Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Richard Fuller and Andrew Love

Monday 8th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Richard Fuller]

I am very grateful for the opportunity to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker. I wish to discuss the proposals in this group, particularly new clauses 11 and 2. I am not a member of the Treasury Committee, I was not a member of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards and I was not even on the Public Bill Committee, so I hope that other hon. Members will permit me to make a few perhaps less-informed commentaries about these proposals on conduct and remuneration, and the issues they raise, and perhaps come at this from a different perspective.

May I start by thanking the commission for its work on this issue and, in particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who made an extraordinarily strong contribution? Collectively, they have a much greater claim than Goldman Sachs to have been doing God’s work on financial services. I thank the Government and congratulate them on their speedy response to the recommendations. I also thank the Minister for allowing us to see the document ahead of today’s debate.

I remember the evening when the membership of the commission was established. It was a late evening, and quite warm. It might have been 10.30 pm, 11 pm or even later and hon. Members were keen to get back to their duties in responding to their constituents. I got up to speak with some trepidation, as hon. Members were hoping that the membership would go through on the nod, to make the point that for my constituents in Bedford and Kempston the commission would fail in its duty if, as a result of its actions, nobody went to jail. It is in that spirit that I want to comment on the new clauses today.

[Mr Love]

I was present on that occasion and the commission took very seriously the point that the hon. Gentleman made.

[Richard Fuller]

I am grateful for that intervention. A lot in the commission’s recommendations reflects the seriousness with which it considered that point, and rightly so. In the intervening 12 months, I have dealt with constituents whose businesses have been put at risk because of the fraud of interest rate swap mis-selling and whose lives have been rent asunder by payment protection insurance mis-selling, and the Government have also taken action on the fiddling and fixing of LIBOR. Beyond that, some of us have been dealing with regulatory failures on Equitable Life. My view is that jail for such bankers and for those responsible is the only fair outcome for the victims of those scams. Despite the intervention from the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr Love), I must still ask where justice is to be found for the victims of those crimes in the recommendations and in the amendments tabled today.

Banking is full of honest and decent men and women. As my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) said, one of the attractions of new clause 2 is that it focuses like a laser beam on the individuals who are responsible and culpable. If we fail to do that and those people do not go to jail, where is the justice for all the other people who work in financial services honestly on behalf of their clients every day?

It is not a habit of this House to consider retrospective legislation, but I want to mention that in a minute. First, let me ask the Minister a couple of questions. In the senior persons regime and the actions that would be covered by new clause 11, the focus is on named individuals at the top. As we saw in the interest rate swaps, a lot of the decisions made by the senior ranks at the banks were translated into budgets and business plans and transferred down through the hierarchy of the banks. Perhaps the Minister, when he considers the issue of conduct, could answer the question of how those extensions beyond the senior persons regime will be handled.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Fuller]

I must admit that I am not particularly familiar with Iceland—certainly not as familiar as the hon. Gentleman is—but he makes an important contribution. Other regimes look at things differently, and are far stricter than we are. Normally, we would look at how United States regulations dealt with some of these things. In the past, they have been more successful than they have been recently as regards criminal prosecutions in financial services. Many people in the United States were held criminally responsible for their actions in the savings and loans scandal; the same has not happened in this financial crisis.

I respect the work of the commission, and I am nowhere near as smart as it is on these issues, but I have to say that no one has gone to jail, and that is not good enough.

[Mr Love]

I will comment on the commission’s thought processes on some of the issues that the hon. Gentleman mentioned. He will remember, as we all do, the evening on which we set up a special parliamentary vehicle in the wake of the LIBOR rate-rigging scandal. Since 2008, there have been a variety of critical events, including the credit crunch and the recession. All that led to a catastrophic decline in the reputation of the financial services sector. Trust in bankers sank to an all-time low, and frankly LIBOR was the last straw. This was truly shocking behaviour on an unprecedented scale. Something had to be done, and the focus was very much on our terms of reference on standards and culture.

As a result, the commission had to answer some tough questions, and the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) has posed some of them: why had so few bankers been held to account for their failings? Why had it appeared that bankers pocketed the gains, but passed on the losses to the taxpayer? Why were customers who should have been treated fairly treated in the exact opposite way—a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Cathy Jamieson) raised? We tried to answer those questions through three themes that came out in our report. The first theme is individual responsibility.

When all the head bankers came before us, we were genuinely shocked to hear that they denied any responsibility for what happened in their banks. Whether it was ignorance of the serious failings happening under their noses, or because there was collective decision making, the result was the same: no one could be held to account. That, we discovered, was the result of the failure of the approved persons regime, which did not attribute responsibilities to senior staff, who, as a result, could not be held to account.

Two steps are proposed to try to address that problem. First, we have already mentioned the new senior persons regime, designed to ensure that the most important responsibilities are assigned to specific individuals, who will more easily be held to account for them. Secondly, for a much wider group—not every employee, but those who could do serious harm to the bank, or its customers, due to their customer-facing position—we propose a new licensing regime, with a set of banking standard rules that enable them to be held to account.

However, for people to be held to account, we need more effective sanctions, and that is the second theme of the commission’s report. Identification of those responsible under the new regime will provide a stronger basis for the regulator to enforce existing civil penalties, such as fines, restrictions and bans. One of the great difficulties was assigning responsibility; we hope that individual responsibility will address that.

Given the seriousness of the wrongdoings—an issue mentioned in earlier contributions—the commission is recommending two new, far-reaching powers. New clause 2 does not address this point, but under certain conditions, the regulator should be able to impose a full range of civil sanctions, unless the person can demonstrate that reasonable steps were taken to prevent or mitigate the failing. In effect, that does what new clause 2 suggests: it reverses the burden of proof, but only under certain conditions.