Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Simon Hughes and Mark Field

Monday 14th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Simon Hughes]

I and a former leader of Lambeth council and others have dealt with these issues for a long time. I have heard the hon. Gentleman’s criticism, I understand it and it will be made from experience. I hope he will tell us what he and Westminster city council cabinet members and officers think might be the right answer. None of us has a perfect solution. We are all trying to find the best combination of tools to have in the box.

[Mark Field]

Naturally, I will try to be constructive. I wholly agree that the lower level nuisance and annoyance behaviour covered by an IPNA does not always warrant the threat of criminal prosecution, which perhaps happened in the past with ASBOs. Among the concerns expressed earlier was that elements of those ASBOs were not being properly enforced. We should rightly look to avoid criminalising the country’s youth wherever possible, but in practice the specific problems that we face with, for example, the very professional, aggressive begging on the streets of Westminster, literally within yards of where we are all sitting tonight, can currently be tackled only through the use of ASBOs on application. We rely heavily on the genuine threat of arrest to protect victims and to deter professional aggressive beggars, who are completely different from the 16-year-old who has got into trouble by graffitiing a bus-stop, for example. We lose that threat under the new proposals.

I want also to speak briefly about the antisocial behaviour committed by people with no fixed UK address. From the experience in Westminster city council area, but also in the City of London area that I represent, I know that tackling antisocial behaviour often involves dealing with organised aggressive begging gangs from across the EU. I fear that we will hear a lot more of this in the months to come. Some individuals travel to the UK in large numbers, with the sole intention of doing a short, but profitable begging stint before returning to their home. These people enter the UK according to their rights as EU citizens, and cannot currently be deported unless they remain in the country for longer than three months or commit a criminal offence. While they are in the UK, and particularly while they are here in central London, they have no fixed address and are completely transient in nature, with many sleeping rough.

Where we have previously dealt with such individuals through ASBOs on application, under the IPNA system the local authority will be able to apply for an arrest warrant only after a breach has occurred, by which time the individual in question may well have left the country, entirely unchallenged, to return at a future date. These people are deliberately off the grid, and we must have some legislation in place that closes this potential loophole and does not actively encourage the gaming of the system.

Water Industry (Financial Assistance) Bill

Debate between Simon Hughes and Mark Field

Wednesday 14th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Simon Hughes]

This issue is of significant interest to those of us who live in the Thames Water area. Some 20% of the population of the United Kingdom do, so it is not an irrelevant issue to people across the country who pay water rates. Specifically, I am talking about colleagues who have constituencies in Gloucestershire, Northamptonshire, Essex, Kent, Hampshire and Greater London, and the issue raises broader questions about how the Government and Ofwat, the regulator, deal with water companies, their financing and, specifically, the financing of major projects.

I shall make some preliminary comments that relate to all three amendments. I am grateful to the Minister and to the Secretary of State for engaging with the issue; I am grateful for the engagement on Second Reading; and I am grateful for the correspondence that I have had with the Secretary of State since Second Reading. I shall refer to that and read some of it into the record.

First, in parts of London and, certainly, in my constituency, one of the most significant current debates is about whether there will be a Thames tunnel, and Thames Water’s proposal is that to address the current system’s inefficiency and inability to deal with London’s sewage, understandably because the system was created in the Victorian era, new infrastructure—a main sewer, in effect—needs to be built to cope with current and future needs.

There is an ongoing debate, which I do not propose to get into today, about whether the current plan for the proposed tunnel is the right answer. In summary, sewage capacity is already being built to the east of London, in the Lee valley; and there is a proposal—the projected costs of which have risen to £4.1 billion—for a long tunnel, travelling from west London not far from here, along my constituency and ending up at the sewage treatment works in east London.

Some people say that the only solution is the currently proposed tunnel; others say that it would be better to have a shorter tunnel and some other forms of sewage alleviation. That debate is ongoing, but in the end decisions will have to be made. There is a whole planning process for deciding whether the tunnel will be built.

Secondly, there is a debate—in constituencies such as mine and in boroughs such as Hammersmith and Fulham, and Wandsworth—about where, if there is to be a tunnel, the main sites of activity should be. In the middle of Bermondsey, a very large site is proposed for drilling down to create the shaft from which the tunnel boring will happen, both west and east, at a place called Chambers wharf. In the first round of consultation, the proposed site was King’s Stairs gardens, by the Rotherhithe tunnel. That is a greenfield site, and the proposal was not at all popular. We have managed to persuade Thames Water that that is not a good idea, but there is a tale of unexpected, or unwished-for consequences, because having won a battle to save one site we then found that the company came up with another site next door, taking the pressure off one community but immediately transferring it not far away. That is a separate debate, and I do not propose today to get into the detail of where the sites should be. I see my constituency neighbour and colleague, the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) in the Chamber, and many of us have a constituency interest—big and small—in where the sites should be.

The third issue—the issue of the Bill—is whether the Government should, if necessary, provide financial support to Thames Water for such a project, and if so, the terms and conditions under which it should be granted. Clause 2, which all my amendments would change, is entitled “Financial assistance for major works”. I shall not read it all into the record, as people can turn to it, but it proposes the insertion into the Water Industry Act 1991 of a new provision, section 154B, of which I shall read the first proposed subsection:

“If the Secretary of State considers it desirable to do so, the Secretary of State may give financial assistance in connection with—(a) the construction of water or sewerage infrastructure, or (b) the carrying out of works in respect of existing water or sewerage infrastructure.”

In further proposed subsections, there are various conditions, one of which is:

“Financial assistance may be given in any form and in particular may be given by way of—…grant…loan…guarantee…indemnity…the provision of insurance, or…the acquisition of shares in or securities of a body corporate.”

My first amendment, amendment 4, proposes:

“Financial assistance may only given under subsection (1) if the financing of the infrastructure is being secured by a group company which has adopted the equator principles.”

I shall come back to that.

Secondly, I want to test the Government’s reaction to amendment 5 and my proposal:

“Financial assistance must not be given to any company which has a debt to equity ratio of more than 65%.”

That precise figure is relevant, but there is a much bigger issue about what the financial past and present of a company should be if it is to receive Government support.

My third amendment, amendment 10, states:

“The Secretary of State may only grant financial assistance after a business plan for the proposal infrastructure has been approved by Ofwat”—

the regulator—

“and the National Audit Office…The business plan must demonstrate that the company carrying out the infrastructure has adequate capital resources to complete the…project.”

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman’s debate is not entirely abstract, but on amendment 5 how would the Government be able to judge financial assistance on the basis of that debt to equity ratio? Presumably, assistance will come in different tranches, so any group company’s activity might at various times fall on either side of any category that the right hon. Gentleman has in mind, and any assistance might be for a specific project in different tranches. Does he not feel that his amendment would over-complicate what he is trying to achieve? Will he detail precisely how he thinks it would operate?

[Simon Hughes]

Some of this is quite technical, but these are important issues. The reason I chose that figure, which is not a matter of precise science but a starting point for debate, is a Financial Times article in 2006 suggesting that Ofwat’s expectation was that gearing levels for Thames Water should remain below 65% for any project. There was then a debate, in public, between Thames Water and its owners—they have a history in this matter—and the regulator as to what the percentages of borrowing against capital, borrowing against income, and borrowing against profits should be. The company should have sufficient capital to fund the project and should not be giving away its capital by way of dividends so that it has to look elsewhere for funding that it could have had if it had not been paying out capital that it had acquired previously from its investments.

[Mark Field]

The right hon. Gentleman will be aware that Thames Water is looking to secure a large-scale investment from a Chinese sovereign wealth fund. Is he concerned that such an investment—this is a specific case, but it could apply generally to anyone who was getting such financial assistance—would help to distort, and could, at particular levels of investment, deliberately distort the debt to equity ratio in such a way as to negate any benefit created by the provision that he hopes to put into the Bill?

[Simon Hughes]

As the hon. Gentleman knows, Thames Water has a very complicated corporate structure: the graphic picture shows that there are about 10 layers of corporate entities. At the top are investors Macquarie—an Australian company—and the new Chinese investor that was recently announced when the Chancellor was in China, and there have been other acquisitions.

We must not prevent Thames Water and its holding company, and its holding companies, from obtaining money from external investors; indeed, we need to encourage that. However, we, the Government and Ofwat must ensure that we do not condone, particularly in relation to Kemble Water, which is the relevant driving company, and Macquarie, a practice that is unacceptable in two respects. First, it allows the company to pay out in dividends to its shareholders very large profits while not retaining the money that it needs for its capital investment, thereby forcing it to come to Government and, in turn, to the taxpayer, to underwrite something for which it should not have had to come to the taxpayer. Secondly, these processes should not result in our corporate sector avoiding the taxes that we would expect it to pay. One of the issues for next week’s Budget is the need to ensure that people, personally and corporately, who can afford to pay their due taxes do pay those taxes. There has recently been a pretty unpleasant history regarding Kemble, Macquarie and Thames Water whereby people have paid far less tax than the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster and I would believe to be acceptable. They have been using various onshore and offshore mechanisms to avoid tax liabilities involving money that should have come back into the Treasury to the general benefit of the taxpayer.

Ofwat has said that on the previous two occasions when it carried out price reviews, it assumed, for the purpose of setting price limits, a gearing within the range of 55% to 65%. It worked from that starting point, although it was simply an assumption for the purpose of price setting, not a requirement. My suggested figure is therefore also a starting point to see whether we should write in a figure that requires a balance between payment out of dividends and the retention of capital and earnings to ensure that there is no abuse of the relationship with the taxpayer, to the detriment of the consumer.

At the end of the day, this is about the level of water bills for people in the Thames Water area. The current projection is that as a result of the Thames tunnel project, bills will rise by about £80 a year indefinitely. I do not want Thames Water to charge every ratepayer roughly £80 a year extra and, at the same time, not pay much money into the Treasury by way of tax and indefinitely siphon off huge amounts of profits to national or extra-national investors while we are paying for something that we ultimately do not own. There are parallels in the history of the private finance initiative regarding public sector investment in projects where the money then goes off into the private sector. The M6 toll road, in which Macquarie had an interest, has not been a happy tale of investment benefiting taxpayer and users, with some people apparently creaming off the profit to the disadvantage of those taxpayers and users.

--- Later in debate ---

[Simon Hughes]

That is exactly the position. I want us to address this now and not to discover, when the system gives planning permission for this big project, that we have a corporate financial structure that is not going to work for the interests of the water rate payer or the taxpayer. I have a double interest on behalf of the water rate payers of the Thames Water area—144 colleagues represent people in that position—and on behalf of the taxpayer. I want to ensure that we are not shelling out money when we should not be doing so and the private sector should be picking up the tab. Transparency is hugely important, and it is not helped by a corporate structure that has 10 layers of involvement where it is not clear who owns what, and where one of the layers at the bottom appears to be based in the Cayman Islands. That is not a place where I thought that we were encouraging schemes that we, as taxpayers, were supporting financially.

[Mark Field]

There is plenty of water around the Cayman Islands, but that may not be entirely what Thames Water had in mind. I thank the right hon. Gentleman for making clear his concerns. I hope that he and I will both speak on Monday in the debate on the Government’s waste water national policy statement, specifically on the issues relating to the Thames tunnel, which concern many of us as Members of Parliament. It is rather distressing that a very small minority of us seem to be concerned about this, yet no fewer than 144 Members, many of whose constituencies are well outside London, but none the less within the Thames Water area, will be directly affected by the huge and ongoing increases in bills to which he refers.

[Simon Hughes]

I am not pretending that we are hugely disadvantaged in the Thames Water area at the moment. My colleagues in the south-west and their constituents have had hugely greater bills over very many years. I am not arguing that we should not have to pay more money as Thames Water ratepayers, but that if we are going to do so, we should be paying it for a project, if it is agreed, where we know that the taxpayer is not being fleeced and water rate payers are not paying more than they should be. This must not be seen as a method for allowing private sector companies—all the water companies are now, in effect, private sector companies—to export profits indefinitely, at a higher level than they ought to, when they should be putting that money into the project and making sure that bills are lower.

[Simon Hughes]

My hon. Friend is right. Perhaps it would helpful if, rather than trying to go round the circuit twice, I quickly summarise my letter to the Secretary of State in which I set out my concerns and the history of the matter, summarise the key points of her response, which deal exactly with my hon. Friend’s point about the mechanism regarding the tunnel, and then raise the three specific issues that should be addressed before colleagues and the Minister speak.

The provisions could, of course, apply to any water company. I am talking about Thames Water because we know that the Thames tunnel is the big project that the Government have in mind. However, the Bill relates not just to Thames Water, but to financial assistance for major works by any water company throughout the country, so the issues could relate to any constituency across the United Kingdom.

I will give a brief history. Thames Water was previously owned by the German utility company RWE. As I well remember, at that time it had one of the worst records for leaks and failed to meet its agreed targets for remedying leaks for four consecutive years. Despite that, RWE raised the dividend that Thames Water paid out to the company by 52%, took £216 million from the company and simultaneously announced a rise in profits as it prepared to sell the company on. At that time, Thames Water had a debt to capital ratio of about 45% and an excellent credit rating with all the major rating agencies.

Thames Water was bought by Kemble Water in 2006 in a deal worth £8 billion. Kemble Water is a financial vehicle for a consortium of investors, primarily made up of private equity funds led by Macquarie, the Australian bank. The deal included £3.2 billion of debt, which was incorporated into the company through whole company securitisation. That was undertaken for a special purpose finance company that Thames Water set up in the Cayman Islands, presumably to allow the owners of Thames Water to avoid taxes on the income that they received from the interest raised. That increased the debt ratio sharply to 67.9% of regulated capital value. The company has continued to borrow heavily and the debt to capital ratio has now increased to 72.9%.

That has happened at a time when Thames Water has paid extremely high dividends, which have regularly exceeded its earnings. For example, in 2010, the ratio was 141.5%. In other words, it paid out in dividends nearly one and a half times as much as it received in earnings. By contrast, South East Water, to take another local example, had a payout ratio of 48%—just a third of that of Thames Water. That strategy has had a serious detrimental effect on Thames Water’s credit rating. It has fallen from a corporate credit rating of A plus on the Standard & Poor’s rating scale when the company was bought by RWE in 2000 to a position today in which some of Thames Water’s debts have been assigned a triple B rating, which is considered to be the lowest investment grade rating possible.

For 10 years, Thames Water has been owned by two companies that have sought to extract the maximum possible value from the company. It has prioritised that over the necessary prudential financial arrangements that would have allowed it to make the large, long-term capital investments that it knows it has to make. As a result, Thames Water no longer has the capacity to access the finance required to make large infrastructure investments. It is not as if this project is a new idea. It has been, excuse the pun, in the pipeline for a long time.

The company has therefore asked the Government to provide financial backing for its Thames tunnel scheme. It is not yet clear to me why our Government should help this company after its years of excessive and unjustified borrowing and extraordinary dividend payments, which have eroded the company’s capital position. At the end of the Second Reading debate, the Minister said that the financial arrangements of the company were a matter for the regulator, Ofwat. That is in part true, but Parliament certainly has an interest and the Government must have an interest. If Ofwat’s controls are not sufficient, we need to address that. That is why I have raised this matter in the amendments.

Before the sale of Thames Water by RWE, Ofwat made a clear statement warning potential investors not to follow the very strategy that Kemble Water has since followed. Ofwat said that potential bidders should preserve Thames Water’s investment grade credit rating, which would have meant keeping the company’s debt to capital ratio below 65%. That is the link between solvency, external financial respect for the company and the percentage ratio, which my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster raised with me earlier. Since then, the regulator has, in effect, stood by and done nothing to prevent Kemble Water from further saddling the company with debt. Ofwat has stated that that is acceptable because the company has kept its investment grade credit rating. In fact, the credit rating has deteriorated to the lowest investment grade possible. Ofwat appears to have neglected the need for the company to incur more debt in the future to pay for large capital investments.

I am troubled that, unless we amend the Bill, there will be nothing to prevent that behaviour from continuing. I am trying to make the Government address how we will prevent it. I do not propose to force the amendment to a vote, but I want to hear the input of Members, if they want to contribute, and the Minister’s response. I am keen to ensure that we do not let go of this matter. My constituents want me to raise it now and the constituents of many colleagues in London have an equally strong vested interest in it.

[Mark Field]

It is important that we do not just see this as a problem with Thames Water. This is a fundamental issue about the financial structuring of a range of companies, many of which are getting ongoing financial assistance from PFI schemes, which often have years or decades to run. The right hon. Gentleman has made it clear that he will not press the amendment to a vote. I hope, however, that not only this Department, but other Departments that have responsibility for companies that have gone through this sort of financial restructuring and that are receiving ongoing financial assistance give serious thought to the matter.

[Simon Hughes]

That point is very helpful. I have raised this subject as a matter of general Government policy with my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, because it is not just an issue for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, but an issue across Government and for the Treasury in particular. It is also a matter for the Public Accounts Committee, audit organisations and others. In a second, I will link the points that I have made with the PFI issue, which my hon. Friend just raised, and other places where we are spending public money on projects that are excessively encouraging or facilitating private gain to the disadvantage of the state and the taxpayer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Field]

While the right hon. Gentleman is going through the financial figures, it would be useful to know what the level of reserves was during those years. Were they building up, or had Thames Water, in its own mind, already built up a war chest for the works that it is looking to do—or was it essentially draining its profits by more than 90% year on year?

[Simon Hughes]

I do not want to misrepresent the position, and I do not have with me the full accounts over those five years—the Minister may be able to help us with that—but my understanding is that the reserves have reduced over that five-year period. That is one reason for my concern about the balance of decisions on dividend payments and capital retention. That should trouble us and cause us to ask questions.

The figures that I have show that 2008 and 2009 were the only recent years in which dividends did not exceed profits. I understand that in 2010 there were £295 million of dividends and £237 million of profit after tax. Probably 30% or 40% more was paid out in dividends than received in income and earnings.

The Secretary of State rightly says that Ofwat does not enforce limits on dividend payments. I do not dispute that in principle, but she states:

“However the licence conditions of each water company’s licence include a requirement to ensure the dividend policy rewards efficiency and good management of economic risk, and will not impair the company’s ability to finance its functions as a water undertaker…Ofwat does not place a cap on levels of gearing. Instead, it determines a notional capital structure for an efficiently financed and operated company for the purposes of setting the cost of capital and assessing the financeability of the price limit it sets. This approach is consistent with the approach Ofgem has adopted in its regulation of the gas and electricity sectors. In the last two Price Reviews this nominal capital structure assumed that water companies would have gearing”—

the figure that I have mentioned before—

“in the range 55%-65%; this was a modelling assumption and not a requirement. The requirement was that they should maintain an investment grade credit rating, plus some headroom and it is this together with the regulatory ring fence that provides the protection for customers. Several of the large water and sewerage companies have a similar gearing ratio of around 80%.”

I pause there to note that if the licence conditions are meant to be about both the ratio and the credit rating, it seems to me that we again have cause for concern.

The Secretary of State continues:

“The regulatory ring-fence also requires a company to ensure that it, or any Associated Company, maintains an issuer credit rating which is an investment grade rating. If a company’s investment grade is threatened, the cash lock up provision within the licence means that if a company is placed at the minimum level for investment grade (i.e. BBB- or equivalent)…the Appointee cannot transfer cash or other assets to an Associated Company without the prior consent of Ofwat.”

Thames Water is moving slowly down towards that position. She continues:

“Moody’s provides a corporate family rating of Baa1 to the whole business securitisation that encompasses Thames Water Utilities Limited. Standard & Poor’s do not provide an equivalent rating for whole business securitisations; instead they rate individual bonds…These bonds are rated in the range A- to BBB…These credit ratings are very similar to other water and sewerage companies and provide headroom against the floor for investment grade credit quality.”

However, it remains the case that we have seen a drop in the credit ratings of Thames Water collectively, and some of its activities particularly. That should start ringing alarm bells with us.

The Secretary of State ends:

“Finally, discussions with Thames Water on financing the Tunnel are ongoing. Achieving best value for money for customers and safeguarding taxpayers are top priorities for Government”.

I wish to mention two other matters, if I may. I am conscious that this is a much longer speech than I would normally want to make, but I am dealing with all my amendments together and this is a fairly complex issue.

Ofwat’s statement of its position is that the ring-fencing licence conditions require a company to

“conduct its business as if the regulated business were substantially its sole business”

and

“have adequate financial, and facilities and management resources to carry out its regulated activities and to confirm each year that it will do so for the following 12 months.”

A further condition is that a company must

“ensure that its dividend policy will not impair the company’s ability to finance its functions”.

I am not sure that Thames Water has done that. It seems to me that its dividend policy has impaired its ability properly to carry out its functions, but it has put it in a position whereby it may not be able to finance on its own, or principally, a project that it knew it would want to finance.

Ofwat states:

“Our long established policy is that it is for each company and its management to determine a capital structure that is appropriate for its circumstances. But our view is that if investors choose to adopt highly geared structures, it is right for customers that both those investors and the companies bear the risks associated with their choice of financial structure.”

That is fine, but now the company is coming to the Government to ask for help to support it. Finally, Ofwat states that capital restructuring generally

“involves the replacement of equity capital with debt capital. This can have a tax benefit.

Consistent with our view that capital structures are a matter for the companies, we set the price limits for companies on the basis of a notional financial structure for an efficiently operated and financed company”.

The Secretary of State also made that point. Ofwat continues:

“We do not set the cost of capital on the basis of each company’s actual capital structure.

However, in setting price limits, we separate the treatment of tax from the cost of capital. This includes tax as a company-specific cost based on the company’s actual gearing projections.”

We could well do the following things. First, if we applied the equator principles, we would put in place a credit risk management framework for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project finance transactions, which is recognised in this country and around the world. Equator principles financial institutions—there are four eminent ones in the UK, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and Standard Chartered commit to

“not providing loans to projects where the borrower will not or is unable to comply with their respective social and environmental policies and procedures that implement”

the equator principles. There are 76 financial institutions in 28 countries that have adopted the principles, covering more than 70% of international project finance debt in emerging markets. If we were to have that accountability mechanism, which would allow communities to have redress when companies do not meet environmental and social norms, that would provide added reassurance that companies involved in financing large infrastructure projects would uphold high standards. That would apply not just to the water industry but to public financing as a whole.

My amendment 5 suggests that no financial assistance be given to a company with a debt to equity ratio of more than 65%. That ratio is a measure of a company’s financial strength and demonstrates how much the company has borrowed against its assets. It has a direct effect on a company’s credit rating, and consequently on its ability to borrow on the financial markets. I appreciate the Government will not accept the principle of the amendment today, but they might do so in the other place or in another way. If they did so, they would send a message to water companies that if they want Government support to build new infrastructure, they will need to demonstrate that they have the financial strength to be a credible and reliable partner of the Government.

That is also the purpose of amendment 10, which would require any company seeking financial support to come forward with a business plan. Any bank or building society would ask that safeguard of any business in our constituencies. They would say, “Show us your business plan. We’ll then tell you whether we are willing to lend you the money.” A reputable bank involved in financing an infrastructure project would demand to see a business plan, but so far, Parliament is being asked—unless I am corrected by the Minister—to allow the Secretary of State to give financial assistance to water companies, which may include grants, loans, guarantees, indemnity or equity, without any obligation on the Government to seek such guarantees.

We should be concerned about that not just because of the recent history of Thames Water, but for the reason given a moment ago by my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster and given the history of the private finance initiative. The previous Government went through a period of giving blanket permission—effectively—to engage in large-scale infrastructure projects financed by PFI, to build hospitals, schools and many other things. The Treasury Committee has made it clear that PFI projects often lead to higher costs and produce poorer-quality buildings and services. It has said that those costs are eventually borne by the taxpayer, and that PFI projects were unacceptable if the costs were simply diverted to private profits in the private sector for companies that pay little or no tax.

A further disadvantage of PFI—this was touched on by my hon. Friend the Member for St Ives—is that the asset passes from the public or accountable sector into the private sector. We therefore lose the asset and the revenue stream to the public purse. We do not reduce the public’s payment, which in the end is more expensive.

[Mark Field]

An issue not specific to this debate is ongoing financial assistance from the public purse for many years to come, often through an artificially created special purpose vehicle rather than a more straightforward process. Such vehicles, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly points out, are often driven by maximising profits, potentially by minimising tax and all other returns to the Treasury.

[Simon Hughes]

To turn that into a picture, that could mean that the Thames tunnel will be built by a separate company, not Thames Water. The company will own the tunnel indefinitely, and rent, as it were, the use of the tunnel to Thames Water. It will collect the income indefinitely and do what it will in terms of distributing the profits, while we—the 12 million people in Thames Water constituencies—continue to pay charges, with no control over the profit being made by the owners.

The M6 is the best example I can find. The M6 toll road is currently the only cash motorway in the UK. In May 2003, Macquarie executive Dennis Eager boasted:

“'We can put up the tolls by whatever we like and start the tolls on day one at whatever we like. If motorists don’t complain about it being too high, we have done our job properly.”

I went through the toll the other day and paid £4.60 or something. That was the weekend rate, which is slightly cheaper, but cars using the toll during the week are charged £5.50, and lorries pay £11, making the M6 toll one of the most expensive toll roads in Europe. You, Mr Hoyle, may know the price more accurately than me because you have probably used it more frequently than I have.

Traffic using the M6 toll is declining, but it is soaring on the neighbouring non-toll M6. The number of cars using the M6 toll declined by 10% in the past year, meaning that it is ineffective at relieving traffic on the M6, which was its whole purpose. In 2005, the company operating the toll road had a net worth of £67 million and paid no corporation tax.

[Mark Field]

One concern with the Thames tunnel is that there is so little incentive for Thames Water to have a cost-effective scheme in place because of the nature of the payouts. Many hon. Members will recall that at the outset, the project was to cost £1.6 billion, but we are now looking at a £4.1 billion project. There seems to be no sense whatever of an incentive for Thames Water to have something that is more cost-effective, which would obviously benefit hard-pressed bill payers from 144 constituencies in the House.

[Simon Hughes]

That is exactly the point. I should have gone on for another paragraph before I let my hon. Friend intervene. I shall finish the figures on the toll and then address the point he makes.

In 2006, Macquarie Infrastructure Group, the owners of the M6 toll, cashed in £392 million in profits despite contributing only £1.5 in equity to the scheme. The link is that Macquarie is behind Kemble Water, which owns Thames Water. My concern is exactly that alluded to by my hon. Friend. There is an incentive to build the biggest, most expensive tunnel because the largest amount can then be charged to get the maximum revenue stream indefinitely, and no incentive to have a cheap, good-value product at the end of the day. My question to my colleagues in government is this: are we asking the serious questions as to whether the taxpayer should be putting up any financial support for the scheme?