Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

Given the timing of this development, we have not thought through the exact procedures of the review, but it will certainly be undertaken before we move to ending the provisions that remain.

We now come to the amendment in lieu passed by the other place in respect of clause 1, and what has been described as a purpose clause. It was suggested variously in the other place yesterday that this amendment would have no effect; that it would have some effect, although that effect was not entirely clear; and that it would have a future effect in guiding successive Lord Chancellors when consideration was being given to what services might be added to the scope of legal aid under clause 8(2).

The difficulty the other place has so far had in establishing the precise effect of the amendment is instructive as this House decides whether it should stand. A duty with an uncertain effect is desirable neither in legislative terms nor for the person attempting to discharge that duty. However, it is the Government’s view that the effects of this duty can be described and are highly undesirable. The amendment would remove the uncontroversial, unambiguous duty the Bill places on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that legal aid is made available according to part 1 of the Bill. This made a clear link between the duty and legal aid. In terms of a clear duty, it does not get much clearer than this. However, the amendment would not only remove that but would replace it with a duty that would bring ambiguity and uncertainty. It refers to “legal services” rather than “legal aid”.

The argument was also made in the other place that the amendment had no effect other than to underline the Government’s commitment to the principle of access to justice. We contend that the imposition of any duty on the Lord Chancellor in legislation must create in law a potential course of action through challenges to the discharge of that duty. If it is accepted that the imposition of such a duty must give rise to a potential course of action, the amendment’s effect must be to bring into question the range of services provided under the Bill. The matter would then turn on the question of which legal services meet people’s needs. That contrasts with the clear and unambiguous duty in clause 1(1) requiring the Lord Chancellor to

“secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with”

part 1.

The Government believe that the question of which legal services meet people’s needs is not relevant to the Bill. Schedule 1 lists the services that Parliament, following consideration of first principles and extensive consultation, believes it appropriate to make available under legal aid. To reopen that question via an ongoing duty would frustrate our intention to bring certainty and clarity to the scope of services funded by legal aid. The amendment would result in only one thing: numerous expensive judicial reviews—more than likely at taxpayers’ expense as the boundaries of the new duty are tested and because the question of which services should be provided would be reopened.

It was said yesterday in the other place that such JR applications would almost certainly fail, and that consequently there would be no cost implications to the amendment. However, even rejected applications have an inherent cost: lawyers are paid legal aid fees for their work up to that point and the Government pay their own lawyers to defend such cases.

I would also like to address the argument put forward in the other place about the amendment’s effect in guiding future Lord Chancellors. It seems novel to include in the Bill an overriding duty that activates when the Lord Chancellor considers adding a service or services to the scope of legal aid. I am not convinced this is possible, and I am certain it is unhelpful. Adding services to the Bill requires the affirmative approval of both Houses. Such a process will be more than adequate to ensure that the Lord Chancellor takes account of the relevant factors when considering what, if any, services should be added to the scope of legal aid.

I emphasise, however, as Lord McNally did in the House of Lords yesterday, that the Bill’s present form arises from extensive debate and consideration across both Houses and reflects decisions about the future nature of legal aid. In short, the amendment is incompatible with the Bill. It would muddy both the duty to which the Lord Chancellor is subject and the scope of services that might be funded.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

I am not arguing that the House should agree to the Lords amendment, but the Minister will know, as the Lord Chancellor does, that I have asked that the Government consider bringing immigration matters—whether onward appeals by judicial review or when a judge gives permission for a case to go to a higher court—back within the scope of legal aid. Will he put on the record the response to that plea, which I have made to the Lord Chancellor and him several times?

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend finds the right moment to ask about something not subject to the amendment. It is an important point, however. My right hon. and learned Friend has written to him about onward appeals in immigration cases. The Department will conduct a review of the impacts of withdrawing legal aid in such cases once we have sufficient data and after implementation of the reforms. I envisage allowing about a year for the reforms to take effect before starting such a review.

Lords amendment 2 was passed in the other place yesterday by the extremely narrow margin of three votes. Unusually for this topic, no one spoke other than the mover and my right hon. Friend Lord McNally. That indicates how far we have moved. I remind the House of the main points. First, and crucially, legal aid to obtain the full range of injunctions and orders to protect against domestic violence will remain exactly as at present. There is no evidential gateway for legal aid for these remedies, and those who need legal aid to protect themselves can get it, regardless of their means.

Secondly, although we have removed most of private family law from the scope of legal aid in favour of funding mediation and less adversarial proceedings, we have made an extremely important exception for victims of domestic violence. That is so that they can take or defend proceedings about child contact or maintenance, or about the division of property, without being intimidated by their abuser during the proceedings.

We have made significant changes to the detail of this exception in response to concerns expressed in both Houses. We have accepted in full the Association of Chief Police Officers’ definition of domestic violence. We have also significantly widened the list of evidence that we will accept as demonstrating domestic violence for the purposes of the exception. That list will now include undertakings, police cautions, evidence of admission to a refuge, evidence from social services and evidence from GPs and other medical professionals. That is in addition to the range of evidence that had already been confirmed, including the fact of an injunction or order to protect against domestic violence having been made, a criminal conviction or ongoing criminal proceedings for domestic violence, a referral to a multi-agency risk assessment conference and a finding of fact by the courts that there has been domestic violence. We have also doubled the previously announced time limit for evidence for this exception from 12 months to two years.