London Local Authorities and Transport for London (No. 2) Bill [Lords] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebatePhilip Davies
Main Page: Philip Davies (Conservative - Shipley)Department Debates - View all Philip Davies's debates with the Department for Transport
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I do not wish to crow, other than to say that it is important that just because a Bill is a private Bill it should not be subject to less scrutiny than a public Bill. As was said on Second Reading, why should a local authority impose a statutory regime in its area different from the national regime?
I am delighted to see the Minister, who will be able to respond to some of the concerns about why a regime for dealing with skips different from the regime that applies elsewhere in the country that has to be introduced private legislation rather than through a public Bill promoted by the Government.
Before I get too distracted from the subject matter of the amendments, I should say that amendments 1 and 2, which can be considered together, are an example of why the Bill is unnecessarily complex. The Bill applies to the whole of London other than the City of London, yet it is proposed that its provisions should be brought in at different times in different areas. If we are to have a regime for skips, for example, in London, surely the changes should apply to the whole of London at the same time rather than piecemeal. Yet clause 3(2) states:
“Different days may be fixed under this section for the purpose of the application of the provisions mentioned in section 1(3) to different areas.”
Likewise, clause 3(3) states:
“Different days may be fixed under this section for the purpose of the application of the provisions mentioned in section 1(3) to an area.”
I understand my hon. Friend’s point. Is it possible that what he mentions is done to enable authorities to trial something, to make sure that the system works efficiently and properly before extending it? If that is true, is it not sensible?
It may be that my hon. Friend, as so often, anticipates the response to come from my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman), who speaks on behalf of the promoters. We shall have to wait and see. On the face of it, the issue is worthy of an explanation. If the legislation is untried and experimental, that should be clearly set out in the Bill.
It could be, but I am not going to try to follow my hon. Friend by making accusations against the promoters or London authorities by suggesting that the Bill is designed to confuse and ensure that they can get more in penalty income than they might otherwise be able to. Again, the fact that my hon. Friend raises that as an issue demonstrates the climate of suspicion regarding a lot of local authorities in relation to the imposition of penalty charges, which I recall from having read an article are now giving hundreds of millions of pounds in income to London local authorities alone. Many people feel those measures were brought in almost by subterfuge through Bills such as the one we are considering tonight, and now many years later people can see that has resulted in a significant financial burden and quite a lot of injustice. That is why I think it would be better to have simplicity and clarity, which would require that any provisions in this Bill be introduced in all areas of London at the same time on the same day, rather than causing the confusion to which I have referred.
I just wonder whether my hon. Friend’s amendment will achieve what he seeks. Are these parts of the Bill making something clear to people, rather than being a necessary part of the Bill? Even if my hon. Friend’s amendments were accepted, would it not still be possible for these measures to be introduced on different days? I am not entirely sure where it is made clear they would have to be on a specific day. Are these two parts of the Bill just making something clear to people?
My hon. Friend raises another point that I had not thought about, which is that these subsections may be superfluous anyway and it is implicit within the powers being given under clause 3 that an appointed day could be a different day for different parts of London in different circumstances, in which case, in trying to keep legislation simple there would be another argument in favour of accepting my amendments 1 and 2, as in leaving out subsections (2) and (3) of clause 3, they would make the Bill clearer. We will have to wait to hear the response to the debate before assessing whether these amendments are of such significance that we would seek to divide the House on them. Speaking for myself, I think it would be reasonable to await the full explanation before rushing to judgment.
Amendment 3 is significant. It is the first of the amendments addressing part 2 of the Bill, and clause 4 in particular, which deals with the attachment of street lamps and signs to buildings, and changing the regulations relating thereto. At present, the regime is pretty restricted under the highways legislation, but this Bill seeks to give much wider powers to local authorities, enabling them to permit the attachment of street lamps and signs to buildings even when that is not approved or supported by the owners of those buildings. This power is potentially quite significant, because the owner of a building could suddenly find they are required to have a street lamp or sign attached to their building.
We know from earlier stages of the Bill that the Society of London Theatre was very concerned about the impact of the measure on theatreland, and it is to the credit of the promoters that they decided that they would therefore exempt theatres, which is why clause 4(14) specifically states:
“This section and section 5 shall not apply in respect of a theatre.”
In a few moments I will talk about amendment 4, which follows on from that. Amendment 3, however, deals with subsection (13), which states:
“A London authority may not, under section 3, appoint a day for the purposes of this section until a code of practice dealing with the exercise of the powers of the said section 45 and the said section 74 as modified by this section has been published by a joint committee.”
My amendment would ensure that the code of practice must not only be published by a Joint Committee but be approved by the Secretary of State for Transport—an appropriate and proportionate safeguard.
I am not learned in any sense of the term, but this amendment has been selected and I thought that rather than just referring to “the Secretary of State” it would more appropriate if it specified the Secretary of State for Transport. If the Minister wishes to intervene to suggest that it should be the responsibility of a different member of the Government, so be it. The point I am trying to make is that this is a significant issue. It is recognised by the promoters as sufficiently serious in its potential implications as to mean there should be a code of practice to deal with the exercise of the powers. The code should go further, in the sense that it should be approved by the Secretary of State for Transport. It would be unreasonable to expect this code to have to be approved by this House, through a statutory instrument, but it is reasonable to say that there should be a safeguard and that the Government can ensure that the code of practice accords with what is reasonable and proportionate. The Secretary of State for Transport could then be held accountable by this House for approving a code of practice if it did not meet the reasonable conditions we think ought to apply.
My hon. Friend comes at this with far more expertise and knowledge than I do, because whereas I never have been and never will be a Minister, he has been—indeed, he was in the then Department of Transport. Will he therefore outline how he would expect the Secretary of State to take on this responsibility? Would it just be a meaningless rubber-stamping exercise?
Whether it was a meaningless rubber-stamping exercise or something of substance would depend very much on the Minister. Although we would say that the code would be approved by the Secretary of State for Transport, in practice it would be brought before a more junior Minister, who would carry out the approval in the name of the Secretary of State. It is not for me to comment on the assiduous way in which various junior Ministers operate, but I have no doubt that the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond), would be extremely assiduous if he was the Minister charged with this responsibility. The paper would be put before him by his officials and he would ask probing questions, perhaps on an iterative basis, whereby it might take a few days or weeks before the matter went through. He would take the responsibility seriously and examine the code, raising any concerns he had and suggesting any modifications that he wanted to have.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the first part of his remarks and I hope that in due course we can explore further the second part, in which he said that there was no need for the code of practice to be approved and that it could stand by itself. Quite, but would it not be an additional safeguard to ensure that it received the approval of the Government rather than just a Joint Committee, as suggested? I shall leave the matter there and we can perhaps explore it in due course.
Amendment 4 would add a new subsection after clause 4(14) so that clauses 4 and 5 would
“not apply in respect of any building in a conservation area.”
The provisions already exclude any application to listed buildings and, as we have discussed, theatres, but a building in a conservation area has traditionally enjoyed the same protection as a listed building outside a conservation area. The essence of a conservation area is that all the buildings should be considered together in the context of the local environment. One might be concerned that if a lot of street lamps and signs were attached to buildings in a conservation area, that could detract from the character of the area quite significantly. My challenge to the Minister in responding to the debate is that if it is reasonable to exempt listed buildings from clause 4, why has that not also been extended to buildings in conservation areas?
The next amendment in the group comes under the category of bad drafting and an attempt to take extremely wide powers. Amendment 5 would amend clause 5(4)(b), which deals with the serving of notices under clause 4 on people who would be affected by the application of the clause on the attachment of street lamps and signs to buildings. It states:
“If, for the purposes of serving a notice…the name or address of the relevant owner cannot be ascertained after reasonable enquiry, the notice…may be served by…addressing it to him by name or by the description of “owner” of the land (describing it)”.
That is probably similar to a lot of the letters one gets through one’s letterbox addressed to “The Owner” and asking, “Have you thought of selling your house or letting it through some great agents?” It would seem to be perfectly reasonable. Alternatively, one could leave
“it in the hands of a person who is”
on the land as a
“resident or employed on the land or leaving it conspicuously affixed to some building or object on or near the land.”
That is a standard way of serving notices, by affixing them to a property. Giving it to a person who is resident is fine, but what concerns me is how we are to judge whether to give a formal notice to somebody who “appears to be” the resident. That is such a large loophole. Anybody could say, “I saw somebody there, they appeared to be the resident, I served notice on them. I don’t know who they were, I didn’t ask them any questions, but they appeared to be the resident.” That is granting a power that is far too wide—unnecessarily so—and could undermine the whole purpose of the clause, which is intended to ensure the reasonable service of notices and that the owner or resident of affected premises should receive the proper notice. I look forward to hearing from my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East on how we will judge whether people appear to be resident, and why it is necessary to have this extraordinarily wide power, which allows a notice to be left with somebody who appears to be resident; implicit in that is the idea that they may not be resident.
I totally agree with my hon. Friend; this is a ludicrous state of affairs. Also, the Bill says “appears to be resident”—appears to whom? A person may appear to be resident to someone who is issuing a notice, but there is no regard to whether anybody else would think that the person was resident. Is this a good enough test?
Exactly. My hon. Friend makes a very good point.
Clause 5(5) falls into the “ludicrous and superfluous” category. It says:
“This section shall not be taken to exclude the employment of any method of service not expressly provided for by it”,
but of course the clause is only permissive; subsection (1) says that a notice
“may be served by post.”
What does clause 5(5) add to the statute book, other than completely superfluous wording? I would have thought it a statement of the obvious. Do we really need to include on the statute book lots of statements of the obvious, like this one? Amendment 6 would therefore leave it out.
On amendment 6, which would leave out subsection (5), has my hon. Friend had any thoughts about what might be included in those other methods of service? Might they include notices being served by e-mail, or by some other electronic means? If so, does he support that?
I find that a rather testing intervention, because I am rather against the idea of using e-mails to serve notices. From my limited experience of receiving and sending e-mails, I think it is often not clear whether they have reached their destination or got lost in the ether. Quite a lot of mine seem to go into something—I cannot remember what it is called—
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. They go into the spam folder, so they are effectively never received, because they are automatically deleted—or they certainly are on my computer, but I do not want to be drawn into that issue. The promoters may have it in mind that they could serve notices in that way to anybody who appeared to be resident, but I do not know how they would find out how to do that. I look forward to hearing from the sponsor on that point.
One of the reasons why it can be frustrating for people following private legislation is that during the Committee stage of a Bill which is the subject of a petition it is not possible to go into the detail of the drafting, unless a petitioner has expressed concern about it or members of the Bill Committee take an interest and ask the promoters what a particular clause or subsection means. When the Bill comes back to the House on Report, it is often the first chance that we have to examine the wording and why the promoters consider it necessary.
Clause 6 deals with damage to highways as a consequence of adjacent works. It provides that
“The 1980 Act shall apply in Greater London as though for section 133 (damage to footways of streets by excavations) and its heading there were substituted—
Damage to highway by carrying out of works”.
The current wording of clause 6 is:
“If a highway maintainable at the public expense is damaged by or in consequence of any works on land adjacent to the highway, the highway authority for the highway may make good the damage”.
The effect of my amendment 7 would be that the highway authority “shall make good” the damage, because the highway authority has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the highway. I declare an interest as the chairman of the all-party parliamentary group on highways maintenance. We had a meeting today to discuss the fraught issue of highway maintenance, the number of potholes that there are, and the rather varied performance of local authorities up and down the country in addressing the problems caused by deteriorating road surfaces and the creation of potholes.
Most people say that it should be the responsibility of the highway authority to put the road back into good order if that is what has happened. Amendment 7 would make it mandatory for the highway authority to make good the damage, and amendment 8 would enable the highway authority to recover the expenses reasonably incurred by it in so doing.
May we stick to amendment 7 for the time being? I agree with my hon. Friend’s general premise. Motorists get a raw deal in this country, considering the amount of tax that they pay. Might the amendment lead to a perverse situation where the damage may be minor, yet the local authority would be forced to carry out work, which may be considered disproportionate? Might that be an unintended consequence of my hon. Friend’s amendment?
I do not think it would be an intended consequence. I concede that my hon. Friend may have got me on that. Essentially, the question is whether we would describe minor damage as being covered by the amendment, or whether we are talking about significant damage. I drafted my amendment on the basis that we are talking about damage of such significance that it should be made good. We know that an unevenness on the road surface may soon deteriorate when heavy vehicles go over it or when it is subject to water penetration. What might start off as relatively minor damage may, if not addressed in timely fashion, become a significant pothole and a hazard to road users. My hon. Friend makes a good point, but I do not think that it really counters the general thrust of amendment 7, which is to try to ensure that the highway authority takes responsibility for making good any damage caused by works adjacent to the road.
My hon. Friend, rather uncharacteristically, is rushing through his amendments and catching me out as a result. To return to amendment 8, which would insert the word “may”, is he indicating that clause 6, as drafted, would force the highway authority to recover the expenses? Is the purpose of his amendment to allow some flexibility?
Yes. If we were to leave out “may” and insert “shall”, as amendment 7 proposes, but not make amendment 8, obviously the highway authority would be required to make good the damage and be forced to recover the expenses reasonably incurred. I do not think that it would be sensible to oblige a highway authority under the terms of a statute to recover the expenses, which might prove difficult. It would be better to say that it “may” recover the expenses, which is why amendment 8 seeks to insert “may” in front of the word “recover” in the provision. That way, the highway authority would have a responsibility to make good any damage caused to the highway by adjacent works, but it would have discretion over whether or not to seek to recover the resulting expenses. I hope that is clear.
It is clear, but I wonder whether my hon. Friend could expand a little on why he thinks the highway authority should not recover the expenses reasonably incurred.
In a sense, that is the other side of the coin my hon. Friend has just used. The answer is that it might not be worth the candle. Why should we force a local authority to try to recover a relatively small sum when the cost of doing so could be disproportionate? That is the best answer I can give to the good point he makes.
Let me turn to amendment 9. This is another example of where the Bill’s drafting is unnecessarily wide. If a highway is damaged as a result of adjacent works, surely the person responsible for paying to repair it should be
“(b) the person carrying out the works; or
(c) the person on whose behalf the works were carried out.”
Why should
“(a) the owner of the land in question”
be the subject of the recovery of expenses if he neither carried out the works nor had the works carried out on his behalf? That seems unnecessarily oppressive, because the owner of the land might know nothing whatsoever about the work being carried out or any damage resulting from it. That incorporates a provision of strict liability in circumstances in which I do not think it is reasonable.
That is why I have tabled amendment 9, which would leave out subsection (a) and ensure that the expenses reasonably incurred could be recovered from the person who carried out the works or the person on whose behalf the works were carried out. That might often be the owner. However, if that person was not the owner, he would not and could not be liable. I look forward to hearing from the promoters of the Bill why they think it is reasonable to expect the owner of the land to be liable in the circumstances that I have described.
My hon. Friend makes another good point. I do not know. The explanatory notes define “owner” in relation to part 3, but he is asking about part 2. That is perhaps an omission. There may be more than one owner. As he suggests, they may be a leasehold-owner, a freeholder, or, indeed, a sub-lessee. That is a reasonable point of inquiry. It might also be another reason why leaving out any reference to an owner would be the best way forward for the promoters of the Bill.
Amendment 20 is in the same group, which is headed “Highways and general”—“general” in this case. It relates to part 4, which has only one clause—clause 15, on the subject of gated roads, which says:
“Any person who opens, closes or otherwise operates or interferes with a relevant barrier without lawful excuse shall be guilty of an offence and liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale…In subsection (1) a ‘relevant barrier’ means any barrier lawfully placed in, or over a highway by or on behalf of a traffic authority in London for the purpose of preventing or restricting the passage of vehicles or any class of vehicles into, out of, or along a highway.”
My amendment 20 would leave out all that. If we are to have specific legislation creating a criminal offence for people who open, close or otherwise interfere with such barriers, it should introduce that offence right across the country rather than in a particular part of it. I have no evidence to suggest that there is a bigger problem relating to gated roads in London than anywhere else.
Furthermore, introducing specific offences litters the statute book of criminal law with rather a lot of unnecessary trivia. In this case, if somebody goes along to a barrier and cuts off the padlock or forces it open in some way, they will be guilty of criminal damage, which is obviously already an offence in criminal law. The provision would potentially criminalise somebody who might open a barrier because it was not locked and then find themselves guilty of an offence.
I agree with my hon. Friend wholeheartedly. Does he agree that there may well be a perfectly good, legitimate reason for somebody to do that if it is to preserve their health and safety or for other emergency purposes, and yet the provision does not give any wide-ranging exemptions for such people?
Absolutely. The clause refers to anyone who
“interferes with a relevant barrier without lawful excuse”,
which raises all sorts of questions regarding how to avoid the build-up of congestion caused by an accident or another incident such as a fire. If somebody says, “We need to open this barrier so that the traffic can flow more freely,” they might—unless they are authorised by the local authority—find themselves guilty of an offence. It seems to be a totally disproportionate response to the problem that the Bill’s promoters say exists.
I have seen no evidence of how many occasions gated roads have been opened, closed or otherwise interfered with by people to the detriment of the local authority. As I said at the outset, if there is a problem surely it would be better dealt with under the Traffic Regulation Act 1984, which relates to all authorities, not just those in London.
Rather earlier than some might have anticipated, I have reached the end of my introduction to the amendments, to which I have tried to speak in a constructive way. This is not an exercise in trying to prevent a Bill from making progress; it is an exercise in trying to ensure that the legislation that we put on the statute book is clear beyond peradventure and of sufficiently high quality to merit inclusion. It is very difficult to put these things right after the event, and on too many occasions in the past local authorities and Transport for London have been given wide powers that were not sufficiently explored beforehand, to the detriment of the general public. That is why, on behalf of road users and residents in London—I declare an interest as the owner of freehold property in London—I propose these amendments. I hope that the Bill’s promoters will address them as constructively as they have agreed to address at least two of the amendments in the next group.
I thank the Minister for that helpful intervention. Amendment 4 would mean that local authorities could not put up lamps and signs in a conservation area without consent. The problem is that councils already have the power to do that, although they must obtain the consent of the owner of the building. This is a decluttering measure; the idea behind these provisions is to remove the clutter of road signs and signage that appears all over London, which most of us Londoners recognise as disastrous. The amendment would restrict the ability of local authorities to declutter conservation areas and put up appropriate signs, although that ability is what most people want to see. Finally, the provisions in question, including those on conservation areas, were proposed by English Heritage. I bow to its expertise in wishing to pursue them.
Amendment 5 deals with notices. My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch made several points about people who appear to be residents or are employed on the land in question. The point is that notices would be served on such people if the local authority had been unable to ascertain the name or address of the owner of the premises. The provision in the Bill retains flexibility and is exactly the same as that in section 53 of the Crossrail Act 2008 and many other pieces of Government legislation. It is entirely consistent with previous legislation, so I strongly resist removing it.
My hon. Friend is doing a good job of explaining the position. However, if I heard him correctly, he said that handing over a notice would be a last resort. Will he at least accept that the Bill does not actually say that?
It is clearly incumbent on the local authority to make every effort to establish the name and owner of a building, and it would be sensible for it to do that. However, in London in particular, there is often a freeholder, a leaseholder and maybe a sub-leaseholder, and the ownership and responsibility may be confused. The provision is about giving a notice setting out what is going to be done to the outside of a building. That is not particularly draconian, but it is clearly required. A local authority frequently goes through a set of procedures to make such things happen. It would be draconian to frustrate its ability to provide signage or lamps that are wholly consistent with the general requirements of TfL or London local authorities.
Amendment 6 would remove the provision allowing local authorities to use any other existing general powers to serve notice. Councils have a power to do so under section 233 of the Local Government Act 1972, and that power is enshrined in the Bill. The effect of the amendment would be to remove that capability under the 1972 Act. My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch may have difficulties with that Act, but this is not the right place to express them.
No, it wouldn’t. It says that the local authority “shall” step in and do the work, irrespective. That wording is incorrect and is why I shall resist amendment 7, as well as amendments 8 and 9, which are all consequential amendments.
On amendment 20, London has many gates placed across roads to prevent the flow of traffic through residential communities. The roads are normally accessible by the emergency services—the fire brigade, ambulance service and police—and other appropriate authorities, but sometimes there is a severe problem. At the moment, if someone damages a gate, they can be held liable for criminal damage, but if they merely open the gate for their own convenience—to access the road or bypass a congested road—it defeats the purpose of that gate, which is to prevent large parts of London from being used as rat runs. The promoters therefore seek an enforcement option. If, on being directed by the emergency services, someone opened a gate, clearly they would not be guilty of an offence, but if they opened a gate for their own convenience—or for other people’s convenience, for joyriding or whatever—they would be guilty of an offence, and it would be up to the local authorities to enforce those actions.
I accept completely that there is an issue of interpretation around the reason for opening the gate, and there is always the potential for somebody to receive a penalty for incorrectly opening one, but it is entirely fair and proper to make it clear that people should not open one unless they have authority or good reason to believe that life or limb are in danger.
I am not entirely sure that the matter is as clear-cut as my hon. Friend says. As I understand it, if someone is at a red traffic light, an emergency vehicle wishes to get through and that person moves through the red light to allow it through, they still can be, and in some cases have been, prosecuted for going through a red light. I fear that, under the clause, if somebody for a good, common sense, although perhaps not lawful reason, opened a gate to allow an emergency vehicle to get to the scene of an accident, they could still find themselves prosecuted, which surely cannot be anybody’s intention.
Clearly, this is a matter of interpretation. The purpose of placing barriers across a traffic highway is to prevent the incursion of normal vehicles, but I cannot envisage someone ever being prosecuted for opening a gate that is normally locked in order to give access to an ambulance, the police or the fire brigade. However, the promoters are keen to ensure that people understand that if they interfere with a locked gate that is there for the purpose of preventing traffic from passing through, that will be an offence and they can be prosecuted.
Having made something of a study of such gates in London over the years, I can say that they are almost all locked with padlocks—except where someone has stolen the padlock, in which chase the gate will often flip open and shut. Young people—in general it is young people—have a habit of occasionally using such gates as a form of entertainment. We need to make it clear that such gates are there for a purpose. This issue is a matter of interpretation. We are talking about gates being interfered with—that is, opened to allow the incursion of traffic.
My earlier intervention fell on stony ground, so I will try from a different angle. My hon. Friend thinks that somebody in the scenario that I painted would not be prosecuted, but how about this scenario? What would happen if somebody refused to open the gate for an emergency vehicle in a desperate situation because they feared being prosecuted for contravening the law as it stands? Would that not be a shocking consequence of the proposal we are discussing?
It would be shocking; indeed, it would be shocking if the emergency services did not have the keys to access such a gate when they arrived at the scene, which in my experience they always do. To my knowledge—I will bow to anyone else’s superior knowledge—there has never been a situation where the emergency services required access to such a gate but were prevented because they were not carrying the keys.
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. That is one of the problems with the clause: it will potentially make criminals out of people who seek to do good. That cannot be right. It also prompts the question of what signage would be in place. In the context of the other clauses, we were talking about trying to remove signs, but there now might need to be new signs to warn people that such activity is a criminal offence. I entirely support the amendment and I look forward to hearing from others.
Order. I call Mr Philip Davies, and I am modestly confident that the contribution will be relatively brief as I feel sure that he will wish to get on with the consideration of amendment 10. Nevertheless, I have come back to hear colleagues and I wish to hear from the hon. Gentleman.
Among your many other great qualities, Mr Speaker, you are clearly a mind reader. I was only just thinking to myself that I must be brief so that we could get on to the next group of amendments. I commend you for that.
I find myself in a rather difficult position. I usually agree totally with my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) in his amendments, which are always thoughtfully considered and well argued. He usually manages to persuade me. I am rather torn on this group of amendments, however, as although he has persuaded me on some of them he has not on others. My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) has done a great job in making the case for the proposers of the Bill and articulating their side of the argument and, in some cases, he has persuaded me.
I am not entirely sure how this might operate, as I am not an expert in the procedures of the House—unlike you, Mr Speaker, and my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch—but I want to tell my hon. Friend which of his amendments I think are strongest and on which he might, if possible, wish to divide the House. Some of the amendments are stronger than others.
Some of my hon. Friend’s amendments are superficially attractive, as they generally are. He made a good point with amendments 1 and 2, which highlight provisions in the clause that are either bad or unnecessary. However, there is some merit in having some flexibility for the London boroughs in organising how they do business. There might be good reasons for trialling measures or introducing them at different times, and that flexibility should be allowed. The provisions might be superfluous but I do not see from listening to the arguments that they are particularly dangerous.
At the risk of hastening my hon. Friend on, will he specify which he thinks are the best amendments in order of preference? If his remarks are cut short, we will then have heard him putting the best first so that we can consider on which of them we might wish to divide the House.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend and I certainly will do that. To cut to the chase, his strongest amendment is amendment 5, on the issue of serving notices and whether someone is a resident or, as the Bill states, “appears to be” the resident. For me, the situation is completely nonsensical. On what basis does somebody appear to be a resident? One of us might be delivering leaflets in our constituency, as we do, and might have just left the door of a place only for somebody from the local authority come along to serve the notice. Seeing that we are leaving the door, they might serve us with the notice because they presume, quite wrongly, that we are the resident. All sorts of ridiculous scenarios could ensue. Sometimes, such provisions are just for the convenience of the laziness of local officials, so that they can use the justification that as far as they could see somebody appeared to be a resident and they therefore did not have to take any reasonable steps to ensure that that person was a resident. Surely the least any resident affected by these provisions can expect is that the authority concerned makes a proper effort to serve them with the relevant notice. If it was enough for someone to appear to be a resident, the local authority could, for its convenience, idly hand that person the notice, come what may. That is a ludicrous situation that we in this House should not tolerate, so I hope that my hon. Friend will consider pressing amendment 5 to a Division; that would be doing us a great service.
My hon. Friend’s other particularly strong amendment is amendment 20, on gated roads. This is a very important issue. As I mentioned in my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East, there are often well-meaning, well-intentioned provisions in legislation that have totally perverse outcomes. As I said, if a person drives through a red light to allow an emergency vehicle through, they are liable to prosecution for the offence of going through a red light. People might think, “It would be ludicrous if anyone who went through a red light just to allow an emergency vehicle through was prosecuted. Surely that would never happen,” but people have been prosecuted in those very circumstances. It does actually happen.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East says that when someone opens the gates for a good, common-sense reason, they will not be prosecuted. I do not doubt that that is his genuine belief, but we cannot pass legislation on the basis of what we think is likely to happen; we have to look at what the legislation actually states. We cannot allow perversity in the law. What if there is a terrible accident, and someone says, “For goodness’ sake, open that gate! An emergency vehicle is coming along in five minutes, and we need this person to be dealt with as soon as possible,” so a person opens the gate, and then finds themselves with a criminal record because they had done something they were not allowed to do under this legislation? That would be ludicrous, and we would be enshrining that kind of perversity in law.
On the other hand, someone who is encouraged to open a gate because an emergency vehicle is coming in five minutes’ time may say, “No, I’m not opening the gate, because I know the legislation, and I will be committing a criminal offence if I do.” We may end up with that kind of idiotic situation as an unintended consequence of the Bill. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch will try to find a way for amendments 20 and 6 to be put to the vote.
My hon. Friends the Members for Christchurch and for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) were very gung-ho about amendment 9, and I feared that they might seek to put it to a vote. I advise a certain amount of caution, because including a reference to the owner of the land in the legislation is quite sensible. Clause 6 does not say that the highway authority has to go after the owner; it just allows the authority the flexibility to do so, if that is the right person to pursue.
Let me briefly show why that may be a good idea. If the provision mentioned only the person carrying out the works and the person on whose behalf the works were being carried out, the following scenario could arise. Say a landowner’s permission is sought for work to be carried out. Although they are happy for that work to be done, and may well have encouraged it to be done, it may not have been carried out on their behalf, and they may not be the people carrying it out. However, they could quite easily be just as liable as the other people for the damage done, because they gave their consent for the work, although it was inappropriate.
Another scenario may come into play. My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch may unintentionally create a loophole with his amendment, because a wealthy landowner who does not want to be liable for any damage caused may get someone who has no means whatever to request that work be carried out, and get another person who has no means whatever to do the work. When the damage is done, the local authority has no means of recovering its money because the people who carried out and officially requested the work have nothing. The owner of the land, who actually wanted the work done in the first place, though that may not be evident at the time, gets away scot-free. I therefore fear that my hon. Friend could be creating a loophole, which would be unfortunate. Knowing him as I do, I am sure that would be an unintended consequence of what he is trying to achieve. I urge caution on him in pursuing amendment 9, even though I appreciate that my hon. Friends the Members for Christchurch and for Bury North feel that it is a particularly strong one.
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend.
Amendments 12 and 13 deal with the level of penalty for any person convicted of an offence under clause 8(6), which says that
“in the case of an offence under paragraph (a)”
the fine should be “not exceeding level 3”. However, under paragraph (a) the penalty would apply to somebody
“on whom a requirement is imposed…if…without reasonable excuse he fails to comply within the period specified”.
That means that he would not be providing the information within 14 working days. That is, I submit, a relatively minor contravention that should merit, if indeed it is prosecuted at all, only a fine not exceeding level 1 on the standard scale. Obviously, if a person responds to the requirement and, in so doing, gives information that he knows is false in a material particular, that is much more serious. The gravity of that could be reflected in a fine not exceeding level 3 rather than a massive one at level 5. I look forward to my hon. Friend explaining why the fine levels in the Bill were chosen.
Will my hon. Friend clarify what sums are involved at levels 1, 3 and 5 so that we may better assess a reasonable amount that somebody should be fined?
Does my hon. Friend have in mind a scenario in which a skip that has been properly lit is vandalised by people who prevent it from being lit? As it stands the owner would still be liable even if he had done everything he could to ensure that the skip was properly lit. Does my hon. Friend think that “taking any reasonable steps” would protect somebody who was doing their best?
That is exactly the scenario I had in mind. The owner might employ security guards to look at the skip regularly, but if the light was stolen or vandalised at some point would it be reasonable to say that the owner should be liable to a penalty charge?
When I spoke to amendment 10, I referred to amendment 15, which would strengthen the Bill because it would make it incumbent on the owner to take reasonable steps to ensure that the skip is clearly and indelibly marked with his name and telephone number and—rather than or—his address. Having a name and telephone number on a skip is not as good as having a name and address on a skip. I do not understand why the Bill’s promoters and drafters did not require both the telephone number and the address of the skip owner to be displayed. I would have thought that that would be much more preferable. That shows that these amendments are designed not to undermine the Bill, but to try to strengthen it where appropriate.
Amendment 16 relates back to clause 9(6)(d). Subsection (6) sets out, for the purposes of the London Local Authorities Act 2007, a number of provisions relating to
“the grounds on which representations may be made against a penalty charge 40 notice arising”,
one of which is paragraph (d), which notes that
“the contravention of the relevant provision in question was due to the act or default of another person and that he took all precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the contravention by himself or another person under his control.”
That seems brilliant, but subsection (8) states:
“Where the ground mentioned in subsection (6)(d) is relied on in any representations…the relevant highway authority may disregard the representations unless, before the representations are considered, the person making the representations has served on the relevant highway authority a notice in writing giving such information identifying or assisting in the identification of that other person as was then in his possession.”
That seems oppressive in the extreme. It would be fine to leave in subsection (6)(d) without subsection (8), and that is the purpose of amendment 16, which I hope will be acceptable to my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman).
Does my hon. Friend accept that if amendment 14 is accepted and requires someone to take “any reasonable steps” with regard to a properly lighted skip, we would not need subsection (8)? Amendment 14 is a much neater way of doing what the promoters of the Bill seem to be trying to do with their other provisions.
Exactly. Sometimes the imagination of those who draft private Bills runs away with them and they think of all possible scenarios. Requiring someone who has taken all reasonable precautions to avoid a contravention to set out in writing their information about other people who might have been up to no good, goes too far.
On Second Reading, the hon. Member for Ealing North (Stephen Pound), who I am sorry is not in his place, made a point about the immobilisation of builders’ skips—I think the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Jim Fitzpatrick) also raised that issue. If a builder’s skip is unlit, not properly guarded, causing a nuisance, filled with rotting rubbish or whatever, is it sensible to immobilise it? That is the challenge I put to the promoters of the Bill with amendments 17 to 19, which would leave out clauses 12 to 14.
If the owners of a skip have offended against provisions in part 3 of the Bill, surely penalty notices and so on will be involved. To immobilise the skip in the meantime, thereby preventing its owner from removing it when it is not lit or causing a nuisance, seems to go slightly in the wrong direction. I am sure I am wrong about that, and when my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East responds to the debate he will put me right and explain why London would be a better place if all skips were immobilised. The fact that this was a cross-party issue and taken up on Second Reading was not properly addressed in Committee, so I hope it can be addressed in response to my remarks. I look forward to hearing from my hon. Friend in the hope that we can proceed with these amendments in a similar way to the previous ones.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for clarifying the issue.
In summary, let me say on behalf of the promoters that we accept amendment 11 and oppose the rest of the amendments in this group. Part 3 of the Bill deals with appropriate action to make London streets safer when people put skips on the public highway, by ensuring appropriate fines and enforcement action when people break or flout the rules. We will accept amendment 11, but I invite my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch not to press the other amendments.
I seek to fulfil the same role in this debate as I did in the debate on the previous group of amendments, by speaking briefly and highlighting for my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) where I think he is on to a winner and also where he has not necessarily persuaded me of the merits of his case.
I am rather puzzled by the whole debate on amendment 10. My hon. Friend made a good case for saying that we should ask people to supply information about the owner of a builder’s skip only
“where that information is not clearly and indelibly marked under the provisions of section 9,”
as his amendment sets out. If I understood my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) correctly—I am sure he will correct me if I am wrong, which I may well be—he was saying that because skips change ownership quite often, having just a name, telephone number, address or whatever it might be on the skip would not necessarily be a good enough indicator of the actual owner, because the skip might have changed hands a couple of times since those markings were applied. That might well be true, but the problem is that it flies in the face of clause 9, which states that the owner would have to ensure—I might add that anyone who did not do this would have to pay a fine—that
“the skip is clearly and indelibly marked with the owner’s name and with his telephone number or address”.
The promoters of the Bill cannot have it both ways. They cannot say that such information is required for the purposes of clause 9, but that it would be unfair to require it in clause 8. I would advise my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East to have another think, because my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch is simply proposing a modest, common-sense amendment that goes with the flow of the Bill, not against it.
Perhaps I can assist my hon. Friend. The difference might be that clause 8(1) refers to “the name and address”, whereas clause 9(3)(b)(iii) refers to “telephone number or address”, so perhaps the owner could give a telephone number, but not an address.
I appreciate that point, but amendment 10, standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch, simply says that if the information was already clearly marked, it would not have to be requested. To me that seems a sensible and modest amendment, and I certainly agree with it.
I am delighted that amendment 11 has been accepted—we do not need to waste any time on that. I do not intend to delay the House for long by discussing amendments 12 and 13. I do not have a strong opinion on the level of the fine, but I want to make a wider point on legislation generally. If we look at different pieces of legislation “in silo”, we might find individual fines appropriate or inappropriate, but we could end up in the ridiculous situation whereby some serious offences attract small penalties and some minor ones attract severe ones. Instead, we ought to look at the criminal justice system as a whole, to determine the appropriate level for different severities of crime. I wonder whether this particular offence could attract a much more severe penalty than other, more serious, crimes.
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. His amendment goes with the flow of the legislation rather than against it, and I think this is a genuine improvement.
On amendment 15, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East. Making the provisions for London much more onerous than in other parts of the country would be unfair. The only thing I will say—and here I hope my hon. Friend will forgive me if I tease him somewhat—is that his point about not providing different rules for London than obtain in other parts of the country is the argument that we have been making in respect of virtually every other part of this particular Bill. He has refused to accept that particular logic with all the other provisions, so it seems to me ironic that he was prepared to pull that argument out of the hat when it suited him, when he has denied it in respect of lots of other amendments on this legislation. I hope he will forgive me for teasing him in that way.
On the final three amendments—amendments 17, 18 and 19—I thought my hon. Friend for Christchurch made a very good point in his usual engaging and amusing way in saying that if a skip is causing a particular problem in a local community, it is surely the wrong solution to immobilise it and keep it there unnecessarily for even longer. I am not entirely sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East answered that point to my satisfaction, because there is an unerring logic to what my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch was saying. It may well be that there are occasions when immobilisation is the best solution, although my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch and I cannot think of them. I am prepared on that basis to give my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East a rather dubious benefit of the doubt.
I do not want to extend my remarks any further, but I reiterate my hope that if the opportunity allows it, my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch will seek to press his amendment 14, which is the strongest of his amendments and the one that would improve this legislation without doubt.
If I may, I will start where my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) left off, and work in reverse order through this set of amendments, presented so ably a short while ago by my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope). I am grateful, as ever, for the clarification of what might be termed the case for the defence, so ably made by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman).
Starting with amendments 17, 18 and 19, I entirely agree that it is somewhat bizarre that the solution to a problem skip is to immobilise it, but I was persuaded by what my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East had to say on the matter. To be perfectly honest, I have never seen one of these devices, and I can only imagine what they must look like. I understand that they both immobilise and light up the skip at the same time, which seems an eminently sensible idea for dealing with a problem skip. I have always thought that even empty skips are particularly difficult to move, so I would not think that they needed much help to be immobilised, although I am prepared to accept that that may well be a solution in some cases.
I turn to the other easy one—amendment 11, which has sensibly been accepted by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East and the promoters. That demonstrates the sense and worth of the work done by my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch in going through the Bill in some detail and tabling the amendments. The promoters have accepted that the correct period is 14 rather than three working days.
I turn to the slightly more contentious amendments. I looked at amendment 10 and thought it was merely a clarification. There would be no point in criminalising someone or causing them to commit an offence if the information was patently obvious from looking at the side of the skip, in accordance with clause 9. Apparently, the promoters think otherwise. Personally, I would support amendment 10.
We now move neatly into the debate about decriminalisation. We are not really decriminalising these things, just moving the responsibility for taking action from one authority, the police, to another authority, the local authority. The net result is the same. Anyone reading language such as “commits an offence” would think, “Crikey! They mean a criminal offence.” Apparently, however, the measure represents decriminalisation. I humbly suggest that if clause 8 had read, “A person on whom a requirement is imposed under this section shall be liable to a civil penalty,” that would have been more appropriate if the intention was to decriminalise.
I entirely agree with what my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley said about amendment 14. It is entirely right that when it comes to the liability of someone who has committed a skip offence, to use some shorthand—[Interruption.] Not a skipping offence, but a builder’s skip offence. When it comes to such a person’s liability, the inclusion of the words
“take any reasonable steps to”
is entirely sensible. Although it might look as though one of those specific offences was being committed, there could be a whole host of reasons why a person ought not to be held liable.
The issue of criminalisation is important when considering the question of proof. If the offences are to remain criminal, the burden of proof is “beyond all reasonable doubt”. However, if they are to be dealt with according to a civil burden of proof, “the balance of probabilities” applies—it could be 51:49. There is a whole host of difference between liability in criminal and civil cases. The matter needs to be nailed down. We need to be absolutely clear about whether we are decriminalising this. Is it going to be a criminal offence, or is it going to be a civil offence and is it going to be dealt with under the civil law? That will affect the burden of proof required of those who seek to enforce these requirements.