Referral of Prime Minister to Committee of Privileges

Debate between Phil Brickell and Lloyd Hatton

Tuesday 28th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)]

May I start by saying that I take serious exception to the remarks made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Joy Morrissey), who I see is just about to leave the Chamber? She complained about us spending an afternoon talking “laboriously” about process. It is process that is on the face of the motion that the Leader of the Opposition has brought to the Chamber today, and that is what we are debating. That is because of the hon. Lady’s party. I am more than happy to spend an afternoon talking about process, because that is what we are here to do.

I speak in this debate on privileges with a unique perspective—one garnered from almost 15 years of experience working in a highly regulated sector, with responsibility for managing financial crime and reputational risk at two FTSE 100 firms, accountable for decisions made in managing conflicts of interest, promoting ethical codes of practice, training staff on when to do the right thing, testing the effectiveness of whistleblowing regimes and completing enhanced due diligence on individuals who posed heightened risk. That experience was gathered in the UK, the US, India, the UAE and elsewhere. I also speak as a recently departed member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who sat in Portcullis House only in November and quizzed Sir Chris Wormald, the former Cabinet Secretary, and Sir Olly Robbins, the former permanent under-secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, when they gave oral evidence to the Committee in the light of the sacking of Peter Mandelson as UK ambassador to Washington.

Let me say first that my thoughts are with the victims of Jeffrey Epstein’s terrible crimes. Nothing we say or do today can take away from the unimaginable hurt and pain that that man caused and continues to cause for victims, survivors, and their friends and families. Today and all days, we must remember them and do all that we can to support them in their continued fight for justice.

Secondly, I will confine my remarks to the specifics of the proposed referral to the Privileges Committee in the motion today. Mandelson’s appointment, what was recorded in the proprietary and ethics team’s due diligence report, and the UK Security Vetting process have all been debated on numerous occasions in this place already, and there remain live reviews under way that I do not want to preclude in any way.

Thirdly, the Prime Minister has rightly recognised that appointing Mandelson as ambassador to Washington was a mistake. Mandelson’s behaviour has been contemptible, and we are in no doubt on the Government Benches that he should never have been appointed. It was a mistake for which the PM has faced significant opprobrium, and there have been consequences for him—let us not forget that.

The honest truth is that we are all fallible. The PM made an error of judgment. For that, he rightly apologised in the House last Monday and sought forgiveness. As I will set out, to suggest that he has in any way misled the House is a political fabrication anchored not in truth but in a smokescreen of political mendacity that supposes a cock-up somehow equates to a conspiracy.

The Opposition moved a motion to have the Prime Minister referred to the Privileges Committee—something that has not happened since Boris Johnson’s referral back in the early part of 2022. That case and the matters being debated today are like chalk and cheese. Johnson was referred to the Privileges Committee for the most egregious of lockdown breaches: partying in No. 10, in breach of the rules, while we all made daily sacrifices to contain the virus; denying that he had breached the rules; and then doubling down on his denials.

Reading back through the Committee’s 108-page final report from 2023 gave me flashbacks, especially in recalling that Johnson misled the House on no fewer than six occasions, that he misled the Privileges Committee, that he breached confidence, that he impugned the Committee and undermined the democratic processes of the House and—perhaps most importantly—that he was complicit in a campaign of abuse and attempted intimidation of the Committee. I mention all that not to advance a political argument but rather to warn Conservative colleagues that the country has not forgotten what took place the last time the Privileges Committee convened to consider a PM’s conduct, and to advise them to take heed of that history.

[Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is speaking wisely of the time when Boris Johnson was before the Privileges Committee. Does he believe the House should remember that that Prime Minister lost an anti-corruption champion, who resigned over the issue? Conservative Members would be well placed to remember what happened when the Privileges Committee found misdeeds and wrongdoing on the part of that Prime Minister.

[Phil Brickell]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. He is a noble campaigner on cleaning up the House and the public sector more broadly.

The Opposition’s motion supposes that the PM may have misled the House due to statements he gave in this place about due process and about pressure. This is a complex topic. Given the forensic demolition of the motion by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis) with reference to pressure, I will focus my remarks on due process.

Before I speak more pointedly to process, as flagged by the Opposition, let me say this: I have no special access to information and I have not spoken to any of the individuals concerned regarding Mandelson in any way, shape or form since the Humble Address. I offer only my analysis based on the documents we have been given and statements made to the House by the Prime Minister and others when giving evidence before Parliament.

I speak as a Member of the House who is determined to drive up standards in public life, to improve the integrity of our system of government and to work constructively with Members of all political persuasions to improve the standing of politics as a force for good in the country at large. That is why only last week I met the Ethics and Integrity Commission to give formal input into that body’s workstream to tighten rules about financial disclosures, lobbying and the operation of the business appointment rules as they relate to Ministers and senior civil servants. But first, let us consider ongoing proceedings.

On 4 February, the House passed a Humble Address relating to the appointment of Peter Mandelson as His Majesty’s ambassador to Washington DC. It directed Government to

“lay before this House all papers relating to Lord Mandelson’s appointment…including but not confined to the Cabinet Office due diligence which was passed to Number 10, the Conflict of Interest Form Lord Mandelson provided to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office…material the FCDO and the Cabinet Office provided to UK Security Vetting”

as well as, among others,

“all information on Lord Mandelson provided to the Prime Minister prior to his assurance to this House on 10 September 2025 that ‘full due process was followed during this appointment’”.

Subject to agreed redactions for national security and international relations purposes as agreed with the Intelligence and Security Committee, the first volume of material was published by the Cabinet Office on 11 March.

Last Tuesday, the Foreign Affairs Committee took evidence from Sir Olly Robbins, the former permanent under-secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. On Thursday, the Committee heard from Catherine Little, the civil service chief operating officer and permanent secretary at the Cabinet Office. Earlier today, the Committee heard from Sir Philip Barton, the previous permanent under-secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, as well as from Morgan McSweeney, the former chief of staff at 10 Downing Street. There is also a separate live police investigation being undertaken by the Met into Mandelson, which the Cabinet Office will be keen to avoid prejudicing. It will require a delicate balancing of information to ensure that detectives are able to conduct their vital work without it being in any way overshadowed by ongoing parliamentary inquiries.

This brings me to the reasoning for today’s debate brought by the official Opposition. The first limb is due process. To the best of my ability, my understanding is that the Opposition contend that due process was not followed, first, because UK security vetting took place after Mandelson’s appointment and, secondly, because his vetting decision was not escalated for discussion with No. 10 or the Cabinet Office.

On the sequencing of events, let me set the record straight as I see it. When the Cabinet Office published its first volume of material after the Humble Address, it included a file note dated 11 November 2024 and marked:

“Official Sensitive—Personal and Staffing. Advice to the Prime Minister, Options for His Majesty’s Ambassador Washington.”

In that note, written to the PM by Simon Case, the Cabinet Secretary at the time, it is laid out in very clear language that one option was a political appointment, as was undertaken when Ed Llewellyn was appointed as HM Ambassador Paris by David Cameron in 2016 and as HM Ambassador Rome by Boris Johnson in 2022, for which there was a clear process to go through. To quote Lord Case in that note to the PM:

“If this is the route you wish to take you should give us the name of the person you would like to appoint and we will develop a plan for them to acquire the necessary security clearances and do due diligence on any potential Conflicts of Interest or other issues of which you should be aware before confirming your choice. A letter is then needed from the Foreign Secretary to the PUS to FCDO formalising the decision to make a political appointment.”

That was in November 2024.

Simon Case’s note was followed up by another note dated 11 December 2024 from the PM’s principal private secretary, Nin Pandit, noting that due diligence had been sought from the propriety and ethics team in the Cabinet Office on Mandelson—checks which were conducted by PET on 4 December 2024. After that, the PM’s chief of staff discussed Mandelson’s relationship with Epstein and noted that the PM’s director of communications was satisfied with Mandelson’s responses to questions about contact. Importantly, this was before further information came to light in September of last year, when it was identified that those responses were not truthful.

Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Debate between Phil Brickell and Lloyd Hatton

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)]

I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this important debate and I am pleased to see the Minister in his place. He has already heard plenty from colleagues in the Chamber on sanctions, and I hope that today’s debate will provide further food for thought.

Effective sanctions regimes for human rights violations and corruption speak to who we are as a nation—a nation that stands up for the rule of law, that respects international law and that says, “Wherever and whoever you are, if you persecute individuals, plunder your country’s resources or embezzle from your own people, there will be consequences.” The reason we are having this debate today to my mind is not to call for some shiny new instrument to hold the world’s criminals and the corrupt to account; rather it is to call for better use of the world-leading tools that we already have to deny the human rights abusers and kleptocrats access to our financial system, professional services and property market.

I want to focus on two particular threats: first, what I see as the inconsistent and inadequate use of Magnitsky sanctions against serious human rights abusers, particularly in Georgia and Hong Kong; and secondly, the failure to enforce sanctions properly, allowing evasion, secrecy and professional enablers to undermine the entire regime.

Let me begin with Georgia, because Georgia is a country that should be moving closer to Europe, not sliding backwards into authoritarianism for the benefit of Moscow. Yet since the highly disputed parliamentary election of 26 October 2024, that is exactly what we have seen: all branches of government and state institutions now captured by Bidzina Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream party; civic space crushed; independent media and civil society organisations targeted under a new foreign agent law—legislation that comes straight out of the Kremlin playbook; and peaceful protests met time and again with violence.

The UK has rightly sanctioned some individuals responsible for violent attacks on journalists and protesters, and that is very much welcome, but as the Minister knows, I do not feel it is enough. The omissions are glaring. Most notably, the UK has failed to sanction Bidzina Ivanishvili, the individual widely regarded as exercising decisive influence over Georgia’s political direction.

[Lloyd Hatton]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that the current situation in Georgia is not dissimilar to what we have seen in other central and eastern European countries and beyond, where Russia seeks to have greater political influence and control and has mission creep? Unless countries such as the United Kingdom push back against that early, Russia will continue to infringe and extend its tentacles into political life in countries such as Georgia?

[Phil Brickell]

My hon. Friend is quite right about the spheres of influence that Russia seeks to exert across central and eastern Europe.

Ivanishvili could be sanctioned under any number of our regimes—Magnitsky, global anti-corruption or even the Russian sanctions regime given his reported links to the Kremlin and his blatant kowtowing to Moscow. Just this morning, I was made aware that Georgian Dream has increased state financing for the Kulevi oil refinery, which Reuters has reported received its first shipment of Russian oil last October. The refinery itself is linked to Vladimir Alekseev, first deputy chief of Russia’s GRU. That seems to be an obvious route for sanctions violations, and I hope it will be added to Ivanishvili’s rap sheet. I know the Minister will be unable to comment on individual cases, but can he at least confirm that Ivanishvili’s supposed status as too big to fail due to his alleged personal importance to the Georgian economy does not preclude him from being sanctioned by this country?

I will come to the United States later, but our allies across the Atlantic sanctioned Ivanishvili on 27 December 2024 for undermining democratic processes on behalf of, or for the benefit of, Russia. I certainly do not suggest that we follow the US in every aspect of foreign policy, but it is correct in applying that designation. Sanctioning cronies and underlings can make an impact, but let us be clear that the fish rots from the head. My fear is that our silence on Ivanishvili sends the wrong message to would-be kleptocrats around the world.

Let me turn to Hong Kong and the ongoing repression there, which is of keen interest to me and the valued community of Hongkongers across my Bolton West constituency. The dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms is unacceptable. Since the imposition of the national security law, we have seen the systematic criminalisation of dissent: independent media shut down, civil society organisations dissolved, elected opposition figures jailed, and fundamental freedoms erased in all but name. This is textbook human rights abuse.

The case of Jimmy Lai, who has already been mentioned, symbolises that injustice—a point I was reminded of by constituents of mine who used to work with him back in Hong Kong. As a British national, a publisher and a peaceful advocate of democracy, Jimmy Lai has been imprisoned for years for exercising rights that we regard in this place as fundamental. He now faces the prospect of spending the rest of his life behind bars under a law designed to silence free speech, not to deliver justice. Of course, I welcomed the Foreign Secretary’s strong condemnation of Jimmy Lai’s sham trial last month, but words alone do not protect political prisoners. If Magnitsky sanctions are to retain any credibility, they must be used against those responsible for the erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy and for the persecution of individuals such as Jimmy Lai. That includes officials who designed, implemented and enforced the national security law and those who have overseen its use to crush free expression and political participation.

That brings me to a wider point. We are entering a period in which the United States cannot always be relied on to apply evidence-based sanctions. In that context, the UK cannot simply wait for Washington to lead. We must be prepared to act where the United States will not. We should also not be afraid, as critical friends, to point out where the US gets it wrong. I asked the Minister earlier this week at the Foreign Affairs Committee for his response to Trump’s sanctioning of two British citizens for seeking to, as Secretary Rubio sees it, “coerce” American tech platforms into suppressing free speech. Does the Minister agree that that is dangerous nonsense?

That brings me to my second theme: enforcement. Increasing designations alone is not enough. Sanctions without enforcement are no sanction at all; they are just suggestions. We now have a vast and complex sanctions architecture—Magnitsky sanctions, Russia sanctions and anti-corruption sanctions. Since Putin’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, we have had a massive boost in our own sanctions capacity and seen a huge undertaking in the private sector to keep up, yet enforcement in the UK remains worryingly weak.

We know that sanctions are being evaded. We heard earlier about Roman Abramovich reportedly transferring his UK property empire to his children just weeks before being sanctioned—the very same individual who is now being represented by the Conservative shadow Attorney General over a dispute with the Jersey Government on the source of his wealth. As my hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) outlined forensically, if the Opposition are serious about standing by Ukraine, they cannot have him as their top Law Officer, serving in the other place and attending shadow Cabinet meetings. It is simply incredible. Does the Minister agree that Lord Wolfson’s position in the shadow Cabinet and attendance of those meetings is now completely untenable?

The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has concluded that it is “almost certain” that UK lawyers, estate agents and property service firms have helped clients evade asset freezes. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Lloyd Hatton) outlined, in the past year OFSI has imposed just three fines for breaches of the UK’s sanctions regime, totalling just over £622,000. That is a rounding error compared with the scale of wealth at stake, and it is simply not a credible deterrent. All the while, there have been no breaches of Magnitsky sanctions in the past year.

This issue is acute in the British overseas territories, where low policing capacity and high financial secrecy create ideal conditions for sanctions evasion. There have been some laudable efforts in the OTs to enforce sanctions. However, I have too often been made aware of civil society organisations submitting detailed evidence of Magnitsky sanctions breaches in the overseas territories but receiving no meaningful response at all from those jurisdictions. Will the Minister assure me today that he will ensure that British overseas territories that receive such detailed allegations will act on them?

We must tackle head-on the scourge of corporate secrecy in offshore financial centres linked to the UK. If we are to ensure that our sanctions bite as much as possible, there is an urgent need for those overseas territories that continue to drag their feet—including the British Virgin Islands—to finally adopt fully public registers of beneficial ownership, as they have promised time and again but failed to deliver. As an interim step, the Minister will agree that individuals with a legitimate interest, including journalists and civil society, must have meaningful access to beneficial ownership information. Without that transparency, asset freezes cannot be enforced effectively. I look forward to the update on this issue promised earlier this year in the Government’s new anti-corruption strategy, but can the Minister provide any further information on timelines—