Voting by Prisoners

Rehman Chishti Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

That is an interesting proposal from the hon. Lady, but, if I may say so, I would not seek to answer that question at the Dispatch Box today. It raises a number of ethical and practical issues to which, on the whole, I would want to give further consideration.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[The Attorney-General]

I must make progress; otherwise I will not be able to do what I principally came here to do.

I want to deal with the point about the Grand Chamber in the Hirst case. The Grand Chamber declined, properly, to provide any detailed guidance on how to make our current regime compatible with the convention. It also made it clear that special weight should be given to the role of the domestic policy maker. Despite the difficulties that the House might face, we have a real opportunity, through debate, to shape the dialogue with the Court if we focus on the key issues.

I will now deal with the main legal issues on prisoner voting. I will set out the main points raised by the main judgments, because it might make the debate more difficult if the House does not have them in mind. I shall first outline the key points in the Hirst judgment, which dates back to October 2005. The Court took the view that it was well established that article 3 of protocol 1 to the convention, to which we are signatories, guarantees individuals the right to vote and to stand for election. The Court considered that to be a right, not a privilege. It also considered that that principle was important in ensuring an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law. It therefore felt that departure from the principle of universal suffrage risked undermining the democratic validity of the elected legislature and the laws that it promulgates. That might not have exercised us very much here, but in the context of the many east European states that have joined the European convention it is probably right to say that those are really serious, material considerations.

In the view of the Court, prisoners continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the convention. I do not think that either my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden or the right hon. Member for Blackburn disagree with that. The Court’s reasoning, with which I appreciate many hon. Members disagree, is that, in view of the fact that the convention does not allow prisoners to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or to have restrictions placed on their freedom of expression or freedom to practise their religion, a restriction on their right to vote should have the aim only of

“preventing crime by sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners, and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law”.

The Court also recognised that the participating states had a wide margin of appreciation in deciding on such restrictions, but that that was not an unlimited discretion. It felt that the restriction should be proportionate and—this is the nub of the issue—that section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 imposed a blanket ban, which was seen as being so indiscriminate as to fall outside the acceptable margin of appreciation.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney-General]

I certainly do not want to prevent my hon. Friend from debating such an important issue. He must forgive me for perhaps being too much of a lawyer, but on the whole I tend to look at the terms of the motion, which are very specific and quite interesting. The motion first emphasises our respect for our international obligations, which I do not believe was included accidentally by the right hon. Member for Blackburn or my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden. I assume that the motion thus encompasses our international obligations under the European convention on human rights. Secondly, the motion expresses what I take to be a view that we believe that our existing arrangements, which deny sentenced prisoners the right to vote, are fair, reasonable and proper and we wish to continue them. That seems to be the motion that we have to debate, and which we ought to debate, which is why I sought to answer the question in this way, although I accept that some wider issues could also be considered. At the end of the day, as I have also emphasised, the Government are bound by their international obligations. They have to think, sometimes laterally if not horizontally, about how to get themselves out of the conundrum of respecting the views expressed in this House while also wanting to see that the international obligations that this House wants to be respected are respected.

[Rehman Chishti]

On that very point of international obligations, Lord Hoffmann has said that

“with support of other European states”

that have also been at odds with the Court,

“we can repatriate our laws on human rights.”

What steps are we taking to work with other European states that have also been badly treated to withdraw from the scope of the Human Rights Act 1998?

[The Attorney-General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who is absolutely right; I have not had time to develop the point. Quite simply, negotiations have taken place concerning the difficulties facing the Court, in which the different countries making up the Council of Europe are, in many ways, expressing the common view that the Court is not functioning properly. Quite apart from anything else, there is a backlog of 120,000 cases. This matter is therefore not being ignored by the Government; we would like to make some progress to see whether reform can be achieved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)]

The debate is about whether prisoners should have the right to vote, but it seems to have been turned into an opportunity to bash the European Court of Human Rights, the convention and the Human Rights Act. That is completely unfair, because over the past 30 or 40 years the European Court has been making judgments in cases where it is now accepted that the correct decision was made.

We have heard constant references to Lord Hoffmann’s opinion. When I was training to be a barrister, I was told that citing dissenting and minority opinions of judges is the last refuge of a desperate advocate. Let me tell the House a little about Lord Hoffmann’s background, and let us see whether, by the end of that, people still believe that he is the man by whom one should judge whether the European Court is right or wrong.

I shall start with the case of Peter Sutcliffe. His last victim’s mother sued the police over the negligence of the investigation that led to her daughter’s death, but the House of Lords decided that the police and local authorities could not be sued for negligence in any actions that they took. That principle existed in our courts for 10 years until, eventually, it was challenged, and, believe it or not, it was the European Court in Strasbourg that said, “No, local authorities and public bodies can be responsible and can be sued when there has been a dereliction of duty.”

Cases of children who have been abused or not taken into care by local authorities—

[Rehman Chishti]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

No, I will not. I want to finish my speech.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

I start my comments in light of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, as set out in Hood Phillips’s “Constitutional and Administrative Law”. As paragraph 3.13 clearly states:

“The legislative supremacy of Parliament means that Parliament (The Queen, Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled) can pass law on any topic affecting any persons, and that there are no fundamental laws which Parliament cannot amend or repeal.”

Secondly, all our main legal authorities—from Dicey to Coke and Blackstone—assert that Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever. Thirdly, no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.

In that light, if the House were to vote to confirm the current legislative provision that prisoners should not have the right to vote, that must surely be respected. Once a document is recognised as an Act of Parliament, no English court can refuse to obey it or question its validity. That is our common law, as established in the case of Manuel v. Attorney-General of 1983. The courts of our land must therefore respect the wishes of Parliament.

Schedule 3 to the Representation of the People Act 1983, as amended by the Representation of the People Act 1985, makes it quite clear that someone convicted and sentenced to imprisonment loses the capacity to vote.

[Gareth Johnson (Dartford) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that no one is being forced to forfeit their vote? Criminals choose to forfeit their votes when they decide to break the law. All that people need do in order to retain their votes is comply with the law.

[Rehman Chishti]

My hon. Friend has highlighted the fundamental point that people have rights and responsibilities.

Successive Governments have made it plain that when people are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, they lose the moral authority to vote. In 2003, Baroness Scotland of Asthal clearly stated that those who were convicted and imprisoned would lose that moral authority. The earlier legislation was right then as this legislation is now, and we should respect that.

Parliament’s supremacy has been challenged by the European Court of Human Rights. That cannot be right. It cannot be right for judges from developing judiciaries in eastern European countries to challenge the supremacy of our Parliament and our judiciary.

It is ethically and morally wrong to allow prisoners the right to vote. The concept that those who commit a crime must pay the price with their liberty and the withdrawal of certain rights must be correct.