Philip Davies
Main Page: Philip Davies (Conservative - Shipley)City of London (Various Powers) Bill [Lords]
Philip Davies Excerpts(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Mr Chope
Indeed, Mr Deputy Speaker, I was tempted to ask to intervene on my hon. Friend. I am grateful to him for expanding on that important point, and I am grateful to you for your indulgence in enabling the point to be made. I accept that the City of London is in a separate position from that of other local authorities.
I want to move away from the generalities and turn to the specifics of the Bill. The power in clause 3 relating to temporary street trading is effectively a liberating provision when compared with the current regime. It will enable street trading to be carried out over a limited period and, as the explanatory memorandum makes clear, it represents a relaxation of the restrictive code. I am not going to argue against that, because to do so would be to argue against the principles that I have fought hard for in many similar Bills in the House. I would not quibble with the detailed contents of the measures on temporary street trading.
Philip Davies (Shipley) (Con)
I share my hon. Friend’s view, but when it comes to scrutiny of the Bill, is he happy that the arrangements have been sufficiently relaxed?
Mr Chope
I think my hon. Friend knows the answer to that: I would like to see a much more relaxed arrangement. Any relaxation, however, is probably better than none. It is important for people to be able to enter the marketplace as business men without the need for much capital. I view that as fundamental in an entrepreneurial society. The City of London obviously epitomises the entrepreneurial society, which is why it is good for the City of London to encourage street traders and people starting out in their business life and career to be able to show what they are worth, perhaps initially by getting a street trading licence, perhaps operating like interns on a temporary basis and seeing how it goes. I believe that clause 3 is—I hope I do not have to eat these words later—a clause for good, so I support it.
The issue of temporary licences is not one that greatly concerns me, but I am concerned about whether the case for increased penalties has been made. It is easy to say that it is expensive to prosecute. We know that companies will say, “We do not prosecute people who are shoplifters because it is not worth the candle. It will cost us too much to prosecute and when we get people before the courts, the fines will be so derisory that we will not achieve much purpose and we will have been put to a lot of needless expense.” That argument is often put forward on behalf of public authorities, which are funded by local or national taxpayer resources.
Having said all that, this country is one that believes in the rule of law, and I would have thought that an important principle of the rule of law is that if an enforcement authority feels that breaches of specific local byelaws or local legislation are to the detriment of the people living in the area, it should be quite happy to prosecute, recognising that a cost is associated with that. Ultimately, the taxpayer pays a lot of money for prosecuting people and even more money if those people are convicted and sentenced to prison, but we do not say that it is not a good thing to do that, as it is an important matter of principle. I am not impressed, in respect of clause 6, with the idea that prosecuting authorities should not bring prosecutions just because they think it is not financially expedient to do so on the grounds that insufficient money will come back to them. Apart from anything else, the penalties that will be increased will be court penalties; as I understand it, they will not be to the benefit of City of London local council tax payers. The penalties would go to helping to meet the costs of the national Exchequer, as they are pooled for very understandable reasons. In the absence of hard evidence, I am not convinced of the case for increasing the penalties as set out in clause 6.
I have a much greater problem with clause 7. As I said in an intervention, the provisions on enforcement of seizure, the return of seized items, compensation, forfeiture of seized items, seizure of perishable articles, motor vehicles and disposal orders have been considered on a number of occasions by Members, most recently in respect of four private Bills promoted by the city of Leeds, the city of Nottingham, the city of Canterbury and Reading borough council. Those provisions were removed from all four Bills. My hon. Friend may say, “Ah, but this Bill relates to London, and the same provisions have been passed in the case of other London local authorities.” That is true, but they were passed against the wishes of my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies), who I am pleased to see is present, and against my wishes, as well as, I believe, those of many other people.
Mr Chope
My hon. Friend’s comments serve to remind me that last night I was in the City of London Guildhall library where our party colleague the Minister of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Michael Fallon) made a speech entitled “Deregulating for growth,” which is a principle I am sure my hon. Friend and I both support. Too much legislation adds new regulation, however, which is counter-productive to the policy of promoting growth in our economy, and anything the City of London does in adding further regulation will come under more scrutiny than if that is done by a little borough council somewhere else in the country, as the ethos of the City of London is based on having the minimum amount of regulation necessary to ensure we get economic growth and successful financial and professional services industries in the City. It is against that background that I raise my concerns about clause 7.
Philip Davies
As my hon. Friend knows, I agree with his views about giving local authorities of any description the power of seizure, especially on such flimsy evidence as provided for in this clause. Is he reassured in any way by proposed new subsection 16A(2), which says an article can be seized only
“if it may be required to be used in evidence in any proceedings in respect of the offence in question”,
or is that merely a mask covering something that is still unacceptable?
Mr Chope
On the face of it, that does not seem too bad, but if we look at other provisions in clause 7, we see that there are difficulties. Proposed new subsection 16A(1)(c) states that an authorised officer may seize
“any receptacle or equipment being used by”
the person in question. My hon. Friend will know from having read the Bill that a receptacle could be a motor car or van from which ice-creams are being sold. These receptacles or pieces of equipment are therefore potentially quite valuable, and the fact of having them seized could cause the person concerned a significant problem, particularly if they are seized on dubious grounds.
Philip Davies
It is stated that such an item can be seized only
“if it may be required to be used in evidence.”
Does my hon. Friend agree that that does not really provide any safeguards at all, because anything could be seized on the basis that it may be required, as that does not mean that it is required?
Mr Chope
My hon. Friend is on to a good point. It is stated later in the Bill that such an item could be retained for up to six months on the basis that it may be required in connection with a prosecution. However, a prosecution may then never take place and the person will have been deprived of their goods for six months. That may have achieved the enforcement authority’s objective, but it generates a grave injustice for the victim of that seizure. That is why there needs to be a proper balance struck between the rights and responsibilities in the Bill’s enforcement provisions. We should be most reluctant to give powers of seizure not only to constables, but to authorised officers, who could be
“any officer or employee of the Corporation”
or
“any person by whom…any enforcement functions under this Part fall to be discharged”
or
“any employee of any such person”.
That is getting quite remote from the person in charge, and the more remote we go, the more scope there is for abuse.
If the only redress is something that may come six months later, there may be no redress at all. For example, if the ice cream van—the “receptacle”—is seized in March, it might only be returned in September, by which time the main ice cream selling season will have passed and so the person’s livelihood will have been taken away from them for the duration of the season. That illustrates the potential gravity of what is being proposed.
My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) might say that new section 16B deals with the return of seized articles, with subsection (3) stating:
“Subject to subsection (8), following the conclusion of the proceedings the article or thing shall be returned to the person from whom it was seized”.
Again, however, the devil is in the detail, as we see in the provisions dealing with the return of an ice cream van. New section 16B(5) provides that
“where a receptacle seized…is a motor vehicle used for ice cream trading, the Corporation or the Commissioner of Police…shall, within 3 days of the receipt of an application in writing by the owner or registered keeper of the vehicle, permit the person to remove it.”
In other words, the person would be able to take it back. However, the Bill goes on to state that they would not be able to do so
“where the circumstances mentioned in subsection (7) apply”.
One of those circumstances is perfectly reasonable— the person has been convicted of an offence under the legislation already. I am not going to quibble about that, but I do quibble with new section 16B(6)(b), which states that one of these circumstances is where
“the owner or registered keeper of the vehicle is being prosecuted for a previous alleged offence”.
In other words, someone gets arrested and prosecuted, and the proceedings have not been determined—so the presumption of innocence surely continues to apply—yet the mere fact that they are being prosecuted puts them in a more prejudicial position than if there were no prosecution. It is reasonable to look at some of the issues that we might want to raise in Committee, and that provision removing a person’s ability to recover their ice cream van within three days of it being removed if they are being prosecuted for another offence is draconian, over the top and unnecessary.
Philip Davies
I very much agree with my hon. Friend, but will he turn his eye to clause 16B(6)(c) as well? Not only is the position as he suggests, but another circumstance is where
“the vehicle has been used in the commission of such an offence or previous alleged offence.”
Is he aware of exactly who determines whether it has been used in such an offence or how an allegation of an offence would apply? That provision seems rather loose too.
Mr Chope
My hon. Friend is on to a good point. The Bill does not say that the vehicle must have been used by the same person in the commission of such an offence. It could have been acquired in all innocence from a previous ice cream vendor in market overt, in an auction or by a private treaty sale. The vehicle’s new owner would not know that it had been used in the commissioning of an offence in the past, so he would be penalised because, unknown to him, the vehicle had been used in such a way. Surely that would be unreasonable. If the EU services directive wants to create level playing fields, I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to consider whether there should be a level playing field, which we do not have at the moment, between those who have purchased ice cream vans but find out later that they have been used in connection with an offence in the City of London and those who purchase ice cream vans that have not been used for such offences. There should be a level playing field between those two categories of person.
Philip Davies
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend, who is very good at picking up on these anomalies in Bills. Will he talk a little about how that measure applies to an alleged offence, as it applies even to an offence that has not necessarily taken place and that has merely been alleged?
Mr Chope
Exactly. When people are given free rein to bring legislation before this House and to create new offences, the temptation always seems to be to draft the offences in the widest possible terms. It is incumbent on us to put pressure on the promoter of the Bill and to ask whether the proposals are reasonable or whether they go over the top. This is a good example of the drafting being far wider than it needs to be.
Mr Chope
Mr Deputy Speaker, you are quite right to have a go at the victim, which is me. I was led astray by that intervention, and I accept full responsibility.
If a product is perishable, the consequences of having it seized may be that it loses all its value. That is important. I am not sure that the provisions relating to perishable items in clause 16E are sufficient. The clause says:
“No article or thing which is of a perishable nature … shall be seized under the provisions of section 16A … unless the Corporation gives a notice in writing under subsection (2) to the person from whom the article or thing is seized.”
I would have thought it best to say that nothing perishable should be seized. Ice-cream could be removed and, if necessary, the van seized. The seizure of perishable articles is quite an oppressive power.
Proposed new section 16E(2) states:
“Where a perishable article or thing is seized…the person from whom it is seized shall be given a notice in writing…giving the address from which the article or thing may be collected; and…stating that if that person is not the owner of the article or thing, then that person should give the owner the information referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b).”
On the face of it, one would think that that would ensure that perishable articles were not seized, but when one looks at the small print one sees that they will be seized, and that is unfair and unjust. Indeed, such provisions have been removed from similar Bills because Members on the Government Benches—I cannot speak for Opposition Members—thought that they were disproportionately heavy in their application to ordinary people.
I have some grave concerns about the powers of seizure, especially when dealing with items of greater value than the maximum penalties under the Bill. A specific provision provides that it is open to the authorities to seize equipment, including motor vehicles, of a value higher than the maximum fine that could be imposed under any circumstances. That, in effect, deprives people of their assets, perhaps temporarily, in a disproportionately heavy manner.
Philip Davies
I wondered whether my hon. Friend was going to mention the provision on compensation for seizure. Proposed new section 16D(4) states:
“The court may only make an order for compensation under subsection (3) if satisfied that seizure was not lawful under section 16A.”
That comes back to reasonable grounds for suspicion, which appears to me to be framed so as to ensure that compensation never has to be paid, even when seizure has happened wrongly.
Mr Chope
As so often, my hon. Friend is right. By looking at all the language in the Bill, one is able to see the consequences. The exemptions are so hedged around that it will be difficult for anyone to comply with them, especially if the ultimate test is whether someone has a reasonable suspicion. That particular fault-line runs throughout these clauses. I have many concerns about the powers, especially as they relate to motor vehicles and perishable goods, but I do not need to go into the detail of disposal orders at the moment.
Clause 8 deals with charges for licensed street traders. I have always tried to be fair and give credit where it is due, and I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster makes a strong case on this issue. If one side of the street is controlled by one local authority and the other side by another local authority, there is an argument for saying that the prices charged for street-trading licences should be the same. My hon. Friend may remember the days when the Foreign Secretary lived on one side of a street in Lambeth and the other side of the street was in Wandsworth, and there was an enormous disparity in council tax—the figure in Lambeth being very much higher than that in Wandsworth. That shows the sensitivity when one part of the street is in one borough and another part of the street in another local authority area, resulting in differential pricing.
Philip Davies
I intervene to remind my hon. Friend that the Ministers have changed places and he can now commend the current incumbent of the Front Bench for his excellent speech last night.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. If the hon. Gentleman is trying to catch my eye, would I be correct in saying that he was not here at the beginning for the opening speeches?
Philip Davies
I was in the House. As I had been on such a long haul in the previous debate, I popped out for a quick drink.
Mr Deputy Speaker
It must have been quite a long drink. As the hon. Gentleman knows, it is not quite the normal thing and I am sure that he would like to apologise before I call him to speak.
Philip Davies
I am very grateful, Mr Deputy Speaker. I do apologise for the discourtesy to you and to my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field). As I said, I popped out for a drink after the previous debate, where I had been on duty for quite some time.
Philip Davies
It was indeed. However, you will be pleased to know, Mr Deputy Speaker, that I watched the monitor while I was drinking said cup of tea, and so I did catch the points that my hon. Friend made. You will be relieved to know that I do not intend to detain the House for long, but I am sure that you did not expect me to.
I want to begin where my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) left off, by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster. He is a reasonable man who listens to the points that are made in debate and, where good cases are made, responds in a positive way. We have not always seen that in previous debates on private business, and we should commend him for his approach to these matters. This Bill is certainly not as bad as some of the Bills that we have considered. As my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch said, some of its clauses are positive changes that we welcome.
It is always right on these occasions that we congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch on how he scrutinises such Bills, which it would be perfectly possible to allow to go through on the nod. Yet they do a great disservice to lots of decent people who are trying to earn a crust, and to show some entrepreneurial spirit in doing so, but find themselves on the wrong side of poorly drafted legislation. It is to his credit that we scrutinise these things in some detail so that we can try to avoid those pitfalls.
Like my hon. Friend, I strongly support the purpose of clause 3 on temporary street trading. As he says, this is a relaxation of the law that will enable more people to engage in entrepreneurial enterprise, and for that we should be grateful. However, I am not entirely sure exactly what is intended in all cases when this part of the Bill is brought into play and a licence is granted. It strikes me that the clause is not really intended for the benefit of entrepreneurs, as my hon. Friend seemed to think when he extolled its virtues. He seemed to be saying that it was good because it would be of benefit to entrepreneurs, but I am not entirely sure that that is its purpose, although it may well be its end result.
Let me explain what I think is the real purpose of the clause. Certain people in the City of London may on occasion want to have some swish event, or perhaps not even a swish event but just a celebratory event, on the streets of the City of London. They may realise that in order to make that event as good and as appealing as possible, they would be assisted by the provisions in the clause, without which the event might not be quite so popular. The clause seems to be intended for their benefit rather than the benefit of the people whom my hon. Friend apparently had in mind. However, that is by the by.
Mark Field
It is fair to say that clause 3 is designed to relax the strict rules that have been in place for the past century. I do not think there is any desire to return to the days of Bartholomew Fair or other such terrible things that took place in far-flung parts of the City of London. As my hon. Friend may be aware, the Winter Wonderland in Hyde park has been a tremendous success, and something along those lines, but on a much more limited scale and for a short period of up to three weeks, might be borne in mind for the City of London. It would be sensible to enable provisions for that.
Philip Davies
I agree. To be honest, that was the type of event that I had in mind with regard to the clause, although it states that the corporation may grant a licence
“subject to such conditions as the Corporation may determine.”
I am not entirely sure, but that may involve some harsh conditions that will not be particularly attractive to anybody. We can leave that as a matter for negotiation between any potential trader and the corporation, because it is in the corporation’s interest that some people will want to take it up. I think we can say that clause 3 makes a positive change and I am happy to support it as drafted.
On clause 6, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch on penalties. I, too, was not clear that a case had been made as to why this change should be made. I heard my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster, who promoted the Bill, say—this demonstrates that I was watching the monitor while drinking my tea—that the clause was intended to bring the level of the fine in line with that in other areas. I understand that, but that is not to say that those other authorities are on the right track. That argument seems to take it as read that because other authorities impose fines at a certain level, they must be right. Some may argue that they are not and that the current level is more appropriate.
Mark Field
I think that my hon. Friend would recognise that a fixed penalty notice provides a more efficient means of enforcement than going down the seizure route. One would hope that harmonising it to a level 3 fine of £1,000 instead of the current £500 fine would make seizure, which is the subject of other clauses, less likely. The fixed penalty route is a more efficient way of doing things.
Philip Davies
I accept that point, but I am not necessarily persuaded that we should ratchet up the fines. Of course, if there is good evidence to do so I would be happy to listen to it.
My main concern relates to clause 7 and enforcement, and this has been a common theme when we have debated other, similar Bills. The clause would give rather big powers to any authorised officer. Subsection (1)(c) states that such powers will be given to “any employee” of the corporation, but that extends the powers over seizure and other things covered by the clause far too wide. It seems far too draconian.
I am sure that the overwhelming majority of people who work in local authorities up and down the country do their job diligently, well and to the best of their ability, without abusing the authority that has been given to them. That tends to be how things are done up and down the country.
Mark Field
May I provide my hon. Friend with some reassurance? Part of this process is designed to help save the time of hard-pressed police officers, which is an issue that I am sure applies as much to the West Yorkshire constabulary as it does to the City of London. I assure the House that any officer exercising a power of seizure or issuing a fixed penalty notice will receive proper training. The corporation ensures that that applies to all current staff in cases involving, for example, litter offences and highway obstructions. My hon. Friend can be assured that council employees will receive proper training through training sessions in order to be made aware of their powers and the limitations of those powers under the Bill.
Philip Davies
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. That point is extremely helpful and shows that he understands my concern. He will correct me if I am wrong, but I do not think that that point is made clear in the Bill. It may well be the intention and I am certain that it is his intention. However, the people who run the City of London will change over time and the new people may well take a different view about the level of training that is needed. It might be helpful if it was made clear in the Bill what level of training is required before people are given this kind of power.
I worry about giving local authority officers what are, in effect, police powers, especially as liberally as in this provision. My hon. Friend seemed to indicate that the aim of this measure was to relieve pressure on the police. The point that I made earlier stands. Although the overwhelming majority of council officers carry out their work diligently and appropriately, I am sure that we have all come across examples of the pettifogging council officer. Funnily enough, I had to deal with one myself, a traffic officer, in Bradford not long ago. I am sure that such officers are not unique to Bradford. I worry about giving such powers, willy-nilly, to too many people without any of the appropriate safeguards.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
I think it is correct that if enforcement action is to take place, a police officer or someone in authority has to be present.
Philip Davies
I do not think that that is the case. That is one of the things I worry about.
I am delighted by the arrival of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) in the Chamber, particularly as we are talking about the laws on seizure and about giving council officers the authority to seize people’s goods, because he has shown time and again that he, too, is nervous about such provisions.
My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch was right to highlight that all the issues flow from proposed new section 16A on seizure, which is contained in clause 7. It states that there must be
“reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an offence”.
It would be difficult for any officer to fall foul of such a loose definition. This is not a trifling matter. We are talking about somebody seizing somebody else’s goods. That is a big power. I think that a higher test should have to be met before council officers are authorised to go around seizing people’s goods.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch said, it is not just any article that is being
“offered for sale, displayed or exposed for sale”
that can be seized. Proposed new section 16A(1)(b) states that
“any other article or thing of a similar nature to that being offered or exposed for sale which is in the possession”
of the person may be seized. Even if something is not being offered for sale, the officer is still authorised to take it away from the individual. Paragraph (c) also includes
“any receptacle or equipment being used by that person.”
These are wide-ranging powers of seizure that we are in danger of giving to any employee of the corporation, notwithstanding the reassurance that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster gave about the level of training that will be given, just on the basis of “reasonable grounds” for suspicion. There is a great danger that, on occasion, that authority and power will be misused by people, perhaps out of frustration or for another reason, if appropriate safeguards are not put in place.
The Bill says—I made this point in a brief intervention earlier, but I want to expand upon it—that something may be seized only
“if it may be required to be used in evidence”.
Reading the Bill for the first time, that sounds like quite a good safeguard, because people will not be able to seize things willy-nilly and they will be able to use them only in evidence. However, it states that it can be seized if it only may be required, which is essentially no safeguard at all. Anything can be seized on the basis that it may need to be used in evidence—who is to decide that?
The officers who seize goods will naturally take a precautionary position, and I would not blame them for that. They will want to seize as much as possible, because they will not want somebody further down the line to ask them, “Why did you leave them with that bit of stuff? That could have been crucial evidence to prosecute them.” I suspect that in the training that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster mentioned, officers will be told, “Take as much as you can, because it may be crucial. The bit that you leave behind may have been the crucial bit.” I fear that the provision is written to look like a safeguard but is no safeguard whatever.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch said, the Bill mentions receptacles, and vans, cars or any other type of vehicle could be described as receptacles for the purpose of the Bill. There are serious concerns about the people who can seize products and the definition of when it is appropriate to do so.
Uncharacteristically, my hon. Friend did not really touch on the return of seized articles, but proposed new section 16B(4) sets out what will happen when
“after 28 days any costs awarded by the court to the Corporation have not been paid”.
There are some potentially contradictory points on the matter that do not really flow on from one another. On the one hand, if that point applies, the Bill allows the City of London to dispose of products
“in any way the Corporation thinks fit”.
However, it then states that
“any sum obtained by the Corporation in excess of the costs…shall be returned to the person”.
That is highly unlikely, given that the corporation can dispose of products in any way, shape or form. However, it also states that the corporation has
“a duty to secure the best possible price which can reasonably be obtained for that article or thing.”
I cannot reconcile the corporation being able to dispose of an article in any way it sees fit with the fact that it is being asked to obtain the best possible price for it. Those seem completely contradictory statements. If we are saying that the corporation has to get the best possible price, proposed subsection (4)(a), whereby it can dispose of an article in any way it thinks fit, seems redundant.
The best possible price that can reasonably be obtained for something depends on how the corporation gets rid of it. If it sells it in a similar way to the person who was trading it and from whom it was seized, it can get the full retail price. I am not entirely sure how it will fulfil its duty to secure the best possible price for something. What will it be expected to go through to fulfil that condition? It seems to me that in the real world, it will not make any effort whatever to go out and sell something at the best possible price. It will dispose of it.
Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. He is being generous with his time.
Is my hon. Friend not concerned, as I am, that the real tragedy will be that once goods are seized, the trader involved may well lose their livelihood? Is that not the danger?
Philip Davies
Absolutely, particularly if the products are just going to be disposed of.
Philip Davies
That would be a helpful intervention, but I am not entirely sure that the Bill’s sponsor can give that commitment, to be perfectly honest. I certainly do not think we should press him to do so. However, such anomalies in the Bill make it unclear what will happen.
I do not want to dwell on the issue of vehicles, but where people are being prosecuted for a previous alleged offence, or where a vehicle has been used in a previous alleged offence, that is dangerous territory. The clause makes it clear that no offence needs to have been committed for things not to be returned to the owner; it just needs to have been alleged that things were used in a previous offence. That is no basis on which to take things away from people and refuse to return them. That flies in the face of all natural justice and the British way of doing things. I must say in passing that I am not known for being soft on crime, but I draw a distinction between where a crime has been committed and where one has been alleged. The Bill does not adequately draw a distinction between the two.
Philip Davies
My hon. Friend made that point very well during his speech and I do not want to reiterate his point, but he is absolutely right.
Remaining on the subject of the return of seized items, I have some minor worries about this section. Proposed new section 16B(8)(a) refers to circumstances in which:
“if no proceedings have been instituted before the expiry of 28 days beginning with the date of seizure”.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) made clear, 28 days can be an awfully long time to go without goods if one’s livelihood depends on them. It would be a bit of a kick in the teeth if one were not allowed to have one’s goods when no offence had been committed or was being pursued, and it could have a big impact on one’s livelihood for that month.
Proposed new section 16B(8) goes on to state that an article shall be returned:
“unless it has not proved possible, after diligent enquiry, to identify that person or ascertain the person’s address.”
I am not entirely sure what the definition of a “diligent enquiry” is, or how diligent a “diligent enquiry” needs to be. I fear that some of the provisions will be used to give an excuse for not returning goods to their proper lawful owner. We should be minimising the opportunities for that.
Although my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch did not mention this point, it is worth noting that proposed new section 16C(4) states that the court may order forfeiture of goods even if the value exceeds the maximum penalty for the offence that has been committed. We are in the strange situation where we are levying a maximum penalty, but if the goods exceed that maximum penalty they can still be forfeited. I am not sure on what basis that can be either right or fair. If there is a maximum penalty, surely that should be the maximum penalty. The provision flies in the face of natural justice, and it would be interesting to have some clarification on it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch made the point that proposed new section 16D(1)(b)(ii) states that people might have to wait six months before compensation, which is a lengthy period of time. The court will only be able to make an order for compensation if it is satisfied that the seizure was lawful under proposed new section 16A. I hope my hon. Friend will come back to section 16A and whether we can strengthen
“reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an offence”.
Otherwise, the corporation would never have to pay compensation, irrespective of how it acted, but that cannot be the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster. Surely, it should be forced to pay compensation if it has acted in a way that is not becoming. We would all like to see that, I am sure, yet we are in danger of giving it a get-out-of-jail card and letting it get out of paying compensation.
I agree with the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch about perishable items. I thought he made them very well, so I will not repeat them—[Interruption.]—despite the encouragement from Opposition Members to extol the virtues of his argument a bit more. Perhaps I will, under their provocation, Mr Deputy Speaker—
Philip Davies
But for now I shall resist the temptation.
Instead of repeating my hon. Friend’s points, I will try to pick out those that he might have missed out. Safe to say, subsection (5) to proposed new subsection 16E provides that
“the Corporation shall have a duty to secure the best possible price”
for these perishable goods. How on earth will it go about obtaining the best possible price for these perishable goods? Will it be setting up its own market stall? I do not think so. I wonder why that provision is in the Bill, given that it obviously is not going to happen.
Subsection (4) provides that the goods will be disposed of, if the person from whom it was seized
“fails to collect it within 48 hours of the seizure”,
but just because something is perishable, it does not mean it will go off in 48 hours. It might have a much longer date. I am not sure, therefore, why we have only got 48 hours for all perishable goods, irrespective of how long they could be used for. It seems that we are just presuming that everything being sold will go off within 48 hours, but that clearly does not apply to all perishable goods. I hope that some thought will be given to whether that provision is appropriate, too draconian or just totally inflexible. As we all know, perishable goods go off at various different times.
On the seizure of motor vehicles—or ice cream vans, as my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch pointed out—I wonder how this is going to work. As far as I can see—I could be wrong, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster can help me—the Bill does not make it clear who would pay for the seizure, transportation, storage and return of the vehicle concerned. When the police seize or confiscate a vehicle—for example, when people are driving around without any insurance—they bring in a transport company to take it away and lock it up, and people must pay a release charge to get the car back again. Presumably, the corporation would have to go through the same kind of operation. It would not just leave the vehicle where it was, because presumably that is the whole point—it was causing an obstruction or should not have been there, and so the corporation would want to move it.
If the corporation uses the provisions to bring in a garage to tow away and store a vehicle, a cost will be incurred, but it is not clear from the Bill who would be liable for meeting the cost. Would the cost fall on the trader or the corporation? If the cost was incurred by the trader, but it was later shown that no offence had been committed, would the corporation reimburse the trader? As far as I can see—I stand to be corrected—the Bill does not make any of those things clear. It would be particularly helpful, therefore, if we could have some clarity. It is bad enough someone having their vehicle seized, if no offence has been committed, but if they then have to pay to have it returned and cannot claim back the money, it would be a further kick in the teeth. I hope that my hon. Friend will consider those points, on which I am seeking clarification. Clause 9, as my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch said, seems a sensible provision. It will allow businesses more freedom to trade outside their own premises, and I heartily endorse it.
I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster will accept the spirit in which the scrutiny of the Bill has been carried out today. It is our intention to improve it, and I do not think there has been any attempt to wreck it or to stop it. We in this House take seriously our job of protecting people’s freedoms, and of protecting people from unnecessary or over-zealous regulation and legislation. The Minister of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Michael Fallon), who is in his place, has a good track record of trying to stop unnecessary regulation, legislation and bureaucracy.
I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster will accept that my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch and I are simply trying to prevent any unintended consequences that the legislation might have so that it will achieve what he wants it to achieve and does not do what my hon. Friend and I fear it might well do if it goes through unchecked.