this cull, perhaps that should be specified. That would be very helpful.

[The Chair]

Marcus Fysh has the final question.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

That is clear, thank you. I will bring Ruth in on this, and then we will go to Stella Creasy. Ruth, you wanted to come in.

Ruth Chambers: Thank you, Chair. I have two points of clarification to make. First, I confirm that Greener UK as a coalition also wishes the Bill to be paused and withdrawn. That is not inconsistent with our position that we also believe that the body of retained EU law could be improved and that a process could be devised to do so. I feel that there was a little conflation of those two points but, to be absolutely clear, they are not the same thing.

Secondly, Minister, may I come back to your point about environmental targets, the 2030 species recovery target and the relationship with REUL? The relationship is a rather straightforward one: the opportunity costs that will inevitably come with the Department having to review, assimilate and reform such a large body of law. In fact, the Government have already missed their first legal milestone on environmental targets, on 31 October. That is just one example of how this can have a serious impact—because of the sheer deliverability challenges.

[Stella Creasy]

Q David, may I turn to you? Earlier in this session, you will have heard me say that I had a ministerial correction for the first time ever as a parliamentarian—old dogs and new tricks, all the time—[Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Order. We will come back to your point.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We are all reunited, more or less. Stella has the floor. We will let you know in a moment what the ending time for this witness panel will be; we are still trying to work it out.

[Stella Creasy]

Q Thank you, Chair. We were not actually discussing shrimp when we were rudely interrupted by the Division bell; we were just about to talk about avian flu. David, could you update us? Originally, Ministers said that the requirements around avian flu control—something I feel strongly about, because we have it in my local community—were not within the scope of this legislation, but they have issued a ministerial correction to say that it is. That seems a good example of legal uncertainty. What is the practical impact of having legal uncertainty about the requirements when it comes to environmental protections? Could you give us examples of where there has been legal uncertainty?

David Bowles: There are many examples. I mentioned at the beginning of the session that there are 44 different animal welfare laws, but that is my assessment; if you look at the dashboard that the Government have set up, there are 16 that are not on the dashboard but are on my list. That gives you an indication of the uncertainty, although to be fair, the dashboard is one of the most opaque measures of what the Government are doing. It does not seem to be in alphabetical or chronological order, and going through the 570 laws under the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs tab is quite onerous. I think it is uncertain about where it is.

The Bill applies not just to the UK, but to Wales, and probably 31 of 44 laws in my area of animal welfare are devolved. The Senedd and the Scottish Government, who have responsibility for them, are uncertain as well, because they are taking their lead from DEFRA. Yesterday the Welsh Government said they were not minded to work out which laws were devolved, which were not, and which came under retained law. They were going to leave that up to the UK Government. That just fuels the uncertainty.

[Stella Creasy]

Q On the point about uncertainty and the approach we should take, you all seem to be making the case for a sunrise clause rather than a sunset clause, so that we start with everything and work backwards. You have found 16 laws that are definitely not on the dashboard. I feel inferior now; I found only one: the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017. However, the Conservation of Habitats and Species and Planning (Various Amendments) (England and Wales) Regulations 2018 is on the dashboard. From the point of view of layperson who is not legally qualified, how much variation is there between those orders? What sort of omissions could we be talking about? What uncertainty might be created when there are gaps because laws are not on the dashboard? “Enmeshed” was the word that Dr Benwell used?

David Bowles: It could create huge uncertainty. Two things need to be worked out. First, what does retained EU law mean? As we saw today from the article in the newspaper, there seem to be more such laws coming forward. Secondly, which are devolved and which are not devolved? There could be a huge discussion about that. The Bill will have huge implications. There is not just the devolution issue, but the common frameworks issue, which is how the three Governments work out how to move forward on specific pieces of legislation. There is also the matter of the United Kingdom Internal Markets Act 2020, which is the legislation that allows free trade within Great Britain. There are huge implications for all those issues.

[Stella Creasy]

Q Finally, a big question to all four of you. We were all promised that on leaving the European Union we could have higher standards, particularly in environmental protections. I think that people across the House would want them; we are all very keen on defending them. Clause 15(5) talks about burdens. What is your interpretation of where a burden might impact our ability to provide environmental protection? I am thinking particularly of town and planning orders; environmental requirements are part of the planning process. When you read about that concept of burdens, do you have concerns about maintaining standards, let alone increasing them? what impact could that word have on laws that are not immediately considered to be environmental, but do have an environmental impact? We will start with you, Ruth, to give David a break.

Ruth Chambers: That is a really important question. Clause 15 and how it defines “burden” is one of our biggest concerns about the Bill. If you look at the passage that defines “burden”, it is everything from an administrative inconvenience to something that causes issues to do with profitability. What does it actually mean? It also does not seem to sit readily with the answer that DEFRA Ministers have given, which is that their intention, in reviewing that body of rules, is to improve environmental outcomes. How does that sit with reducing regulatory burdens?

Not many weeks ago, some Government Ministers were suggesting that environmental protections were regulatory burdens and should be removed. That is not the case, we believe, with the current Government and current set of Ministers, but it shows that things can move quite quickly. That is why the Bill needs to be watertight on these issues.

[The Chair]

Shall we move down the table? Dr Benwell.

Dr Benwell: This is a really problematic part of the Bill because, as has been said, “burden” is defined in purely financial and business terms. It imagines that the small cost that business might incur is not worth it for the environmental benefits that come out the other end. Of course even critical laws, such as the habitats regulations, can be improved. For example, you could define projects and plans better, so that you could take intensive land management in as well. Those are conversations we are actively having with DEFRA, and we want to find ways to do that, but those proposals simply could not be given effect through the Bill because of clause 15, which sort of sets out a deregulatory agenda. Altogether you see a lock-in of deregulation where you might otherwise find improvements. We want to improve the law, but the Bill does not allow us to do that.

David Bowles: I concur with the two previous witnesses. The Government came in with a manifesto commitment to improve animal welfare, and indeed they are looking, hopefully, to get rid of cages for laying hens and pigs, but because we are so uncertain about the status of the conventional ban on battery hens, which was agreed in 1999 and finally came into force in 2012, we do not know if that ban is to be scrapped. The Government are almost looking two ways on the issue, and that worries us.

We need reassurance that there is a transparent process for filtering the 570 DEFRA Bills, and a time period in which to do that. I concur with the other witnesses: we are not against improving legislation; of course we want to do that. We are not saying that the legislation is perfect, but there are a number of caveats, including the time period, the filtering process and the impact on devolution. All of that is so unclear that we need reassurance.

Phoebe Clay: You put your finger on it when you mentioned the word “burden”, Stella. That is a really problematic word from our perspective. If we were to frame the discussion around environmental, social and human protections, the Bill would probably be less problematic. We know that people see the rules as protections, and conceive of them as things that keep them safe, particularly at a time when people are feeling incredibly uncertain and under-protected. Shifting away from the idea that regulations are necessarily burdensome would be a really important step forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. We have one minute left. I am keen to bring in Stella Creasy for a quick question, and then Angus for a quick answer, please.

[Stella Creasy]

Q Angus, I understand why you suggest that the challenge is that we need a practical response because our constituents will cross borders, but so will Dikerogammarus villosus, which is a killer shrimp. Although that species has not been found in the River Tweed, is it not better—rather than not involving devolved areas—to look at how we could redo the whole process so that constituents and shrimp crossing borders do not come a cropper?

Angus Robertson: I am all in favour of good intergovernmental relations. I have been doing this job since last year, and I have gone into conversations in good faith about any and every potential challenge. If that is one of them, I am happy to do so again.

The wider point is that we are supposed to have a range of measures that we can use to make devolution work, including the Sewel convention. We have subsequently agreed ways in which Governments in the UK should work together to push through potential challenges, and common frameworks and the like are supposed to deal with some of these issues. I wish the UK Government would live up to their promises to work with the devolved Administrations across the UK, as I am keen to do. They have an opportunity to do so by respecting the Sewel convention in this particular piece of legislation.

[The Chair]

Thank you so much. Your evidence has been very clear, but sadly we have run out of time. It is very nice to see you again.

Angus Robertson: Thanks for having me.

Examination of Witnesses

Michael Clancy OBE, Charles Whitmore and Dr Viviane Gravey gave evidence.