Courts and Tribunals Bill

Siân Berry Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It was a privilege to be here for the powerful and effective speech from the hon. Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols).

When literally thousands of venerable members of the legal profession are saying so clearly that jury trial restrictions will not be effective or practical and may be counterproductive, and that they threaten our rights, surely the Government must listen. The Green party’s reasoned amendment sets out clear reasons for the awful court backlog that is letting down so many victims—it talks about Conservative underfunding over many years—and sets out the missing resources that will help to properly solve it. It is rare for us to agree with some colleagues on anything, but the fact is that we are all right on this point. We need alternatives to the restrictions on jury trials in the Bill, including intensive listings, more sitting days, legal aid investment, better buildings and better services to deliver defendants to court.

The Green amendment also raises the question of whether these measures are yet another part of the Government’s wider attack on civil liberties. They are building a toolkit for tyrants also out of digital ID, facial recognition surveillance on our streets and the erosion of fundamental asylum rights—all things contrary to our British values and which should not be packaged up for this or any future Government to use against minorities, protesters and dissidents. This is all so dangerous. Can the Minister truly deny that the growing acceptance by juries of defences of proportionality or necessity in some protest cases was not a factor in the inclusion of the unnecessary and dangerous curtailment of jury trials in the Bill?

The category of triable either-way cases where jury trials will be restricted includes several of the specific offences created or made more serious by successive Governments in the wake of successful non-violent protest action. By successful, I mean non-violent actions that have—yes—caused inconvenience but which did what non-violent direct action is for: directly aiming to prevent harm to people or the environment, or to create a stir that raises public awareness of serious injustice. Actions made into more serious offences have included interference with infrastructure, blocking roads or demonstrating in airports, specific tunnelling offences, conspiracy to lock on to each other during protests, or symbolically using statues in actions, as well as some kinds of noisy protests—for being annoying.

Along with the wider principle here, I am so concerned, in connection with rights and liberties around dissent and resistance to state power, that juries could no longer be able to judge the public interest or proportionality of the actions of defendants of these kinds of charges. Such people have achieved so much progress throughout our history—that, nobody can deny. The Bill should not affect our citizens’ rights in this way. It should be about real investment in our courts to ensure that justice is not delayed for the victims, who we all care about.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We are going to move on, because there are a lot of questions to get in.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Q I have a question of clarification for any member of the panel who wants to answer. In the letter received from the wider VAWG sector, the offences they are concerned that victims of coercive control or abuse might be charged with after striking back are triable either-way offences and therefore affected by this Bill, but rape and sexual assault, as far as I understand it, are indictable-only and will remain so. The impact on those more serious cases that have been discussed will therefore be due to the impact on the time to trial and on the efficiency of the courts, which we know will be uncertain and somewhat delayed. Is that your understanding? In some of the evidence we have heard, it sounded like the assumption is that rape trials will become judge-only, but that is not what this Bill is about.

Dame Vera Baird: No, it is not. It has been, I am afraid, ramped up outside these rooms, with all these Churchillian speeches suggesting that jury trial is being taken away, full stop. That is completely untrue, as you rightly say.

[Siân Berry]

Q But the victims’ groups who have written in because they are concerned about the criminalisation of women are talking about triable either-way offences, which are directly affected by this Bill. Are their concerns there valid?

Professor Hohl: One thing to remember here is that over 90% of domestic abuse cases are already heard in the magistrates court. VAWG comprises not just sexual violence; it includes domestic abuse, sexual violence and sexual offences. There are some that will be in the either-way category.

We have had a really emotive conversation this morning. One of the issues is judge-alone versus jury trials, and there is a lot of emotion on either side. When we look back at the actual research, there is mention that judges may have biases, and a judge-alone trial may disadvantage people. If that is the genuine concern, why are we happy to accept that for sentencing and admissibility? Why is it that in all the law we are making to guide admissibility of evidence, we trust a judge to separate between myth and stereotypes and facts, but not a jury? If we are genuine about it, we have to go a lot further around oversight and accountability in the judiciary. It would be odd to just worry about it on that specific issue.

I would also like the Committee to consider the evidence around juries. This is not to cast shade on juries but to pause and look at the research, which shows that juries, too, have biases, and there are worries about myths and misconceptions. The research on juries shows that these problems exist there, too. These issues exist with judges and juries. The remedy is not going to be either holding on to the status quo or not. The remedy will be something utterly outside of the discussion we are having that is about accountability and oversight.

Some of the measures in the Bill go that way—for example, recording creates transparency, and judges having to spell out the reasons for their verdict also goes towards that. The debate has moved a really long way away from what the research actually tells us, to quite an emotive batting to and fro. If there is space for the Committee to consider that wider evidence, I would recommend it is looked at.

[John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)]

Q Professor Hohl, do you think the Bill will lead to a fairer system, particularly for women?

Professor Hohl: This is an unanswerable question. What is fairness? [Interruption.] Well, it is an answerable question, but not a black and white one. We have heard this morning about a separation between the speediness of justice and the fairness of justice, as if they were two different things, when all the research shows that, for both defendants and victims, the time taken is part of justice. To artificially separate them does not work.

The way we measure the fairness of the system is about due process, not about outcomes. We cannot measure fairness through conviction and acquittal rates. The way our system is set up is about due process. Due process is not taking place when the system is on its knees, so getting the system to function better, so that due process can take place, should lead to a fairer system—provided that the Bill functions as intended.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Second sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

If we have very quick questions and responses, I can perhaps squeeze in two more.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Q Riel, in my submission from the Criminal Bar Association, there is concern about risks to judges in public criticism. The example given is on sexual offences, but I want to ask about protest-related offences and more political crimes, where the victim is the state or a powerful actor. Would the risks to judges also apply in those cases?

Riel Karmy-Jones: Yes. We are already seeing that in immigration cases. We are seeing judges being targeted and threatened as a result of decisions made in immigration cases. The problem is that the judge will set out his decision making in writing; it will be on a transcript; and, under these proposals, it will go to a victim. It is wrong, not for those decisions to go to a complainant in a case, but for them then to be pored over and disagreed with.

What does the judge say if they do not believe a complainant victim? They have to say so, and that could lead to huge disruption and upset, whereas with a jury, those people are largely anonymous and protected by reason of their anonymity. It is far rarer for us to get jurors who are targeted and attacked than it will be, in our view. As the Lady Chief Justice pointed out recently, it is far more likely that judges will be targeted as a result of their decision making.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

Q Today, 58 out of 516 Crown court rooms are not sitting. Do you agree that it would be better to address that issue—and how would we address it?—rather than limiting jury trials?

Kirsty Brimelow: May I deal with that briefly? Absolutely, if you open the courts, then the courts can hear the cases. Also, let us look at the reason for the lack of productivity. Our courts are just not sitting as many hours as they did in 2016 or 2017. We should get the number of hours back up, and cut out the delays even in the courts that are sitting. That includes looking at the defendants being brought to court late. We are collecting data on that, and it is an astonishingly high number. Around a quarter of the data we have collected so far shows defendants being brought more than five hours late to court. You attack that, do the type of listing that is working now, bring the investment in quickly—

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Bishop]

Q It is good to see you again, Claire. I echo everyone else’s comments about your very powerful evidence. You will remember that the last time you attended a debate in the Chamber, certain Opposition Members commented—we have heard comments and suggestions even today—that sometimes mistakes happen and both parents should have the right to their children at all times, but do you agree that this is an opportunity, and that the Government and, in fact, all parliamentarians should be doing everything we can to make sure that the 68 does not go to 69? I would rather that we make a mistake and the child survives than make a mistake where a child dies. Do you agree?

Claire Throssell: Absolutely—I agree with that 100%. It comes back to the fact that we must not presume that children are safe. We must not presume that children are not going to lose their lives, because perpetrators of abuse manipulate, they lie, they turn it around and they use DARVO—everything is always everybody else’s fault, and their voice is always louder than the child’s. You have an opportunity now to change that. You have the opportunity to make sure that no other child has to use their voice and say to a fireman, a police officer or a doctor, “My dad did this, and he did it on purpose.” No other boy should have to have a dying testimony and believe that he saved the life of his brother, because I never told him differently. Mistakes are not good enough. Sixty-eight mistakes is a national disgrace, and in 2026, there should be no more.

[Siân Berry]

Q Thank you so much, Claire; it has been really powerful to hear from you. I have heard from a constituent who has a close family member going through all of this, and she has been advised by solicitors to avoid the family court at all costs, describing the potential outcomes as a “lottery” and talking about very patchy training and understanding. Would you back my constituent up on those conclusions?

Claire Throssell: Yes, I do back that up. Judges do need training. They are hiding behind the fact that they are independent. They should be independent—they are the law of the land—but they should not be above the laws that they serve, and they do need training. They do need understanding. Like I say, the court is another arena; it is a secondary abuser. We go through the abuse, we take the courage to leave—that is not easy—and we enter a court system where we think, “This is going to be fair; this is going to be just.” We go into these arenas, and there are no guarantees that we can protect our children. We are ripped apart, and our personalities—we go through trauma. We tell people the same thing again and again, but we are not seen, heard, believed or supported.

[The Chair]

Order. Thank you, Claire. I am sorry, but we have reached the end of the time allotted for your evidence. Thank you so much for sharing with us today. We really appreciate it and your campaigning.

Examination of Witness

Doug Downey gave evidence.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

The Minister has already said “particularly complex or lengthy”, and just then she said “complex and lengthy”. Having rejected an amendment that would have set a limit of five months, will she think again about defining both complex and lengthy more rigorously in the Bill? The explanatory notes say “complex and lengthy”, but we do not have a definition of complex or a length limit. I think we need to hear more about that from her.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for her point, which has been raised by others. Those terms are well understood in their ordinary meaning and can be applied in a clear and straightforward way by judges.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Amendment 13, which was tabled in my name, provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months, which would keep the Bill in line with Leveson’s suggestions. The Government have failed to take into account the impact that increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers will have. Magistrates’ backlogs are increasing, and magistrates courts are not set up to take on more complex cases.

The Government are also making some bold assumptions about the speed at which magistrates can clear these cases. They have their own backlog to face, which stands at 379,000 cases and increasing. That is a 17% increase on the previous year, which comes alongside a major cut to the number of magistrates over the past decade or so, from 28,000 to just over 14,000. Removing the power of defendants to elect, plus the changes in sentencing powers, will increase the workload of magistrates courts, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Magistrates will be required to deal with more complex cases despite the summary nature of their jurisdiction. Either they will be unable to handle those cases and will send them to the Crown court, or they will risk delivering poor-quality justice, which would let down victims and defendants alike.

The cohort affected by this change consists by definition of defendants expected to receive a prison sentence of between one and two years. The impact assessment shows that the Government assume that each of these trials in the magistrates courts will be completed within just four hours. The impact assessment also assumes that cases involving a guilty plea will take just 30 minutes. Either the impact assessment is incorrect or these cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve.

Our other amendment, amendment 21, would make changing the general limit on custodial sentences for either-way offences in the magistrates court possible by affirmative resolution only. It is very similar to amendment 34, which the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden spoke to on behalf of her hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central. The amendment would ensure that any changes to magistrates’ sentencing powers—if amendment 13, to limit their powers, is not passed—is subject to the affirmative procedure. It would give greater parliamentary oversight, as all changes would have to pass through a Delegated Legislation Committee. Leaving that to the discretion of the Lord Chancellor is not a strong enough condition; it does not provide enough scrutiny or protection against rogue actors. The measure was also recommended by the Law Society of England and Wales. It would provide just that protection, and would ensure that Parliament would have and maintain its say in matters.

[Siân Berry]

I will speak as quickly as I can. I support the amendments tabled in this group by the Liberal Democrats, which would limit any increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates beyond 12 months; amendment 34, which was moved by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden; and the Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments that would ensure that, if that limit is not accepted, any further changes are made by the affirmative resolution procedure.

I am sure we will all remind the Minister that Sir Brian Leveson specifically made his reforms to jury trials contingent on not increasing the sentencing powers of magistrates. He stated that specifically in paragraph 71 of his report. He also stated:

“My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months.”

That followed, in paragraph 70, another important caveat that the Government seem to have overlooked:

“While removing the right to elect for certain offences may streamline the judicial process and alleviate the burden on the higher courts, it raises concerns about balancing the right of the defendant with the broader interests of justice.”

We have to admit that the Government are taking a risk with the moves they are making. The magnitude and volume of that risk increase with the number of extra cases that are pushed to the magistrates courts through other provisions in the Bill, while the consequences of that risk increase with the higher sentences made possible under clause 6. This is not a step we should take alongside those other steps. They increase the risks to justice.

In oral evidence, we heard from Claire Davies, the leader of the south eastern circuit, who said of magistrates courts:

“There are errors and mistakes made, but if the length of sentence is extended, it will potentially increase that risk.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 51, Q99.]

We also heard from Emma Torr, from APPEAL, who described

“swift and speedy justice in the magistrates court. It is often rough and ready; we are talking about cases being tried by lay justices, some of whom may be experienced but some may not be, and we are also talking about less experienced judges. You often find in the lower court, the magistrates court, that advocates are more inexperienced and tend to be at the start of their career.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86-87, Q185.]

This point was also emphasised by Fiona Rutherford, the chief executive of JUSTICE, who said:

“There is a question mark about the accuracy of the way in which magistrates are making decisions.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 82, Q174.]

These are the risks we are talking about compared with having a judge and jury.

Risks also come from the surrounding bureaucratic situation, which could lead to more defendants being unrepresented. When the shift is made, we will be leaving them without legal aid, because of the changes in the income requirements. We heard from Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE that without this representation there could be additional risks to victims.

The Minister needs to admit that this part of the Bill goes too far. On top of the other things she is doing, she is adding more consequence, not just more volume, to the risk equation. That is a poor step to take. Clause 6 should not stand part, and I support all the amendments.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak to my amendment 53 and to amendment 13, tabled by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester.

Clause 6 includes a provision that seeks to expand the Secretary of State’s power to vary the maximum custodial sentence that may be imposed by magistrates courts for triable either-way offences. At present, the general limit for such sentences stands at 12 months, having been increased from six months in 2022. The Bill proposes that we allow that limit to be further increased, by way of regulations, to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government frame that as a necessary tool for operational flexibility, it represents a significant extension of the custodial powers of our magistrates courts.

The central question we must address is not merely whether the powers should be increased, but how such a decision should be scrutinised by Parliament. The Bill allows the changes to be made under the negative procedure. Through amendment 53, we propose that any future exercise of the power be subject instead to the affirmative procedure, requiring the explicit approval of both Houses of Parliament. As I have said, I also support amendment 13 from the Liberal Democrats, which says the powers should not be increased full stop.

Increasing the maximum custodial sentence a court can impose is not a minor or technical adjustment; it is a substantive change in the fundamental balance of our criminal justice system. When we discuss the power to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years, instead of one, we are discussing one of the most serious powers the state can wield. Magistrates courts are designed for summary trial, which is a process intended for the swift disposal of less serious, low-level cases. Allowing that framework to pass two-year sentences is a major shift. As laid out by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, the evidence we heard explained that such an expansion will mean that more serious and complex cases will be dealt with by lay justices.

For a change of this magnitude, the negative procedure provides an inappropriately low level of scrutiny. To understand why the affirmative procedure is necessary, we must look at the mechanics of parliamentary oversight. Under the negative procedure, a statutory instrument is usually made by a Minister and becomes law immediately upon being laid before Parliament. It remains law unless either House successfully votes to annul it, through a process known as praying against an instrument, within a set 40-day period. In reality, the power to object is rarely used and even more rarely successful. I understand that the House of Commons has not successfully prayed against a negative instrument since 1979, and the House of Lords has not rejected one since 2000. The procedure essentially relies on the absence of objection to grant legitimacy to a change in law. In an area as fundamental as the power to imprison citizens for extended periods, Parliament should not rely on a lack of noise to signify consent. It must require explicit, recorded approval.

The affirmative procedure provides a much more robust safeguard. Under that route, a statutory instrument is laid in draft and cannot become law until it has been actively debated and approved by both the Commons and the Lords. That ensures that the Government must stand at the Dispatch Box, in the same way the Minister has been doing all week, in a Committee Room just like this, and openly justify why the increase in sentencing powers is necessary and proportionate.

That level of scrutiny is essential, because the Government’s current justifications are contested. The Government argue that the powers will allow more cases to be retained in magistrates courts, thereby reducing pressure on the Crown court backlog. However, independent bodies such as the Institute for Government have noted that assumptions about time savings in magistrates courts are highly uncertain. There are serious concerns that magistrates courts, which already face their own peak backlog of over 370,000 cases, simply do not have the capacity to absorb that work. Although the provision in clause 6 will not lead to an immediate increase in sentencing length, it is reasonable to assume that the Government would not have introduced it if they did not have some intention, at some future point, to increase the sentencing powers available to magistrates and therefore to retain more cases in the magistrates courts.

We must also consider the differential quality in justice administered under the expanded powers. As we have heard, critics, including the Criminal Bar Association, warn that extending summary justice to cases carrying two-year sentences is a recipe for—[Interruption.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 6, page 17, line 11, at end insert—

“(9) After section 15 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, insert—

‘15A Entitlement to Crown Court funding levels in certain proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court

(1) This section applies to criminal proceedings in a magistrates’ court where—

(a) an individual is charged with an either-way offence; and

(b) the court, having regard to the sentencing guidelines, considers it likely that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 12 months will be imposed upon conviction.

(2) Where this section applies, any relevant representation order shall provide for remuneration at the same rates and under the same conditions as would apply if the proceedings were determined in the Crown Court.’”

This amendment links legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It ensures that defendants facing more than 12 months' imprisonment receive Crown Court level funding, regardless of which court the case is heard in.

The amendment would link legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It would ensure that defendants facing more than 12 months’ imprisonment received Crown court-level legal aid funding, regardless of which court the case was heard in.

The context of this is that the Bill’s equality statement acknowledges that

“if more cases are dealt with in the magistrates’ courts, it is likely that an increased proportion of these defendants may be ineligible for legal aid when they would otherwise have been eligible if their case had been heard at the Crown Court.”

That is because the eligibility threshold for receiving representation from a publicly funded lawyer in the magistrates court is an annual income of below £22,325—significantly lower than the Crown court threshold of £37,500. As a result, individuals in full-time minimum wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court.

Without that being addressed, it is clear that we will face an increase in the number of defendants attending court without legal representation, which undermines fairness for all those involved. Complainants, victims and witnesses may be cross-examined by the alleged perpetrator of the crime; it could slow proceedings down; it risks unfairness to the accused; and it means that the outcome of the cases will depend on whether the defendant can afford expensive lawyers, not on the true justice of the case. That concern is compounded by the fact that clause 6 provides magistrates with greater sentencing powers, meaning that defendants will be facing more serious cases. It will also prolong hearings, which will reduce the savings the Government claim they will make by shifting cases into the magistrates court.

Our amendment would ensure that, if the Government’s plans are implemented, which we oppose, legal aid would be linked to the sentence length, ensuring that those who face longer sentences in the magistrates court received the funding they would expect in the Crown court. There is a lower threshold for legal aid in the magistrates court because it is assumed that cases will be shorter and simpler. That will no longer be the case, with more serious cases taking place that could take days to complete. Our amendment would avoid concerns about two-tier justice and an increase in the number of defendants appearing in court without legal representation.

[Siân Berry]

It is very good to see you in the Chair this evening, Ms Jardine; thank you for looking after us. I will speak very briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have added my name. I have spoken already about the many risks piling up with the Bill, and this amendment is one essential mitigation for some of those risks. If the Government press ahead, they cannot ignore it.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I rise to support the comments made by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, about the importance of legal aid. There has already been a real reduction in the number of cases in which legal aid is given. Many defendants turn up at the magistrates court without any legal representation because of the constraints on legal aid. Bearing in mind that such defendants could now, if the Bill goes through, be facing up to 24 months imprisonment, it is important that legal aid provision is given to people facing custodial sentences. Means should not be the only element; an important thing to consider is whether somebody has a real chance of going into custody.

We have found historically—this may be anecdotal evidence—that defendants not getting legal representation at an early stage results in more delays. They often plead guilty right at the last stage, when the matter is set for trial. By then, six or eight months have passed, and they might have been able to save some money; or it has got into their head that they have to have this trial, so they try to raise some money. That causes delays. If people are guided, right at the beginning, as to what the evidence and the likely sentence are, they are more likely to plead guilty at an earlier stage.

The previous Government made significant cuts to legal aid. One of the arguments I remember raising then—this was more than 10 years ago, during the passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—was that restricting legal aid would mean lots of unrepresented people turning up at court, and that that would delay the system. It is also fundamentally unfair. Someone facing a criminal charge should be able to access legal aid. I ask the Government to think about that, and perhaps extend legal aid and make it more generous.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq.

Clause 7 and schedule 2 will restrict the right to appeal the decision of a magistrates court to the Crown court, and will change the process that those appeals go through. Currently, a defendant has an automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court against either conviction or sentence; in either case, the appeal is a hearing before a judge and two magistrates. The Bill will instead introduce a requirement for an application for permission to appeal based on written grounds. A Crown court judge will decide whether to grant permission, and the appeal hearing would be heard by a single judge. Instead of a rehearing, the appeal would be only on the issues on which permission is granted. If the appeal is against conviction, the judge must allow the appeal if the conviction is unsafe. If so, the judge may order a retrial in the magistrates court.

It is not unreasonable to have a conversation about the appeals process, especially as there is a small amount of evidence of the system being abused by a very small minority of defendants who believe that the appeal will be successful on the grounds that the victim or witnesses will refuse to go through the experience again. I absolutely recognise that, and we need to put essential safeguards into the criminal justice system to provide greater protection for those victims. We will be getting to the crux of that issue over the next days in Committee.

However, clause 7 and schedule 2 are blunt instruments that will harm access to justice. We cannot ignore the fact that although a very small number of cases from the magistrates—less than 1%—go to appeal, more than 40% of those are successful at appeal. Given that the magistrates court will be hearing more complex cases that carry higher sentences, the measures will increase the risk of miscarriages of justice. Touching the appeals process at this point is unnecessary when it is currently sparingly used. The Criminal Bar Association has argued:

“Access to justice will be harmed. Who is going to find the lawyers who have time to review transcripts of evidence and prepare grounds of appeal? Who is going to pay them for that work? What about the defendants who were ineligible for Legal Aid, because of the lower cut off for eligibility?”

We discussed the eligibility cut-off in the previous clause.

JUSTICE has raised similar concerns, stating that replacing the automatic right of appeal with a multi-stage permission system

“is complicated and highly likely to be inefficient”,

and will fail defendants who cannot navigate these processes, as laid out articulately and clearly by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.

The current process means that appeals are heard by a judge and two magistrates. The opportunity for magistrates to sit with a Crown court judge to hear appeals is an important one, as it helps with the training of magistrates and drives up standards. Under the Bill, there are no circumstances in which lay justices would sit with professional judges. We are debating a number of amendments, some of which seek to restore the conditions we have right now—retaining the automatic right to appeal—and some that go further, although I think the shadow Minister suggested that he would not press them all to a vote.

I would appreciate the Minister’s explaining whether she thinks the processes being put in place by clause 7 and schedule 2 are compatible with the principles of access to justice that she has laid out previously in Committee. I remain gravely concerned that the measures will have a huge impact on the most vulnerable in society.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I am happy to have you back in the Chair today, Dr Huq. I wish to oppose the clause and the schedule. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden for pointing out so clearly that the restrictions on appeals will push down hardest on the least advantaged people and will compound injustices in wider society, as well as the injustices put in place by other clauses.

I will not reiterate in detail the evidence we heard, or the speeches I made previously, about the risks of more errors due to the speedier but rougher and readier justice of the magistrates courts being applied to more cases, or the risks arising from higher sentences. However, clause 7 adds yet more risk to the potential harm from reducing the right to select a jury trial in clause 1 and the restrictions put in place by other clauses. This is counterproductive for the overall courts workload, too.

As others have pointed out, the clause will introduce a multi-step process. We heard in oral evidence from Emma Torr of Appeal that the

“multi-step process…will only increase the workload of both the magistrates and Crown courts. To give a very brief outline of how it works at the moment, the defendant or the solicitor can fill out a very simple form, which results in a quick rehearing at the Crown court. It takes a couple of hours at most and even less for sentence appeals.”

She also pointed out that the Law Commission had carefully considered the matter last year in a consultation paper that ran to 700 pages. She said:

“Its independent analysis was that the removal of the automatic right to appeal will increase the workload of the magistrates court and the Crown court.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 83, Q174.]

In our oral evidence sessions, we heard clear views about the lack of legal aid in magistrates courts for people without representation to meet fairly the test set for appeals. Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE told us:

“Without a lawyer being present, and of course without there even being the right to appeal directly, you are leaving a whole load of defendants, who may well be wrongly convicted or may get the wrong sentence for the crime they have committed, floundering…I simply don’t know who will inform these people about how they will put grounds of appeal together, what grounds of appeal even are, how you formulate those, what key points you need to make in them to persuade a Crown court judge sitting alone in a room with just some evidence papers and how to put your best case forward.” ––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86, Q184.]

These are serious matters of injustice. I do not know how the least advantaged defendants will be able to do anything to use the application to the High Court for judicial review, which seems to be the only remedy that the Minister has put forward to us today. I do not know how many miscarriages of justice are acceptable to the Minister, but I believe that these measures must not form part of the Bill, because of the impact that they will have on the right to justice for too many people.

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I do not support clause 7 or schedule 2. I welcome the debate on various amendments and the comments from the Minister.

Clause 7 and schedule 2 would replace the current automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court with a much narrower permission-based system. At present, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court can appeal to the Crown court against conviction or sentence, and that appeal is heard by way of a full rehearing, usually before a Crown court judge sitting with between two and four magistrates. About 40% of conviction appeals and 47% of sentence appeals succeed.

We are now being asked to introduce a system that would instead require permission for such appeals, would usually proceed on written grounds, would be heard by a single judge and would limit the grounds on which permission is granted. The Government say that that would save about 500 Crown court sitting days. I feel that I may be running out of ways to phrase this sentence, but yet again we are seeing a significant roll-back of an important safeguard, justified on the basis of a small hypothetical gain.

We should ask ourselves whether an important protection is being weakened for anything like a proportionate return. On clause 7, I do not believe that it is. I strongly emphasise that appeals are not historical oddities or a procedural quirk; they are one of the principal safeguards against the risks inherent in summary justice. The Bar Council is very clear:

“The proposed change would remove a vital safeguard against wrongful summary conviction and excessive (or unlawful) sentences imposed by magistrates. The consequence risks adding to the burden on the criminal courts rather than reducing it.”

It goes further and says that the current right

“does not appear to be exercised frivolously or vexatiously.”

The Law Society made similar points in its written evidence: it said that the automatic appeal route is a “vital safeguard” and that in 2024 it was used in 2,487 cases, overturning magistrates’ decisions in 41% of convictions and 44% of sentences. It describes about 1,000 miscarriages of justice as being corrected through that route. That is the central fact that the Government cannot really get around. If four in 10 conviction appeals and nearly half of sentence appeals succeed, that cannot be read as evidence that the appeals process is being abused. In fact, it is the opposite: the process is demonstrably being exercised appropriately.

I am deeply concerned that if we roll back the right to appeal, we will be locking the door on an unknown number of cases in which a conviction might have been found to be erroneous, but will now not be identified as such. That is an unknown number of miscarriages of justice not put right, and an unknown number of lives ruined. I am not willing to pay that price for the gain of 500 sitting days, and I cannot bring myself to believe that Government Members are differently inclined.

We do not particularly need to speculate about what the safeguards protect against, because we can point to recent examples. In the notorious Hamit Coskun case, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court of a section 5 public order offence had his conviction quashed on appeal to the Crown court. The appeal court found that the prosecution had failed to prove essential elements of the offence and stated plainly:

“For these reasons we allow this appeal and quash…conviction”.

That is the automatic appeal route doing exactly what it is supposed to do and correcting a conviction that should never have been imposed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 17, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. I acknowledge the progress that we have made on the issue; it has not been as fast or as good as personally I would like, but it has absolutely been progress. The hon. Member has laid out some of the important points.

The idea that we will record these proceedings and that the transcripts will exist, but that the victim cannot have them, is obviously not sustainable. If they do not exist at all and nobody has them, that is one thing, but when they are available and some people might be accessing them—defendants, for example—it is really not reasonable that victims cannot, for all the reasons that we have discussed in relation to the Crown court. The existence of recordings will make that less of an excuse. Again, the interaction of different elements of the Bill, with longer sentences, restricted appeals and more serious cases being heard, builds an even stronger case for victims to have access to the transcripts.

The hon. Member for Chichester mentioned the unduly lenient sentence scheme. As we talked about in the context of Crown court appeals and the current use of the scheme, it is pretty hard to appeal an unduly lenient sentence if we do not even have access to the route to sentencing that the judge laid out to explain why they gave the sentence that they did. In my understanding, we have a later amendment that asks for an expansion in the use of the scheme in order for it to be meaningful. We talk about the unduly lenient sentence scheme, but people cannot access it in the magistrates court, even though we are about to put more serious cases into that court. At the minute, people are able to access the scheme when a case is heard in the Crown court. For those reasons, we enthusiastically support the hon. Member’s amendment.

[Siân Berry]

I will speak briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have put my name. Later, I hope to speak about the real difference between viewing evidence—seeing it given in real life, or going into the room where evidence is given—and being able to review it more dispassionately later in writing. Given that we are now producing transcripts, the amendment would be an important measure to provide them free to victims who may want to see what has been said in court, without having to attend court and see it in a more triggering, more visceral way, and without facing a financial penalty. It is important that the amendment is agreed to, along with everything else, to allow for a more compassionate way to treat victims.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is great to see you back in the Chair to help us to make our way through the Bill, Ms Jardine. New clause 28 is a probing amendment, and I shall not press it to a Division when the time comes. To give the context for why I have tabled the new clause, I will lay out the experience faced by a young child—I cannot give many details of the case, as the Committee will appreciate.

This young child was below school age when they became the victim of and witness to abuse. They gave clear evidence on video at the time that it had happened, and while the case was investigated and awaiting trial in court, they continued with their childhood. Their mother helped them to move on from the abuse, and she says that the memory of what happened not being constantly brought back was a key part of their recovery. However, during the court case some years later, they were made to rewatch the video. By hearing their younger self talk about the abuse, they were, essentially, properly traumatised for the first time, as they for the first time properly understood, with a real, more mature understanding, what had happened to them in detail.

That case made me realise that the process of being cross-examined and watching back original, video-based evidence in chief, even just while the prosecution team refreshes their memory of their evidence, can do victims real harm. Although I can see why it may be necessary to cross-examine a witness on what happened, based either on their memory or facts stated in the evidence, I feel strongly that putting them through the additional trauma of rewatching it themselves is not necessary and should certainly not be routine, and that that should be in the law or guidance.

My new clause would amend sections 27 and 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which are intended to relate to special measures and directions. It would ask that witnesses not be obliged to watch video recordings of their earlier evidence, and would allow transcripts, as a potentially less traumatic alternative, to be submitted for cross-examination. It would also ask for notice of questions for cross-examination to be provided in good time. Although I understand that there is no legal obligation for the videos to be rewatched, I know that it is happening even when concerns have been expressed. I want to make sure that it is clearer in the law or relevant guidance that no witness or victim is obliged, against their will, to relive the crimes committed against them.

As I said, the new clause is probing. I am grateful that the Minister has looked into the issue, and has today committed to updating the guidance. I have corresponded with her departmental colleagues who are leading a review of the victims code, passing to them more details than I can mention here on that particular case and some ideas for how relevant guidance around special measures could be amended, as that could take the place of changes in primary legislation. I hope that my bringing this point to the Committee is constructive, and I thank the Minister for her attention.

[Dr Mullan]

As we have heard, clause 15 clarifies the use of pre-recorded evidence for cross-examination and re-examination, which is often referred to as section 28 evidence. Our courts frequently rely on recorded testimony to spare witnesses the trauma of a live trial, so the rules governing the editing and presentation of that evidence must be clear and robust.

Clause 15 provides clarification on the circumstances under which a video recording may be edited before it is admitted as evidence in a trial. Editing may be required if certain procedural requirements were not met during the recording being taken, or if specific portions of the material are deemed inadmissible or contrary to the interests of justice. The clause requires the court to perform a delicate balancing act, weighing any potential prejudice towards the accused against the desirability of presenting the whole, or substantially the whole, recorded examination.

A clearer statutory footing for editing is welcome, but it must be applied with consistency and transparency. If recorded evidence is to protect witnesses properly, the rules for its use must be as rigorous as those for live evidence. We must acknowledge, as we discussed earlier in respect of screens, the highly variable state of court technology. In my time on the Justice Committee, I visited courts and heard that they sometimes did not have the screens necessary to show evidence. There is a huge difference between a poky little TV of low granularity and a proper screen for showing video evidence to the jury.

Sir Brian Leveson’s review and others have highlighted that malfunctioning or substandard equipment can derail trials or create grounds for appeal when it comes to the use of pre-recorded evidence. Without reliable hardware and skilled technical staff—I also heard about the challenge when something goes wrong and there is no one available to fix it—the legal clarification in clause 15 will remain theoretical rather than practical.

My final point is about the guidelines, which the Minister talked about. We must ensure that they are sufficiently detailed, rigorous and standardised, so that, notwithstanding the further clarifications in the clause, they are suitably consistent in their application.

What are the Government’s current plans to address the technological challenge on the court estate in relation to section 28 recordings? What steps will be taken to ensure that all parties have time to review and potentially challenge edited versions of recordings before they are played to a jury? The ability to challenge is vital to ensuring consistency and fairness.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that I have demonstrated to the Committee that I have a genuine interest in the suggestion that this element is causing an issue. We are open-minded to that. My instinct is that, at heart, this is about the courts, judges and other professional staff making bad decisions and bad judgments. That is at the heart of these issues, and I am cautious about us reaching for a statutory amendment to legislation that I do not think will necessarily result in the benefit that we are all seeking to achieve and that we all agree with, and that Claire so powerfully articulated to us in the evidence session.

[Siân Berry]

I support this clause quite strongly. We heard powerfully from Claire Throssell in oral evidence how important its impact could be.

Most Members will have experiences like mine through casework of cases where this clause could help. I have heard from parents and family members so distressed at how their cases have been determined, despite clear evidence, where this presumption was obviously given far too much weight in decisions. These words in legislation, which were added and have had an influence on decisions, need to go.

I want to read parts of correspondence I received after the announcement in October 2025 that this measure was going to be changed. My constituent described it as an enormous relief. They were very impatient to know exactly when this was going to come forward. I am very pleased that we are discussing this now before the end of the Session.

My constituent said:

“I have personal experience of the impact the current legal framework can have. I am unable to provide specific information as a very close family member is still going through Family Court hearings to protect a child in a case of domestic abuse. However, as recently as January this year”—

this was in 2025—

“the aforementioned person was advised by two independent firms of solicitors to avoid the Family Court at all costs, due to the ‘presumption of involvement’, allied with the inconsistent and regionally patchy training and understanding by Family Court judges in domestic abuse (in spite of changes to the Domestic Abuse Act in 2021), referring to potential outcomes in Child Arrangements as ‘a lottery’.”

I really do support this clause. I also support the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester, which will help to tackle training gaps and which also reflect experiences that I can recall from casework. They are based on high-quality work and requests from organisations that work directly with victims and survivors, who have asked for these changes. I hope that the Minister will look at making changes that further strengthen the Bill in this way.

[Rebecca Paul]

I begin by echoing the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. I completely understand why the Government have brought this clause forward. I welcome the debate. Similar to the hon. Member for Chichester, who spoke so eloquently, I was deeply moved by the evidence we heard from Claire Throssell. I cannot even imagine how she has coped. To do what she has done and to try to take something positive from that is an incredible thing.

The evidence this Committee has heard from those witnesses and other survivors of domestic abuse is that they feel that the family courts have not properly identified risk and believe that a pro-contact culture has, at times, overridden safety. That is extremely concerning, and it is absolutely right that we take it extremely seriously.

Child safety must come first. Where the present framework has contributed to poor outcomes, it is right that the Government act, but it is also incumbent on us today to make sure that the clause that is being repealed is indeed the cause of the harm to those children. I also make the point that, where Parliament removes an existing statutory principle, it has a duty to be clear about what will replace it.

My concern today is less with the Government’s objective than with whether repeal on its own is sufficiently precise, evidence based and thought through to achieve the Ministers’ intended objective. The Government’s own impact assessment, which has already been set out, says that

“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,

even though it is expected to

“change the process judges follow”.

That is an important starting point for this debate. It is really important that we do not make changes to law because everyone wants us to make those changes and thinks that will improve things when, in reality, we have the evidence and facts to know that it may not deliver those outcomes.

It is incumbent on all of us to make sure that we actually deliver the outcomes that we all desire; we all have the same ambition. I know this comes from a good place and we are all approaching this debate in the best way we can to protect children. My purpose this afternoon is to be constructive—I am not saying I have all the answers on this, and I hope my comments will be taken in that spirit. If the Government proceed with repeal, do they also need to do more to provide a principles replacement framework, clearer guidance and stronger supporting reforms?

It is important to start with the facts around the presumption. The current presumption does not give any parent an automatic right to contact, override the welfare checklist or override the paramountcy principle in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and it certainly does not require courts to make orders that place children at risk. The Family Services Foundation is clear in its written evidence that current law already places the child’s welfare first, stating:

“Section 1(6)…expressly ensures the presumption applies”

only where parental involvement

“does not put the child at risk of suffering harm”.

It says that practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already provide an important framework for identifying and responding to abuse in family proceedings.

Equally, I recognise the contrary concern expressed by survivors who say that, in abuse cases, the presumption can place pressure on courts to prioritise parental contact even where there are serious safety concerns and can make it harder for victims to be properly heard and protected. The real question is therefore not whether safety matters more than contact—it plainly does—but whether removing the current presumption will improve how risk is identified and acted upon, or whether it risks creating new uncertainty while leaving the deeper operational problems untouched and discouraging parental involvement in cases where it would actually be beneficial.

There are already substantial protections in the current legal framework, although they clearly fail in the worst way on occasion. The Family Services Foundation points out that the Children Act 1989, practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already equip the courts to restrict or refuse contact where “harm is shown”. It also reminds us that the UK is bound by the UN convention on the rights of the child, including article 9, which recognises that children should maintain regular contact with both parents unless that is

“contrary to the child’s best interests”.

Both Parents Matter makes a similar point, saying:

“The Presumption was introduced in 2014”

to reflect the UNCRC and provide a statutory benchmark that the safe involvement of both parents generally furthers child welfare. I emphasise the word “safe”—no one has ever said that parents should be involved if it is not safe. I make those points not to argue that nothing should change. If the Government are minded to proceed, we need a clear understanding of how the replacement framework will continue to distinguish between safe parental involvement, which can be beneficial, and unsafe parental involvement, which must be stopped. At present, I am not sure the Bill by itself gives enough reassurance on that point, and I am worried that safe parental contact will be discouraged.

That leads to one of the most important points of all. The Government’s own documents suggest that repeal alone may not be the solution that they are hoping it will be. As mentioned earlier, the impact assessment says,

“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,

although it is expected to change the process that judges follow. That is a significant admission. It suggests that if the Government want safer and better outcomes in family proceedings, repeal can be only part of the picture, and perhaps not the decisive part.

We should keep in mind that many of the awful failures that have rightly horrified people seem to be failures of risk assessment, information sharing, institutional practice, professional judgment and resourcing. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys puts it well:

“If abusive contact is being ordered or preserved inappropriately, then the concern lies with the quality of risk assessment, the speed and fairness of investigation, and the consistency with which courts and agencies apply the law.”

That is a useful and constructive way of putting the point. It does not deny the seriousness of the problem, but it does ask whether the solution is the right one. My concern is not that the Government want to strengthen protection; it is that repeal may be presented as more self-sufficient than, on the basis of the evidence, it really is.

I also think the Committee should be careful and candid about the strength of the evidence base behind repeal. Both Parents Matter says that the Government’s own review

“provided limited and inconclusive evidence of the impact of the Presumption. It could not determine how often the Presumption was applied in judgments, nor could it assess how harm…related to the application of the Presumption.”

It also criticises the underlying methodology:

“Quantitative analysis was based on only 245 court judgments, with over half from a single magistrates’ bench. Qualitative analysis involved only 29 parents.”

It added that the literature review

“examined only 55 studies, excluded all research published after April 2024,”

and omitted

“major studies showing positive outcomes”

from safe shared parenting and ongoing parental involvement.

Other evidence goes further, arguing that the Government review appears to have misunderstood or overstated the conclusions to be drawn from Professor Anja Steinbach’s work. I recall a striking line from Professor Steinbach, who said:

“There is plenty of research showing that contact with both parents is beneficial”,

and

“except for violence…contact with both parents is the baseline.”

I do not think that material should make the Committee cautious about treating the review as a fully settled or exhausted evidential platform for repeal.

Again, my point is not that that means that repeal must not happen; it is that we should not over-claim what the existing evidence can prove or support. I also think it is important to avoid turning this into a false choice between protecting children from abuse and supporting children to maintain safe relationships with both parents. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys says that the public debate often frames the issue in that way. However, it says:

“A good family justice system must do both. It must protect children and adult victims from abusive parents. It must also protect children from the avoidable loss of safe, loving, and important parental relationships.”

I think that is right.

The Family Services Foundation similarly said:

“reform should focus on enhancing the protections available, rather than creating conditions that may inadvertently prevent children from maintaining safe, meaningful relationships with their parents.”

That is why I urge the Minister not to present clause 17 as though all principled concern about repeal is somehow concern for parental rights over child safety. It is perfectly possible to support the Government’s child safety objective while asking whether the law should continue to recognise some clear and carefully framed way, where there is no established risk of harm, of enabling children to benefit from stable and safe relationships with both parents.

Several of the written submissions that we received raise concerns about unintended consequences if repeal proceeds without a clear replacement framework. Both Parents Matter warns:

“Removing this important statutory benchmark, and relying instead on practice and non statutory frameworks”

may increase uncertainty, inconsistency and conflict. The Family Services Foundation says something similar, warning that repeal may confuse frontline professionals, affect negotiations outside court, reduce the incentive for out-of-court resolution and, ultimately, increase strain on a family court system that is already under pressure. It notes that only a minority of separated families ever come before the courts, but many more families and professionals orient their expectations around the legal framework.

That is a serious point. Even if the court’s paramount consideration remains unchanged, removing a statutory starting point may still alter behaviour before a case ever reaches a final hearing. It may affect how solicitors advise, how CAFCASS frames disputes, how mediation is approached and how parents negotiate. With that point in mind, I hope that the Minister might be in a position to share some more detail on how she expects the changes to operate, and why she is confident that they will improve outcomes rather than simply shift conflict elsewhere.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

I rise to speak to my new clause 6, which would introduce specialist courts for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases. It is similar to new clause 2, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Warrington North, and Conservative new clause 25, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle.

We tabled new clause 6, which would ensure that specialist court capacity is made available for the fast-tracking of rape and serious sexual offence cases, because that was a Labour manifesto commitment. The Government have announced blitz courts, which will list similar cases together. They will be introduced to begin with in London and the south-east, where the backlog of cases is most severe, and will at first prioritise cases involving assaults on emergency workers. Our new clause would ensure that court space and time is set aside for RASSO cases.

The Government promised in their manifesto to implement specific rape-focused courts, but have chosen not to deliver that commitment. As of September last year, 16% of cases in the backlog were sexual offence cases. We all listened to the harrowing oral evidence from victims and survivors of rape who waited years for their cases to be heard. I pay tribute to them and to the hon. Member for Warrington North for their bravery in doing something incredibly challenging: reliving the most fragile moments of their lives. They did so incredibly well. We owe it to them to fix the system. I recognise that the Government are trying to do that, but they are choosing to do it in a different way from the way a lot of survivors are asking for it to be done.

Specialist rape courts have not been properly trialled. What have been trialled are courts with specific trauma-informed training. Fast-tracking rape cases will alleviate the wait that many face. If courts are trauma-informed, that might limit retraumatising experiences for victims at the point that they enter the process. In her written evidence, the Victims’ Commissioner said:

“Victims of rape are particularly impacted by the backlogs and by the criminal justice system more broadly. The duration between the case being received and completed at Crown Court is particularly high for rape offences, an average of 429 days compared to an average of 259 days for all offences… Specialist rape courts which expedite rape cases and ensure a trauma-informed approach via training and adaptions to the court environment could help lessen the impact of the system on victims.”

The Victims’ Commissioner has been calling for specialist rape courts since 2022 and was really pleased that the Government committed in their manifesto to introduce them. I think that comes from her experience working alongside a very limited pilot that created a trauma-informed court in a particular Crown court. I am sure she will be keen to see the Government make good on the commitment that they stood on just two years ago.

New clause 23, which is also tabled in my name, would require the Lord Chancellor to commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Bill on the progression of rape and serious sexual offence cases, and to respond to the recommendations in the report. It is completely unacceptable that these cases are waiting for so long. We need to understand whether the Government’s measures make a material impact on those cases and reduce the time that people have to wait in the criminal justice system. The new clause is also supported by the Victims’ Commissioner, so that we can see real progress for victims who are stuck in the criminal justice system.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Huge apologies for my lateness, Sir John. I wish to speak in support of new clause 2 and lend my support to new clauses 6, 23 and 25, all of which seek to honour the commitment that the Government made in their manifesto at the last election. I have huge admiration for the hon. Member for Warrington North, both for her courageous and clear speech on Second Reading and for tabling new clause 2, which seeks to honour that commitment. I am heartened by how many Labour Members have added their names to the new clause, and I hope that the Government will listen.

New clause 2, which is detailed, would introduce specialist courts. It sets out the different ways in which guidance can deal with the difficulties that courts currently have in dealing with issues such as coercive control and honour-based abuse, and would make sure that the courts deliver justice in a timely and compassionate way. It is so important that we look at the many practical ways of dealing with the cases that we need to hear, for victims of domestic violence and sexual offences, that do not completely remove the right to select a jury trial, as the Minister has admitted the Bill will do, and that do not adjust the thresholds in courts so as to effectively abolish the centuries-old principle of jury equity. That principle is important to our democratic right to protest and to protect our fellow citizens from unjust prosecution, including by authoritarian or tyrannical future Governments.

The new clauses in this group outline how much can be done to make court processes support victims in a practical, kinder and more compassionate way. They would make the processes more trauma-informed, and more effective and just, as they would bring more successful prosecutions in cases of sexual and domestic violence. I also support new clauses 8 to 10, which would mandate training in such matters and which we will discuss later.

A goal of the Government’s reforms is to increase speed, and the new clauses would achieve that by focusing specialist courts on these important cases. We have debated extensively the many other practical measures that could speed up justice more generally and clear the backlog, which is getting in the way of far too many of these cases.

I really hope that the Government are listening and that we can vote on these issues today. I hope they will go away and listen more to the victims groups that are determined to put forward practical measures to deal with these things without affecting our fundamental rights, and introduce clauses that will do that—and remove clauses 1 to 7—on Report. That is the right thing to do. The issues have been laid out clearly during the Committee’s debates, and the Government now have an important choice to make.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. I too support the new clauses, and I concur with a lot of what has already been said about the reasons for supporting them. I will make a couple of wider points on the merits of specialist rape courts and courts for sexual offences.

There is nothing wrong with the legal system in this country when it comes to the fundamental principles of trying these crimes—that someone is innocent until proven guilty, that they have a right to be heard in court, and that evidence must be tested rigorously, as is the right of a defendant in any case. The issue is how that is applied in the way our courts operate in respect of a set of crimes that are extremely sensitive because of the impact on the complainant—the victim—who is almost always a live witness. It is trying to deal with the operation of the court that is at issue here.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

Once again, I strongly reject that suggestion. The two things are not mutually exclusive: wanting to bring in measures that speed up justice for every victim in the criminal justice system and building the foundations for a specialist court.

Let us get back to basics. What is a specialist court? What are we talking about? I have discussed this with my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North. A specialist court prioritises a type of offence to address the timeliness issue. It guarantees special measures. Again, we have debated provisions in Committee about how we ensure the consistent guarantee of special measures in whichever Crown court in the country a rape trial occurs. Thirdly, it is a court in which not just those who are adjudicating and directing juries, but those who are supporting the participants, are trauma-informed, as that is how we now in contemporary society understand that evidence needs to be treated. That training is in train.

Those are the essential ingredients of a specialist court. Those are the building blocks. We guarantee them not just in this Bill but through the funding of training and the measures being implemented in our courts. That is really important, but it does not have a bearing on the overall backlog problem. It prioritises those cases, as we recognise them being among the most serious with some of the most acute trauma, but it does not deal with the huge backlog delays for other forms of violent crime and other types of crime.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister and I have both talked about making choices. The brass tacks are that the Minister has chosen to make huge changes to our court processes, but not to introduce this change in the Bill. There is still the chance to introduce measures into the Bill on Report and make different choices. Will she consider that?

[Sarah Sackman]

We are making those choices. The difference is that we do not need legislation to make those choices. We have made those choices, including the commitment of money to fund independent legal advisers, trauma-informed training and victim support. We have made those decisions. We have put those building blocks in place. We do not need legislation to deliver specialist courts. I had this discussion yesterday with the Victims’ Commissioner. We do not need legislation.

I wholeheartedly agree with the spirit of the new clause. How could I not? It is in our manifesto. We are taking action to deliver it. We do not need the new clause to deliver it—that is the point. I will come shortly to its unworkability, but I will not take from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion or anyone else the suggestion that we have not been making the choices to deliver on our commitment to halve violence against women and girls.