Oral Answers to Questions

Robert Neill Excerpts

Tuesday 8th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I am happy to assure the hon. and learned Lady that the terms of reference have been carefully couched to make it clear that we have distinctive contexts and natures in each of the jurisdictions, and that they will be considered where that is necessary. I am also content that where there are particular questions on devolved matters or of a devolved nature, the independent review will be approaching or inviting engagement from all appropriate parties. Of course, it is only the first stage in making recommendations. I can assure her that any proposals that will come forward will of course involve the fullest consultation with the devolved Administrations and, indeed, of course the fullest respect for the devolved settlement.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

Can I welcome the tone of my right hon. and learned Friend’s statement and his very clear commitment to supporting the independence of the judiciary? That is an absolute and fundamental principle of our constitution, and should never be undermined by anyone. Can I also welcome the terms of reference of the review, which are balanced and measured in relation to the Human Rights Act and, in particular, the quality of the panel that has been appointed? I happen to have known Sir Peter Gross throughout my professional career, and he is known as both a man and a judge of the highest independence and integrity, as are the other members of the panel. Perhaps my right hon. and learned Friend can reassure us that they will have a completely free hand to act as they think is appropriate within the terms of reference, without any pressure on their independence from any quarter.

[Robert Buckland]

My hon. Friend the Chair of the Justice Committee is absolutely right to highlight the impeccable credentials of the chair, Sir Peter Gross, not only as a distinguished former Lord Justice of Appeal, but of course as the judge responsible for international relations: he understands very well the issue of judicial diplomacy, which is very much at the heart of this review. I am glad that the geographical representation also includes an academic from the Republic of Ireland, because it is my fundamental belief that we need to look at the position in all parts of our islands to respect not only the human rights settlement, but the Belfast agreement.

Courts and Tribunals: Recovery

Robert Neill Excerpts

Thursday 3rd December 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I listened very carefully to the right hon. Gentleman, and I am afraid that, as is sadly so often the case, his peroration was a direct contradiction of the reality of what is happening on the ground across the justice system. We acted from the outset to protect lives, to protect staff and to make sure that our prisons were safe, and the results are well-known. There has been considerable achievement in our prison system, and I know that he would want to acknowledge the work of staff; I am sure he would.

The same can be said about the work done in our courts. This was an unprecedented challenge. We were the first jurisdiction in the world to reopen jury trials, in late May. We are now rapidly reaching the position with regard to jury trials being heard, or guilty pleas being tendered at or just before trial, that we were in before the beginning of this pandemic.

The right hon. Gentleman is right to talk about the past in the justice system, which is why in July I announced the biggest increase in court maintenance in not 10 years, but 20 years; he can do the maths and work out the time that he had partial responsibility for the system. This is not a pure story of life since 2010; I have inherited a system that, frankly, needs a fundamental change, which is what I am doing.

The settlement that I have reached will hugely support the increase in sitting days in the year ahead. Already, before the pandemic hit, I had increased the number of sitting days, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, from the year prior to my taking office. I was already acknowledging the pressure on the system. I remind the right hon. Gentleman that while 39,000 cases is of course a significant number, it is not the historic high that we have seen in the past. I am working to ensure that the number of trials in that particular statistic is dealt with as quickly as possible, together with all the other important hearings.

The right hon. Gentleman talked about victims. I am sure he would readily acknowledge not only the £25 million announced in the spending review for next year but the in-year funding of £15 million on victims’ services that we continue to roll out. The covid funding that has been administered on behalf of my Department by police and crime commissioners for local victims groups totals over £25 million. Indeed, the announcements I made last year rapidly and significantly increase funding for independent sexual violence advisers to levels that we have never seen before in our country. We have also introduced the revised and streamlined victims code. We are, at every step of the way, taking action to support the victims of crime. I can assure him that when it comes to domestic abuse and sexual violence, the courts are giving priority to those hearings and making sure that they are dealt with as quickly as possible.

On legal aid, again the right hon. Gentleman misses a hugely important development this year, which was the extra funding of up to £51 million for criminal legal aid lawyers via an improvement to the graduated fee scheme as part of the first stage of criminal legal aid review. We are going to embark on stage two very soon, and I will keep him fully apprised of that. He will, I am sure, note with interest that that will result in more investment in criminal legal aid in the year to come. [Interruption.] Oh yes, it certainly will. I know that it is sometimes difficult to accept positive news, but I am grateful to partners in the criminal justice system and those practising in the professions for having given an encouraging welcome to the news last week. I accept, with them, that there is a way to go, but we are now turning the corner, and I am confident that in the years ahead we can enhance, improve and build on the success of our justice system.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con) [V]]

I thank the Lord Chancellor for his statement and welcome what he has said. I and the other members of the Justice Committee certainly wish to join in the tributes that have been paid to the hard work of all those involved in the Courts Service and the broader justice system in dealing with the necessary recovery from the pandemic.

Can the Lord Chancellor help me on a couple of points, though? First, does he accept that it will be necessary to have a multi-year settlement once this year is out of the way to maintain the progress that we need to achieve to get our courts system back to the levels of reform and improvement that we have ambitiously set out? Secondly, will he update the evidence that he helpfully gave to the Justice Committee on Tuesday as to where we are in reducing the backlog in the Crown court? Although there has been progress, he will know that the backlog prior to the pandemic was already at record levels, and that was increasing up until the latest management figures we had that went back to October. Will he give us the projection—and, in due course, the modelling behind it—as to when we will see that backlog start to reduce? None of us wants to see contested trials being listed out to 2022, as I am sure he would agree.

[Robert Buckland]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. First, with regard to a multi-year settlement, it would not be right for me to prejudge what the decision of the Chancellor might be on that. The important decision had to be made this year to have a one-year settlement for the obvious reasons of the covid outbreak and the fact that, rightly, there was not a fiscal event—namely, a Budget. I will leave that decision ultimately to the Chancellor. However, my hon. Friend can be reassured that the work being done within the Department is indeed looking beyond one year only and coming up with evidence-based arguments and proposals that lead on to longer-term investment. For example, he will see in the capital programme not only a welcome £105 million extra for court maintenance but the multi-year prison capital programme, which will make a huge difference in terms of modern conditions in our prisons.

With regard to the Crown courts, my hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the figures. The figures for Crown court statistics are populated both manually and by automation. Therefore, they take some time to fully settle down. However, I am particularly encouraged by the figures relating to effective trials: trials that end up being “cracked”, as they say, with a guilty plea on the day; and trials brought into the court by the judge just before trial, or a week before trial, where guilty pleas have been tendered. The overall figures I am looking at now through November show a very encouraging increase in that overall number, getting us much closer to the pre-covid baseline. It is not there yet, but if those trends continue, we can get to that pre-covid baseline on trials, I think, in the new year. Of course, that allows us to start to make real progress on the rest of the case load.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]

Robert Neill Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Alex Chalk]

Private international law, sometimes known as conflict of laws, comprises rules applied by courts and parties involved in legal disputes for dealing with cases raising cross-border issues. The rules generally apply in the context of civil law, including specialist areas such as commercial, insolvency and family law. PIL typically includes rules to establish whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a claim that has cross-border elements, which country’s law applies to such a claim, and whether a judgment of a foreign court should be recognised and enforced. However, it can also encompass rules on co-operation between courts and other public authorities in different countries involved in dealing with cross-border issues, such as service of documents, taking of evidence abroad or even establishing efficient procedures to assist with the resolution of cross-border disputes.

These agreements are important. They are the sort of thing that a member of the public, or a business trading across borders may not know they need until a difficulty or a disagreement arises. Without these agreements, cross-border legal disputes can become expensive and difficult to resolve. With them, the path to resolution is clearer and smoother.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way so early on in his speech. As he will know, I have to chair the Justice Committee in a few moments, but may I thank him for stressing the importance of this not just for the big financial institutions and businesses of this country, but for individuals? Will he confirm that, in accepting the amendments, we have managed to achieve an improvement to the Bill through the very constructive approach for which he in particular has been responsible? Will he also confirm that, as well as the Bill, it is the Government’s firm intention to seek to join the Lugano convention on the enforcement of judgments and other international co-operation at the earliest possible date, so that we do not have any gap post the end of the implementation period, and to move on to the other international conventions—Hague and others?

[Alex Chalk]

I thank the Chairman of the Justice Committee for his remarks and for the contribution he has made throughout the passage of the Bill. I am quite confident that we are in a better place because we have looked at it constructively. That is, in large part, because of the contributions he has made, together with others. Yes, this is about individuals as well as businesses, and yes, we want to use this as the vehicle to get into Lugano, which will be good for the rule of law, good for individuals, good for certainty and good for businesses.

I was making the point that these agreements mean the path to resolution is clearer and smoother. Just by way of a couple of examples, these agreements can help a family where relationships break down and one spouse moves abroad, and they can help to sort out arrangements for custody, access and maintenance in the best interests of the children. These agreements can provide a framework for a small business to seek redress when left out of pocket by a supplier based in another country.

Oral Answers to Questions

Robert Neill Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

As I said in response to the previous question, I do not disclose details of discussions I have with Cabinet colleagues. However, I can reassure the hon. Gentleman and everybody else that people should be in no doubt about my steadfast defence not just of the judiciary but of an independent legal profession. We have, of course, seen criticism of lawyers throughout the ages. I respect the views of members of my profession, but we should put things into their full context.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I welcome what the Lord Chancellor said about defending the legal profession and I join him in that. It is an honourable profession and I have always found that those I dealt with at the Bar and solicitors generally left their politics behind when they went to argue the case for their client, which they must do without fear or favour. Equally, will he recognise that when he and I were doing an awful lot of legal aid work in practice, the former leader of the Labour party and then Prime Minister was describing legal aid lawyers as fat cats? No one has entirely clean hands on this and perhaps we all ought to moderate our language when dealing with the professions.

[Robert Buckland]

The Chair of the Justice Committee puts the matter into its fullest context. Sadly, from Shakespeare onwards, and probably before, lawyers have come in for criticism. The question is how far that goes. We live in a lively democracy and none of us is above criticism, but I say to him that in all my years in practice, I did precisely what he did, which was to leave my politics at home whenever I went into chambers or into the courtroom.

Ministry of Justice: Legal Aid Spending

Robert Neill Excerpts

Thursday 22nd October 2020 Westminster Hall

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I beg to move,

This this House has considered the spending of the Ministry of Justice on legal aid.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair today, Mr Robertson, and to move this motion on behalf of my colleagues on the Select Committee on Justice, which I have the honour to chair. I am delighted to see a number of colleagues here today.

People might think that spending on legal aid is a technical and rather dry subject, but it is not, and nor should it be, because ultimately it is about access to justice. When preparing for today, I was struck by a comment from the late Lord Diplock, one of our very distinguished jurists, who said:

"Every civilised system of government requires that the state should make available to all its citizens a means for the just and peaceful settlement of disputes between them as to their respective legal rights. The means provided are courts of justice to which every citizen has a constitutional right of access.”

The last point is important. It is the realistic ability to access justice that is important, if we are to talk about genuine access to justice, as opposed to the theoretical.

Rightly, after world war two, the legal aid scheme was set up under the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949. Governments of all parties have sought to provide means of access. To quote another distinguished late jurist, Lord Bingham:

“Denial of legal protection to the poor litigant who cannot afford to pay is one enemy of the rule of law”.

In a democracy, we are all committed to the rule of law. We debated it not long ago in Westminster Hall, Mr Robertson. To achieve that, it is important that those who have rights that they seek to enforce have a means of going to the courts to do so. They should not be constrained in exercising those rights by their means. The test ought to be the merits of their claim, rather than the means they have to bring it. In the same way, in criminal matters, those whom the state charges with an offence are entitled to a proper means of putting the state to proof as to whether that offence is made out against them. Their ability to do that should not be constrained by their means either. The test in a criminal case should be whether the state can prove the case against them on the merits and the evidence, to the appropriate standard. Those are basic things we all sign up to.

We have to ask how we can do that effectively in reality, in circumstances where many of the population find affording to pay for litigation, which no one embarks upon lightly, not viable or within their grasp. It is not just about litigation. I remember that when I started as a young barrister—I refer to my declarations in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests—some of the most important things were those done through the green form scheme, such as giving important early advice on whether a contract case, or a case for possession of property, or a matrimonial case, had merits. It is not purely legal criminal matters that we are concerned with. Often, that early advice saves a great deal of trouble for individuals and for their families, either enabling them to resist an unfair claim against them, or warning them off pursuing an unwise course of action that might get them into more expense.

Access to justice and an effectively functioning legal aid system are in everybody’s interests and a societal good. Governments of all complexions have had to balance the need to do that with the need to sustainably fund it at times when there are other pressures on the public purse. It has struck me throughout my time in this place, that governments of all complexions have, from time to time, reduced spending on legal aid. No one is entirely free of that, and it is almost inevitable at a time when the Ministry of Justice also has to deal within its budget with prisons, probation and many other matters. It is very easy for legal aid spending to be seen as one of the more discretionary elements in the system and to be squeezed out.

That is why on a number of occasions over the years the Justice Committee has carried out inquiries and issued reports on spending on legal aid and its sustainability. Indeed, very recently we conducted an inquiry into legal aid in the context of the pressures placed on the legal profession and the court system by the covid-19 pandemic. We have now embarked on a fresh inquiry into the future of legal aid; we started it on 7 September and we are looking for evidence until 2 November. I hope that people will submit evidence to the Committee on the broad sustainability of legal aid.

Of course, the current statutory basis of legal aid is the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, or LASPO, but the Government have rightly undertaken to review that. There have been delays in that process and it has taken some time, but we need to see how effective that Act is. Some of the changes it made were sensible; others have not necessarily stood the test of time and we need to be honest about that. Perhaps the problem was that the introduction of LASPO was linked with a very significant reduction in legal aid spending. It was not the first time that had happened; the Labour Government before the coalition reduced spending on legal aid quite significantly in a number of areas. Now, however, we have a chance to consider what is a sustainable basis for legal aid. I hope that eventually we reach a degree of consensus so that legal aid ceases to be something of a party political football, which any type of public spending can sometimes become. I hope that the Minister will be able to update us on the progress of the Government reviews.

That does not mean that in the future we have to deliver legal aid in exactly the same way as before. However, it is important that people should have access to early advice, and there is no doubt that, for various reasons, the financial pressures on the system are creating real difficulties in delivering to people the level of service that we would wish to see. I note the briefings that have been provided by both the Law Society and the Bar Council in that regard.

As many will know, I spent most of my life in practice at the criminal Bar. A great deal of my work, either prosecuting or defending, was publicly funded. There is no doubt that there is a real problem now in attracting bright young lawyers, either solicitors or barristers, to undertake that sort of work. The cases that I worked on started with a solicitor attending the police station—in those days, the duty solicitor scheme had been brought in quite recently. We have heard compelling evidence over the last two or three inquiries, and indeed over the last two or three years, from solicitors and other practitioners that there is now a real dearth of people who are willing to undertake the fairly onerous task of turning out, sometimes in the middle of the night, to sit in a police station when somebody charged with an offence—often a serious criminal offence—is interviewed. It is part of that person’s constitutional right—part of ensuring both that the guilty are properly prosecuted and the innocent are defended—but in many areas now it is very hard to find legal aid solicitors available to undertake that work. The average age of a duty solicitor is pushing 50, whereas the average age of those in the legal profession as a whole is much younger, so disproportionately legal aid work is becoming an older person’s part of the profession. If we do not recruit new people to do the work, the supply of duty solicitors will dry up.

In the civil field, there is a geographic difficulty regarding the availability of housing advice; that was a particular example that we were given. I suspect that post covid more people will be in financial difficulty, facing problems of debt, and housing possession actions will loom even larger in the courts. However, in many places, including quite large local authority areas, it is physically very hard to find more than one legal aid practitioner who will provide advice on housing law for people. That is not a sustainable position.

The position is similar at the Bar. Even large specialist sets of criminal chambers—such as mine, and I suspect the Minister’s—will probably say anecdotally that far less of their work is publicly funded than was the case in the past. That bears particularly hard on young barristers just starting out, who very often cut their teeth on this sort of work. We need a sustainable means of making sure that people can make a living. I am not talking about a grand living—one of the most unpleasant and annoying things for those of us who understand this area is these ridiculous headlines about fat cat lawyers doing criminal work; that is simply not the case. The facts clearly demonstrated to our Select Committee in reports over the years show that that is not the case, but of course the easy headlines make the most noise, as far as public debate is concerned.

We have recommended that a particular focus should be given to ensuring that we can uplift the funding for criminal legal aid. I recognise that the Government have put more money into this and revised some of the payment schemes. I welcome that, but I say to the Minister that there is more still to be done. Particular issues have been raised with us about interim payments to ensure that at the present time, during the covid-19 pandemic, cash flow for solicitors firms and sets of chambers undertaking publicly funded work continues to be available.

I know the Minister had an important role in securing the valuable money that has been expended in support for legal advice centres. That is important and welcome, but we need to ensure that they are put on a sustainable footing, too. There is a concern about the very high level of administrative costs in the Legal Aid Agency. An administrative budget of £88.8 million seems an awful lot for the organisation, which is supposed to be a light-touch operator.

That comes against the background—as the Minister himself rightly said when he was a distinguished member of the Select Committee—that spending on legal aid is a fraction of a fraction of total public spending in the United Kingdom,; it has been said to be about 0.1% of total spend. We are not talking about large sums of money in the overall scheme of things, but those sums of money make a profound difference to the citizen’s ability to enforce their rights or to defend themselves against unjust accusations.

I have not had time to talk about family or civil work, but I know that some of my hon. Friends will show their expertise in those areas. I will, however, make two points. Since certain changes were made, there has been a real collapse in the number of people able to access the employment tribunals. I suspect that, given the pressures of an economy damaged by the pandemic, demand will grow in that area.

It was always thought that changes to family legal aid would lead to more mediation. In fact, we found that mediation fell through the floor, because early access to the lawyer was the gateway for pointing people to go into mediation as a cheaper and less confrontational means of resolving their family disputes. Actually, the risk is that some of the savings that were taken out have not been cost-effective; they have been false savings, because there has been a growth of litigants in person, making the cases longer to deal with, resulting in greater burden on the judges and court time, and less good outcomes for the individuals and society as a whole.

I know the Minister understands these matters much better than most. I hope that the Government will commit to continue the review of LASPO in a timely fashion, and that we will not be afraid to come to certain interim conclusions and put some interim money in, where it is appropriate and justified by the evidence, to keep the legal aid market sustainable under the current pressures. I hope we will take a broader view about the sustainability of legal aid going forward.

Finally, perhaps all of us could use this as an opportunity to improve public awareness of the importance of the law. The law is not a purely transactional matter. I think Lord Kerr put it well in the Unison case. This is not purely a matter of private concern between the individuals; there is a public good in access to the courts. It is important constitutionally that people should be aware of their rights and how they enforce them.

We should not be afraid, therefore, of saying that any civilised society should resource its justice system just as much as it would resource any other social service—as much as we would expect to resource education, care for the elderly, healthcare or housing. Those are all matters that we would regard as part of the fundamental social fabric. Access to a workable court system is an equal part of that, requiring proper funding of the courts and judiciary, as well as, where appropriate, ensuring that those who have meritorious claims—a test to ensure that is fair—are not deterred purely by want of means from bringing them.

I hope that serves as an introduction to this debate. I have tried to explain why we think this is important, and why we regard the inquiry that the Select Committee is currently undertaking as important. I hope the Government will be able to respond positively.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McDonagh. I congratulate the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), on securing the debate and on opening it in such a full, balanced and helpful way.

In preparing this speech, I looked back at previous debates, and what a joy it was to see that the hon. Member for Westminster North (Ms Buck) secured a debate here in 2010. The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) was there, as indeed was the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy). There was a rather lovely moment when the hon. Member for Hammersmith paid tribute to the hon. Member for Westminster North’s

“unrivalled record in pursuing such matters”—[Official Report, 14 December 2010; Vol. 520, c. 207WH.]

If she had an unrivalled record in 2010, it is even more unrivalled now. I genuinely congratulate her on the work she has done over so long in raising these issues.

I begin by emphasising some important points that have been made powerfully but bear emphasis. Legal aid stands as a pillar of our constitution and a bulwark of our freedoms. For a great many people, it operates out of sight; they may go through their entire lives without encountering it, and in that way it is not like the NHS or schools or policing. However, for those who do encounter it, its importance is immediately understood. Legal aid ensures that the guilty are convicted and the innocent walk free; that those facing conviction, punishment and disgrace on the accusation of the state will have those allegations properly tested. It is there to ensure that the rights and liberties of ordinary citizens, often created by this Parliament, are upheld. To paraphrase Lord Reid in the Unison case, legal aid ensures that statutes are not rendered a dead letter.

I echo the points that the hon. Lady for Westminster North made about practitioners. She referred to the good will, dedication and vocation of those who practise in legal aid work, and I cannot use any better words. She put it very well. They are not fat cats. I make the point, as I made in an earlier debate, that those who act in these cases, or indeed any cases, may very well not agree with their clients on the substance of what is being advanced, but they know that their first duty is to the court and their second duty is to their client. They must defend those interests and fight that case, within the law, without fear or favour. Those principles underpin why the Government spent £1.7 billion last year funding legal aid for those who need it. It is imperative that we properly protect this support and that it continues to be available in the future.

The hon. Member for Hammersmith asked me to concede that funding is less now than it was in 2012. That is a fact, so he is right about that. In fairness—I pay tribute to the entirely appropriate tone that the debate has been conducted in overall—in 2010 there was a sense that, whichever Government came into power, there were going to be some cuts. However, the question at this stage, as we take stock, is what legal aid should be required for and to what extent. That is a careful consideration that we intend to apply.

Over the past few months, the importance of the advice and legal sectors has been brought into sharp focus. My officials and I have been engaging extensively with various organisations across the advice sector throughout this period, and I know how challenging it has been for providers and their service users alike. I also know how many providers and practitioners across England and Wales have gone above and beyond to ensure that vulnerable people across society can continue to get the help they need.

As a Government, we have tried to support that work as best we can over this difficult period. I am delighted that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Laura Farris) pointed out, we were able to secure £5.4 million of emergency funding for the not-for-profit advice sector, to ensure that providers across England and Wales were able to adapt their operations and continue to provide their important services. In the early days of the pandemic, we understood that almost half the law centres in England and Wales were facing potential collapse, and I am extremely pleased that our funding helped to prevent that outcome. I do not suggest for a second that it solved all problems, but I hope it is fair to say that it was of some significant assistance.

I am also grateful for the close working relationships we have built with actors across the sector to ensure that funding can be utilised in the most effective way possible. Beyond the funding, we made a number of changes to support legal aid providers in the short term, including changing rules for payments on account and ensuring that providers can claim the same for remote hearings as they can for face-to-face hearings. In August we announced additional funding of up to £51 million for criminal defence lawyers through the criminal legal aid review.

Respectfully, and notwithstanding the point that can always properly be made that there needs to be more, £51 million is a significant sum. The point that I would gently make is that that was the first occasion when people were being paid for reviewing unused material. As practitioners in this room no doubt well understand, it is those hours spent between 10 o’clock at night and midnight reviewing the unused material that all too often discloses that critical point that allows them to advance in court the key issue that might lead to the acquittal of their client. That is now being remunerated in a way that it was not before.

I have very limited time, so let me try to deal with the issue of sustainability. Although I maintain that we have made some positive changes in the time available, I think everyone here would acknowledge that there is more to be done to ensure that the legal aid and advice sector thrives into the future. Many of us here will be well aware of the challenges faced by the sector, and we do not seek to suggest that they do not exist or to downplay them. The demands on providers, and indeed on the courts, are high and will likely remain high over the coming months as the covid-19 recovery gathers pace. Those impacts will no doubt be felt across society.

We are already doing important work in this space, and we want to go further in the coming months. As has been trailed, I recently launched our new legal support for litigants in person grant, which builds on the more than £9 billion that the MOJ has invested. There are some who would say, as did the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous), who is no longer in his place, “Look, it’s not enough.” I understand why he says that, but we need to look forensically at what it is going to develop. The answer is that law does not stand still, just as the rest of the world does not stand still. There are other mechanisms by which legal advice and assistance can be delivered using technology, and we must be alive to that.

In some of the excellent conversations that I have had with law centres, they have started to recognise that maybe their catchment area of need is not simply the area around, say, North Kensington for North Kensington Law Centre or the area around Hammersmith for the Hammersmith and Fulham Law Centre—which, incidentally, I know fine well the hon. Member for Hammersmith has spent many years supporting. Is there scope for technology to widen that catchment area, to broaden access to justice?

We have also launched a new project considering the issues relating to the wider long-term sustainability of the civil legal aid system. I am only too well aware that many practitioners and stakeholders say that this is a long-standing issue, but now, of course, it has been made more pressing due to the current situation, and we are taking a broad look at the system. Some hon. Members have raised the point about fee levels, and that is fair. In addition to considering the fee levels, we will look at structural issues such as the delivery model for civil legal aid and will seek to improve the remote delivery of advice where appropriate, to ensure support is available for those in hard-to-reach places, learning both from what has worked well during the pandemic and what has worked less well.

I have only a minute left, sadly, and I want to give my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst time to speak. I could have talked about the means test review. I wanted to talk about CLAR, the accelerated areas, the courts estate, which is getting more money, and my principal passion, early legal support and advice. I am absolutely of the view that intervening early makes a huge difference.

Let me end by saying that covid-19 presents a great challenge to our way of life, perhaps unknown in the modern era outside wartime. Other priorities will likely dominate the headlines—jobs, schools, hospitals, debt—but in a nation of laws, legal aid is vital, now and in the future. Legal aid work will never provide the personal financial rewards for practitioners of a commercial or chancery practice, and nor should it, but we need a system that continues to attract lawyers of sufficient calibre, prioritises acute legal need, achieve redress and improves people’s lives. That is the platform for those priorities that I have set out today.

[Sir Robert Neill]

Even I can’t be that short.

Lord Chancellor’s Oath and the Rule of Law

Robert Neill Excerpts

Wednesday 14th October 2020 Westminster Hall

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair again, Mr Twigg, and to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). I have great respect for her as a lawyer; we do not always agree in our political views, but I take seriously what she says on legal matters. I ought to mention my interests as a non-practising member of the English Bar, as a consultant to a law firm and as a bencher of the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple. I will start with the topic of the debate: the Lord Chancellor’s oath. The hon. and learned Lady ranged widely in her speech, and I am sure she will forgive me if I do not follow some particular matters that she understandably raised relating to the constitutional settlement and devolution.

The irony of this debate is that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 does indeed place the Lord Chancellor in a different position from that of other Ministers, both because of the oath and because of their obligation under section 17(1) of the 2005 Act to respect the rule of law and defend the independence of the judiciary. Ironically, the Blair Government in 2005 never actually defined the rule of law in the Act. The late Lord Bingham, who has been much quoted already in this debate and probably will be again, noted that that was interesting and rather unusual, as it placed great reliance on a concept that was set out in statute but never defined. That, he concluded, clearly was not an accident; it was clearly because it was probably impossible, if not unhelpful, to find a pithy statutory definition that could be put in an Act of Parliament of something that has evolved over time. His conclusion in his admirable book, which I brought along this morning, is that it was desirable to leave the matter to be decided—as courts might need to, from time to time—in the practical, rather than purely in the abstract, as issues arose. That, perhaps, is wise.

That means that it was wrong for some in recent weeks, since the arrival of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, to make rather unjustified ad hominem attacks on the current Lord Chancellor—first, on his conduct throughout, and secondly, in making an assertion that the rule of law is potentially breached. An assertion is, of course, no more than that, and a legal argument, however distinguished, be it made by academic or legal commentators, is no more than that either. I have known the Lord Chancellor for his whole professional career, and the reality is that he is absolutely rooted in his commitment to the rule of law and to the profession, as he made clear when he took his oath and repeatedly since. I will come to part 5 of the Bill in a moment, about which my views are well known. However, I believe and am satisfied that the Lord Chancellor has acted diligently throughout all this to ensure that we deal with a potentially difficult situation proportionately and consistent with our obligations.

Since taking, the Lord Chancellor has also been clear in his support for the independence and integrity of the judiciary. Not all his predecessors in recent years have been; I say that frankly. There are people in all jurisdictions that we might wish to brush over, as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West put it. For every Lord Rich there is a Lord Braxfield, perhaps, and others who we might not wish to dwell upon. The reality is that the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Robert Buckland), has been meticulous in this. I welcome his clear commitment in his letter to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, to the Government’s continuing support for the provisions of the European convention on human rights. He has been willing to be outspoken on that.

Reference was made to the risk to the rule of law being undermined by the Government’s proposals to examine the scope of judicial review. When I started my law degree at the London School of Economics—which was, I hate to say, in the early 1970s—judicial review was a very new and evolving legal concept. There was little of it in those days. It grew, as many of us will remember, through the Gouriet judgment, the Grunwick case and so on, and perhaps rightly so. There has never been a fixed corpus of law in this area, as there is in others, such as jury trial. There is nothing wrong in that; the advantage of the common-law system is that it can evolve.

No one would seriously say that, prior to the development of the current system of judicial review in, let us say, the 1970s through to the beginning of this century, Britain was not a country that was subject to the rule of law. A willingness to review the way in which judicial review as a concept operates, and what are or are not the proper limits, cannot be regarded as an assault on the rule of law per se, on any objective basis.

[Joanna Cherry]

I take that on board, but the difficulty is that the individual who has been put in charge of the review has evinced very strong criticisms of the Supreme Court’s decision in the prorogation cases and has also evinced hostility to the European convention on human rights, notwithstanding what the hon. Gentleman has already said. There is a widespread perception in the legal profession that what is intended here is to circumscribe the rule of law, not just because Lord Faulks is the chair but because of the Government’s rhetoric. Surely the hon. Gentleman must see that.

[Sir Robert Neill]

Lord Faulks is a fellow bencher of the Middle Temple and a distinguished lawyer. That does not mean that one always has to agree with everything that he says. It would not be fair or reasonable to judge somebody by past comments until we have seen the results of the panel as a whole. Lord Faulks is the chair of the panel, but there are other very distinguished people on it as well. I respect what the hon. and learned Lady says, but this is a classic case of not prejudging the issue until we have seen the outcome of the deliberations.

I am a great believer in judicial review, in appropriate cases. Has it sometimes been abused? Many people would say that perhaps that can be the case. When I was the junior Minister at the Department for Communities and Local Government, I was critical of the attitude adopted to some decisions by the then Secretary of State, the noble Lord Pickles, is he is now, in relation to the removal of regional spatial strategies. We were judicially reviewed by large commercial housebuilders, undoubtedly in pursuit of their own vested commercial interests. They sought to prevent our removing the comparatively easy route, so they could impose large housing developments on communities that did not want them. I was critical of those house builders for doing that and for undermining in law the wishes of local residents. The courts found that they were entitled to do it, but that does not mean that we were assaulting judicial review as a concept, simply by criticising the motive behind some of the people who bring it.

There is an important distinction, which I recognise. We criticised the clients—the people who brought the judicial review—but I did not criticise the lawyers who were instructed on their behalf. I would not seek to do so. It is important to say that we should not, whatever our views in politics, use political arguments to attack lawyers generally or by taking broadbrush approaches. The attacks upon the judges, which were not perhaps called out as much as they should have been at the time of the early Miller litigation, were wholly disgraceful and unacceptable. The current Lord Chancellor has made it clear that he would not countenance such attacks and such language without speaking out. That is very much to his credit and entirely consistent with his own personal integrity. I do not care for the use of language such as “lefty lawyers” or the broadbrush approach of saying that systems are being hijacked. That is not language that I would use. However, I am a Member of Parliament; I am not a speech writer.

I gently observe that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West referred to the taxi rank principle at the Bar. That is something that I have always worked under as well. To be fair, there have always been sets of chambers that would not prosecute, or would not act for landlords, for example. Some might ask whether that is in theory inconsistent with the taxi rank rule. It probably is, yet it is not something that warrants a great deal of personal attack. I just make the observation that those matters cannot be seen in a purely academic sense. I would not make too much of that, but that is where I stand as far as that is concerned. It is pretty clear where the Lord Chancellor stands, and where I suspect my hon. Friend the Minister stands as well, as far as those matters are concerned.

The other issue raised is part 5 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, about which I was not a little critical when it was first introduced. I believe we have sought to improve that Bill. Is it perfect? As yet, that I do not know. Would the use of the powers in part 5 be wise politics? That is a very big question mark. However, that is not the same as, say, that it is per se constitutionally improper to put those clauses in the Bill, provided there are appropriate safeguards. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West might disagree upon that, but I think it is a legitimate area of legal dispute and the Lord Chancellor is entitled to have a different view from her and, indeed, perhaps from me in that regard, without it being suggested that he has failed to uphold his oath of office or his constitutional obligations.

I note the views, which have been referred to, of Professor Catherine Barnard. She is a distinguished academic and her views are worthy of respect. By their nature, however, she not being a judge or legislator, and valuable and worthy of respect though they are, they cannot be determinative of the point. It is one side of an argument that can properly be hooked. If, on those matters, there were no scope for difference of opinion, no scope for difference of legal interpretation, no scope for legal argument, there would scarcely be any scope for litigation and scarcely any scope for lawyers at the end of the day. It is perfectly possible for respectable lawyers to hold different opinions around matters of this kind, particularly in emerging areas of law or new legislation as it comes forward, without it being appropriate for us to say that either side is seeking to undermine constitutional principles or their professional or governmental responsibilities. That is the proper way to look at the position, as far as that is concerned here.

I am glad to say, in response to some of the endeavours, which I may have had a small hand in, the Government have made it clear that, effectively, they will only be using those powers should they ever be needed. I hope to heavens that they are never needed because we will get a deal, but should that be the case, there will be certain triggers that would have to be met, both in procedural terms but also in terms of substance. In particular, we would only do so had the European Union, in our judgment, demonstrated bad faith. Bad faith is recognised in international treaty law and in the Vienna convention as being a ground under which it is possible to derogate from an otherwise binding commitment.

The fact that we will be using this as a shield rather than a sword is important—it is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, in some respects. The Minister may well have more to say about that, but that is an important shift and one that I welcome. Therefore, the suggestion that the mere putting of those clauses on the face of the legislation is itself a breach of law is not one that is universally accepted, and I do not think therefore that it can be regarded as an act of impropriety on the part of the Government or of any Minister. As I say, there is a proper political debate as to the wisdom of using them, if we ever come to that, but that is not for today.

I want to say one final thing in relation to this. Lord Bingham was very clear that the rule of law itself is something that can evolve and must be flexible, but there are certain fundamentals. I do not think anyone would suggest that anything we are doing here alters the basic fundamentals. I am conscious of his eighth principle, but I do not think we are at that stage, and I hope we will not be. Moreover, he accepted that parliamentary sovereignty was a fundamental part of the rule of law too. There is always a set of checks and balances in that regard.

I have no problem with certain circumstances where the actions of Ministers properly should be reviewed by the courts, but I do not think this is really going to change that. Lord Bingham made it quite clear, though, that he did not accept the view advanced by, for example, Lord Steyn or Baroness Hale of Richmond that there are some concepts so fundamental that even Parliament cannot legislate to change them. He did not take that view. Again, there is a perfectly respectable dispute there and disagreement between highly distinguished former jurists, which makes the point that none of the arguments powerfully advanced by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West are determinative of any failing by either the Lord Chancellor or any other Minister in respect of their constitutional obligations.

This is a worthwhile debate to have. In a sense, an hour and a half is not enough to do it justice, because as we go forward, we are going to have to think about our constitutional and legal settlements in a broader sense, how we will operate the separation of powers in a post-Brexit world and how, continuing, as I hope, as a unified state with devolution within it, we can perhaps refine the arrangements that are required to make that work in practice too. Those are all proper matters for further consideration, but do not, I think, impinge upon any proper allegation of any failure by the current Lord Chancellor or his Ministers to act in accordance with their constitutional duties.

[Derek Twigg (in the Chair)]

Before I call Rob Butler, I remind him that I intend to take the Front-Bench speakers around 10.40 am, so if he could keep his speech to around six minutes, so that the Member for South Cambridgeshire (Anthony Browne) can get in, I would be very grateful.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]

Robert Neill Excerpts

Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee stage: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 6th October 2020 Commons Chamber

Whatever happens here today, the Bill needs to go back to the other place. I hope that that will provide a breathing space for Ministers to take stock of the issues at hand and agree a compromise position that should, frankly, have been reached by now.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I rise in support of the amendments in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly). I agree with and adopt the arguments that he has made—in particular, in relation to scrutiny and the inadequacy of the current arrangements under the CRaG Act. That is not satisfactory, and we are going to have to address it sooner or later. As a consequence of leaving the European Union, we will be signing a great number of international treaties and other important international obligations, too—free trade agreements of many kinds. We do have to put in place a fit-for-purpose system, and relying on the Ponsonby convention really is not sustainable at the current time.

I had the pleasure, funnily enough, of knowing the third Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede—now no longer with us—who was very active in London government, and it was his grandfather who was responsible for this. That is itself indicative of the passage of time. It was in 1924, at the time of the Zinoviev letter, when this convention was put in place, so we really do have to have something—with every respect to the memory of the Lords Ponsonby—that is more fit for purpose for the modern time, particularly because this deals with very important issues and because international treaties have themselves become much more complex and very frequently now have implications for domestic law, as well as international treaty law obligations. Therefore, a new system, as set out of my hon. Friend, for scrutinising these issues is something we have to do at some point.

The one issue that does need to be dealt with quickly—my hon. Friend is right about how long such treaties take—is that we should sign up to the Lugano convention as a matter of absolute urgency. It is one of the unfortunate consequences of our departing from the European Union that we will leave one of the most sophisticated and effective means of civil justice co-operation that exists. That was not probably something very much debated during the referendum, and it is perhaps collateral damage in that sense of the broader decision that was taken, which I have to respect, but it is an important potential loss for British legal services and British business.

That can be made good if we swiftly joined Lugano, and a number of other international conventions, including the various Hague conventions, that go with it. That is why our amendment would in fact place joining Lugano in the Bill, although I will not read out new schedule 1 in detail. There is a real concern among businesses, as well as among lawyers, of a lacuna. At the moment, any British company or individual contracting with someone in the EU or the European Free Trade Association for that matter would, by virtue of our membership of the EU, be part of the Brussels I and Brussels II recast conventions and also of the Rome conventions in relation to domestic family law. Those enable contracts to be recognised and enforced, and judgments of the courts on those contracts to be recognised and enforced automatically in any of the member states. We have that advantage at the moment by virtue of our membership of the EU, carried over in the transition period, but that will go.

Obviously, for any contract to be worth its weight, it has to be enforceable—there is no point in having it otherwise—and that runs across every type of business. There is the significant and highly lucrative development of derivatives and other financial instruments, in which the City of London remains a world leader, and they have to be enforceable should they ever be called upon, as do contracts for manufacturers or the supply of agricultural produce. Contracts for any type of good or service that have an international dimension have to be effectively enforceable, and the same applies for the rights of individuals.

For example, for the British tourist or business person abroad who is injured in a road accident where the defendant—the driver at fault—is resident in one of the continental states, at the moment they can pursue their action in Bromley county court if need be or in the High Court to get a judgment and then have it enforced in France, Germany or elsewhere. Without getting into Lugano, there will be a gap in that person’s ability to seek justice and redress. It would be unconscionable if we should get ourselves into that state of affairs.

There is also the position of the single parent if the father, perhaps, of a child has moved to one of the EU jurisdictions. At the moment, the mother can enforce the judgment of the British family courts for maintenance payments, access arrangements and so on. They can be enforced in the place where the father is domiciled, and she can get her money. Again, it would be unconscionable if we were to have a gap. I know that that is not what the Minister wants, and I know that the Government are striving earnestly to achieve this, but at the moment we do not have it. If I get the chance, I may say more about that on Third Reading, but that is why we think giving statutory provision for Lugano in the Bill demonstrates its importance.

As the negotiations go forward, it is obviously important that we get a deal on free trade in relation to goods and tariffs, but absolutely as important is that we get a deal on judicial co-operation—whether criminal and police co-operation, but also civil co-operation. I hope that our negotiators will be saying, “If we get a deal with the EU, part of that must include the Commission dropping its current objections to the UK joining Lugano.” I hope that that is a negotiating gambit at the moment. The EFTA members are happy for us to join. The EU members at the moment, on the advice of the Commission, are not. This may not be easy, because France and Germany, in particular, have a history of being highly protective towards their jurisdictions in matters of legal services, so it is not something that is to be a footnote for Mr Frost’s agenda—the full Frost agenda, if I can put it that way. It should be central. That is why we think it is sufficiently important to flag it up on the face of the Bill. The Minister knows that, and I think it needs to be stated and put out there, right across Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

But the point is that when we were in the European Union and the European Union had competence to enter into PIL agreements, those would be brought into effect in the United Kingdom via the doctrine of direct effect. What role did this Parliament have? None. We are seeking to introduce much more by way of parliamentary scrutiny—the points, respectfully, that the right hon. Gentleman did not advert to. First, there is the CRaG procedure, and secondly there is the affirmative procedure.

I am at pains to mention that because I talked just a few moments ago about the Israeli agreement and the United States agreement. How did those come into force? Not through the affirmative procedure, not even through the negative procedure, but through an Order in Council. In other words, normal hon. Members—mere mortals like most of the people in the Chamber—had no say at all; just Privy Counsellors. We therefore respectfully say that it does not lie in the mouth of the Opposition to raise these concerns.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison) made the point powerfully that this precedent, which the Opposition understood when they were in government, recognises that there is an opportunity cost. If we start filling up the parliamentary timetable with such legislation, which everyone accepts is not controversial, there is less time and less space for schools, hospitals and transport, etc.

On the point about criminal offences, which was made powerfully by the Chairman of the Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), this is an area where it is important to move cautiously. We will continue to reflect on the range of views expressed. I agree with him that an awful lot of offences are created by statutory instruments, but we need to take care, none the less.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I am grateful for the Minister’s observations in relation to criminal offences, and I will take him at his word as far as that is concerned. I know that he will want to take away, perhaps, how we deal with that proportionately.

The Minister refers to the value of the affirmative procedure, as is proposed. That, of course, is used when the PIL treaty first comes into force in our domestic law, but often these treaties or agreements can be modified as they go along. Can he help me with the concerns raised by the Bar Council and the Law Society about how the proposed scrutiny regime would deal with, for example, declarations that are attached to international agreements when we bring them into force? Such declarations can sometimes modify or limit their scope. Secondly, how will we deal with model laws, which are now often used in international trade negotiations?

[Alex Chalk]

If I may respectfully say so, that is an excellent point. That is one of the reasons why we seek to frame things this way, because one of the points my hon. Friend made most powerfully is that there are shortcomings in the Lugano convention. He talked about the Italian torpedo, but there are others, some of which Lord Mance referred to in the other place, for example.

How are we to be expected, in an agile and proportionate way, to address those changes, supposing they are negotiated, if we effectively have to have a new Act of Parliament each time? With respect, that would be wildly disproportionate. It would clog up this place unnecessarily, because there may be very good opportunities to improve those agreements and get them on to the statute book.

Let me deal with this business about Lugano, in amendments 1 to 4, 8 and 9, new clauses 1 and 2, new schedule 1, new schedule 3, new clause 5 and amendments (a) to (g). First, it is premature to put Lugano into the Bill while our application is outstanding, even if amendment 2 specifically includes reference to this being contingent on the UK’s accession. It is also inadequate—this is the point I was adverting to—as additional provisions will be required, mostly of a procedural or consequential nature, to properly implement to Lugano convention into domestic law.

For example, the civil procedure rules might need to be changed. What if Lugano is improved, as I indicated? What, also, if our application is unsuccessful? We may then need to move quickly. With whom will we want to move quickly? As my hon. Friend well knows, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland have published statements of support for our Lugano application, and that may be a route we would want to go down.

The most important point is that we have, and indeed should have, ambitions beyond Lugano. We must stay at the forefront of developments, whether the Singapore convention on mediation, as my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) powerfully referred to, or the Hague convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters, also known as Hague ’19.

I advert to the fact that the Bill properly complies with the devolution settlement. We take that extremely seriously. As the hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) indicated, both the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly have passed legislative consent motions for the Bill, and the Welsh Government have agreed that an LCM is not required as PIL is almost entirely reserved. There is a small exclusion for Cafcass Cymru, but that is really it.

The right hon. Member for Tottenham spoke about the super-affirmative procedure, and I accept this amendment was submitted in the spirit of trying to be helpful. I entirely acknowledge that. These proposals are contained within paragraph 4 of new schedule 3, tabled by the Opposition, and there is a similar proposal in new schedule 2, although the SNP new schedule would introduce a super-affirmative scrutiny power only for Lugano. I respectfully make the point, and I appreciate that this is to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), but why would we need a super-affirmative scrutiny power for Lugano, which we have been operating for years? That is not very obvious to me.

The bar for the super-affirmative scrutiny procedure has always been high. Let us look at the context. Section 85 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 provides for a super-affirmative procedure for regulations that deal with changes to reserved matters as set out in that Act. The Human Rights Act 1998 provides for such a procedure for remedial orders that deal with legislation that has been found to be incompatible—declarations of incompatibility. Under the Public Bodies Act 2011, a super-affirmative procedure is needed for orders that abolish, merge or change the constitutional funding arrangements. I dealt with those quickly, but the point is that super-affirmative procedure is reserved for matters of key constitutional importance. We must not forget that in the case we are discussing, we have the additional CRaG brake.

If we drill into the detail of super-affirmative procedure, it creates additional stages, but I query whether it results in improvements to the proposed regulations. Instead, it simply delays. It would also create a potential discrepancy between England and Wales and the devolved jurisdictions. One could easily imagine a situation whereby two litigants lived five miles either side of the border and the cases were dealt with differently, to the disadvantage of a litigant in England, because the Scottish Parliament had got on with it and simply brought an agreement into force. That would be unsatisfactory. I do not suggest that that is what the right hon. Member for Tottenham intends, but I fear it could be a consequence.

New clauses 1, 6 and 7 deal with laying the report. New clause 6 would require a report to be laid in Parliament before the UK ratifies an agreement. New clause 7 would require the Government to lay a report in Parliament for 10 House of Commons sitting days before a draft statutory instrument was laid. I accept the need for clear and detailed explanations, but it is not immediately obvious that new clause 7 would add anything to the current process. All SIs are already accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. I dug one out to prepare for the debate. It deals with the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. It runs to 18 pages and is very detailed and helpful. Other than requiring the information 10 days earlier, I cannot see that new clause 7 would make a difference. We should not forget that an SI is typically laid several weeks before the House gets to debate it. None the less, I accept the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst made about the need to reach out to distinguished practitioners and jurists. It is right that we should do that, and I am keen for that happen.

I am very grateful for the consideration of the Bill in Committee. I share the desire to ensure that PIL agreements that we wish to join and domestically implement are appropriately scrutinised. All Governments must balance the need for scrutiny with the need to move in a timely manner to ensure that British citizens can enjoy the benefits of PIL agreements as soon as it is properly possible to provide for them. Those benefits are significant, and if the House gets the balance wrong, our citizens will be denied them by an unnecessarily labyrinthine process.

The proposed procedures provide for scrutiny of a delegated power using an affirmative SI together with the CRaG procedure to implement the agreements. That is a balanced and proportionate approach.

[Sir Robert Neill]

Before the Minister sits down—

[Alex Chalk]

Just in the nick of time.

[Sir Robert Neill]

Perhaps the Minister can help my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and me. I understand what the Minister is saying, and none of us wishes to create a labyrinthine process. Does he accept that it may be necessary to learn from experience with CRaG as we go forward? Are the Government closing their mind to the idea that we could seek refinements and improvements to the CRaG process as we operate it? The answer might help us.

[Alex Chalk]

I thank my hon. Friend for raising that point. There is no doubt that the CRaG process is evolving and maturing. Proper points have been made about the need to consider it and how it should evolve over time. I certainly do not want to shut my eyes or my ears to my hon. Friend’s proposals.

The Bill takes a balanced and proportionate approach. I therefore invite hon. Members to support the Government amendments and reject the remainder.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Robert Neill]

We have had a constructive set of debates on the Bill, and I pay tribute to all Members for the approach that has been adopted. I pay particular tribute to the skill and elan with which the Minister has steered the Bill through the House: he is a credit to our mutual profession. He is certainly no Henry VIII—and I say that in a good way—but of course he and I are both proud members of the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple. The nearest Tudor connection I can find is that the first Middle Templar to be Lord Chancellor was Lord, previously Sir, Richard Rich, for those who follow “A Man for All Seasons”. I am not sure whether that is a good sign, but I do not think that the Minister is a Richard in terms of personal integrity, since he was certainly one of the most successful Lord Chancellors but also one of the most corrupt. We have moved forward a great deal, and I suspect that the legacy still entertains us in Middle Temple with the wine cellar.

The Minister has done a great job on the Bill, and I hope he will reflect on some of the comments made, none of which were aimed to obstruct or make life difficult for the Government, because we all share the objective. I welcome the tone adopted throughout by the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), and those on the SNP Front Bench. It is important for the country’s sake that we get this right.

It has been rightly observed that this is not just about dry technical law. When I went to the London School of Economics in the ’70s, it had an international law module, which most of us avoided. It had just introduced a European law module, and somebody said, “There’ll never be much work around that,” which shows how things can be got wrong. As we exit a period of 40 or more years during which EU law has been an increasingly important part of our domestic and international legal systems, it is all the more important that we have a proper means of getting private international law agreements on a sound footing. I think we all share the Government’s objective in that.

I suspect that this may not be the last we hear of the Bill, either in the other place or here. I hope we will find a constructive way forward that meets some of the concerns raised in the other place about how scrutiny is dealt with. I welcome the Minister’s longer-term commitment to look at those issues. I hope he will take away the criminal sanctions aspect in particular, and the need to look at how CRaG operates.

May I give the Minister a further reading list, so to speak? As well as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the other things for a wet Friday, perhaps he could look at the Law Society and Bar Council briefings on how we deal with the two issues that I flagged briefly in Committee in relation to our having a proportionate and effective means of scrutinising the declarations that are frequently attached to international legal agreements. International agreements are often adopted by country with a declaration that modifies or limits the extent of its application to varying degrees. The Bill provides for the affirmative procedure for the initial adherence to the treaties, but it might not, as far as we can see at the moment, cover how we would properly scrutinise the declarations, which could have a significant impact.

An example of that, if the Minister wants it, is that we are committed to seeking to join in our own right the Hague choice of court convention 2005, which is an important document. When we joined it as part of the EU, the EU opted to exclude insurance contracts from that agreement. The provisions that we made following the withdrawal agreement and the memorandum on delegated powers that accompanies this Bill suggest that we will continue to exclude insurance contracts from it.

We need to think about why that is and how we will deal with scrutiny of changes to that, because the potential effect of that is to deprive court judgments based on excluded contracts of the right to be enforced by the 2005 convention when we hopefully sign up to it. That would leave a considerable gap in a very important sector of the British economy. Insurance and reinsurance markets are of real significance to the financial world, and we need to have a means of adjusting the position if that is required and taking on board those concerns. That is precisely the area where it is suggested that we should be talking to the experts in not only private international law but the insurance sector. I have already declared my interests in relation to these matters, but it is important that we take that as an example.

A similar issue arises in relation to how we will deal with model laws. Model laws are not international conventions that impose rights and duties between contracting states, but they are what are sometimes termed agreed soft law provisions, which are often modified substantially before they are given effect in domestic law. They are important, none the less, and they are a growing area of activity, so I hope the Minister can think about the mechanism that we have to ensure that they are properly scrutinised, as well as being brought in timeously. I flag those up as examples of what we need to do. It is certainly important that we do not just stop at joining Lugano. Whether it is on the face of the Bill or not, I know that the Minister and the Government are committed to joining it, and that is an important first step, but as we all know, there are other conventions that it is most important we seek to join, some of which have already been mentioned. I hope that we will push on swiftly, for example, to implement and ratify the 1997, 2005 and 2007 Hague conventions, because between them they would provide a suite of the vital civil and family law co-operation measures that we want to see continue after the transition period.

Of course, we also hope that the Government will ratify and implement in England and Wales the 2000 Hague convention on the international protection of adults. It has already been brought into force in Scotland but not in England and Wales, and it seems bizarre that a vulnerable adult could be treated differently if they were in Gloucester as opposed to Glasgow. That implementation would, for example, enable us to deal with important issues relating to vulnerable adults such as people who are subject to powers of attorney or who are under the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection and who might have overseas assets or overseas properties. Not having continuity of legal recognition of the judgments and contracts that are entered into could make it difficult to deal with those persons’ affairs.

These are techie issues, but they affect real lives, so the technical is not insignificant or without a human dimension. I hope that, as we go forward on a constructive basis, we can ensure that, having decided to leave the EU and branch out into broader areas of economic activity, the Government will make a concerted effort, as both the Law Society and the Bar Council have called for, to take a lead in selling, maintaining and building on the UK’s position as a jurisdiction of choice. Tens of thousands of jobs depend on it, as does billions of pounds-worth of economic activity, and it is in our fundamental national, strategic, economic interest to do this. With this Bill on the statute book, I hope that that is the most important thing the Government take forward as a matter of high policy in our negotiations to, hopefully, exit the EU with a deal, and in future free trade agreements.

So far, it has been tough to get free trade agreements to deal with services, and legal services in particular, but we have a potentially strong asset in our legal system and in the integrity and standing of our judiciary, which we should never pillory. No politician should ever knock lawyers for the sake of it, because ultimately, respect for the integrity of the system is fundamental. I know that the Minister and the Lord Chancellor share that view, and I hope that the Bill will give us an opportunity to build strongly on that.

Oral Answers to Questions

Robert Neill Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I thank the hon. Lady for her kind remarks. The issue is very straightforward. If we are in a position where the EU has acted in material breach of its own treaty obligations, meaning that acts to the active prejudice of the United Kingdom are being occasioned, then we will act.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I also wish the Lord Chancellor a happy birthday. I calculate that I have known him for about half his life. Throughout that time, I have never had the slightest doubt as to his integrity and his commitment to the rule of law. Does he accept that the important changes that the Government accepted in the course of the Committee stage yesterday would not have happened without some pressure from the Back Benches, and without his very close personal and direct involvement in making changes to the Bill and to the test that the Government will apply. That was precisely because he, I and many others are committed to the rule of law. Ad hominem attacks to the contrary are unworthy and unjustified.

[Robert Buckland]

I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend. He is right to remind us that personal attacks are no substitute for real debate. What he has done, and what I have sought to do, is, at all times, to make sure that we find a way through these problems. Brexit has thrown up unprecedented challenges to a Government in peacetime. I never pretended that it was going to be anything other than a difficult road. He shares that view and, through his constructive work and the work that I and others have done, this House has a lock on these matters, and, indeed, I think the way is much clearer and much more satisfactory.

Sentencing White Paper

Robert Neill Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

It was all going so well, and then the right hon. Gentleman had to spoil it with an ill-judged, ill-timed and wholly inappropriate intervention. May I remind him that as a practitioner, for years I had to endure a Labour Government that passed with incontinence criminal justice Act after criminal justice Act, creating the chaos with sentencing reform that I am now having to deal with? With the greatest respect to him, I will take no lectures about a Labour Government who made automatic early release at the halfway term the norm for so many sentences. That is the wrong that we are righting now as a result of the reforms that we will introduce.

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for how he has sensibly engaged with the important issues about the rehabilitation of offenders. I am particularly pleased by the warm welcome for the work we will do on neurodivergent conditions and disorders. That has been a long-standing passion and commitment of mine. Autism and ADHD are real conditions that affect thousands of people in our country. I have had personal experience in the criminal justice system of representing people with those conditions, and I think we can do better. That is why we will take action on that.

I can reassure the right hon. Gentleman about the cross-Government work on offender employment. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, who is deeply committed to increasing the number of offenders in work. We are working on plans and a cross-Government strategy. The committee is chaired by the Prime Minister, which exemplifies the Government’s deep and fundamental dedication to this bold agenda.

I welcome the other comments that the right hon. Gentleman has made, and it is in that spirit of constructive engagement that I am sure we will work together to make sense of criminal justice after years of failure, mainly by the Government of which he was a member.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I warmly congratulate the Lord Chancellor on an excellent and very well-balanced statement, which shows his own experience as a practitioner in these matters. A number of the themes that the White Paper addresses are ones that the Justice Select Committee has picked up on a number of occasions. I look forward to progress being made on those. I particularly welcome the recognition that protection of the public and rehabilitation of those who can be rehabilitated are not mutually exclusive. However, will he also use the opportunity of the White Paper to engender a wider debate across society as a whole about the purpose of sentencing, and the purposes of imprisonment and community sentences, to give both the public and sentencers greater confidence in the suite of measures available and create a broader-based, better-informed understanding of the complexities of the tasks that people in the justice system grapple with day to day?

[Robert Buckland]

I am grateful to the Chairman of the Justice Committee. We all know his long and deep knowledge of the system as a practitioner. He is right to remind us of the purposes of sentencing. He will see in the White Paper a lot of reference to public protection issues—protecting the public from harm, but also protecting the public from crime. The two go together, and one is served, I would submit, by effective prison sentences, while the second is served by rehabilitation through the community options that can make such a difference with the right support.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]

Robert Neill Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 2nd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I share my hon. Friend’s enthusiasm and sense of impatience about the pace of change in fora such as the Council of Europe. I just need to caution him on this basis. When it comes to the use of the powers that we anticipate under this Bill, we are talking about a narrowly defined type of agreement—practical, detailed but important changes that will lead to the sort of improvements that I referred to in responding to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). I am sure that as he hears not just my contribution but the one made in winding up by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), he will be even clearer about the particular role that this Bill will play in the incorporation of international law.

That is very important, because concerns were raised in the other place that somehow this was a Trojan horse or an invitation to open the floodgates, to allow for the incorporation of major swathes of international treaty law into domestic legislation with minimal scrutiny. Nothing could be further from the case.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Robert Buckland]

I give way to my hon. Friend the Chair of the Justice Committee.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I know that we will move on to the question of what is not in the Bill and what might be later, but before the Lord Chancellor leaves the issue of improving our access to international legal agreements, he has not yet mentioned our application to accede to the Lugano convention, which many regard as critical, it being markedly superior in a number of respects to those listed on the face of the Bill. There is a concern that the Commission is currently recommending against Britain joining the convention, even though the European Free Trade Association members of that convention support it. What is the position on that? Will he assure us that the Government regard this as one of the highest priorities in our ongoing negotiations? It should not be allowed to be hijacked and held as a hostage to fortune in other negotiations.

[Robert Buckland]

I can assure my hon. Friend that not only do the Government place a very high premium upon the importance of accession to Lugano, but I personally have vested my own time in direct discussions with counterparts at the Commission and other member states of the EU. In fact, in Zagreb, at the final Justice and Home Affairs Council, I took the opportunity to discuss this at length with several other member states and, indeed, the then newly appointed Commissioner for Justice, and we had a very productive discussion.

My view and that of Her Majesty’s Government is very straightforward: the application for Lugano is a discrete matter. It is separate from the negotiations that are ongoing with regard to a future free trade agreement, and it should be treated as a separate matter. The time for ideology has gone. This is a time for us all to remember that the interests of the citizens that member states serve are paramount, and the interests of ensuring that civil judgments are enforced as swiftly as possible are clear. I call upon all interested parties to put those priorities first, and then hopefully we will see a swifter conclusion to the negotiations, but I welcome the warm support we have had from EFTA countries both prior and subsequent to our application.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Buckland]

Indeed it has made some very trenchant comments about CRAG, and that is precisely why it is important that that Committee does its work on improving and enhancing the procedure. I welcome its work and we will actively engage and ensure that that is so.

The most pressing need for the delegated power is to implement what we hope to see—namely, the Lugano convention, which we have already discussed. As I have said, we still do not know the outcome of our application. It is being considered by the contracting parties to the convention, including the EU. It currently underpins our private international law relationship with Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, but could also be used to underpin our relationship with the EU after the end of the transition period. It would provide valuable certainty on cross-border recognition and the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments, as well as clarity on which country’s courts may hear a dispute.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s commitment to joining Lugano. It is important for all the reasons he has set out. There was compelling evidence given to the Justice Committee over a number of years about the importance of this. Also, is it not important that we join so that we can then, as one of the convention parties, seek to influence the development of the convention—for example, to avoid a race to the bottom in jurisdictional terms in dealing with the threat, as it is sometimes called, of the Italian torpedo? We cannot deal with the Italian torpedo until we are in Lugano to sort it out, so is that not all the more reason to reflect on putting this on the face of the Bill? Perhaps nothing would be lost by doing that.

[Robert Buckland]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The Italian torpedo is not a reference to the successful naval action by the Royal Navy against the forces of fascist Italy in the second world war. This is a particular device taken by parties who issue proceedings in a jurisdiction that they know will not accept control over the particular proceedings. It is, in other words, a massive delaying tactic that can cause real obstruction to the course of justice and to the resolution of important disputes, and that is why he is right to say that Lugano would be very much a beginning when it comes to the development and refinement of that type of important co-operation.

My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) asked why we do not mention Lugano. Well, there is an obvious argument that I should have addressed, which is that, as we have not yet been able to join it, it would perhaps be premature for us to refer to it directly on the face of the Bill, as opposed to the Hague conventions, which we have joined. Regrettably, there will not be time to bring forward further primary legislation before the end of the year, should our application be approved within the next few months. Therefore, for that sad but practical reason, it would be right not to pass anticipatory legislation but rather to await the outcome of the negotiation and then to allow the use of the delegated power.

The power could also be used to implement other agreements. I have talked about mediation, and in particular the 2019 Singapore convention on mediation and 2019 Hague judgments convention. We have not yet taken a formal decision on either of those, but of course I am happy to talk more about those conventions with hon. Members during the passage of this Bill and, indeed, in the future as we decide on our final approach to these instruments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I welcome the approach to the Bill that the Lord Chancellor has adopted and I support the Bill. I support it without hesitation, because it is necessary, but also with a measure of sadness, because I wish it were not necessary. It is a consequence of a decision that was taken that some of us continue to regret and is perhaps an example of the price that is paid in respect of an issue that some thought was technical and dry but that in fact affected people’s everyday lives and the prosperity of the business community of this country but was perhaps not given enough attention in the course of the debates that preceded our decision to leave the EU. Perhaps that caused us not to value enough the system of connections and regulation that we were party to.

The reality is that we are doing our level best—the Lord Chancellor and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) are doing precisely that—to put in place the best possible scheme that we can have and that is available to us when, at the end of the year, we leave the most comprehensive set of private international law agreements that exist. We just have to accept that that is the reality, but let us not kid ourselves that we will get any improvement: we will end up with something that is less good than we had and that we are leaving behind—ironically, when the Brussels IIa recast, particularly in its relation to the strengthening of the provisions in relation to jurisdiction-of-choice clauses, is something that Britain has succeeded in having changed and improved specifically to advance and protect the interests of the British-jurisdiction and English-law clauses that greatly advantage the City of London and our broader national financial services sector. I put that on the record as a matter of context and to get it off my chest, but it needs to be said, because it ought to influence the way and the speed with which we now move on this.

I welcome the fact that the Government have picked up, on this and the preceding measures, a number of the Justice Committee’s recommendations on how we might best deal with the situation that we find ourselves in. For example, bringing the Rome regulations on family and other matters, which did not require reciprocity, into domestic law, and implementing the Hague convention, as set out on the face of the Bill, are desirable. The ambition to join Lugano is, for reasons that we have already debated, very important. The Hague conventions are worthwhile but are not as good as what we had before, so moving to Lugano, which would be an improvement, would be a step forward.

I hope, too, that we swiftly deal with the other two conventions referred to in the helpful letter that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, sent to all Members of Parliament: the 2019 Singapore convention and the future Hague convention agreements. There has been some debate in the other place, particularly from Lord Mance, about which order they shall come in. On balance, I am persuaded by the evidence that we have heard over the years and the arguments made by the Law Society of England and Wales—I think the Law Society of Scotland finds itself in the same place—that the more important thing is not to have any gap in the recognition and enforcement of judgments and recognition of international public clauses. That is why the Law Society favours pressing ahead with entry to Lugano as soon as we can, rather than waiting for what may develop with the Hague arrangements. The Government are right not to delay in that regard; we must press ahead.

That is, of course, the means by which we should deal with the Italian torpedo. I mention it not because this is like when we were doing trials in long, boring fraud cases, and there was sometimes a bit of a side bet to make an unlikely comment in one’s closing speech to the jury. The truth is, as we all know, that the Italian torpedo—the delaying tactic of seeking to thwart an exclusive jurisdiction clause, very often operating in favour of the UK, by commencing unmeritorious and almost abusive proceedings in another jurisdiction, which would then hold up the process—has caused a problem in commercial matters and real hardship in many family law cases. Getting the family law issues right is particularly important. The Government’s objective of ensuring that, for example, the partner of a finished relationship is able to enforce her maintenance payments from the other partner, who may be in one of the EU or other contracting states, is critical for ordinary individuals—not just businesses. Having in place a means of protecting the English and Scots law jurisdiction clauses, which are very important for financial services contracts, is critical too.

It is perhaps not the time to go into this in detail, but when we get to Committee, may I ask Ministers to reflect on the matter of asymmetrical jurisdiction, which was raised by Lord Mance, who has massive experience in this field? I tend to agree with him on that, whereas I am not persuaded about the sequencing of Lugano and Hague. He referred to it in some detail in his speech in the Lords. I will not repeat what he said, as he is much more experienced than me, the Lord Chancellor and the Under-Secretary of State, who did not have the fortune—literally or otherwise—to practise in that field. Lord Mance’s wise words are important, because this issue relates to derivative swaps and other financial instruments, which, for reasons that he set out well, are of particular importance to the UK financial services sector. As things stand at the moment, the provisions in the Bill do not sufficiently address that.

That is a technical but important matter for our business interests that we ought perhaps to reflect on as the Bill makes progress in Committee.

The other thing I want to say at this stage is that while I know the Lord Chancellor wishes to be ambitious in scope, I am not saying that this is necessarily a Henry VIII power or that all wide-ranging powers to amend by delegation are always wrong. Lord Garnier, who has been referred to as a mutual friend of all those on this side of the House and elsewhere, put it rather well when he said—I paraphrase him—that essentially all parties when in opposition oppose clauses of this type, but all parties when in government make use of them. He said that he had done so himself, and I did so myself when I was a Minister. Those on the Treasury Bench have done so at various times, so it is not a question of haloes in that regard—

[Alex Cunningham]

But on this occasion, Lord Garnier was actually in support of the Opposition’s position.

[Sir Robert Neill]

He was indeed, and if the hon. Gentleman allows me to develop it, I will suggest a nuanced way around this. It is not to say that we should not have delegated powers, but that we should perhaps look again at the way in which they are cast. I do not think it would necessarily be needed to bring back clause 2, as it was before it was removed by the other House—and I understand Lord Chancellor’s point about not bringing in pre-emptive legislation—but there was some merit and a genuine concern to assist in the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) about putting the power on the face of the Bill with a provision to exercise it at such time as the application was approved. That might remove the sting from it.

I know that the Under-Secretary has examples of instances when delegated legislation is used to create criminal offences. Those of us who have much more experience in that field, as the Lord Chancellor and others have, know it happens. It is not an objection in principle, but it might be possible to redraw the provisions more tightly to make sure that that is not unduly widened. Perhaps there are things that can be done to speed up the process without bringing ourselves into what might be quite a significant conflict given the size of the majority by which clause 2 was rejected in the other place; I think it was 320 to 233, so it was not a marginal matter. I hope, therefore, if we are to ensure the swift passage of the Bill, which is the one thing that we absolutely must have for the sake of avoiding a lacuna on 31 December this year, perhaps some imagination can be given to how that potential difficulty with the other place might be overcome.

I hope that we will be able to proceed with the Bill swiftly. We do not perhaps always give sufficient value and attention to these matters. The status of our civil law and the status of private international law are not talked about enough—

[John Redwood]

I wonder whether my hon. Friend will address my query to all the expert lawyers in the House about what Britain could now do by way of leadership to improve a big area like family law through these mechanisms. Does he have any ideas for Ministers?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Robert Neill]

The first one is one that we have been talking about, which is early joining of Lugano, and being active in the international law field. I think we can do that and, in particular, one area in family law has been a concern, which was expressed by the Family Law Bar Association in evidence to the Select Committee some time ago. It is that the current arrangements in The Hague convention can tend—as the evidence of Philip Marshall, QC, the then chairman, suggested—to militate against mediation in family law cases. Active participation in that could be a very constructive way forward.

I am keen that we get on with this. As I know, and my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) will talk about this more, Britain has a world-leading sector in mediation and arbitration, and that is something that we should also develop. In terms of commercial cases, it is of great value to the country, but it is also of real human value when it can be applied in mediation cases. Despite my regret about the necessity for the Bill, it is well put forward by the Lord Chancellor and I take on board his points. I hope that we will be able to resolve any outstanding issues between this House and the other place as to the best way forward to get the practical objectives that we all share across the House on the statute book as soon as possible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Robert Neill]

We all need clients!

[Mr Davis]

I am the client of the House today.

The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) made the very important point that these prospective pieces of legislation, only under secondary legislation, could actually create criminal offences and therefore impinge directly on the rights of our citizens. They could, when I think about it, even put the rights of those citizens under foreign laws, as has happened with the European arrest warrant and other such measures. Does my hon. Friend think that that specific test of whether it creates a criminal offence that might impinge on our citizens might require rather more than simply secondary affirmative legislation?