Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Tuesday 27th October 2015 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Immigration (James Brokenshire)]

When we broke for our short adjournment, we were touching on the use of a particular term: we were looking slightly ahead to the use of the term “worker” in clauses 3 and 9. I want to ensure clarity about where that term is used because that may be informative to the Committee and perhaps help to narrow the debate and argument.

I assure hon. Members that the definition of worker in clause 3(6) applies only in one context, which is in respect of clause 3(4)(e)(i), which relates to sections 2 and 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The definition of worker in all other Acts in the director’s remit is unaffected. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras may find that and the context in which the definition applies helpful.

The definition of worker in the Employment Agencies Act 1973 is unaffected. The Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate will continue to take action against rogue employment agencies and businesses regardless of whether the worker is here legally or illegally. Similarly, the definition of worker in the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 is unaffected. The Gangmasters Licensing Authority will continue to take action against rogue gangmasters regardless of whether the worker is here legally or illegally. That matches the concerns raised in contributions this morning.

Furthermore, the definition in the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 is also unaffected. That will continue to apply only to legal workers—that is how it is framed. The provisions are about not extending rights to illegal workers, but bringing strategic oversight together under one person. We do not think it is appropriate to give illegal workers the right to the national minimum wage. Of course, the employer who employs an illegal worker and pays them less than the national minimum wage will still be committing an offence under section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which comes with a higher penalty. The Bill also includes measures to enable us to take a tougher enforcement approach to employers of illegal workers, including increased prison sentences if they employ people whom they know or reasonably suspect are illegal workers.

The definition of worker in clause 3(6) has no effect on section 1 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. All offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour will be within the director of labour market enforcement’s remit, because it would be illogical to exclude those forced to work from the director’s purview. Indeed, all offences of trafficking under sections 2 and 4 of the Modern Slavery Act that involve slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour will also be within the director’s remit.

The definition in clause 3(6) also has no effect on the trafficking offences criminalised by sections 2 and 4 of the Modern Slavery Act. The only effect the definition has is on which type of trafficking offences are in the director’s remit. Offences involving sexual exploitation, removal of organs, securing services by force and securing services from children and vulnerable persons will be in the director’s remit only if they relate to workers or work seekers provided for in the definition—legal workers. It will still be an offence to traffic an illegal worker for any of those purposes, but we do not think it appropriate for that to be in the director’s remit. Instead, such offences will be dealt with by the police and the National Crime Agency. All modern slavery offences will be in the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner’s remit.

As I explained before, the definition is not about granting new rights or curtailing offences. It is simply about creating the right remit for the director of labour market enforcement, which I believe the clause does. We are clear that the remit provides the director with the ability to tackle the broad spectrum of labour exploitation, from non-compliance to the most serious harm against workers.

I recall the comment I made earlier about the relationship between the commissioner and director, where the commissioner will effectively have that oversight role. Therefore, we believe that that will lock things together in a clear fashion.

I appreciate that this has drawn us into something more technical than contemplated at first sight by the amendment. I hope, for the sake of clarity, I have spelled out the context in which the definition is used.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way and for the statement he has just shared with us. I am not absorbing its detail as quickly as I would wish; perhaps we can find a way to reflect on it before we reach a final view.

Notwithstanding the points the Minister has made, the concern remains that we are in danger of including only offences committed against workers as defined in the Employment Rights Act 1996, that is, those with a valid contract of employment, so by definition, regular migration status. Although we are trying to achieve the same objective here, the provision might risk leaving the director powerless to investigate trafficking in the very sector of the labour market—illegal working—that the Bill is designed to target.

As the Minister indicated, this is about not conferring new rights on workers, whether in relation to the national minimum wage or whatever, but ensuring that the director can cover all the listed offences, no matter against whom they are committed. As it stands, the clause is potentially in violation of article 3 of the European convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which guarantees the provisions of that convention, irrespective of national origin.

I take it that the purpose of clause 3(4)(e)(i) is to narrow the remit of the director so that he or she covers human trafficking offences only for labour exploitation, as opposed to sexual exploitation or organ harvesting. In that case, subject to reaching agreement on the position in our amendment, the Minister would have our support. The way the clause is currently drafted seems to exclude human trafficking of illegal workers from the remit. Further confusion is created by including human trafficking offences committed against “a person seeking work” in the director’s remit. We just need a bit of time for reflection on that, if the Minister would agree.

[The Chair]

Before the Minister answers, these are detailed and complex matters, which is why I am allowing the interventions to be relatively lengthy. I would not normally stand for an intervention that long, but I will because it is on a technicality. Do not think, ladies and gentlemen, that you will get away with it later.

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[James Brokenshire]

As the hon. and learned Gentleman has highlighted, the amendment seeks to clarify the role of the proposed information hub. In our ongoing consultation on tackling labour market exploitation, we set out the intention behind our proposal for an information hub, which is to

“inform and support delivery of the Director’s strategic plan”.

The hon. and learned Gentleman highlighted the relevant section in paragraph 71 of the consultation document. We will continue to reflect on that as we receive submissions in response to the consultation.

I stress that there is already close co-operation between the different labour market enforcement bodies, often in tackling abuses. However, that is sometimes impeded by barriers to sharing data and because the bodies cannot share data. The clause therefore gives the new director the responsibility to lead an information hub, which will form a coherent view of the nature and extent of exploitation and of non-compliance in the labour market.

The director will use the hub to formulate the strategy. The information hub will gather available data from the labour market enforcement bodies and other sources, such as immigration enforcement, the police, the National Crime Agency, the Health and Safety Executive, local authorities and the voluntary sector. The hub will analyse information and develop a much richer picture of the nature, extent and impacts of exploitation in the labour market. It will identify where workers are at risk of abuse and use that information to formulate the enforcement strategy. It will also provide tactical intelligence to the enforcement bodies for use in targeting their enforcement activity. The hub is intended to help strategically and tactically. It will be able to assist in the tasking of operations and to see and understand what practice might inform strategy. It will assist in the promulgation of good practice and in employers fulfilling their duties and responsibilities.

The hon. and learned Gentleman highlighted resourcing. Resources will be provided by the Secretary of State and may include officers from the enforcement agencies, their parent Departments and the wider law enforcement community, so there is that sense of people, as well as of how data are provided and linked. We are giving further consideration to how things would work practically and who would be involved, but in fairness we also want to allow the consultation to inform further development. I am highlighting the nature of what we envisage that the hub will provide—a centre for the sharing of intelligence and data to inform the director and to inform, potentially, the tactical response.

[Paul Blomfield]

I reassure you, Mr Bone, that this is a brief intervention. I thank you for your indulgence earlier; I thought that that was an important point that needed to be resolved.

On the question of funding, the Minister spoke earlier about the integrity of the budgets of the three separate agencies over which the director of labour market enforcement will have strategic overview. He pointed out that the agencies sit within individual Departments. He is obviously right—we agree—that data sharing and better use of data are critical to the effective development of the role, but that will presumably require, apart from people pooling, some additional resource. Is he saying that that resource will not be drawn from any of the three existing budgets and will, therefore, be found by the Secretary of State as an additional support?

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[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister. Of course, any measures to give people the confidence to come forward should be pursued. There would be general agreement about that—in particular, in relation to some of the offences we have been discussing. However, adding an offence when there is no evidence that it is needed simply makes a bad situation worse. If the Minister has evidence that anybody at all has ever said, “The problem here is that we haven’t got an offence for the employees”, I have not seen it and it has not been set out in any great detail.

[Paul Blomfield]

Does my hon. and learned Friend accept that the nub of the Government’s argument in relation to this offence, as we understand it, is to reduce pull factors—to create a disincentive for those coming to this country to enter into illegal work? Is he concerned, as I am, that the Government seem to have no evidence that it will work? We have heard substantial evidence that this may be counterproductive, but there is no evidence from the Government that it will work as a deterrent and undermine pull factors.

[Keir Starmer]

I agree with my hon. Friend and am grateful for his intervention. What is important is that the objective behind the Bill is properly pursued. There is a real risk that introducing an offence against the employee will be counterproductive if it drives underground the very group of people who are the most vulnerable when there is little or no evidence that the offence is needed.

I want to go a little further than that, because this is an offence without any mental element in the Bill. It is strict in the sense that absent the right status, the offence is made out, and then it is an offence without a defence, which is an unusual combination in criminal law. For example, some people will be here working in the belief that they have the right status because they are sponsored by the employer or somebody else. However, unbeknown to them, they may not have status because their employer has not correctly completed all the necessary arrangements for sponsorship. They fall into a category of individuals who are here without the required status, but without any knowledge of that or any intention to be in that position. Given the inflexibility of the offence, they would be immediately criminalised without even the opportunity of raising a defence of reasonable excuse. Their defence would be, “I am working. I had understood that my employer or somebody else had completed all the necessary forms and legalities. It now transpires they haven’t, but I had absolutely no reason to think that to be the case.” At the very least, if the clause is to stand, such an offence—there could be many other examples—ought to have a reasonable excuse defence, and that argument lies behind the amendment.

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[Anne McLaughlin]

It would depend on whether he had been caught working. He would be prosecuted and could have been imprisoned. Thankfully for Mehdi and Rezi, that did not happen, but there are many other people like them. She was extremely vulnerable. Had the Bill been around and they had been imprisoned, she would have been left destitute, facing deportation without him by her side. With him by her side, she was terrified enough. He would have gone to prison and then, undoubtedly, he would have been deported separately from her.

A fit, healthy married man in his 30s who is working illegally is not someone we typically highlight when trying to attract compassion from those who wish to control illegal working and are also concerned about vulnerable people, but who among us could not feel compassion for Mehdi and Rezi? We should remember that even those who are not the archetypal exploitable worker often have truly heart-breaking stories and are often left with no choices. The Bill would make it even riskier for them. If it is riskier, they will become ever more dependent on their abusive, exploitative employers. They deserve our compassion and support to get out of those situations. They do not deserve the threat of a prison sentence hanging over them.

[Paul Blomfield]

On amendment 68, I welcome the observations the Minister made in his latter comments. The Bill creates an unreasonable anomaly between the caveats it provides for employers and the absence of any for employees. As I understand it, under clause 9, employers are only guilty of the offence of employing an illegal worker if they do so “knowing” or

“having reasonable cause to believe”

that the person is an illegal worker.

We are saying to employers that there is a test of reasonableness before they are criminalised for the act of wrongful employment. The problem with clause 8 is that there is no such test of reasonableness. With the amendment, we seek to bring some equivalence between the way we approach employers and the way we approach employees by enabling them to be able to demonstrate “reasonable excuse” for the predicament in which they find themselves. Although I have reservations about the entire clause, were the Government successful in retaining it, I hope they would look generously on the amendment, which could provide that equivalence.

I have concerns about clause 8 more generally, as it criminalises the act of illegal working. I take the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the shadow Minister that we might disagree on this matter across the House. However, I do not think we need to. A number of us have said that we are at one on the objectives of the Bill, as we were with the Modern Slavery Act. In seeking to ensure that clause 8 does not stand part of the Bill, we are at one with the Government’s policy objectives of achieving effective labour market enforcement and, indeed, of combating modern slavery. Less than two years ago, in November 2013, the Home Secretary made combating modern slavery a priority. I do not have the experience that Conservative Members and, indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham have of serving on that Bill Committee but I commend those who were involved on that legislation, just as I commend the Home Secretary on the priority that she placed on combating modern slavery. That aim won wide support, found expression in the Modern Slavery Act, and took us in the right direction. The problem with clause 8 of this Bill is that it risks undoing some of the good of the Modern Slavery Act.

I am sure that the Government do not intend to undermine their own legislation so soon after it has become law so I hope that the Minister will give serious regard to the points that we are raising in suggesting that clause 8 should not stand part of the Bill. I hope he recognises that if it does, slavery is more likely to thrive. I notice that he is shaking his head and I look forward to his response.

I put this to the Minister: what do we know? What is all the evidence clear about? I am happy for him to intervene if he disagrees, but all the evidence is clear on one thing. The more vulnerable workers are, the stronger the hand of the gangmasters or the unscrupulous employers who seek to exploit them. I am sure that the Minister agrees, as I notice he does not wish to intervene. Vulnerability plays into the hands of those who seek to exploit, such as unscrupulous employers. The more vulnerable workers feel, the less likely they are to come forward to report their abusers. Clause 8 increases that vulnerability and strengthens the hands of the gangmasters. I note that the Minister is again shaking his head. I would be happy for him to intervene if he can provide any evidence to suggest that that is not the case. When we took evidence from witnesses, we heard from many experts who said that this was the case; none said that it was not.

The clause, by threatening exploited workers with 12 months in prison if they are deemed to have committed the offence of illegal working, gives another crucial card to the suit of cards that gangmasters can play. It does not only affect those who have committed the offence of illegal working; it changes the psychology and relationship even between the employer and the employees who have not committed an offence. According to the National Crime Agency, in cases that it has taken up, 78% of those who have been exploited for their labour in the UK actually have the right to work here as EEA nationals. Rights awareness among those workers is low and their options are limited, which allows unscrupulous employers to hold the threat of removal over them.

[James Brokenshire]

I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman. In the example he just gave, he said that the individuals concerned had the right to work. How would they be caught under the clause if they would not be working illegally?

[Paul Blomfield]

I thank the Minister for that intervention because it gives me the opportunity to explain more clearly; I apologise if I did not do so before. The point I am making is that clause 8 affects those who do not have the right to work, because it criminalises them and makes it less likely that they will whistleblow and report their employers. Rights awareness is low, even among those who have the right to work here. We have seen various cases where exploitative practices have been blown apart. Part of the intimidation and the way in which employers were enforcing compliance was by cloaking a series of threats that did not apply in those cases. That is my point.

[James Brokenshire]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, but he seems to be articulating some of the broader issues that we know are redolent around slavery and trafficking, on debt bondage, housing, and physical enslavement. It is those threats and issues and the threat of deportation that might be more redolent in the examples that he has given, rather than law enforcement.

[Paul Blomfield]

I take the Minister’s point, but why give those who exploit yet another card to play? The threat of 12 months’ imprisonment and criminalisation is the card that will be exercised both in relation to those who have no right to be here, or to be working, and in relation to those who do.

[Sarah Champion]

One of our witnesses, Caroline Robinson from Focus on Labour Exploitation, said:

“We know that 78% of those exploited for their labour are, in fact, documented in the UK.”––[Official Report, Immigration Public Bill Committee, 20 October; c. 28, Q59.]

[Paul Blomfield]

My hon. Friend makes exactly the point that I was seeking to make. Even where people have rights to work, the lack of rights awareness and the intimidatory relationship between exploiter and exploited make this another card to play. I see the Minister is still shaking his head. Even if we were to restrict the measure simply to those who did not have the right to work, we are still giving the exploiter another card to intimidate and therefore make it less likely that people would be willing to whistleblow. I am happy for the Minister to intervene on me. Perhaps he could illustrate the evidence that suggests the clause will be of assistance—not the intuition, the belief, the view, but the evidence.

[James Brokenshire]

The hon. Gentleman is encouraging me to intervene. I will take him through the logic as to why we think the clause is necessary. The interesting and thoughtful way in which he always presents his case identifies broader issues, and I do not see this offence changing the situation in the way that he says. The cases that he has enunciated and the evidence that the hon. Member for Rotherham highlighted show that in the majority of cases people did have rights and are not touched by the offence. The area is complex, and I know that the hon. Gentleman understands this. It is about the broader issues and themes that I touched on earlier.

[The Chair]

Order. Mr Blomfield, I have used that trick a lot of times, but, given that the Minister is going to speak and that some of the responses will have to be lengthy, the matter is not right for an intervention, so it might be better if the Minister deals with some of the issues in his remarks later.

[Paul Blomfield]

I am pleased to know that I am following in sound footsteps, Chair, but I will take your advice.

[Anne McLaughlin]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that it is not only the exploitative employer who can continue to exploit the person who is working illegally? Undocumented workers face threats from all sorts of people. I spoke to somebody who had worked illegally for different reasons to the previous person I talked about. They were not only ruthlessly exploited by the employer, but were blackmailed by colleagues who themselves were working legally, but were aware or at least suspected that this person was working illegally. He faced blackmail, threats and intimidation. Although he said, “Actually, you don’t know what my status is”, the point that the blackmailers made was, “Are you willing to take that risk?” Of course, such workers are not. The exploitation comes from all around, not just from one employer.

[Paul Blomfield]

The hon. Lady adds another dimension to my argument that the clause makes those who are already in a precarious situation more vulnerable and open to exploitation. In an earlier intervention, my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham mentioned the evidence given by Caroline Robinson from Focus on Labour Exploitation, which works directly with victims of trafficking for labour exploitation and of which I am the trustee along with some Members from other parties.

FLEX has identified three drivers of labour exploitation. The first is the feeling among migrant workers that they deserve less or have fewer rights than UK citizens. The second is a lack of checks on labour standards in the workplace, including everything from health and safety to minimum wage enforcement. The third is a fear of officials, especially of immigration officials. The Bill makes each of those drivers worse, and clause 8 has a particular effect on the first and third factors.

First, on the rights of migrant workers, the clause puts the focus on immigration status as a condition of asserting labour rights. By criminalising the exploited worker, whether they are committing the offence of illegal working or not, they can be treated and threatened by a gangmaster as if they are. On the second driver, we have talked at length about a number of aspects of labour market enforcement. The Bill seems to reflect the Government’s desire to move further towards an intelligence-based approach to enforcement. Essential to that intelligence is whistleblowing. We need to ensure that we do nothing in the Bill to discourage exploited workers from coming forward and thereby give gangmasters another card to play. Sadly, the clause risks doing exactly that.

On the third driver of labour exploitation, the problem that we identified earlier—the overlap between labour market enforcement and immigration enforcement—is at the heart of the Bill. The clause gives undocumented workers another reason to be worried. The consequence is that labour exploitation is not rooted out and continues to be a pull factor for migration, which is against the Government’s policy objectives.

Mr Bone, I will take your advice. I will not ask the Minister to intervene, but I press him to share evidence from anywhere in the world that shows that the approach of criminalising workers, unlike many other aspects of the Bill with which we agree, assists in the policy objective that he outlined and we share.

[Sarah Champion]

Will my hon. Friend comment on something else that Caroline Robinson said, which gets to the nub of his point that clause 8 does not meet the Government’s objective? She said:

“What we think will prevent people from working here undocumented is to reduce the demand for undocumented workers. To do that, we require enforcement of labour standards across the board. To be clear, the demand for undocumented workers is not because employers prefer undocumented over documented workers; it is because they cannot pay documented workers below minimum wage as easily as they can undocumented workers.”––[Official Report, Immigration Public Bill Committee, 20 October 2015; c. 28, Q59.]

[Paul Blomfield]

My hon. Friend will not be surprised to know that I agree. The quotation adds very much to the case that I seek to make; perhaps it makes the point more clearly than I was doing.

I want to move on and talk about international examples. I have challenged the Minister and I am confident that he will come back with examples later. I have challenged him to give comparisons, but let me share one that was shared with me yesterday when I met representatives of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—GRETA. They shared with me the example of Italy. They had done some work and talked about the amendments made to the Italian Consolidated Immigration Act in 2002, the so-called Bossi Fini law, which was aimed at regulating migrant worker flows by introducing a system of entry quotas, and which was supplemented in 2009 by the criminalisation of irregular entry and stay. Their concern was that the requirements of a formal employment contract in order to obtain a residence permit exposed migrant workers who were already at risk of labour exploitation because of their irregular migration status. They were worried that irregular migrants would be afraid to report cases of exploitation to the authorities because they were concerned about being detained and expelled. The United Nations special rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and children, reported on the negative consequences of the criminalisation of irregular migration for victims of trafficking.

In response to points made to them by GRETA, the Italian authorities indicated that there were 14 convictions for trafficking in human beings in 2010 and nine in 2011. GRETA was concerned that those conviction rates were very low and urged the Italian authorities to strengthen their efforts to ensure that crimes related to trafficking were proactively investigated and prosecuted promptly and effectively. They asked the Italian authorities to study the implications of their immigration legislation, particularly the offence of illegal entry and stay. As a consequence, in January 2014, the Italian Senate approved Government measures to decriminalise those aspects of illegal immigration. They had recognised that the approach of criminalisation was not only unhelpful and policy-neutral but actively counterproductive.

[James Brokenshire]

I am interested in what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but does he accept that the approach of immigration enforcement in relation to those who have entered the country illegally and committed an offence is to deport rather than prosecute?

[Paul Blomfield]

I accept that it is to deport. Clearly, those who are here without rights, having exercised due process to establish whether they have a right to remain, should be deported. There is no disagreement on that, but does the provision of criminalising illegal working in clause 8 assist in that process or not? All the evidence seems to suggest that it will drive people underground, out of sight and make them less likely to whistleblow. That will frustrate the aspirations of the Government, with which we agree, to tackle both illegal working and its exploitation.

[James Brokenshire]

We have had a wide-ranging debate on clause 8 and the amendment tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. It is important to take a step back. In all the contributions to date, the focus has been on the victims of trafficking and the effects of it; I will come on to those issues in more detail. There has not been much focus on the impact of illegal working on the rest of the population. For example, an illegal worker in effect takes a job from someone who is here legally—people born in this country, or those who have gone through all the right routes to come to this country.

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[James Brokenshire]

If I may, I would like to make a bit of progress.

We are also keen to take action in the Bill to address a genuine gap in the law that currently impedes the Home Office’s ability to address the economic incentives behind illegal work and impairs our clear message that those engaging in such activity should not profit from it. It is already a criminal offence to enter or remain in the UK illegally, as I have highlighted. However, migrants who require permission to be in the UK but do not have it, such as overstayers, may not be committing a separate offence of working illegally if they engage in paid work, including employment and self-employment. That is the gap for overstayers who go on to work. In other words, they have not come into the country illegally, so the courts do not always regard earnings derived from working illegally as the proceeds of crime when considering cash seizure or asset confiscation cases. The new offence tackles for the first time the difficult issue of those in self-employed occupations.

What is important in the context of the Bill is how the offence links to economic incentives and proceeds of crime legislation. As hon. Members will see, there is a specific reference to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in the clause. I would articulate this as focusing on some of the economic benefits that might be derived. We think that there are benefits in how this is framed to assist immigration enforcement officers in their work, because they have identified this specific element in the course of their activities when seeking the removal of people from this country.

[Paul Blomfield]

It would be helpful if the Minister could tell us how many people fall into the category of those who are working illegally because they are overstayers. I anticipate that the number will be much smaller than the general figures. This is about balancing the impact on one group against the negative impact on another. Will he provide those numbers, both specifically and as a proportion of overall illegal workers?

[James Brokenshire]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, but as he will well know, one challenge that we have faced is understanding overstaying, which was why we introduced exit checks at the start of this year to identify more clearly patterns of behaviour, sectors and other elements that are relevant to those who are not overstaying the leave granted to this country. He asks me for information that is not currently held, and it is equally difficult to estimate the size of the population who are working illegally. I am sure that the labour market enforcement director will consider that when he examines the size of the problem in his reports to Ministers, but that does not undercut what immigration enforcement representatives say to me about the gap in the existing legal framework.

We need to ensure that there is an overarching approach on criminal law and, as I have said, there is a criminal aspect of people entering the country illegally. We are creating an additional offence for those who are overstaying, who are not covered by the existing criminal law. That means that they are not subject to proceeds of crime legislation, which is having the negative impact about which we have heard.

I share the concerns of the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras about ensuring that an offence is used when circumstances suggest that it is the right approach. However, it is important to remember that individuals with an irregular immigration status will have committed a criminal offence under existing legislation by coming into the UK in the manner that I have described, regardless of whether they are working. Therefore, I do not accept arguments made about how the criminal law, or an extension to it in the form of the offence we are discussing, will make the situation more difficult, as has been suggested. However, there are some important points to which I want to respond, including what the hon. Member for Rotherham said about slavery and existing offences under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. She served on the Modern Slavery Public Bill Committee, so she understands these issues.