(1 year, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is clearly not for me to comment on the best way for a Department for domestic English affairs to rule on what English courts and English Law Officers can do and must do. Equally, it is not for anybody here, including those of us from Scotland, to change the rules on what the Law Officers and courts of Scotland can do and must do—that is exclusively for the Parliament of Scotland.
Given the importance that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Scotland repeatedly attached yesterday to the need for consensus when considering any change to the relationship between our two nations, will the Minister confirm that the consensus principle works in both directions, and that no changes will be made to the powers and responsibilities of Scotland’s Law Officers or Scotland’s courts without the explicit consent of the Scottish Government?
As I just said, the structure of the Law Officers’ powers is consistent with the established position of the Lord Advocate within the Scottish Government, as in other contexts the structure rightly allows the Lord Advocate to represent the Scottish Government’s views on the interpretation of devolved legislation, but not legislation that is reserved to Westminster. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw the amendments.
I do not know whether the Minister fully understood the significance of my question. We have not tabled the amendments because we think that the power is being given to the domestic Law Officers and courts of England—that is not for us to comment on. It is not even that we think that what is being proposed is wrong for the domestic Law Officers and courts of Scotland. However, what is completely wrong is for the domestic Parliament of England to legislate on the legally separate legal system of Scotland against the clear objections of the domestic Parliament of Scotland, which speaks on behalf of the sovereign people of Scotland.
If the Minister is convinced that what is proposed in the Bill is in the best interests of justice in Scotland, and if she can persuade the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Government and the Scottish Law Officers that that is the case, there is no question but that the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament will legislate on those terms. However, on the day after the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Scotland insisted that the relationship between our nations must be based on consensus, the Minister is proposing to drive a coach and horses through that consensus by insisting that this Minister and this Parliament have the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of another nation in this Union. That is a serious breach of the guarantees contained in article 19 of the Treaty of Union, and it is not acceptable.
I invite the Minister to come back, should she so wish, and advise the Committee. In preparation for the Bill, has she had any advice whatsoever on the application of article 19 of the Treaty of Union? Does she know what it says?
The comments I made in relation to the last group of amendments are equally, if not more, applicable here. I appreciate that many members of the Committee would not have thought that the submission from the Law Society of Scotland was relevant to the interests of their constituents, nor should it be. The legal systems of the two nations are entirely separate. They are required to be in perpetuity by the Treaty of Union. That is not my favourite piece of legislation, but while it is there it is incumbent on this Parliament to comply with it.
The Law Society of Scotland wanted the whole of proposed new section 6B to be deleted in its entirety. It raised a number of serious concerns in principle, many of which will apply to the application of the legislation to English courts and Law Officers as well. Proposed new section 6B changes the way in which some civil law can be challenged in the courts without changing the way in which other civil law can be challenged in the courts, so the concept of the unity of a single body of civil law starts to be weakened. The legal profession will be extremely concerned about that.
The legal profession is also concerned about the idea that after a civil case has been concluded, when the time for any appeal has passed and the case is settled, Law Officers who are not a party to the case can then intervene, effectively to act as an appellant in a case in which they have no direct interest. That process rightly applies in relation to criminal law, because almost every criminal prosecution involves the Law Officers acting in the name of the Crown on behalf of the public interest.
In fact, in Scotland nobody but the Law Officers is allowed to take a prosecution in the public interest. Bodies such as the Post Office and the Health and Safety Executive are not allowed to prosecute cases in Scotland’s criminal courts. After a case has been concluded, it is perfectly in order for the Law Officers to appeal against the leniency of a sentence, for example, because they were an interested party in prosecuting the case in the first place. That does not apply if it is a civil case, so there is a legal precedent created here that the Law Society of Scotland has raised serious concerns about, as well as very possibly the Law Society of England and Wales.
The clause again threatens compliance with the Treaty of Union—that is how serious it is, Mr Howarth. Passing the clause threatens to be in breach of article 19 of the Treaty of Union, because it makes the Law Officers of England superior to the Law Officers of Scotland. It makes the domestic courts of England superior to the domestic courts of Scotland. Why do I say that? It explicitly allows the Law Officers of England to step in and interfere in a civil case that applies only in Scotland, between two parties who are resident in Scotland and subject to the law of Scotland, where a case has been considered through due process in the domestic courts of Scotland and settled with finality as a matter of Scottish law. At that point, the Law Officers of England are allowed to wade in and interfere in a legal system that has nothing whatsoever to do with them—not on a matter of reserved legislation or one that is within the remit of domestic law in England.
The equivalent power does not apply to the Law Officers of Scotland. There are no circumstances in which Scotland’s senior Law Officers can come in and interfere in a civil case that has been heard in English courts. However, there are circumstances in which the Law Officers of England can interfere after the event in a domestic case in Scotland’s court. That is not equal treatment of the two legal systems. That is not recognition of the right of the Scottish legal system to operate independently of interference from this place. I will take advice on that and I will be interested to hear if the Minister has. That would appear to me to be a deliberate breach of one of the articles of the Treaty of Union. As many will be aware, when one article of a treaty is broken, either party has the right to consider the treaty to have been brought to an end.
I expressed my concerns in the previous sitting of the Committee that the Minister might be about to accidentally repeal hundreds of bits of legislation by mistake. I am tempted to say that we should not interrupt our opponents when they are making a mistake. If this place wants to take the risk of repealing the Treaty of Union by mistake, I will not stand in its way. However, I think I should bring it to hon. Members’ attention so that at least they cannot afterwards say they did not know what they were doing.
I will try to address all the points raised because I know how seriously they are taken by Opposition Members. The Committee should reject amendments 35, 36, 37, 48 and 93 as they would give Law Officers of the devolved Administrations the power to intervene in reserved matters, which is not constitutionally appropriate.
Amendments 35, 36 and 37 concern proposed new section 6B, established by clause 7 of the Bill, which provides UK Government Law Officers and Law Officers of the devolved Administrations with the power to refer points of law arising from retained case law to the higher courts, when proceedings have concluded, for consideration against the new test for departure set out by the same clause.
Amendments 48 and 93 concern new section 6C, which gives Law Officers the power to intervene in cases before the higher courts and present arguments for them to depart from retained case law following the new test for departure in the Bill. It is right that references and interventions by the Lord Advocate are restricted to the points of law within the devolved competence of the Scottish Government. The provisions are framed so that Law Officers may exercise the reference and intervention powers on behalf of their respective Governments in cases where other Administrations have a particular view on the meaning and effect of a relevant piece of retained EU law for which they are responsible.
The powers allow Law Officers to bring the matters before a higher court, in the light of the new test for departure from retained case law, for a decision after hearing the relevant Government’s view on the correct interpretation of a relevant retained EU law. That will allow Law Officers and the Lord Advocate to ensure an appropriate development of the law as we move away from the influence of EU case law and the rules of interpretation. It would consequently be inappropriate for the Lord Advocate, on behalf of the Scottish Government, to exercise the reference and intervention powers where the points of law relate to reserved legislation. That includes points of law that concern the retained functions of the Lord Advocate as a prosecutor, as those functions concern legislation that is reserved to Westminster.
We consider the structure of the Law Officer powers to be consistent with the established position of the Lord Advocate within the Scottish Government. As in other contexts, the structure rightly allows the Lord Advocate to represent the Scottish Government’s views on the interpretation of devolved legislation but not legislation reserved to Westminster. For those reasons, we ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw his amendment.
(1 year, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI take on board what the Minister says, although that last comment on the environment is slightly galling considering that on 31 October the Government were meant to bring forward, under their own domestic post-Brexit legislation—the Environment Act 2021—targets on a whole range of areas, including air quality and water quality. It is now 24 November and we still have no targets. If I am a little concerned about the Government’s performance here, she should not be surprised, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Scope of powers
I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 10, page 11, line 12, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) for sub-paragraph (2), substitute—
(2) Power may only be exercised by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) if—
(a) a written statement explaining the modification has been published by the Secretary of State,
(b) the Secretary of State has made an oral statement on the modification to both Houses of Parliament, and
(c) the Secretary of State has published an assessment of the impact of the modification.”
The intention of the amendment is to do what Brexit was supposed to do: restore some parliamentary oversight to the way in which the Government make and change legislation in this place. The amendment is pretty self-explanatory. It is not ideal that Ministers are giving extensive powers to chop and change laws as they see fit. If, in exceptional circumstances, it is necessary for them to have those powers, the very least Parliament should expect is that Ministers will be held to account and will explain to Parliament—ideally beforehand, but certainly afterwards—why they have done what they have done and what the impact has been.
If the Minister genuinely believes in improving accountability in this place, she will accept the amendment. In saying that, it is clear that all Ministers—nothing against this Minister—in all Public Bill Committees are under instruction not to accept anything from the Opposition. If we moved an amendment that said, “Today’s Thursday”, the Government would keep talking until it was Friday and then vote it down.
I recognise that none of that was directed at me personally, but rather collectively at all Ministers. I beg hon. Members to reject the amendment. The Government recognise the significant role that Parliament has played in scrutinising instruments to date and we are committed to ensuring the appropriate scrutiny of any secondary legislation made under existing delegated powers. We must end the restriction that some existing powers may only be used to amend retained direct principal EU legislation or rights under section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 if they are also capable of amending domestic primary legislation.
The hon. Member for Glenrothes suggests that a written ministerial statement made by a Secretary of State is accompanied by an oral statement when an existing power is exercised. I remind him that all statutory instruments that are subject to parliamentary procedure must be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. These memorandums provide Parliament with the information and explanations required. When powers are exercised by virtue of paragraph 3(1) to schedule 8, explanatory memorandums would be laid as appropriate. Any statutory instrument that reforms retained direct EU legislation made under existing delegated powers will be subject to the proper processes for impact assessments. However, a blanket requirement for impact assessments is not appropriate as some reforms could fall below the de minimis threshold set out in the “Better regulation framework” guidance.
Now that we have left the EU, it is only appropriate for retained direct EU legislation that was not scrutinised or approved by Parliament to be treated in the same way as domestic secondary legislation, which is amendable by existing delegated powers that this Parliament has approved. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
The difference, of course, is that any secondary legislation—even if it is done by the affirmative procedure—goes through a Delegated Legislation Committee in which, at best, three or four of the parties in this House are represented. For the last seven and a half years, the Scottish National party has been represented in those Committees because of the exceptional level of support that it enjoys in our country, but there are Members of Parliament, who collectively represent the interests of a lot of constituents, who never get on to Delegated Legislation Committees. The only chance they get to question the Minister about secondary legislation is if the Minister makes an oral statement before the House. Publishing something is all very well, but Members of Parliament who are not in one of the big three or four parties do not get the automatic right to question Ministers on a written statement—they do get the automatic right to questions Ministers on an oral statement. It is quite clear which way this is going, so I will not detain the Committee by pushing the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I ask hon. Members to reject the amendment. Clause 10 ensures that appropriate parliamentary scrutiny is applied to the use of existing delegated powers when they are used to amend retained direct EU legislation or section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 rights. It is this Government’s view that the appropriate procedure applied when amending retained direct EU legislation should be the same as the procedure applied to domestic secondary legislation. Any additional procedure, such as that proposed by the hon. Member, would be disproportionate given the type of legislation retained direct EU legislation is composed of.
It would be wholly inappropriate if, for example, updating individual provisions adding cheese and honey to the simplified active substance list required the approval of both Houses of Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Parliament. Making it easier to use pre-existing powers to amend assimilated retained direct EU legislation, while ensuring it receives the most suitable level of parliamentary scrutiny, will ensure our regulations can be kept up to date, supporting growth across the whole UK.
The Minister referred to domestic secondary legislation. Does she not understand that if a piece of secondary legislation relates exclusively to, for example, a devolved power of Senedd Cymru, as far as this place is concerned that is not domestic law—it is somebody else’s domestic law—and this Parliament should keep out of it?
I think we have covered the point of domestic law, law in Westminster and the role of Attorneys General. At the moment, we are forced to treat some retained direct EU legislation as equivalent to an Act of Parliament when amending it. It is no longer appropriate for retained direct EU legislation to keep the status of primary legislation when most of it has not had anywhere close to the same level of UK parliamentary scrutiny. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw the amendment.
I stand to speak in favour of the amendment, although, at best, all it seeks to do is take an entirely unacceptable clause and make it slightly less unacceptable. Clause 11 is about a Henry VIII power; it is about removing protections for this House that were, ironically, forced on the Government by Members of the other House. I am not a great fan of unelected legislatures anywhere—I certainly do not want my country even partly ruled by one—but I have to say to Conservative Members that when the House of Lords is keener on protecting the rights of this House than Government Back-Bench and Front-Bench Members are, the Government really do need to look at themselves in the mirror and ask themselves: are we a democratic Government or are we not?
I support the limited improvements to the clause, but if the amendment falls, I will seek to divide the Committee to exclude clause 11 in its entirety.
I ask hon. Members to reject the amendment. Unless I was in a different Committee Room, or on a different planet, I think Opposition Members have had every opportunity to raise their voices, because we have heard much from them today and on Tuesday, and we have had much scrutiny as well. Our constituents know exactly what we are doing because it is all noted in Hansard.
The amendment would render clause 11 without purpose. Subsections (1) and (2) ensure the removal of additional parliamentary scrutiny requirements, established in the EU withdrawal Act, in relation to the amendment or revocation of secondary legislation made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. Subsections (1) and (2) will ensure that when secondary legislation made under section 2(2) ECA is being amended or revoked using other delegated powers, the only parliamentary scrutiny requirements that will apply are those attached to the power being used. These delegated powers have their own parliamentary scrutiny procedure attached, which has been approved by Parliament, ensuring suitable scrutiny will continue to occur.
It is imperative that additional scrutiny requirements are removed, because it is clearly inappropriate that legislation created solely to implement our obligations as a member of the EU enjoys this privileged status. What is more, no tangible benefit has been identified as a result of these scrutiny requirements; as was mentioned, that was referenced in the evidence session by Dr Ruth Fox of the Hansard Society. In practice, they add a layer of complexity that makes it difficult to make amendments to legislation containing section 2(2) ECA provisions.
Removing these requirements reflects the main purpose of this Bill, which is to take a new approach to retained EU law, removing the precedence given in UK law to law derived from the EU that is no longer considered fit for purpose.
The hon. Member is not being wholly honest. The level of scrutiny of any piece of legislation, not only in Committee but on the Floor of this House and the Floor of the other place, takes place for all items of legislation.
The hon. Member will be well aware of the evidence session we had just a few weeks ago, when we had a number of people from environmental agencies who previously had Green credentials or who were previously Green or Lib Dem candidates. So it is not as if those voices are not heard.
I cannot speak about what decisions the Scottish Parliament will take after we are independent, but I look forward to seeing that day before any of us are very much older. I am confident that it is a modern, democratic Parliament with much improved scrutiny procedures. For example, in the Scottish Parliament it would have been impossible for us to have two changes of Prime Minister without the explicit approval of the Parliament. Nobody can become a Minister of the Scottish Government without being approved by the Scottish Parliament. There is much greater parliamentary accountability for the Executive than there is ever going to be here.
My confident expectation is that when an independent Scotland goes back into the European Union, the Scottish Parliament will have a much greater role in scrutinising the actions of our Ministers, acting on our behalf, at the European Council than this Parliament has ever had. As I have said to the Committee before, the problem with lack of accountability and scrutiny of European legislation is not because the European Union’s processes are flawed, but because parliamentary accountability in this place is fundamentally flawed.
If I intended to be part of this establishment for much longer, I would be attempting to improve its processes in order to bring it into line with proper democratic Parliaments, such as the one in Scotland. Given that neither I nor any of my colleagues from Scotland are likely to be here for very much longer, I will have to leave it to those who remain to sort out the mess of a Parliament that they have created.
Our objective is not to remove power from Parliament. Our objective is to ensure that amendments or revocations made to subordinate legislation made under other existing powers receive the most appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny. Fundamentally, people need to accept the Brexit vote and appreciate that we have to have sovereignty here. I do not think we are going to win that argument—we are too far apart.
When the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 was agreed, additional parliamentary scrutiny requirements were agreed in relation to the amendment or revocation of secondary legislation made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. It is clearly inappropriate that legislation created solely to implement our obligations as a member of the EU enjoys that privileged status. We therefore seek to remove those requirements. This reflects the main purpose of the Bill—removing the precedence given in UK law to EU-derived law—which is no longer fit for purpose now that the UK has left the EU. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The overarching aim of the Bill is to define retained EU law as a legal category, and the power to restate such law must be viewed with that in mind. The hon. Member for Argyll and Bute said that he wants to help the process, even though he is fundamentally trying to block it. The power to restate has been designed to allow the Government to restate domestic law where it is considered appropriate for the UK in a post-Brexit setting. However, the resulting legislation will no longer be retained EU law, as subsection (3) makes clear. The restated legislation will be ordinary domestic UK legislation that is subject to traditional domestic rules of interpretation. In particular, the supremacy of EU law will no longer apply, and section 4 rights and the general principles of EU law will cease to be read into the legislation.
If I can make a bit of progress, I will give way later.
The power will enable the Government to clarify, consolidate, codify and restate REUL to preserve the effect of the current law, while removing it from the category of REUL. It will be used selectively and is not a way to simply continue the broad concepts of EU law. Retained EU law was never intended to sit on the statute book indefinitely, although I believe that hon. Members wish it did. It is both constitutionally anomalous and politically challenging. Subsection (3) is therefore a crucial part of clause 12, and is necessary to ensure that the Government can deliver on the overarching aims of the Bill.
Can the Minister explain the difference between restating and amending? At what point does a restatement of a piece of legislation become either an amendment or a completely new piece of legislation? Who will be the arbiter of that? Will the courts decide?
I did not hear the end of that question, but each Department will be in charge of the Bills in its portfolio. We have the Brexit opportunities department helping as well. I have already mentioned the processes in place to ensure that scrutiny happens, and how Ministers will work to ensure that we assimilate, amend or update.
I am sorry if the Minister did not understand my question. I am talking not about the political, democratic scrutiny, but about the legal interpretation of restated legislation, which will fall to the courts. My question is: who decides whether what has been done under clause 12 is simply a restatement of EU retained law or an amendment to law, which requires a different process?
I hope I am not failing to understand the question. As I mentioned, each of the REUL Bills is assigned to a Department, and it will be for the Ministers responsible for the REUL Bill to make a decision on whether they need to assimilate, repeal or update.
I ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw his amendment. I ask the Committee to accept the Government amendments. They are simple clarificatory amendments that ensure that the restatement powers in clauses 12 to 14 cannot be used to bring back EU law concepts, such as the principle of supremacy, or general principles that the Bill aims to sunset.
A long time ago now, it seems, I was a member of my local planning authority for a number of years. We used to get dozens and dozens of planning applications for consideration, and there was often a lot of discussion about whether councillors who were uncomfortable with an application should attempt to draft conditions that had to be honoured before the application could be approved. A lot of those conditions were perfectly reasonable; we would put in conditions to ensure that housing development was road-safe, for example. An important piece of national guidance that certainly applied in Scotland—I do not know if there was an equivalent in England—was that if someone had to burden a planning application with a huge, complex set of conditions in order to make it acceptable, the application should be refused and the applicant invited to come back later with a better one. That is where we are with clause 15. The official Opposition clearly feel that the only way to make clause 15 even vaguely acceptable is to restrict it in so many ways, and with so many amendments, that it would effectively tear the heart out of the clause.
Although I certainly will not oppose any of the amendments that the hon. Member for Leeds North West wants to press to a vote, we will oppose clause 15 when the question on it is put, whether it is amended or not. It is an utterly dreadful piece of legislation. Can Members imagine any circumstance in which it could be considered good governance to give an individual or a national authority the right to repeal 4,000 pieces of legislation, knowing perfectly well that they have no intention of bringing anything forward to replace them? That is what clause 15 effectively aims to do.
As the hon. Member for Walthamstow pointed out earlier, subsection 5 of clause 15 gives the lie to the entire argument about why the Tories wanted to be allowed to regulate for themselves. It was never about being allowed to have better standards of employment law than the rest of Europe, and it was never about being allowed to apply better standards of environmental protection, consumer protection, animal welfare or anything else. It was always about pandering to what my hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute has described as the wide-eyed enthusiasts of the European Research Group, and those who are so far to the right of the ERG they cannot even get elected to this place. In clause 15, and particularly in subsection (5), theirs is the agenda we are being asked to follow.
I am really interested to hear the Minister explain why she feels it is necessary to have an Act of Parliament that potentially allows a national authority to tear down 40 years of protective legislation, with the intention of replacing it with nothing, and with the extreme risk that we will run out of time to replace it with anything. We should remember that we have barely a year from now, never mind from when they start to tear apart the legislation.
When we look at the restriction in subsection (5) and then look over the page at what some of the terms in the subsection mean, we find that they are hair-raising. Legislation that imposes a burden that could include a financial cost is not allowed. There is no threshold and no limit on how many people would need to be affected by that financial cost. For example, the personal protective equipment non-provider PPE Medpro—it was slated in The Guardian this morning and in the Chamber earlier—made a profit of £76 million by supplying to the Government PPE that was not fit for use. If the Minister had been minded to bring in replacement legislation, it would have reduced PPE Medpro’s overnight profit from £76 million and tuppence to a mere £76 million. The Bill would say that was a financial burden. It would therefore be an increased regulatory burden, and it would not be allowed.
Subsection 10(b) refers to “an administrative inconvenience”. Well, good luck to the lawyers who want to decide what is an inconvenience and what is not. Again, there is no threshold and nothing about proportionality. There is nothing to say whether it imposes a disproportionate administrative inconvenience on a substantial section of the economy. That would be a reasonable protection to want to build in, but anybody who claims that that is inconvenient administratively could then challenge it in court. In fact, there is nothing written into the clause that says that the burden has to affect the private sector in order to make it unlawful.
If the burden applies to the civil servants that are trying to administer the new legislation, that is an administrative inconvenience to the civil service, especially if there will be 90,000 fewer of them than we had last year. I am talking about improving legislation that allows one person out of 60 million in these islands to say, “That’s a bit inconvenient for me”, and an entire piece of secondary legislation can be struck down. Despite some of the things I have seen from the Conservative party in my time, I genuinely do not believe that that is what it wants, but I know that that is what some people want.
My fear is that people who cannot get elected to this place are pulling the strings of those who did. Those people are looking to use the clause, and particularly subsection (5), to achieve their dream of a tiny bit of the world where all regulations can be struck down at the stroke of a pen, and once they are struck down it is impossible to replace them with anything. There are people who, at times, have been very close to the seat of power in this place—their donations have helped to change the course of political history in the last 10 years—who do not want there to be any workers’ rights whatever.
A former member of the Government, on whose watch this Bill was drafted, is on the record as saying that he does not think workers have an automatic right to paid holidays. That is the kind of ideology we are dealing with here.
Clause 15 is not about achieving a reasonable objective; it is about completely tearing down 40 years of legislation, some of which we might not welcome but much of which has helped to make the four nations of the United Kingdom more modern and democratic. For that reason, I can understand why some people would happily see all that legislation torn up and replaced with nothing. I genuinely do not believe that is what the Minister wants, I genuinely do not believe it is what the majority of Conservative party members want and I can say with absolute certainty that it is not what the people of Scotland want, and it is not something that the people of Scotland will accept.
I will support any amendments that the Opposition are minded to press to a vote but, amended or unamended, I will seek to divide the Committee on removing clause 15 from the Bill.
I beg that the Committee rejects amendment 84 and does not press new clause 9 or amendment 87.
It may surprise the Committee that English is not my first language—I was not born in this country—but it has never occurred to me that the words “regulation” and “standards” are the same. Members can look them up in a dictionary, but they are definitely not the same.
Clause 15 is about ensuring we have the right regulations in place, by removing those regulations that are unduly burdensome, outdated or not fit for purpose in the UK. How about swapping them for proportionate, high-quality and agile regulations that help the UK economy, and all of us who work in it, to be nimble and competitive?
I remind the Committee that Departments will be able to maintain the current level of regulation where it is considered appropriate. Only where existing regulations are considered to be unnecessarily burdensome and not fit for purpose may a lower level of regulation be introduced. I will validate that in a moment.
The concerns of hon. Members regarding the scope of the Bill’s powers are unfounded, as the powers to revoke or replace are important cost-cutting enablers of retained EU law reform. The dashboard has identified more than 2,500 pieces of retained EU law, and it is therefore right to have a power of this scope that is capable of acting on a wide range of REUL covering a variety of policy areas. The powers have several safeguards that mitigate their use, namely any legislation made under clause 15(2) that recreates a delegated power or a criminal offence present in REUL is subject to the affirmative procedure. Legislation made under clause 15(3) is specifically subject to the affirmative procedure, which will ensure that changes to policy objectives can be actively approved by Parliament. In addition, a sifting procedure will apply to legislation where Ministers choose to use the negative procedure.
The clause 16 power is intended to facilitate technical updates to retained EU law, to take account of changes in technology or developments in scientific understanding. This ongoing power is not intended to bring about significant policy change. It is instead designed to ensure the UK keeps pace with advances in science and technology over time.
The amendments would add a significant amount of time to the process and, ultimately, could risk Departments being unable to maximise the use of their powers to revoke or replace retained EU law across all policy areas, until such powers sunset. The Bill has been drafted to ensure that legislation made under these powers is subject to robust scrutiny procedures that are proportionate to the scope of the powers, as highlighted above.
I ask the Committee not to press amendments 85, 86 or 94. As I mentioned, the Bill is an enabling Act. Amendment 94 would place a number of environmental requirements on UK Ministers or devolved authorities when they intend to use the powers to revoke or replace, irrespective of the policy area. This amendment would therefore preclude Departments making reforms in policy areas unrelated to the environment, which would significantly impact the opportunity to use these powers.
On amendments 85 and 86, we have sought to ensure that the powers to revoke or replace cannot be used to add to the overall regulatory burden on this subject area. In her evidence to the Committee, Professor Alison Young noted that combining
“a number of earlier burdens, turn them into one burden with a higher standard, that is also not increasing the burden.”––[Official Report, Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill Public Bill Committee, 8 November 2022; c. 19, Q33.]
The requirement not to add to the overall regulatory burden has been drafted to allow the relevant national authority to determine how best to achieve the desired policy outcome. For example, removing regulations or administrative requirements that are deemed unnecessary or unsuitable will make it possible to add new regulations with a higher standard—shock, horror—where it is deemed necessary or desirable, provided that the overall regulatory burden is not increased. The reforms that these powers will enable are vital to allow the UK to drive genuine reform and seize the opportunities of Brexit.
We had a repeat of the debate about animal welfare. As I mentioned the other day, the Government remain focused on how best to deliver the “Action Plan for Animal Welfare” published in 2021, which builds on our existing high animal welfare standards. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Leeds North West to withdraw the amendment.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIf the hon. Member gives me a moment to expand a little more I can explain; I will then take interventions from the birthday boy. Officials have catalogued retained EU law across Government, which has been collated, as part of the cross-varietal substance review of retained EU law, into the dashboard that was published on 22 June. Crucially, powers in the Bill have been drafted to ensure that the current date is workable. The preservation power enables UK Ministers and devolved authorities to keep specific pieces of legislation that would otherwise be subject to sunset where the legislation meets a desired policy effect, without having fully to restate or otherwise amend the legislation.
The power to revoke or replace the compatibility power and the power to restate assimilated law will be available until 23 June 2026, while the power to update will be a continuous power. These powers have the ability to amend assimilated law once the sunset date has passed and retained EU law is no longer a legal category; that means that Departments can preserve their retained EU law so that it becomes assimilated law after the sunset date, and amend it further beyond that date if required. In addition, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy will be working closely with other Government Departments, as well as devolved Governments, to ensure that appropriate actions are taken before the sunset date. Finally, the extension mechanism in clause 2 ensures that, should more time be required fully to review the changes needed to retained EU law, the sunset can be extended for specific provisions or descriptions of retained EU law until 23 June 2026.
The Minister has tried heroically but unsuccessfully, I am afraid, to argue that this arbitrary deadline will not place enormous strain on a civil service that is already under enormous strain. Can she look at it from the opposite direction? Can she explain why it would be bad to set an absolute deadline of 2026? If Departments and Ministers are able to sort things out by the end of 2023, they can do so in a safe environment where they are not under pressure to get it done quickly, with the possible consequence that it would then be done wrong.
I simply do not recognise that the added burden means that the programme of work cannot be deliverable. I mentioned the fact that we have an ability to provide an extension, depending on what that piece of legislation is. What we do not want to do is undermine focus on delivering the bulk of the work by the sunset date that is in place at the moment.
The Committee should reject the amendments, which would exempt devolved legislation within Scotland’s legislative competence from the sunset, and amend the territorial extent of the Bill so that it does not extend to Scotland. A sunset is the quickest and most effective way to accelerate the review of the majority of rules on the UK statute book by a specific date in the near future. That will incentivise genuine rule reform in a way that will work best for all parts of the UK.
The territorial scope of the Bill is UK-wide. It is therefore constitutionally appropriate that the sunset applies across all four sovereign nations in the UK. That approach is consistent with other EU exit legislation, and will enable the devolved Governments to make provisions for addressing retained EU law in areas of devolved competence. Every nation of the UK should have the opportunity to review the retained EU law and have the powers to reform the legislation in a way that is appropriate and best suited to its citizens and businesses. Nothing in the sunset provision affects the devolution settlement. It is not intended to restrict the competence of either the devolved legislatures or the devolved Governments.
I put it to the Minister that rejecting the amendment very much affects the devolution settlement. It means that the priorities on which the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland civil service work will no longer be those set by their democratically elected Parliaments and Governments, but the policies set by the UK Government. Angus Robertson made it clear that the Scottish Government believe that there will be a substantial burden of administration on the Scottish civil service. What gives Ministers in this Parliament the right to tell the Scottish civil service to do what they tell them to, not their elected Ministers?
I will continue.
A question was raised earlier, as the hon. Member raised just now, about a power grab. When using the powers under the Bill, the Government will use the appropriate mechanisms, such as the common frameworks, to engage with the devolved Governments. That will ensure that we are able to take account of the wider context and allow for joined-up decision making across the UK. If any disputes arise, we are committed to using the appropriate processes set out in the review of intergovernmental relations.
Nothing in the sunset provision affects the devolution settlement. It is not intended to restrict the competence of either the devolved legislatures or the devolved Governments; rather, it will enable the Scottish Government to make active decisions about the retained EU law within their devolved competence for the benefit of citizens and businesses throughout Scotland. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw the amendment.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesYou will not be surprised to hear, Sir George, that I wish to reject amendments 73, 76, 67 and 60, and new clause 4. While the speeches were taking place, I was reflecting on the level of scrutiny we had when we were governed and subjugated by rules coming out of Europe. I do not recall transcripts from those meetings, or opportunities for Members elected to represent constituents and their businesses to get involved and offer up what they thought was needed for those businesses domestically. However, here we have an opportunity to assimilate, review and potentially improve rules and regulations, and to ensure that we are governed by rules that we enact here in the United Kingdom.
I may be mistaken, but I distinctly remember being a member of the European Scrutiny Committee in this place for several years. The explicit job of that Committee was to scrutinise proposed EU legislation and to express whether it, on behalf of Parliament, was content for Ministers to either support that legislation or oppose it. It was not the fault of the European Union that very often that Committee had no teeth. It was certainly not the fault of the European Union that as often as not, Ministers ignored the views of that Committee. Is it not the case that the difficulties with parliamentary oversight of European legislation for the 40 years that we were in the EU were nothing to do with the failings of the European Union, and everything to do with the failings of scrutiny in this place?
On new clause 4, it is right that the public should know how much legislation is derived from the EU and the progress that the Government are making to reform it. This is why on 22 June 2022 we published an authoritative public record of where REUL sits on the UK statute book in the form of the REUL dashboard on gov.uk, which catalogues more than 2,400 pieces of legislation derived from the EU. The information is there; asking that we cut and paste it somewhere else is slightly ridiculous and over-bureaucratic.
The Government have no intention of abandoning our strong record on workers’ rights, having raised domestic standards over recent years to make them some of the highest in the world.
The hon. Member for Walthamstow raised the issue of maternity rights. She has done a huge amount of work for women’s rights, as have I. I just find it incredibly unfortunate that both she and I have been defending and promoting women’s rights but that we might create an anxiety based on fiction and not on fact. The repeal of maternity rights is not and has never been Government policy. The high standards of maternity rights that I mentioned earlier have never been dependent on, or even mirrored, those of the EU; we have always gone a lot further.
Taking all that into account, I ask the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston to withdraw his amendment.
As hon. Members know from this morning, the clause is the backbone of the Bill, ensuring that EU-derived subordinate legislation and retained direct EU legislation will all be removed or reformed by 31 December 2023. Specifically, the amendment will ensure that the Bill’s sunset does not impact on amendments to primary legislation inserted by retained EU law that is now in scope of the sunset. As drafted, the Bill provides for that to be the case only where an entire instrument is revoked by the sunset. This Government amendment provides that the revocation of a particular provision of an instrument does not affect any amendment made by the provision to any other enactment. Sunsetting amendments to primary legislation is not our aim with the Bill. We clearly rule that out of the Bill’s scope. I ask the Committee to join me in voting for the amendment.
Turning to Government amendment 3, further clarity is required to ensure that, where the preservation power under clause 1(2) has been exercised, it is REUL as it exists at the time of the sunset that is preserved. Without amendment 3, there is a risk that modifications to a piece of REUL made after it has been preserved, but before the sunset date, would unintentionally be subject to the sunset. The amendment will ensure that the modification is also preserved. As such, it is minor and technical but ensures the necessary clarity that REUL is preserved as intended, with necessary amendments or restatements.
The Government have admitted that, even before we decide on clause 1, three important parts of what the Minister described as a fundamentally important clause need to be amended, because the Government got it wrong. How can we be confident that, in less than a year, 4,000-plus statutory instruments will be amended, revoked or replaced without similar mistakes being identified when it is too late and the defective legislation is already in place, with no other choice but to amend them in a Public Bill Committee?
The hon. Gentleman might have been in Parliament longer than I have and might have sat on Committees longer than I have, but it is not unusual to amend pieces of legislation in Committee. I have known that in legislation from many Departments. It is not unusual; it is just the process that we are in.
Before the comments from the hon. Member for Walthamstow, the Minister thought she was winning the argument. She said that there was nothing unusual in legislation having to be amended by the Government in Committee. That is exactly the problem. It is not unusual; in fact, it is almost inevitable. It is happening so many times in this 23-clause Bill, which runs to 30-something pages, but we are expected to believe that anything up to 4,000 pieces of legislation can be wiped out and that they will all be properly and adequately replaced, when this Public Bill Committee stage, which is allowing the defects in the original Bill to be corrected, will be removed from all of them. That is why this is such a reckless and cavalier way to go about changing the laws of these islands. We are not talking about one or two pieces of secondary legislation being introduced to replace or amend what was there before. We are talking about thousands of pieces of legislation needing to be enacted to replace a blank set of paper—in order to replace complete anarchy. Does the Minister now understand that that is why, with the best will in the world, the civil servants will not get them all right? If we go ahead with clause 1 and the rest of the Bill, as the Minister insists, there will be defects in the legislation that is put in place. Bits will be missed out that no one wanted to miss out. Businesses will suffer as a result.
Another question about scrutiny. Thank goodness that we are having this debate and legislating in the UK, where there is an opportunity to scrutinise and have everything on record in Hansard.
Let me go through the process again. Departments will be expected to develop a delivery plan, which will outline their intention for each piece of retained EU law. They will be supported by the Brexit Opportunities Unit. There will be a huge amount of outreach and stock-take process in place. To go through the process further, the Bill will obviously go from here to Report stage and then to the House of Lords. There will be a huge amount of scrutiny throughout. Once the Bill receives Royal Assent, work on reform will continue in Departments. They will review their retained EU law, prioritise areas for reform and lay statutory instruments where appropriate. That process may include designing policy and services; conducting stakeholder consultations; drafting impact assessments; or supporting individuals who may be impacted by any such reform. That is the level of work that we always conduct when we are legislating.
On the question about the statutory instrument programme, and how the House will have sight, the Government recognise the significant role that Parliament has played in scrutinising instruments to date and are committed to ensuring the appropriate scrutiny of any legislation made under the delegated powers in the Bill. The Bill will follow the appropriate scrutiny procedures as it progresses through Parliament. It is right that we ensure that any reforms to retained EU legislation receive the proper scrutiny from the relevant legislatures and are subject to the proper processes for consultation and impact assessment.
Once the Bill receives Royal Assent, work on reform by Departments will continue. They will review their retained EU law, prioritise areas for reform and lay SIs before Parliament where appropriate. A sifting procedure has been included to ensure that Parliament can assess the suitability of the procedure used for SIs. Parliament can recommend stronger scrutiny procedures as needed. I hope that is thorough enough.
I do not want to detain the Committee much longer, but I cannot support clause 1. It is not just about me not accepting that this Parliament has the right to take my people out of an international union that they voted to be part of. It is about the fact that even if we accept that there is no way back into the European Union—even if we accept that Brexit has to be a process of substantially distancing ourselves from it—this is not the right way to go about it.
It is perfectly possible, as others have said, to set up a process that allows retained EU law that gets in the way to be revoked, repealed or amended, but that allows good EU law to be maintained and adopted into domestic legislation, without running the risk of having to start from a blank sheet of paper and replace 40-years of legislation in the space of a few months.
The briefing paper to the late Queen’s Speech that the Government produced to set out the background to the Bill talked about using the Bill to assert the sovereignty of Parliament. Well, quite clearly, the Government do not understand that this Parliament never has exerted, and never will exert, sovereignty over the people of Scotland. If the Bill was to progress with clause 1 as it is, it would not be asserting the sovereignty of Parliament; it would be asserting the sovereignty of the Prime Minister and the Government Chief Whip. They will decide what goes in the legislation, they will decide who presents that legislation to Parliament and they will decide what Minister gets the boot if they do not support the necessary changes. That is not about the sovereignty of Parliament; it is about the sovereignty of the Executive—of the Prime Minister and Chief Whip in particular.
If we look at that briefing on the important aspects of the Bill, we see red flags all over the place because it is about short-circuiting the parliamentary process. The Government’s own assessment is that, if we were to take this retained EU law through a proper process of parliamentary scrutiny, it would take decades to get through. I am not necessarily saying that we should wait decades for the process to be completed. But taking a process of decades—by implication, that is 20 years at least—and squeezing it into a single year, and especially a single year when the Government are dealing with the impacts of the war in Ukraine, the after-effects of covid and the worst cost of living crisis in living memory, is not a responsible way for the Government to make legislation.
I will be opposing clause 1. If people believe that that will wreck the Bill, then this is a Bill that has to be wrecked. The Government have to be told to go back and bring forward a Bill that achieves what most Members in this House now seem to want, but that does so in a way that does not expose all of us—and those who elected us—to risks that we cannot yet even identify because they could come out of legislation that nobody here knows exists. It would be madness to repeal a piece of legislation that we do not even know is there.
Well, it was not a simple question, and it was full of contradictions. During debates on previous amendments, we have spoken to the high levels of animal welfare that we have here in the UK, and the level of scrutiny that will take place.
To the point that the hon. Gentleman raised, conferring the extension power on the devolved Governments would introduce additional legal complexity. Specifically, it might result in different pieces and descriptions of retained EU law expiring at multiple different times in different Administrations across the UK. Those pieces of retained EU law may cover a mix of reserved and devolved policy areas, and policy officials are still working through how the extension power will work in practice, but we are committed to working collaboratively with devolved officials. I am keen to discuss this policy as it progresses to ensure that the power works for all parts of the UK. The amendment would work against everything we are trying to achieve through the Bill, which is why I ask the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston to withdraw it.
The Minister’s clarification in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute’s questions has been about as clear as mud. On the basis of that response, I sincerely hope that my hon. Friend will stick to his guns, move his amendment and push it to a vote. Either the Minister genuinely does not get devolution, or she gets it and is trying to roll it back, because the whole point of devolution is the recognition that there are four distinct identities, at the very least—four distinct sets of needs and priorities—within the four nations of this Union. Arguably, England could be split into several autonomous regions as well if the people of those parts of England so desired.
I think the fault line is that the Minister continually expects the people of Scotland to be reassured when she says, “This is not what the Government intend to do with this new power. This is not what the Government intend to do with this new legislation.” I mean nothing personal against this particular Minister when I tell her that the people in Scotland do not trust this Government. The people in Scotland have never trusted a Tory Government and never will, so if the reassurance that the Minister wants to give my constituents and constituents of other colleagues in Scotland is “We promise you that although we’ve got this power, we will not do it to you”, that will not be enough. The one way to make that promise credible is to say, “We are so determined not to do this to you that we are not going to take the power that would allow us to do it. We are going to make a law that would prevent us from doing that.”
The Minister still has not answered my hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute’s questions, so maybe I can ask them in a different way. Who does she believe should have the right to decide whether chlorine-washed chicken or hormone-injected beef should be allowed to be sold in shops in Scotland? Is that a decision that rightfully belongs with the Parliament of Scotland, or does it belong to this place?
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Sir Stephen Laws: Yes, it does. The major difference between the way the UK traditionally legislates and the way the EU—and indeed lots of other countries—legislate is that under a parliamentary system the Government take responsibility for the effect and quality of the law. That means that when law is made, it is made to do something that people have agreed on. Very often, law made in Europe—in different languages as well—was a matter of agreeing words, irrespective of what the words achieved. If you could agree on the words, that was the best that you could hope for; that may happen very occasionally in my experience, and very rarely indeed in the UK. In the UK people agree on the substance, so you know what the law does. Retaining all this law that was there because it was a compromise on words is making life difficult for those people who have to use it.
Q
Sir Stephen Laws: Well, most of the law that this relates to—certainly the early clauses about subordinate legislation—is not law that Parliament made; it is law that Parliament enacted or approved because it had to. The law that will be made under the Bill will be made by a Government accountable to Parliament. The powers in the Bill are equivalent in some ways to the power under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972, but in that case there was no choice about the substance of how you exercised the power; the argument was all about the means. Under this Bill, Parliament will have an opportunity to look at the substance as well as the means.
Q
Professor Young: Thank you, Minister. It is a matter of recognising that EU law tends to be drafted by setting out the purposes that it is meant to achieve in certain circumstances. Directives have a different format from regulations; they set out the aims and purposes, and allow member states discretion in how to implement them, which is why so much of retained EU law is secondary legislation that was enacted by the UK to implement particular provisions of directives. In that sense, it tends to be drafted in a slightly different style. You also have to recognise that its main aim was harmonisation, so that might influence how it was drafted.
While the UK was a member of the European Union, we got used to understanding how EU law was drafted, and to interpreting it in line with background EU law principles, including the general principles of EU law. Obviously, one of the things this Bill will do is switch that off. You then have to think about how, without those general principles, we will interpret any of the retained EU law that becomes assimilated or is retained by regulations. We might have to think about not just retaining particular provisions through regulations, but whether we need to add elements to amend them or make them clear, so that we have a fuller understanding of how they are meant to apply in certain circumstances.
Q
Professor Barnard: The simple answer is no; I am completely unaware of any precedent for this. Of course, that does not mean that we cannot try to adopt this approach, but we need to be extremely mindful of the associated risks. That is one of the reasons why we have proposed carving out areas, such as environment and social policy, that are already subject to obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement. That will ensure that we do not accidently turn them off but not turn them back on again through the powers in clauses 1(2), 2 or 12 to 15, and so will ensure that we are not subject to the trade and co-operation agreement’s dispute resolution mechanisms, which may result in tariffs being imposed on us.
Q
Tom Sharpe: I see the Bill as a framework Bill. Of course, it gives Ministers and Departments very considerable powers—powers of proposal, as you know, to amend, revoke or replace existing legislation.
As Martin has just said, an Act of Parliament, which was probably passed—if I may say so respectfully—before many of you were born, provided an enabling power to enact legislation of some quite sweeping character. Despite all the things that law students learned about how Parliament needed to approve legislation, not one single regulation—this is one of the bits we are discussing—has ever been debated, approved or amended by the House of Commons or Parliament. That is a striking statement, but it is absolutely true. We were forbidden, in law, to debate or amend such legislation. I suspect you all know that, but it does not hurt to be reminded.
As for the directives, of course they, too, were approved by Parliament—or, more accurately, not disapproved—but the power of Parliament was utterly residual because the objective of a directive had to be observed. If it was not, the UK would be subject to proceedings from Brussels—and it was, on occasion, but not as often as many other countries.
We are now debating a system of revocation, amendment and replacement, and giving it far more formality than we gave the creation of the laws themselves. That ought to give us pause for thought. That is the background. As far as parliamentary scrutiny is concerned, yes, most of it will be subject to negative resolution, and it is easy to make what I will disrespectfully call a good debating point about the times when statutory instruments have fallen under the negative procedure. But here, we are dealing with a sea change. We are dealing with masses of legislation, as we know, all of which will be subject to significant scrutiny within the House of Commons by parliamentarians and by the press. It seems to me that those issues have to be given notice. There is also the sifting procedure that we adverted to earlier, which I think could be quite a powerful brake on Ministers’ discretion.
Q
Tom Sharpe: Where do we start?
Martin Howe: I am concerned by the attitude taken by the Bar Council. As a subscribing member, I fear that it is trespassing rather too far into political issues. Unfortunately, I think there is a sort of small “c” conservative lawyer’s mentality, which has led over time to various things, such as counsel saying in the “Lady Chatterley’s Lover” trial, “Members of the jury, would you allow your wives or your servants to read this book?” Since so many members of the Bar are imbued with the system of working with European Union law—it is all part of their practice and the way they operate—there is a natural mental attitude towards keeping it. I do not think that reflects the necessities of the democratic process following the referendum result.
Q
Mark Fenhalls: I am not a parliamentarian or a politician. The short answer to that is that I do not know, but I do know that every single stakeholder and lawyer I have spoken to—who are simply thinking about their clients’ business interests and the rights of the people involved—wants to know what the alternative proposals are before they take a view. The difficulty with this Bill is not change, because change in itself is fine; it is the fact that we do not know what the proposals will be. We have suggested what we suggested in our submission and we have put in fall-back positions saying that if the Bill is to proceed, we should put in place scrutiny measures or duties on Ministers to come to the House and say, “This is what we propose to do,” and not run the risk, for example, of the sunset causing us to crash into the wall at the end of next year.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Angus Robertson: They can in any area they like—that is the problem. That is the concurrent nature of the powers for UK Ministers and devolved authorities. It is clear to be read: it is a power that can be used. I cannot foresee exactly which Minister would seek to use such a power or for what purpose, but they would have that power. That should surely be a concern for everybody. Is it not?
Q
Angus Robertson: Yes.