Middle East: Security

Pat McFadden Excerpts

Tuesday 7th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend is correct to highlight that this is not just about the incident of 2 January. The long and consistent destabilising of the region by the Quds Force has done Iran no favours at all. In fact, it has had the opposite effect. Rather than making Iran powerful and influential, it has made Iran a pariah in its own neighbourhood and has led the Iranians down a cul-de-sac to the potentially dangerous place we are now in. We all need, therefore, to do everything we can to de-escalate, including ensuring that Iran ceases the destabilising activity that prevents the building of trust by its neighbours. The neighbourhood may well help to find a solution, but it has to trust Iran.

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

The key question is about where all this is going. Iran has announced since this happened that it will not abide by limits on the use of centrifuges agreed under the JCPOA. What is the Government’s assessment of the JCPOA? Is it in intensive care, or is it dead? Is it the Government’s policy to resurrect the agreement? If it is, how do they intend to pursue that objective?

[Mr Wallace]

We believe that the JCPOA still has life in it. With the right amount of effort and focus, both from the E3 and from Iran and in the work that we communicate to the United States, it is a route that will prove successful. The JCPOA contains a dispute resolution mechanism. We have not yet gone to that, but it is one of the things that we can use to seek to remedy the situation if we are going to try to pull Iran back from a path that may eventually break the JCPOA. We do not think it is dead. We think there is still a chance, and we will make sure, despite what is going on now, that it is the best solution in the long term.

Liberation of Mosul

Pat McFadden Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

On my recent visit to Erbil, I saw for myself some of the medical evacuation training that British troops are offering to the peshmerga, showing them how to get casualties away from the frontline as rapidly as possible. That has been a big part of the training that we have been able to offer. They are now relatively seasoned troops; they have been doing this kind of operation for many months in other towns and villages, both in the north of Iraq and along the Euphrates valley, although not on this scale. They certainly understand the importance of getting casualties off the battlefield as quickly as possible.

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

The taking and holding of territory has been central to Daesh’s philosophy, in contrast to some earlier manifestations of that kind of ideology, so what is the next step in reducing the territory that will be held by Daesh after this operation, as well as combating the ideology, which in recent years has been used to justify not only what Daesh has done, but the killing of innocent civilians, from Mali to Tunisia, France and many other countries?

Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Pat McFadden Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

I am happy to be a substitute for my right hon. Friend the Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw), Mr Speaker.

The decision to go to war in Iraq was, certainly in foreign policy terms, the most controversial decision of the Blair premiership and, indeed, of the entire Labour period in government. One hundred and seventy nine British troops died, as did more than 4,000 American troops, and many thousands of Iraqi civilians in the chaos and destruction afterwards. Sir John’s inquiry was asked to look at how the decision was taken and what lessons can be learned.

First, there is the crucial question of whether the war was based on a lie. On this, the report concludes:

“there is no evidence that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that No 10 improperly influenced the text.”

Prior to the report’s publication, there had been years of accusations about fabricating intelligence. In the wake of its publication a different question has been raised, which is why the intelligence was not challenged more.

The right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) quoted from some Joint Intelligence Committee reports. I do not need to repeat those particular quotes, but in 2002 the reports say that the intelligence was “sporadic and patchy”. They also say:

“it is clear that Iraq continues to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD and their delivery means”,

that

“Iraq has an offensive chemical warfare programme”

and that

“Iraq has a chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is prepared to use it”.

This view turned out to be wrong, but it was genuinely felt and reported to the Government time after time. It was shared by many intelligence services around the world, including in countries fiercely opposed to the war. Sir John makes important recommendations about how intelligence is to be assessed and challenged in the future, but they are not the same as accusations of fabrication, lying or using intelligence deliberately to mislead.

Sir John concludes that the war was “not a last resort”, that the inspection process should have been given more time, and that the decision to use military action “undermined the authority” of the UN Security Council. This finding raises a huge and fundamental question, particularly in view of the fact that Saddam Hussein had been in breach of a whole series of UN Security Council resolutions over a period of 12 years, and that he had in the past used chemical weapons against his own people. One therefore has to ask who was really undermining the UN. Was it the country in breach, or the countries trying to enforce the UN’s will?

What does this finding mean for the responsibility to protect? My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) raised that issue yesterday. Is one of the lessons that we should never engage in military action, no matter how multiple the breaches of previous UN Security Council resolutions, unless there is full support from the Security Council itself? If that is our conclusion, what does that mean for the authority of the UN? This was not the view that we took in Kosovo. That action, although it was opposed by some, is generally felt to have produced a positive outcome for the people and to have prevented a disaster in the Balkans.

Thirdly, I turn to the aftermath, and the chaos and destruction that ensued.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael]

The question for the House is whether there is the weight of evidence to justify action, not if we should never act without express authority from the UN Security Council, which would be just one piece of evidence that the House should take into consideration. In the case of Kosovo, which is a good example, there were other reasons for acting as we did. I supported that action then and continue to support it now.

[Mr McFadden]

I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention. My point is that the finding about undermining the authority of the UN raises huge questions. It is one of the most controversial findings in the report.

Colin Powell famously remarked:

“If you break it, you own it”.

It is undoubtedly the responsibility of countries that remove a brutal dictator to put in place security measures afterwards. On this point, Sir John’s report is understandably critical of the UK and the US. With intervention comes responsibility. Security is a key part of that responsibility, but we should be clear about two other points: first, the killing of innocent civilians in Iraq was carried out not by UK or US armed forces, but by terrorists and militias that blew up the UN headquarters, attacked mosques, destroyed already fragile infrastructure and bombed marketplaces; and, secondly, that sectarian violence and killings in Iraq did not begin in 2003. Prior to that, it was carried out by the Saddam regime itself: the Anfal campaign; the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in the north; and the brutal suppression of the Shi’a uprising after the first Gulf war in 1991. It was a reign of terror. Decades on, mass graves are still being discovered. I pay tribute to the courage and determination of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd), who was campaigning for the victims of Saddam’s brutal regime long before the Iraq war in 2003.

Fourthly, what is the lesson for our own security? I believe that people supported the Iraq war for different reasons, and many opposed it for different reasons. They should not all be put in the one bracket. Not everyone has drawn a direct line between this intervention and all the security problems we face, but some have. Foreign interventions will anger jihadists, and may also be used as a recruiting sergeant for jihadists, but it would be a fundamental mistake to believe that the mass murder of innocent people is only a response to what we do, and that if we stopped doing it, they would leave us alone. We should remember that Islamist terrorism existed long before the Iraq war. The USS Cole was bombed in 2000. The World Trade Centre was first bombed in 1993 and then destroyed in 2001, with the loss of 3,000 innocent lives. In Bali in 2002, we saw the murder of hundreds of innocent tourists, and there have been many more attacks around the world since, including last year in Paris. That attack took place in the country in Europe that was the most opposed to the Iraq war.

Let me repeat something I have said here before. Understanding Islamist terrorism simply as a reaction to what we do infantilises terrorists, fails to confer responsibility on them for what they do, and fails to stand up for the pluralism, equality, diversity and religious freedom that we hold dear. Whatever lesson we learn from past interventions, it should not be to franchise out our foreign policy decisions for the approval or veto of the terrorists who oppose our way of life.

Finally, there is the lesson on intervention itself. Sir John makes a number of recommendations on this point—about how intelligence should be treated, ministerial oversight, the challenge of arguments and so forth. The recommendations look eminently sensible, and I am sure that any future Government will take them on board. The truth is, however, that this is not just a matter of process.

[Mr Bradshaw]

My right hon. Friend made a strong critique of one of Sir John’s findings about the undermining of the United Nations. Another finding that I consider problematic is the “last resort” suggestion, which was also criticised by the Chair of the Defence Committee. Does my right hon. Friend agree that, at that time, it was clear that time was running out? Saddam had been given 90 days when the resolution specified 30 days, so saying that other avenues could somehow be explored was not realistic at the time.

[Mr McFadden]

I agree with my right hon. Friend. At some point, there is always the issue of deciding. Every debate about intervention since 2003 has taken place in the shadow of this decision. Iraq has already increased the threshold for military action and the Chilcot report will raise it further. There is an inescapable question, however. To put it bluntly, we can have all the committees and processes that we want, but we still have to decide. The decision can go wrong, and everything that will happen in the aftermath cannot be predicted.

Much has been said about the size of the report, with its 2.5 million words. If we stack the volumes on top of one another, the paper would stand about 2 feet high. The very sight of the report will be a warning to future Prime Ministers. Since 2003, Prime Ministers and Presidents have been very conscious about learning from Iraq, and this report will make them even more conscious in the future. The biggest question of all is this: in reflecting on what went wrong after the invasion and the findings of the report, and adding in the reduced size of our armed forces in recent years, what if the conclusion was, “Never intervene again”? What message would that send out to the oppressed of the world, to dictators or to terrorist groups?

I was not an MP in 2003, so I never had to face the responsibility of voting for the war in Iraq. The most significant vote on foreign policy since I was elected was over Syria in 2013, and that vote was heavily coloured by our experience in Iraq. I have a slightly different interpretation from that of the right hon. Member for New Forest East. I voted against military action in 2013, even after Assad had used chemical weapons against his own people. Yet Syria, where we did not intervene beyond the limited airstrikes we voted for last year, has been a humanitarian disaster even worse than Iraq. Hundreds of thousands are dead, millions have been displaced, and we have seen the greatest movement of refugees since the end of the second world war. It is not a vote to intervene that has troubled me most in my 11 years here; it is that vote not to intervene, as the international community, with the exception of Russia—where have the demonstrations outside its embassy been?—stood back and decided that it was all too difficult. There is no Chilcot report on Syria. We can tell ourselves that because we did not break it, we did not buy it, but that makes absolutely no difference to the human cost.

So let us learn, but let us not sign a blank cheque for despots and terrorist groups around the world, or delude ourselves that the security issues that we face stem only from our foreign policy decisions, rather than from an ideology that encourages the killing of innocent people in countries around the world. Yes, intervening has consequences—2.5 million words detailing those consequences are before us—but so does standing back, and leadership is about deciding the difference.

Armed Forces (Redundancies)

Pat McFadden Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

It is worth remembering when we discuss those matters that although we have had reductions of some 11,000 in the armed forces, we are looking at reductions of 25,000 in the civil service to bring the MOD into a much better and more efficient shape and to help control the budget. My hon. Friend is correct that we will also look at rank structure to ensure that we are not making reductions in the more junior ranks while maintaining those at a higher level in the armed forces.

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

Will the Secretary of State tell the House what the cost to the Department of the redundancy payments in his announcement will be?

[Dr Fox]

I am not able to give that figure yet, because the armed forces themselves have not decided which posts will be lost. When we can provide a figure to the House, we will certainly do so.

Military Covenant

Pat McFadden Excerpts

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Murphy]

The hon. Gentleman knows, as I think everyone in Scotland knows, that we do not agree on everything when it comes to the armed forces, but he makes an important point about the impact on wider societies and communities of any base closures. During the last two years or so of the Labour Government, we considered the future of the firing range in the Western Isles, and it was not until we had received a full impact assessment of the impact on the community and the fragile economy of the islands that it was decided to halt the closure.

In Committee, the veterans Minister said:

“The covenant is a conceptual thing that will not be laid down in law.”––[Official Report, Armed Forces Public Bill Committee, 10 February 2011; c. 21.]

The whole country will be simultaneously grateful to the Minister and disappointed that he has made the Government’s position clear. It seems that the Government’s main line of defence is to attack a non-existent threat. No one is arguing for a set of justiciable rights. No one really wants to campaign for such a thing.

The forces charities themselves said that they wanted the principles defined in law—they did not want new statutory rights—and that is what our motion sets out to achieve. In answer to the hon. Member for Colchester (Bob Russell) in the Select Committee that considered the Bill, the Royal British Legion’s director general said:

“I understand the point about rigidity, specific definition and a detailed Covenant being included in law. I am not making that point at all. What I am saying is that the principles of which a Covenant should take account should be clearly stated and understood.”

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

The Prime Minister’s pledge was not made before the election in the heat of a campaign, but after it. In June last year, he said that the Government would have

“a new Military Covenant that’s written into the law of the land”.

Given the clarity of that pledge, will my right hon. Friend care to speculate as to why the Government would not fulfil that commitment?

[Mr Murphy]

That is probably going to be the hardest question I am asked all day. Just why have the Government U-turned on this issue, given that it was not a pre-election promise, but a post-election commitment? It is for the Secretary of State and his Ministers to articulate the reasons for their Government’s action.

I come back to the point about principle rather than statutory obligations.