Marriage and Civil Partnership (Minimum Age) Bill

Sarah Champion Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th January 2022 Public Bill Committees

Clause 7 provides that the Bill will come into force on such a day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint. Different days may be appointed for different purposes. The Secretary of State may make transitional, transitory or saving provisions in connection with the coming into force of any provision in the Bill. Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument. Clause 8 provides that any amendments made by the Bill do not affect the validity of any marriages or civil partnerships entered before the Bill comes into force. Finally, clause 9 is the short title.

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir George. I am so pleased that the hon. Member for Mid Derbyshire has campaigned with such tenacity on this issue. She has had knocks from every side, but she has kept on going because she knows that it is the right thing to do. I am in awe that she has got the Bill to this point, and all power to her. I would also like to thank the Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organisation, Karma Nirvana and the Girls Not Brides campaign for their ongoing work to help victims and put an end to child marriage.

This is a big problem. Internationally, 12 million girls are married before the age of 18 each year. That is 23 girls every minute. The UK signed up to the UN definition of a child being someone up to the age of 18, but child marriage is still prevalent in this country. Currently our laws allow for a legal marriage to take place from age 16 with parental consent. However, Karma Nirvana’s executive director, Natasha Rattu, says that in her experience many children are pressured into these marriages by family members. Last year, over a quarter—199—of the 753 cases dealt with by the UK’s forced marriage unit were of children under 18, and 113 of those forced marriages were of children under 15.

It is often difficult to apply the parameters of forced marriage to child marriage. Child marriage violates girls’ rights to health, education and opportunity. Girls are highly likely to experience sexual and domestic violence in a child marriage and they often struggle to find a way out. If the UK wants to be a global leader on women and girls’ rights, we must begin by banishing this horrendous practice from our own communities once and for all. Between 2007 and 2017, 3,096 marriages involving children aged 16 and 17 were legally registered in England and Wales, according to the Office for National Statistics. However, we must also discuss the importance of tackling unregistered child marriages. That is why I am so supportive of this Bill.

In the last year, Karma Nirvana has offered support in 76 cases of child marriage. Only 5% of those were registered and an overwhelming 95%—72 out of 76—were non-registered and religious marriages. These marriages are never reported, which presents a really significant barrier to protection and safeguarding. It is so important that this Bill covers any marriage involving a child who lives in England and Wales, or who is a UK national—here is the crux of it—even if the marriage does not take place in this country. It also covers those who officiate the marriage, so no more turning a blind eye with this Bill.

For years I have worked to try to improve safeguarding for all children, both nationally and internationally, which is why I am delighted that this Bill will provide a huge step forward in preventing child abuse. I am proud that England and Wales will soon be able to set an example for other countries to follow—I urge the rest of the UK to do the same.

Internationally, there is still a long way to go but there is some progress. In the USA, for example, in 2017 all 50 states allowed minors to marry in some cases. Since 2018, six states have banned all marriages before 18, but most states allow teens to marry at 16 or 17 if parents and a judge consent. Nine states still have no minimum age for marriage at all. We need to ensure that more protections are in place and that the general public are aware of the laws, so that victims of child marriage can be identified and supported, and I thank the hon. Member for Mid Derbyshire so much for the work she is doing to make that a reality.

[Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir George. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Derbyshire on getting the Bill to this stage. It is a landmark piece of legislation and a very important Bill.

I will focus my comments specifically on legal marriage. One of the reasons why my hon. Friend’s Bill is so important is that the current legal position on consent to marry is, at best, bizarre and contradictory, and at worst, an historical anachronism. I will lay out why that is, in relation to the operation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and how it applies to children in this situation. As well as implementing my hon. Friend’s Bill, we really need to take forward how that Act operates.

Looking at adults, the law on consent is codified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which lays out what criteria one needs to show in order to demonstrate that one has the decision-making capacity to make a decision. Marriage is one of the decisions that falls within scope, along with decisions to do with sexual relations and medical treatment. There are two types of adults in this world: those with decision-making capacity for a specific decision, and those without. When capacity is lacking and a decision and action has to be taken, the clinician or whoever is involved has to assess the decision-making capacity and then make a decision in someone’s best interests. There are provisions for what is effectively proxy decision making—such as lasting power of attorney, and some situations where people take part in clinical research—but even then the person making those decisions has to act in the person’s best interests.

In general, if someone is lacking capacity and a decision needs to be made, the person acting on behalf of an individual has to make a decision in their best interests, so a best interests framework operates. However, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 states that some decisions are far too personal for someone to make a decision on behalf of someone else in their best interests. I realise that I am going into a technical wonderland of best interests, but a good example is found in medicine. Let us say that someone has been hit by a car and is unconscious. When they come to hospital, the doctors need the powers to treat them. In the context of someone who is unconscious, it is not possible to assess their decision-making capacity, so a decision has to be made in their best interests. Problems arise when there are more complicated decisions and when people are awake, conscious and able to contribute to discussions.

The Mental Capacity Act excludes a certain set of decisions. Where people lack capacity, others can make decisions on their behalf—adoption and marriage are a couple of examples. Of course, parents are able to make a range of very personal choices and decisions for their children, particularly around medical treatment, but even in medicine there are limits on how much parents can consent. When children are detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, there are certain medical interventions for which parental consent alone cannot be relied on, because it is deemed to be too personal and too complex. Electroconvulsive therapy treatment is one of them, and I believe that in the context of serious interventions for children with long-lasting consequences, there are situations where clinicians may want to go to court to get extra back-up and reinforcement because of the nature of the decision.

We have a weird dichotomy, because the Mental Capacity Act states that if an adult lacks capacity, there are decisions that no one can make on their behalf, with marriage and adoption being two examples. However, if someone is a child between the age of 16 and 18— admittedly with decision-making capacity—parental consent can be used to enter into a contract such as marriage. I think that is completely bizarre and it needs to be changed.

Marriage is a big decision, and one that we expect to be a long and lasting decision. Of course, it is not an irreversible decision because of the divorce laws that we have, but I do not think there is a situation so pressing as to not allow a decision to enter into marriage to be delayed until the age of 18. I realise that is not necessarily an uncontroversial point of view—people have different views on it, such as those with strong religious beliefs—but fundamentally I think it is absolutely right that we move marriage to the age of 18. That is because the backdrop to this is a recognition that we see people under the age of 18—children—as inherently vulnerable. Although someone between the ages of 16 and 18 may have decision-making capacity, they are still not necessarily fully mature. They are still potentially more vulnerable than an adult, and we include in our law legal gatekeepers, the thresholds that we determine one must pass to become an adult. The Bill is very important in exemplifying that a child, even someone with full decision-making capacity at the age of 16 or 17, is still someone whose potential vulnerability we have concerns about, and has not moved into adulthood.

[Sarah Champion]

I agree with the arguments that the hon. Gentleman is making, but for me this is also about the fact that the state has a legal, mandatory duty to take care of someone under the age of 18. It is reneging on its duties unless this Bill is enacted.

[Dr Spencer]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, and I see where she is going with her mention of the duty. As always, we will get into a bit of a debate over the duties of the state to protect the most vulnerable in our society, under-18s. One could fiddle around with this, and we could start getting into debates about the right to personal freedoms under article 8(2) of the European convention on human rights, but she has made a strong point.

The hon. Lady has helped me to move on to my more substantial point in this debate, because although children are of course vulnerable and the state has a legal duty to protect them, there is another range of people who are quite vulnerable and who this Bill does not cover: those who have marginal decision-making capacity to consent to marriage. I have done lots of decision-making capacity assessments in my career as a doctor and as a subject of my previous academic research. I admit that I have never made an assessment of capacity to marry, but in general, while the decision about whether somebody has decision-making capacity is very binary—yes or no—there are people whose assessments lie somewhere in the middle, and whose situation is unclear and complicated. Those assessments go to the courts for determination, and there are people with a range of mental conditions, such as learning disabilities and cognitive impairment, whose capacity to consent to marriage may be marginal and may be queried, and about whom determinations need to be made.

Although the broad criteria for assessing decision-making capacity for marriage are codified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, there was originally a common law test, and following that Act the courts have continued to interpret it and apply common law tests for marriage. The test that has been used has evolved over the past 20 to 30 years, and it interacts quite tightly with the common law test for capacity to consent to sexual relations, because judges, rightly or wrongly, have looked at those two as being quite closely associated. In previous cases that have gone to the courts, it has been said that the capacity to consent to sex has to be a lower threshold than the capacity to consent to marry, because by definition if a person marries they have to consummate the marriage. Those are not my words, and they are not necessarily my views, but they are how the courts have applied those two common law tests of capacity.

Our judiciary is absolutely fantastic. It is great that we have it, and those judges do fantastic work in applying the capacity test to complex situations, but nevertheless those tests have evolved over the past 20 or 30 years, importing societal values and mores into them. While we are making clear decisions about what we define as childhood and adulthood, there are some very broad-brush legal proceedings in terms of children.