Northern Ireland Protocol

Sammy Wilson Excerpts

Thursday 15th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House supports the primary aims of the Northern Ireland Protocol of the EU Withdrawal Agreement, which are to uphold the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in all its dimensions and to respect the integrity of the EU and UK internal markets; recognises that new infrastructure and controls at the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic must be avoided to maintain the peace in Northern Ireland and to encourage stability and trade; notes that the volume of trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland far exceeds the trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; further notes that significant provisions of the Protocol remain subject to grace periods and have not yet been applied to trade from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and that there is no evidence that this has presented any significant risk to the EU internal market; regards flexibility in the application of the Protocol as being in the mutual interests of the EU and UK, given the unique constitutional and political circumstances of Northern Ireland; regrets EU threats of legal action; notes the EU and UK have made a mutual commitment to adopt measures with a view to avoiding controls at the ports and airports of Northern Ireland to the extent possible; is conscious of the need to avoid separating the Unionist community from the rest of the UK, consistent with the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement; and also recognises that Article 13(8) of the Protocol provides for potentially superior arrangements to those currently in place.

Thank you for that statement, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I would like to record my thanks to the Backbench Business Committee for granting time for this debate. I am also very grateful that so many right hon. and hon. Members have put in to take part in it. I believe that this is a debate of significance, and at a time of significance.

The purpose of the debate is for the House to agree on how the Government should approach the issues that have arisen in Northern Ireland since the UK left the European Union. I remind the House that the Northern Ireland protocol was part of the 2019 EU withdrawal agreement, not part of the trade and co-operation agreement, which was ratified only this year. It is the protocol that is creating strains on power sharing under the Good Friday agreement, pressures on political stability and an upsurge in tension between the two communities in Northern Ireland.

Let me just say what this debate is not about. There is absolutely no value in point scoring about past divisions and disputes that we have had in this House. That would just further undermine public confidence. This debate is about looking forward, about what we must now agree to do to set things right. The proposals I will come to are in the interests of the EU as much as they are in the interests of the UK.

The motion sets out

“the primary aims of the Northern Ireland Protocol of the EU Withdrawal Agreement, which are to uphold the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in all its dimensions and to respect the integrity of the EU and UK internal markets”

and states that

“new infrastructure and controls at the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic must be avoided to maintain the peace in Northern Ireland and to encourage stability and trade”.

The motion then points out an indisputable fact—that

“the volume of trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland far exceeds the trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland”.

Why is this significant? In 2019, the Northern Ireland Executive found that over 90% of medicines, fruit and vegetables, books, clothes, household goods and baby equipment sold in Northern Ireland was arriving from other parts of the United Kingdom. In 2018, Northern Ireland sales to Great Britain were two and a half times greater than those to the Republic.

The protocol is clear: it is not intended to create what it refers to as “diversion of trade”. On the contrary, article 16 states:

“If the application of this Protocol leads to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to diversion of trade, the Union or the United Kingdom may unilaterally take appropriate safeguard measures.”

[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very important point. Is it not significant that since the protocol came into operation, there has been a dramatic increase in imports from the Irish Republic into Northern Ireland and a fall in trade between GB and Northern Ireland? Indeed, Irish Ministers have boasted that one reason for having a delay in further border checks is to encourage further diversion of trade towards the Irish Republic.

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) on securing it; it is long overdue, but through his persistence we have achieved it.

It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart). Before I get on with my own thoughts, I want to pick up on something she said. She is quite right that if anyone reads the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, they will see, first and foremost, that the border is not specifically mentioned in it. We have had all the wonderful great and good wandering around demanding that the agreement stand, when in fact the border is never once mentioned. Secondly, there has always been a border—my right hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) has made the point that there is a border for VAT, excise and currency. The whole point that the hon. Member for Upper Bann makes is right, and it stands, but that is the bit that has gone missing.

The more something is said and the bigger the lie, the more people believe it—but it has been a lie from start to finish, which has meant that there has been no rational discussion of exactly what will happen under the protocol and thereafter. The protocol itself has failed to support the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, is creating division and does not really keep an open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Lord Trimble has been quoted several times. I have to say that it is only in this country that a Nobel peace prize winner is not really given great distinction. Interestingly, when we took Lord Trimble to Brussels, he was treated with the utmost respect; when he spoke, Mr Barnier and everybody else fell silent and agreed with him. He said that the arrangements that needed to be in place were those that I will come to later—essentially, mutual enforcement. As he says, not only does the protocol

“shatter Northern Ireland’s constitutional relationship with the UK,”

as has been referred to, but it subverts the very agreement that they keep on saying that they want to preserve: the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. It is breaking that agreement and directly setting one part of the community against the other because of the way in which it is implemented and because of its very nature.

The protocol simply cannot stand. I disagree with the Chair of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare); I do not think that this is just about a group of people picking away at it and trying to object to it on ideological grounds. The reality is that, practically, it does not work—and if it does not work, it has to be radically changed or replaced. I am for replacing it.

The other bit that has come out of this is that the EU has become very partisan. A claim was made that somehow the British Government have to be completely independent of this, but they are the Government of Northern Ireland as well. The reality is that the European Union has become very partial. It has sided with one side of the argument and has driven this as a weapon aimed at the Brexit negotiations from start to finish.

I went with a team of people to see Monsieur Barnier, and, as was said earlier, we presented mutual enforcement to him at the table. That was before the British Government got in a mess over their arrangements in 2018 and came up with that poor resolution. The EU team listened, and we corresponded with them for at least another two to three weeks about where this could go. It was interesting that they were open-minded about it until the UK Government decided that they were going to go for equivalence and all the rest of it, and it did not work. They were very keen on the proposal and knew it would work. This is the point I make: there is another solution that will work.

It is worth reminding those who keep saying, “Well, you all voted for this,” that we voted for it because we knew it was not permanent. That was made clear in every single article: article 184 of the withdrawal agreement, article 13 of the protocol and, importantly, paragraph 35 of the political declaration, which envisages an agreement superseding the protocol with alternative arrangements. The idea that this is somehow set in stone and we only have to work to make it better is an absurdity in itself.

It is something to watch the Irish Foreign Minister almost boasting that diversion of trade is taking place which will only settle the natural order of things through the supply chains—these new realities. This is a breach of article 16, and it is very clear that he has admitted that. That is exactly what is going on, and it should have never been agreed to in the first place.

I want to turn my attention now to what the alternative is. We now have a situation where there are two and a half times more checks at the border in Northern Ireland than there are in Rotterdam. Northern Ireland represents 0.5% of the total population of the EU, but it now has 20% of the EU’s customs checks and more checks than France in total. This is quite ludicrous and an utter disaster. The solution, therefore, is to move to mutual enforcement, where both sides take responsibility for their own requirement to uphold the other side’s regulations. We do not need a border, but if prosecutions need to take place, the UK will prosecute those who transgress, and the EU will do the same.

[Sammy Wilson]

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the most important part of mutual enforcement is that there will no longer be any need for EU law to automatically apply to Northern Ireland, and therefore the constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom would not be compromised?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am going to refer to the right hon. Gentleman as my right hon. Friend for this because he is absolutely right. That is the key point about mutual enforcement. We have been working with a group of the brightest and smartest lawyers—experts in European law, experts in trade law and experts financial regulations—and it is quite fascinating. They believe that if we make it an offence to export items in breach of EU law across the north-south border, that becomes our responsibility and the EU’s responsibility. That is exactly the point that my right hon. Friend makes. The EU does exactly the same for us, and it does not breach our sovereignty since the exporters are opting to comply with the importers’ laws anyway from the moment their goods cross the invisible border.

I simply say in conclusion to my right hon. Friend the Minister that the Government now have to make the point that this is the way forward. They have to present this to the EU, and the EU has to recognise the damage it is doing in Northern Ireland and here in the United Kingdom. I urge her to press forward with these arrangements and agree that this is the solution to an outstanding problem.

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[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

I, too, congratulate the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) on securing this debate, and thank him for the continued support that he has given to us in our opposition to the Northern Ireland protocol and the effects that it has had on Northern Ireland.

The protocol, if it continues to exist, is a threat to Brexit. Indeed, that was borne out by the survey carried out last weekend by Savanta, in which 57% of those who were surveyed indicated that they believed that the Northern Ireland protocol was designed to frustrate Brexit. Indeed, 40% of remainers made the same point. It represents a bridgehead that the EU still has on the United Kingdom, a salient from which it will continue to attack our sovereignty and try to claw back the influence that it lost when this country decided to leave the EU.

There are three reasons why the protocol must go. The first is that it will be an ongoing means by which Brexit will be frustrated. We have already seen how the EU has used the protocol. In fact, it is taking the UK Government to court because the UK Government will not accept the EU’s interpretation of the protocol and how it should be implemented to impose the kind of restrictions that the EU demands. The British Government argue that the protocol was meant to deal with only those goods that could be at risk of going into the EU through the Irish Republic; any other goods were not at risk. The EU takes the view that we must prove that goods are not at risk before we can avoid the checks. In other words, 97% of goods that are currently being checked do not need to be checked. They do not go any further than Northern Ireland. Yet the EU is insisting that there is a risk that they might go into the Irish Republic. That is why we have such a high level of checks. There will be future laws that will create more need for restrictions. For example, the EU is bringing in changes to the law regarding the testing of lawnmowers. Lawnmowers could be the next goods that are refused entry into Northern Ireland because they do not comply with EU law, which now applies to Northern Ireland. That is the first reason. If we do not get rid of the protocol, there is always that opportunity for friction in relations between the UK and the EU.

Secondly, I do not care what people have said about there being no constitutional impact. Of course, there is a constitutional impact. The Act of Union has been changed. The Government’s own lawyers argued in the courts that the Act of Union was changed—that when this House voted for the protocol it voted impliedly to change one of the fundamental pillars of the Act of Union, which is that there should be unimpeded and equal trade between the different countries of this nation.

The protocol’s other constitutional impact has been to take powers from the Northern Ireland Assembly. I find it amazing that those who have representatives in the Northern Ireland Assembly, such as the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry), can argue that there is nothing to worry about. His party has a Minister in the Northern Ireland Assembly and his party has Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, yet 60% of the laws that will govern manufacturing in Northern Ireland will never be discussed, cannot be discussed, and, indeed, have to be implemented by the Northern Ireland Assembly without its having any say. The democratic responsibilities of the Northern Ireland Assembly have been undermined, and, of course, there has been a change in the Act of Union and in the constitutional position, and that contravenes the Good Friday agreement, which says that any change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland has to have the consent of the people of Northern Ireland.

The last reason, which people have outlined very well, is the economic impact that all this is having on Northern Ireland. We already see the disruption to trade. Indeed, just this month the Ulster Bank purchasing managers index survey indicated that inflation in Northern Ireland is significantly higher than in the rest of the United Kingdom and about 50% more than the lowest region in the rest of the United Kingdom. Although that does not lie completely at the door of the protocol, it indicates that costs are rising higher in Northern Ireland because of the costs of the protocol—the delay in supply chains, the additional costs in administration and so on.

The protocol has a real impact on the future ability of Northern Ireland to compete. Of course, as laws in Northern Ireland change because EU laws are imposed, that will make it much more difficult for us to compete in our biggest market in GB. There will be those who say that we will get the best of both worlds, with a foot in the EU camp and a foot in the GB camp. That is not true, of course.

[Ian Paisley]

On the issue of having a foot in both camps, at today’s Northern Ireland Affairs Committee the Ulster Farmers’ Union made the point that Northern Ireland agriculture is now in a no man’s land and does not have the best of both worlds. How does my hon. Friend respond to the fact that that multimillion pound industry, our most successful, is now placed in that terrible situation?

[Sammy Wilson]

I have heard time and again the argument that we have the best of both worlds, but I have not heard any examples of where being in the EU single market and being cut off from the GB market has had any beneficial effect. Indeed, any examples I have heard of improved trade have been a result of the trade agreement that the whole of the United Kingdom has with the EU. That is all that has ensured that those markets are open to companies in Northern Ireland.

There are alternatives. We have heard them mentioned today, including the mutual enforcement of each other’s rules. It is not that it is technically impossible—it is technically possible. It is not that it is economically impossible—it is possible. It is not that it is constitutionally impossible—it is simply a question of whether there is political will. Lord Frost must push this with the EU. There are alternatives that can satisfy both sides and ensure that the single market of the UK is maintained while the single market of the EU is protected.

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[Richard Thomson (Gordon) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure indeed to speak in this debate. I begin, as other speakers have done, by congratulating the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) on securing it, although I am bound to point out that it is no surprise that we are here debating the subject—in many ways it was an inevitability. The hon. Member said that he wants us to look forward rather than back; I can certainly understand that sentiment, but I hope he will forgive me if I take an inevitable look backwards as well, to get the waypoints and to get some bearing on how we go forward.

We are here because of the way Brexit was won in the referendum and then negotiated—if that is the word—in the years that followed. Perhaps through necessity, it had to be all things to all people; that was the only way that it could secure the narrow margin it secured. Since then, whether they are in favour or, like myself, very strongly against it, people have had to watch as one by one the promises made to secure it turned to dust—promises to the fishing industry, promises to the farming sector, promises to maintain freedom of movement and even a promise that we would maintain our membership of the single market once we were out of the European Union, as I believe the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster once claimed.

We are here today to discuss the impact of Brexit in Northern Ireland. All of it was predicted and predictable, foreseen and foreseeable. What makes it so disappointing that we have reached this juncture is that those in the UK Government who have taken us to this point have twisted, obfuscated and misrepresented at every stage to persuade the population to believe that the consequences that we now face would simply not arise.



Throughout that period a profound British exceptionalism has been on display, with the UK Government and their supporters noisily asserting their own sovereignty and expressing a wounded surprise that any other EU state that also still had sovereignty should not only have that sovereignty but have a willingness to use it to defend their own interests, including the integrity of the single market. Part of the problem was that the UK Government spent considerably more time negotiating among themselves than they did with European partners, and that allowed a fundamental set of questions to go unanswered for political convenience for too long. Those questions were: what kind of Brexit exactly, specifically, is it that we want? How are we going to get it? What implications will arise from that once we get it?

It was quite possible to leave the European Union and remain in the single market and the customs union. We would have become a coastal state with control over our fisheries, and we could have withdrawn from the political project of ever closer union that seems to cause such existential angst on the Conservative Benches. We could have left in a way that would have not created the present issues in Northern Ireland. Any form of Brexit that went beyond that made the risk of creating trade and regulatory borders a very live one indeed, with any such border having to fall either in the Irish sea or across the island of Ireland itself. After the unceremonious defenestration of the backstop and its political architect, the cry of the current Prime Minister to “get Brexit done” and the ensuing undignified stagger towards an agreement have left us with the protocol in its current form.

Part of the problem we have with that results from the philosophy that the Prime Minister and his advisers at the time had, which was to move fast and break things. There can be no doubt that the protocol was agreed simply to get the Government out of a big political hole at the time, and to allow them to say in Great Britain that they had got Brexit done and worry about the consequences for Northern Ireland after the event. This demonstrated cynicism and short-sightedness in equal measure. Nevertheless, it is an agreement that resulted from the negotiating objectives that Her Majesty’s Government held at the time. It was entered into freely, and if it is not to be implemented fully in its current form, it has to be renegotiated in good faith and in the proper way. The hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex observed in his contribution that the world was watching. I agree: the world was watching during the G7 conference and the world will still be watching to see how the protocol is implemented, whether in its present form or in an amended and agreed form.

The hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) pointed out that Northern Ireland did not vote for Brexit, and it would be remiss of me not to point out that Scotland also did not vote for Brexit. Allow me to be the one to point out—I hope other Members will appreciate this—the great irony in the fact that if Scotland were to become independent and join the European Union, it would once again enjoy free unfettered trade with Northern Ireland. Our businesses would enjoy that in a way that they simply no longer have under the terms of the protocol.

[Sammy Wilson]

Scotland might have free unfettered trade with Northern Ireland, but does the hon. Gentleman not think it would be a far bigger problem that it would not have free unfettered trade with its biggest market, England?

[Richard Thomson]

I think there is a shared interest in making sure that there is as close to seamless trade as can possibly exist across these islands, within these islands and with the European Union. In that sense, the right hon. Gentleman and I are on the same page.

An agreement on animal welfare, sanitary and phytosanitary standards would eliminate the need for very many of the checks and reopen that trade. It is that sort of pragmatic renegotiation of the protocol, in the light of experience and of everything that has come from the nature of Brexit, that would be desirable in order to remove not just the barriers but the symbolism that the frictions that are being felt so keenly in Northern Ireland represent.

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[Sammy Wilson]

When she talks about food standards, does the hon. Lady find it odd that the EU is now proposing to reintroduce the offal that gave us mad cow disease for feed for animals in the EU, and for export to this country? The EU is reducing food standards while the UK Government have animal welfare proposals such as banning the export of live animals. We are the ones upholding food and animal welfare standards, not the EU.

[Louise Haigh]

For us to have higher food and animal welfare standards than the European Union would not be a barrier to a veterinary agreement. The EU has a long precedent for making such arrangements with other countries. Under the New Zealand veterinary agreement, just 1% to 2% of its goods are subject to physical checks on arrival, as opposed to the current rate of around 30% for UK agrifood products entering the EU. The United States has made clear that such issues are not a fundamental barrier to a free trade agreement.

I know that the governance of such an agreement is contentious, but it would not be necessary for the European Court of Justice to get involved. A regulatory mechanism could be agreed that would not limit the UK’s ability to make future free trade agreements. A modern mechanism, designed for GB-EU and NI-GB agrifood trade flows, could be designed to meet the circumstances of Northern Ireland. Such an agreement would also unlock a permanent trusted trader scheme, which would resolve the significant issue of export health certificate requirements, which will come into full force in October when the grace periods expire. I urge the Minister to set out exactly the strategy to find such solutions in the long term. Inflammatory op-eds and contradictory remarks from Lord Frost are not getting us any closer to agreement with the EU, and it is imperative that the mechanisms of the protocol are used to find such an agreement. We cannot keep kicking the can down the road by extending grace periods. This needs to be future-proofed, and Northern Ireland needs to be reassured that as we negotiate more free trade agreements we will not diverge still further.

I also press the Minister again on how the Government are intending to bring Northern Ireland’s political representatives into the discussions and negotiations with the EU. A huge part of the problem is that people feel that this has been imposed on them without proper engagement or consent. That is totally unsustainable. The right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson) made suggestions around the role of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and those should be considered carefully.

Fundamentally, peace in Northern Ireland is still fragile. These issues require careful, responsible leadership and for the Government to be honest with the people of Northern Ireland about the choices they are making and what they are prioritising. We can protect Northern Ireland, but it requires a drastic change in strategy from this Government.