British Indian Ocean Territory: Negotiations

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Monday 7th October 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lammy]

My hon. Friend is right to raise this issue. Some would argue that the International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 2019 was only advisory and that the UN General Assembly resolution of 22 May 2019 was not binding, but he will recognise that many of our closest allies voted against us on that occasion. It is important that we are a country that upholds the rule of law. I am called to come to this Dispatch Box to make the case for standing with Ukraine and for international humanitarian law. For all those reasons, we must be a country that upholds the rules-based order.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

We have just handed sovereign British territory to a small island nation that is an ally of China, and we are paying for the privilege, all so the Foreign Secretary can feel good about himself at his next north London dinner party. In whose interests does he think he serves: those of the global diplomatic elite or those of the British people and our national interest?

[Mr Lammy]

Well, I hope that question may have garnered the right hon. Gentleman a few more votes, but if that is his position, he is unlikely to lead the Conservative party to victory. This deal secures the base and it is in our national interests. That is why it is a good deal and it is why the President and the Defence Secretary of the United States applaud and welcome this deal. What do they know about global national security that he does not?

Ceasefire in Gaza

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Wednesday 21st February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Mitchell]

I have set out the Government’s position extremely clearly. I recognise the point the hon. Gentleman is making. There are strong feelings across the House on this matter. The point that I am trying to make in this speech, and that has been made by a number of Members, is that there is an awful lot in the Government’s amendment that most people in the House can agree with and support.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend said that the Foreign Secretary has asked Israel to think again about any further military offensive or incursion into Rafah. I think we would all urge Israel to think carefully about how that would be conducted. However, does he agree that our support for Israel on 7 October, when we said it should be able to eradicate Hamas, was clear, and that there is a danger that our emerging position—certainly that of other parties—would leave Hamas’s terrorist organisation partially intact? That is an intolerable situation for Israel: it would send a clear message that using human shields works and that we will not allow Israel to fully defend itself. How would he answer that question?

[Mr Mitchell]

I think that I have answered it, because I have made clear the Government’s position in respect of Hamas and Hamas’s future. If my right hon. Friend reads the record and the Government amendment with care tonight, I think he will see that the key point he is making is one that informs the Government’s view.

Israel and Gaza

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Tuesday 19th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Mitchell]

I thank the shadow Foreign Secretary for his comments. We are, as he knows, very committed to trying to make sure that there is no escalation. I thank him for his welcome for the US-led work to secure maritime security, and I also thank him for his comments, particularly at this time of year, about our armed forces. I have already commented on the UN Security Council resolution, which I hope will be voted on this afternoon; like him, I hope that agreement can be reached.

On the issue of the humanitarian catastrophe to which the shadow Foreign Secretary referred, I can tell him that there is some movement this week. There are 50 World Food Programme trucks ready at Allenby bridge to travel through Israel to Kerem Shalom, and if signed off, that will provide a new route through to Gaza. We have made available some money to the World Food Programme—it is available today—to enhance that route if it opens.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

All of us abhor the loss of innocent civilian life in Israel and Gaza, but talk of a “sustainable ceasefire” is unhelpful. All it does is give succour to Israel’s enemies at the time of its greatest need. This is a country that fell to its knees just a few weeks ago and suffered the worst tragedy since the holocaust. Now it is trying to eliminate Hamas and to free the hostages, some of whom are British citizens. Let it finish the job, let it protect Israeli security, and in doing so, let Israel protect our security as well.

[Mr Mitchell]

While it is true that weapons have been discovered in incubators in a hospital in Gaza, nevertheless I do not agree with my right hon. Friend. We are working towards a sustainable ceasefire. We are not there yet, but we should all of us be working towards that. In the meanwhile, on the pathway to a sustainable ceasefire, we need urgently to get these humanitarian pauses so that humanitarian relief can enter Gaza.

Iran’s Nuclear Programme

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Thursday 30th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House expresses grave concern at the imminent prospect of a nuclear armed Iran; calls on the Government in its ongoing negotiations in respect of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) agreement to seek to extend the sunset clauses, enact a stricter monitoring regime, retain terrorist proscriptions, and expand its scope to include Iran’s other destabilising activities in the region.

There are significant concerns, as set out in the motion, at the negotiated deal that is apparently about to be signed. I have been actively seeking an opportunity to raise those concerns over Iran’s destabilising activities for a number of months. I give thanks to the Backbench Business Committee for granting time in the main Chamber, and to my many cross-party colleagues who supported the application.

This debate could not come at a more important time. On 9 June, the UK, Germany and France released a joint statement saying that they are ready to conclude a deal with Iran that would restore the joint comprehensive plan of action, and urging Iran to seize the diplomatic opportunity it presented. On Monday, indirect talks between the United States and Iran resumed in Doha.

This is by no means the first time that we have debated Iran in this place, and I dare say it will not be the last, but today’s debate could perhaps be the last opportunity to evaluate the merits or otherwise of a return to the JCPOA nuclear agreement. I firmly believe that, whatever one’s view—we will hear a range of them today, no doubt—it is vital that, before any deal is signed, our Government hear the opinions of Members of this House.

Anxieties over Iran are felt acutely by many across the House, as I am sure we will hear. I am on the record as having been very sceptical of the original 2015 deal, believing it to be too limited in scope to prevent Iran’s malign activities and far too weak in enforcement to prevent a nuclear Iran, should Iran choose that path. That view was shared at the time by many—including, we have subsequently learned, a number of those who were close to the negotiations. I think, for example, of the noble Lord Hammond and the former Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon, who have both subsequently expressed their concerns at the limited nature of the deal that was ultimately signed.

Whatever one’s thoughts about the JCPOA, the fundamentally different circumstances we face today must be confronted. It is always easy to stick with what one has been involved in for a long time; of course there is pride among those who have negotiated relentlessly on this issue, both here in the UK, in the Foreign Office, and particularly in the Biden Administration, among those officials who were previously in the Obama Administration. However, it is time to appreciate what has happened in the seven years since the deal was signed.

Iran’s nuclear programme has continued apace. While the terms of the JCPOA restricted Iran’s enrichment of uranium to 3.67% fissile purity and a stockpile of only 300 kg of uranium, as of last month the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran has been enriching uranium up to a purity of 60%—a short technical step from weapons-grade levels of 90%.

[Theresa Villiers (Chipping Barnet) (Con)]

rose—

[Gareth Davies (Grantham and Stamford) (Con)]

rose—

[Robert Jenrick]

I am spoilt for choice, but I will give way first to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers).

[Theresa Villiers]

My right hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. Does he agree that, far from the JCPOA-minus that seems to be in prospect, we need a tougher deal with Iran that reflects its transgressions in compliance with the current agreement? We must reflect those transgressions in a deal that is actually powerful in preventing Iran from developing its nuclear programme.

[Robert Jenrick]

I agree wholeheartedly with my right hon. Friend, who has been interested and engaged in this issue for a long time. The point she makes, which I hope I will make over the course of my remarks, is that we do want a negotiated settlement and agreement, but it must be one that is robust and has the effect of preventing both Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its wider malign activities in the region that are harming our key partners, our friends and ourselves.

[Gareth Davies]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend and neighbour for giving way. He mentions that Iran has developed uranium to 60% purity. Is he aware of any country on Earth that has enriched to that level for peaceful purposes?

[Robert Jenrick]

No, and I do not think anyone would believe that that is Iran’s ultimate intent. The latest intelligence, for example, showing that bunkers have been constructed underground in which to hold some of that material, makes clear what the ultimate intent of Iran is on this issue.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

rose—

[Robert Jenrick]

I will give way one last time, and then I shall make some progress.

[Dr Offord]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Many people have focused on transgressions against the JCPOA, but because of the infamous sunset provisions in the 2015 deal, Iran will be able to legitimately undertake a full nuclear programme. That means that we could be facing a nuclear Iran as early as 2025. Without doing anything, we are already in a very difficult and dangerous scenario.

[Robert Jenrick]

My hon. Friend is correct. I will make this point in a moment, but there is no harm in restating it now: the original deal contained a number of sunset provisions, and the proposed deal, as reported, merely keeps those sunset provisions in exactly the same form. Even if we were to sign the deal tomorrow, it would begin to fade away in 2023. One really has to question the point of signing up to the proposed deal.

Iran stands on the verge of possessing a nuclear bomb. In fact, intelligence suggests it has sufficient enriched uranium today for at least two nuclear weapons. It has progressed far beyond the parameters of the JCPOA, so restoring Iran to the old deal has none of the benefits we once thought it would. The JCPOA’s time has been and gone; the Rubicon has been crossed.

After earlier talk of a longer and stronger deal, more recent rounds of the nuclear talks have seen US negotiators make concession after painful concession in an attempt to bring Iran back to the deal. We now see before us the contours of a shorter and weaker agreement—one that many have taken to dismissing as JCPOA-minus. In that agreement the Iranian regime will be reintegrated into the international community and afforded huge economic benefits that, crucially, will be channelled not into education, healthcare or infrastructure projects but into supporting and promoting terrorist activities, for instance through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran’s web of proxies across the region, and the restrictions on its nuclear programme will last for a fraction of the time. It is unclear whether this stands to strengthen efforts for non-proliferation.

I believe that a new framework is required. Proponents of the JCPOA spoke of its ability to restrict Iran’s break-out time to one year. In view of the reduction of this to as little as a few weeks, we need the Government to recognise that this is simply not going to work, and that any agreement that could obtain the consent of this House—certainly of Members who take my view—will need to have very significantly longer sunset clauses.

[Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right in everything he has said. However, it is not only the potential for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons that is a concern, but its ability then to deliver those weapons through ballistic missiles. Clearly Iran has enhanced its capability in that regard and could, if it has nuclear weapons, deliver them now. What would he say about how we need to restrict Iran’s capability to develop such weapons?

[Robert Jenrick]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. The JCPOA contains the word “comprehensive”, but it was anything but comprehensive. It certainly did not speak to the malign activities of Iran throughout the region, but nor did it address the seeking of enriched uranium, the weapons that would be able to deliver the nuclear weapons or the other infrastructure and equipment that is required in the process. Any deal that we now sign needs to address all those matters. In fact, as I said, on the pursuit of enriched uranium, the ship has already sailed because Iran already has it.

The agreement as reported in the media seems set to include the same structural problems as we saw in the 2015 deal. Unless the new nuclear terms are expanded in scope to allow a more rigorous inspection regime, I fear we will repeat the same mistakes. Iran has reached the nuclear threshold under the watchful eye of what was supposed to be the most intrusive inspection regime ever. By its own admission, the UN’s nuclear watchdog is “flying blind”—the IAEA chief said as much in June 2021. One year on, Iran has taken a series of steps to further restrict IAEA access to its nuclear sites, including the deliberate removal of cameras from its most sensitive facilities. Years of tolerating Iran’s flagrant breaches out of fear of the talks collapsing has led us down this path.

A glaring weakness of the JCPOA was that it did nothing to address Iran’s wider activities throughout the world. Our failure to address Iran’s support for its network of proxies continues to reverberate to this day. Iran was and remains the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism—a point I was pleased to hear my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary acknowledge in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday. The regime’s commitment to exporting the Islamic revolution has been underwritten by an active embrace of violence since it first came to power in 1979. In recent weeks, Istanbul has been the setting for an extraordinary Iranian terror plot. Thanks to the close co-operation between the Israeli and the Turkish security services, an Iranian terror cell attempting to kidnap and kill Israeli tourists—innocent civilians—was thwarted. In one incident, several Israeli tourists visiting a market had to be intercepted before they returned to their hotel room, where their would-be assassins were reportedly waiting for their return.

The Iranian threat is very clear and present here at home. In 2019, it was revealed that British intelligence services had identified a Hezbollah cell stockpiling 3 tonnes of highly explosive ammonium nitrate in residential north-west London for use in a terror attack—the very same chemical that was recently inflicting such terrible damage in Beirut. The misplaced notion that the JCPOA would moderate the Iranian regime was dispelled when its Intelligence Ministry sought to bomb an opposition rally in Paris in 2018 with the help of an Iranian diplomat.

Behind all these examples—and there are many others I could cite—sits the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s premier agent for terrorism. The organisation funds, trains and provides the ideological underpinning for many of the world’s terror organisations, from Hamas to Hezbollah to the Houthis. Reports from the previous round of negotiation that the Biden Administration was considering delisting the IRGC from its foreign terror list have been worrying, to say the least. Quite simply, it would be a grave miscalculation and a great dishonour if our Government were to support any such action. It would make a mockery of the efforts that we have made in recent years to proscribe Hamas and Hezbollah if we signed up to a deal that legitimises the very organisation that funds Hamas and Hezbollah. That really would be a perverse and absurd outcome.

The negotiations in Doha cannot be detached from the broader geopolitical landscape. A dangerous new dynamic is at play in the latest round of nuclear talks. As the EU desperately tries to wean itself off Russian hydrocarbons, we see an ill-advised pivot towards Iran for energy supplies. In a visit to Iran over the weekend, Josep Borrell openly called for Europe to seek new sources of oil and gas following its move away from Russia and spoke of the high potential economic benefits awaiting Iran. At the G7 summit in Germany, Macron pointedly called for more Iranian oil to enter the market. The west can ill afford to end its dependency on one rogue regime merely by pivoting towards the religious fundamentalists in Tehran. How ridiculous would it be for us to invest so much time, effort and energy in defeating Vladimir Putin merely to make an advance—an opening—towards Tehran, Venezuela or other authoritarian regimes? It is troubling enough that the talks have been mediated by Russia, the world’s only nuclear-armed state currently threatening to actually use those weapons. If restrictions are lifted, Russia will receive a financial boost from sales of military equipment as well as the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran.

Iran’s list of nuclear transgressions is as long as it is troubling and has long necessitated an urgent response. The UK Government were right to say in March:

“Iran’s nuclear programme has never before been this advanced, and is exposing the international community to unprecedented levels of risk.”

At this critical juncture, the west urgently needs to change its strategy. We valiantly pursued diplomatic avenues to their limit, and beyond. Dedicated officials here in the Foreign Office, and in the Obama and Biden Administrations, have invested immense time and resources in negotiating the JCPOA, but that is not a reason to sign a bad deal. As Iran continues to stall negotiations, it is time for a more robust approach reimposing snapback sanctions on Iran and tightening the economic screw until it is willing to countenance the serious proposals that I have shared here today.

This position is no longer that of ultra-hawkish Republicans. In March, despite a polarised political climate in the United States, 70 Democrats and Republicans in Congress wrote to the National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, to demand that the new deal signed with Iran must include an extension of the sunset clauses that we discussed earlier, retention of the IRGC proscription—I would like the UK Government to proscribe it as well—and a toughening of the monitoring regime, with an extension in scope to include Iran’s other destabilising activities such as its ballistic missile programme. President Obama can press ahead with a weak deal, but if he does, there is a strong likelihood that the Senate and the House of Representatives will do everything in their power to frustrate it, and were there to be an incoming Republican President, which seems quite likely, it would be their day-one act to end the agreement. Why would we do something that is of such a short-term benefit, if any? In doing so, we weaken our relationships with some of our oldest friends and key partners, whether that be the state of Israel, the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia or others, all of whom publicly or privately are pleading with our Government to listen to their concerns and not to proceed with this agreement.

Those countries in the middle east already fear that the west is retrenching and is an unreliable ally, particularly having seen the events of our messy and embarrassing retreat from Kabul a year ago. To impose this agreement in addition, against their best wishes, merely pushes them further away from us and towards new friends and relationships, whether that be Russia or China. That would be a very sad outcome.

To conclude, the Iranian regime brutally represses, persecutes and tortures its own people. It wastes the Iranian people’s resources on terrorism, foreign aggression, missiles and nuclear-weapon capabilities. I hope to see the day when we and our partners have no need for sanctions on Iran or the proscription of its affiliates. I hope to see the day when the UK and Iran can enjoy normalised relations and when the people of Iran have a Government who respect human dignity and exist in peace with their neighbours, but that day will not come if we provide sanctions relief to fuel the regime’s corruption, incompetence and terrorism. Nor will the day come through weak and naive responses to the pursuit of and now the establishment of nuclear-weapon capabilities. I humbly urge the UK Government to change course, to learn from the first JCPOA’s failures, to listen to the concerns of many across the House and our partners in the region, and to work with us and them to impose maximum pressure on Iran.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Jenrick]

I am extremely grateful to the Minister for her response, and to all my hon. and right hon. Friends and colleagues across the House for contributing to a thoughtful and informed debate this afternoon. I am particularly grateful to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) for supporting the debate, and to my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) for contributing and for his role on the Backbench Business Committee that made today possible.

We heard a range of views from across the Chamber today, but I think it was clear that no one spoke in favour of a return to the JCPOA as is. Numerous colleagues spoke in favour of a negotiated settlement with Iran, but all expressed concern at the terms of the JCPOA itself. I therefore ask the Minister to reflect on the contributions she has heard today, because I think there would be grave concern if she and the Government were to enter into an agreement that did not have, for example, extended sunset provisions or greater enforcement provisions or that permitted the de-proscribing of terrorist-supporting organisations such the IRGC. That does not seem to me, in the light of today’s debate, to be the will of this House. It would be unwise of the Government to sign an important international agreement for which there is little, if any, support in this House.

I ask the Minister to reflect on one further point. My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East and many others eloquently said that it seems to be the will of this House, and of many outside, that the IRGC is proscribed. We have made great steps in recent years in proscribing both Hamas and Hezbollah following cross-party campaigns, and I think now is the time to take the next logical step and proscribe the IRGC. I ask her, on our behalf, to take that message to the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary, who have joint responsibility, and to ask them to take all steps to proscribe that organisation as soon as possible.

On behalf of all hon. and right hon. Members here today, I ask the Minister to pass on our thanks to her officials in the Foreign Office for their hard work in the talks thus far, and to ask them to take action to reflect the views of this House as they continue those negotiations on the country’s behalf.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House expresses grave concern at the imminent prospect of a nuclear armed Iran; calls on the Government in its ongoing negotiations in respect of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) agreement to seek to extend the sunset clauses, enact a stricter monitoring regime, retain terrorist proscriptions, and expand its scope to include Iran’s other destabilising activities in the region.

Oral Answers to Questions

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Tuesday 21st June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Vicky Ford]

We work in Colombia on projects to promote peace and stability and also on projects to promote the environment and tackle climate change, and we will continue to do so.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

The solution to the inflationary crisis that we face, driven by high energy prices and a lack of supply, is primarily international. What is my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary doing to challenge OPEC’s position of not intending to take action to increase supply? That strikes me as the single most important thing that the British Government could do to tackle the crisis internationally.

[Elizabeth Truss]

As my right hon. Friend says, we need to tackle energy supply. In the long term, that means more renewables and more use of nuclear energy, but in the short term, it does involve looking at oil and gas. My colleague the Energy Secretary is working closely with his counterparts, particularly in the Gulf region, and I also have frequent conversations with them. We do need to see supply increase in order to lower global process.

Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe: Forced Confession

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2022 Commons Chamber

[Amanda Milling]

I thank the hon. Member for her questions and for raising Nazanin’s case so many times in this place.

As I said in my opening remarks, the Iranian authorities made clear at the airport that they would not allow Nazanin to leave unless she signed a document. I also said that the UK official present passed the message on to Nazanin. Given the situation in which Iran had placed her, she agreed to sign the document. The UK official did not force her to do so.

Iran put Nazanin through a cruel and intolerable ordeal, and FCDO officials raised allegations of torture with the Iranian authorities at the time. We have not received a response, but Iran is in no doubt about our concern at their treatment of Nazanin and our human rights concerns more generally.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

The news that Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe was forced to sign this so-called confession is just the latest evidence of contemptible, despicable treatment of her by the Iranian authorities. In the light of that and all the other malign activities of the Iranian regime that we know of, may I ask the Minister why British officials in Vienna are currently supporting an agreement that would remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from the foreign terrorists list? Are those reports correct, and if so, will the Minister give me an assurance that the United Kingdom Government will not put their name to any such agreement?

[Amanda Milling]

What I would say in response to the question about the negotiations in Vienna is that we have reached the end of the talks there to restore the nuclear deal. The deal that is on the table would return Iran to full compliance with its commitments under the joint comprehensive plan of action, and would return the United States to the deal. This deal represents a significant, comprehensive and fair offer to Iran, which would benefit the Iranian people. Iran should take the offer on the table as a matter of urgency, because there will not be a better one.

Oral Answers to Questions

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Amanda Milling]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. We are clear on our position on the settlements: they are illegal under international law and we urge Israel to end settlement expansion. This is something that we raise with our counterparts.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

Has my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary had an opportunity to raise the cases of my constituent Aiden Aslin and of Shaun Pinner with her Ukrainian and Russian counterparts? These two British citizens continue to be held in captivity and to be tortured and abused for propaganda purposes by the Russian military, which I hope all of us in this House will uniformly condemn. We want to see those individuals released as soon as possible.

[James Cleverly]

I have discussed the issue of foreign volunteer fighters with the Ukrainian Government. They are clear, and we are clear, that those fighting under the Ukrainian flag for the Ukrainian armed forces in the defence of Ukraine should be treated as Ukrainian military and as prisoners of war, with all the protections that the international humanitarian law affords to those individuals.

Sanctions

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd February 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

I have a huge amount of respect for the hon. Gentleman, as he knows—we speak when the cameras are not rolling—but I fear he is putting his prejudice ahead of the statement I am making, because were he to listen to the points I am making and allow me to get to the point in the speech where I am explicit about this, he would understand that the UK Government’s actions are not limited to what the Prime Minister has currently announced. He will hear that we are going to bring forward further legislation to further extend the measures available to us and that we are absolutely not ignoring the fact that there has already been Russian incursion into Ukraine, which we want to halt and reverse and then get those troops away from the Ukrainian border.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

The Minister is being very generous in giving way. May I press him on this point? Many of us feel the package of sanctions announced today is comparatively modest. Is the Government strategy that further sanctions will come forward in the days ahead even if Vladimir Putin takes no further steps and acts of aggression against Ukraine, or is it that the further steps that are undoubtedly being planned by the Minister and colleagues within Government will come forward only should there be an additional ratchet in the level of aggression shown towards Ukraine?

[James Cleverly]

I thank my right hon. Friend for giving me the opportunity to make clear our position. If this has not become clear to the House, let me make it clear now: we intend to escalate these sanctions—to ratchet up these sanctions—in response to what has already happened in order to deter further aggression and in order to stimulate Putin to withdraw the troops from Ukraine, take them away from the border and send them back home to their families and barracks in other parts of Russia.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Jenrick]

Will my right hon. Friend give way on that point?

[James Cleverly]

I have got to progress. I will be crucified otherwise.

In addition, over the forthcoming weeks, we will extend the territorial sanctions imposed in response to the Crimean incursion by Russia to territory occupied by Russian forces in what they claim to be the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. No UK individual or business—no UK individual or business—will be able to deal with them until they are returned fully to Ukrainian control. We also intend to sanction the members of the Russian Duma and the Federation Council who voted for recognition of the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, in flagrant violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. The virtue of speaking late in the debate is that I can keep my remarks mercifully short.

I would like to associate myself with the many excellent and eloquent speeches we have heard, most of which I agree with almost entirely. Today is a sad day—a sad day most of all for the brave people of Ukraine, whose sovereignty is threatened and whose democracy and freedom are undermined. It is a sad day for the order we have known since the 1990s, which many right hon. and hon. Members have spoken of, which now seems shattered, damaged and diminished. It is also a sad day for the people of Russia. I am pleased to associate myself with the remarks of the many right hon. and hon. Members across the House who have said that we wish no ill on them and that we are sad to see the state of their country now. Twenty years ago, I lived and worked in Russia as a lawyer. Back then, Russia was by no means a democracy of the kind that we would recognise, but it was a more hopeful place than the Russia that we see today. It was a country in which one could do business and travel and in which young people were broadly optimistic about the future. After listening to President Putin’s remarks last night, I think we see a very different country, drifting darkly into authoritarianism.

I want to speak about two points and to reiterate those that Members across the House have made. The first is about understanding exactly what the Government’s strategy is today. The Prime Minister spoke of a ratchet. If we are going to take action, we should take action hard now. That is what a dictator such as Putin can understand. Deterrence by way of sanctions thus far has failed. It is probably likely to fail. It does have value, however: it shows resolve and inflicts cost on Russia. If we are going to do that, why would we not do it strongly now?

I do not understand why we would suggest that we will introduce the other measures that the Government are considering only in the event that Russia makes further incursions into Ukraine or makes further serious, egregious assaults on Ukraine or other allies in the region—[Interruption.] My right hon. Friend the Minister shakes his head. If, as I understand it, the Government will introduce those measures in the hours and days to come, perhaps because they require further thought or legislation or because we want to act in concert with our allies—for example, to make sure that the sanctions are synced exactly with those that the United States might bring forward—that is an entirely sensible and defensible policy.

[Sir Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

I am listening with great care to my right hon. Friend’s important contribution. Does he agree that we could go even further and, with international action, impose positive obligations on Russia to withdraw from the regions in question, stating that, otherwise, further sanctions would follow? Would that not seize back the initiative in a positive way rather than passively waiting for things to happen?

[Robert Jenrick]

My right hon. and learned Friend’s point has a lot to commend it. I suggest to the Government that they introduce further measures as quickly as possible, preferably in concert with our allies.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

My real worry is that Putin has actually been very clever: he has advanced into an area that his forces effectively control already and he will stop there. That would divide our allies—for example, Hungary and Germany may not agree—and we would not be able to get sanctions agreed internationally. That is the real worry and why he is not perhaps as mad as we think. He is actually doing this with purpose and he has a plan.

[Robert Jenrick]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. If the scenario that plays out is the first of the ones that I described, there will be little opportunity to introduce further sanctions, because this may be all that Putin intends to do.

I want to make a last point on the specifics of the package that was announced, and I am afraid that I will repeat the comments of right hon. and hon. Members across the House. The banks that have been chosen are relatively minor. I worked as a corporate lawyer, including in Russia, and these are not the primary banks that international institutions, major corporations or the major oligarchs go to to seek finance, so the impact will be relatively limited. I have not seen the latest debates from the United States, but when I last looked at them, our colleagues and friends in the US Senate, for example, were looking at pursuing some of the larger banks such as SberBank. If we were going to make any impact, it would be important to bring forward measures against one, two or more of the larger banks, which are genuinely those that major institutions and the oligarchs whose names have been mentioned in this House today are more likely to use for finance.

Secondly, the list of individuals is very small, and the lion’s share of them have already been sanctioned for a long time by the United States. There are many others we could reach. In my work as a lawyer and in business, as managing director of Christie’s, I had the pleasure—if we can call it that—of meeting a number of the individuals who have been described today as oligarchs. Those individuals are not on the list. There is a much larger group of individuals we could and should now be reaching, and we could tackle them in a range of ways. In many respects, what they most fear is losing the ability to travel—to leave Russia and go skiing in France or Switzerland or shopping in London or Paris. It does not have to be a full sanction, but the list that we are currently considering is far too small.

If we were sitting in the same room as the Russian leadership today, I think we would see a very nonplussed reaction. There is more we can and should do. I hope that further measures will be brought forward in the coming days; I certainly stand ready, as I think all colleagues across the House do, to support them.

Afghanistan Humanitarian Crisis: UK Response

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Wednesday 9th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Vicky Ford]

As I have said already, the UK funding is providing food aid to 4.47 million people. It is an enormously tragic situation. The UK has stepped up for over 4 million people, and we need others also to step up more. We know that there is going to be a long-term need as well, which is why we are supporting the UN conference that will happen at the end of March. We are working with all the relevant partners—as I have said, the World Food Programme and the many other UN organisations—to make sure that the funding we are putting in is getting to where it is needed. That is supporting 4.4 million people at the moment, and as I have said, this will go up to 6.6 million when we include the support we are also putting in for health, water, protection, shelter and so on.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

Last week, the US Treasury Department issued guidance to international banks on sanctions exemptions on humanitarian grounds enabling international banks to transfer money to charities and aid agencies—for example, to pay the wages of teachers or health workers. As a practical step that the Government could take immediately, would the Minister instruct the Treasury, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Bank of England or whichever organisation holds responsibility to issue such guidance to British banks this week?

[Vicky Ford]

I will certainly take up my right hon. Friend’s suggestion with the Minister responsible for south and central Asia.

Russia: Sanctions

Robert Jenrick Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

We have Government planes for a reason: for Government Ministers to use on Government business.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

In addition to targeted sanctions against Kremlin-linked individuals, our friends and allies in the US Senate are considering three further steps. The first is sanctioning Russian state banks, to prevent the flow of foreign capital. The second is having export controls on key technologies that are useful to the Kremlin. Thirdly, a number of Senators, led by Ted Cruz, are proposing a return to sanctions against Nord Stream itself, and related entities and individuals linked to the organisation. Will each of those be included in the Bill that my right hon. Friend intends to bring forward?

[Elizabeth Truss]

As I have said, the legislation we are bringing forward is very wide-ranging and targets a number of sectors and interests in relation to the Kremlin, and I assure my right hon. Friend that nothing is off the table.