Oral Answers to Questions

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Esther McVey]

First, I would like to remind everybody that the Work programme is the most successful scheme of its kind in getting people from long-term unemployment into work. Some 1.75 million people are now being helped and over 600,000 have got a job. In feedback, participants are saying that they are happy with the frequency of contact and think that that works with them and helps overcome the barriers to finding work. The number of people on ESA shows that it is actually performing well above what was expected. It was expected to apply to only one in 14 people and the figure is now one in 10. All the extra work that we have done on the communications between Jobcentre Plus and work providers is obviously showing results.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

What more can the Minister do to get a better relationship between jobcentres and Work programme providers so that they can provide a warm handover when claimants move into the Work programme and when they return from the programme at the end of their two-year period?

[Esther McVey]

My hon. Friend is right. This is all part of the Oakley review. It is about ensuring that communications are better, that that hand-holding is understood, that people get a copy of the claimant commitment, and that they can understand a good cause and work together. At the end of the day, we are trying to get some of the most vulnerable people, who have been unemployed for a long time, into work. What is needed is that communication and that support from Jobcentre Plus and prime contractors.

Universal Credit

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Duncan Smith]

As the hon. Lady knows, we started with single people, but whenever somebody’s circumstances changed—they may have become a couple or had a family—they stayed in the system and have been dealt with. It is not correct, in any way, to say that these are the simplest cases. The roll-out to families introduces further complications, but we are doing this in way that makes sure that we get it right. By the end of this year, the north-west will have universal credit, so if someone falls unemployed and then goes into work, they will do so on universal credit. That is the key point. All the complications will be dealt with within the existing system.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

I welcome the progress announced in the Secretary of State’s statement. Will he confirm that the Treasury has now signed off the whole business case and laid to rest the fear that it was not going to do so?

[Mr Duncan Smith]

That is exactly what was being asked before the summer break, and the answer is that the Treasury has done that. The MPA has also signed off the roll-out process in saying that it de-risks the nature of the roll-out and approves it exactly as it stands at the moment.

Oral Answers to Questions

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Monday 3rd November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

We are looking at a number of options to help people. My hon. Friend will be aware that the national health service has made some announcements about the extra help it will be putting in place for people with mental health conditions from April—this will be a significant improvement. We are also running some pilots, examining access to psychological therapies and linking those up with support in getting into work. So she will see that more support is available for those with mental health problems, both now and going forward.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

Will the Minister ensure that the welcome progress on PIP is also reflected in a legacy on DLA claims, because under-16s, for whom these claims still have to be made, are also experiencing long delays?

[Mr Harper]

I hear what my hon. Friend says. I have had one or two examples of that brought to my attention, and I have asked officials to brief me on the DLA performance for children. I will come back to him in writing when I have something further to tell him.

Pension Schemes Bill

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Steve Webb]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that important point about the potential market and demand for such schemes. We have undertaken research not only among consumers but among employers. We have found that about a quarter of employers say that they would be interested in providing shared-risk schemes and that another quarter are waiting to see. To be honest, if I were surveyed at this point, I would probably be in the waiting-to-see quarter because the legislation is yet to go through and the regulations that this framework Bill provides for have yet to be tabled. Understandably, firms are not queuing up to declare for this form of pension provision.

On the whole, such schemes are unlikely to be provided by SMEs. In general, we anticipate that just as with final salary and DB pensions, it is larger employers who will tend to go for shared-risk schemes—not exclusively, but largely. The reason is that, beyond the bare legal minimum of auto-enrolment, providing a workplace pension is not a legal requirement but an option. It tends to be larger employers who see pension provision as part of a package, perhaps including a company car or a workplace crèche, and who offer additional benefits. A risk-sharing scheme is, to my mind, a fringe benefit. However, it is a very valuable benefit where the employer says, “I want to do more for my employees than the legal minimum.”

My hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman) asked what the incentive is. Although the best pension schemes may have gone, the best employers have not. There are therefore good employers out there who want to do more than the bare legal minimum. They will find that their employees want a pension scheme that reduces the risks and uncertainties of this very uncertain world. They will therefore find that this is an attractive part of their package.

Once the schemes are up and running, small employers may well choose to join them. We will probably need scale before we get to that stage. I am guessing that larger employers will use them first, but once there is the infrastructure—a regulatory regime or governance regime—one can imagine a scenario in which smaller employers would join.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

The Minister has just mentioned the regulatory regime. Has he given any thought to how we will regulate the new defined-ambition, shared-risk schemes? Presumably, if a defined-contribution scheme adds a small promise, it will trip over into being a defined-ambition scheme. The regulation would therefore move from the Financial Conduct Authority to the Pensions Regulator, and it could drop back again. Does it not look as though we need one pensions regulator to make it all make sense?

[Steve Webb]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. That is an issue that the Work and Pensions Committee, of which he is a member, has raised in relation to the appropriate regulatory regime. It is fair to say that in drawing up the regulations and guidance for the Bill, the number of times we have had to ask ourselves which regulator it is that does which bit and to ensure that what the FCA does mirrors what the Pensions Regulator does has added to the complexity of the process. When I gave evidence to the Select Committee a little while ago, I said that this was not the time to start reforming the regulators. That remains my view. My hon. Friend will be aware that the FCA has only just been created out of the ashes of the Financial Services Authority. This precise point is not the right time for yet another regulatory reform. However, the experience of the last 12 months has made me more sympathetic to the view that the eventual destination might well be a single regulator.

My hon. Friend also raises the regulation of DA and collective DC schemes. It is clear that what we need is good governance. Arguably, one of the problems of the Dutch experience, as it has been described to us, is that the schemes were described as DB to the members and DC to the employers. One of those two descriptions was not true. We have to ensure that we have good governance and transparent communication. Because of issues of intergenerational fairness and so on, the rules of the scheme—who gets what when things go wrong and who benefits when things go well—have to be transparent. We therefore need a clear, although not excessive, regulatory framework.

What I have described so far is the Pension Schemes Bill as we originally envisaged it, which deals with risk sharing. Obviously, that is the fruit of several years’ worth of consultation papers and extensive engagement with stakeholders in the pensions industry. I would like to place on the record my appreciation to the many working groups that the Department has run, including the defined ambition working groups of Andrew Vaughn of the Association of Consulting Actuaries, and to all the experts who have given their time to help us draw up the various models. We are very grateful to them.

The second half of the Bill relates to the Chancellor’s freedom and choice in pensions agenda. It may be that other right hon. and hon. Members regularly have people walk up to them in the street, shake their hand and thank them for Government policy. It has been a relatively novel experience for me, but I have genuinely had people walk up to me, shake my hand and thank me for this policy because it gives them back control over their own money. It says not that the Government know best but that the individual, with the right support and guidance, should be in the best place to make their own choices about their own money. The Government are committed to giving people freedom and choice in how they use their pension savings.

Budget 2014 announced radical new flexibilities in how and when people may access their pension arrangements. We undertook a 13-week consultation, and the response to it was published in July. Draft tax clauses for technical comment were published in August. The momentum is gathering. This Bill, along with the taxation of pensions Bill, will mean that from April 2015, individuals from the age of 55 will be able to access pensions flexibility if they wish to, subject to their marginal rate of income tax, rather than the current 55% tax charge.

This Bill will make the required changes to pensions legislation, including a guidance guarantee. That means that everyone with a defined-contribution pension arrangement will be offered free, impartial guidance so that they are clear about the range of options available to them on retirement. There will also be a duty on providers and schemes to ensure that they make people aware of their right to guidance and signpost them to this service.

The taxation of pensions Bill will legislate for the required tax regime changes. The Government will continue to allow members of private sector DB schemes the freedom to transfer to other types of scheme. In the majority of cases, it will continue to be in the best interests of the individual to remain in their DB scheme. That is why two additional safeguards will be introduced to protect individuals and schemes. First, there will be a new requirement for individuals transferring out of a DB scheme to take advice—with a capital A—from a financial adviser before a transfer can be accepted. Secondly, there will be new guidance for trustees of defined-benefit schemes on using their existing powers to delay transfer payments and taking account of scheme funding levels when deciding transfer values. To protect the Exchequer and taxpayers, however, transfers will not, other than in very limited circumstances, be allowed from unfunded public service DB schemes to schemes with DC arrangements.

I want to pick up on two final issues that relate to how the freedom will work in practice. The first was raised in oral questions yesterday and relates to the position of schemes with exit fees. The uncharitable side of me would say that one or two of my answers yesterday were misrepresented in the Twittersphere, as I think it is called. The charitable side of me would say that my comments were misunderstood. Let me be absolutely clear about where we stand on schemes with exit fees.

First, despite Opposition attempts to hype this up and overstate the case, the number of schemes with exit fees is very much in the minority. In other words, our 2013 pensions and charges landscape survey found that more than five in six trust-based schemes, and nine out of 10 employers with contract-based schemes, had no exit fees. We must therefore be clear that exit fees are exceptional.

Secondly—I am generally talking about legacy schemes here—we are already considering charges, and a legacy audit is being undertaken of old and high-charging schemes. That is due to report by December and will provide additional information about existing fees. At the moment, we do not have full information with which to form policy, but the Government are working with the pensions industry to understand how common exit fees are, how large they are, and the terms under which they operate. Crucially, once the evidence is clearer, the Government will be able to decide whether additional measures are required to protect savers. At the moment we are gathering information, but we are determined to ensure that savers are protected. I hope that is helpful.

The compatibility of the two halves of the Bill has been mentioned. On the one hand we are giving people freedom and flexibility, and on the other we are bringing forward a framework within which people might be members of a pension scheme all their life, through working age and well into retirement. We must obviously ensure that those two things gel, and I assure the House that they do.

All our reforms are about putting the saver first and addressing people’s desire for greater certainty about income in both the savings and the pay-out phase—the accumulation and decumulation phase. In a defined ambition scheme, more than one type of benefit arrangement is likely to make up the overall pension pot or income stream. We expect people with defined contribution arrangements within a defined ambition scheme to be able to access those arrangements in line with new budget flexibilities. Members of DC schemes that offer collective benefits will be able to cash out their collective benefits if they so choose. If they remain within the scheme, it is likely that they will receive a pension income for life, since that is how we envisage collective benefits being set up. People will not have to make decisions on how to access their savings; decisions on how to pay out scheme benefits will be made by scheme fiduciaries.

These schemes will offer an option—that is the crucial point: the freedom and choice agenda—for those who wish the scheme to pay them a pension income for life. Either way, the individual will have choice over what to do with their savings. Together with the amendments that will follow shortly, the Bill will set out a legislative framework that will mean greater choice and flexibility for future private pensions, tailored to the needs of employers and individual savers.

This Parliament has seen little short of a pensions revolution: radical state pension reform providing a firm foundation; mass membership of workplace pensions through the effective implementation of automatic enrolment; quality standard charge caps; and a war on rip-off pension charges. Now in this Bill there are two new strands to our reforms: enabling and facilitating risk-sharing pension models rather than the extremes of risk that would otherwise be the case, and new freedoms for individuals to know best what to do with their money. At the end of this Parliament, we will truly have transformed the pensions landscape. That is a record of which this coalition Government can be proud, and I commend the Bill to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregg McClymont]

I would like to take all the credit, of course— having not been in the previous Parliament—but in my opinion and that of the Opposition Front-Bench team, there is a very good case for encouraging collective provision. Politics involves evolution. I am kinder at times than the Minister, so I will not give him chapter and verse about how he has chased our tail on pensions policy, but whatever the origins of the policy, surely the point is to get the best possible outcomes.

The Minister alluded to other parts of the pension scheme in the Bill. Its provisions reflect the knock-on consequences of the flexibilities at retirement announced by the Government, evidenced by the fact that this is being shared between the Treasury and the DWP. It redefines the type of workplace schemes that can be set up so that a third form of scheme—neither DB nor individual DC—can be created. It also prevents the transfer out of most public service defined-benefits schemes, except to other DB schemes, which makes sense given the basis on which these Treasury-funded schemes proceed.

Currently, on the insolvency of an employer, the Pensions Regulator can employ an independent trustee from a register that it maintains. Conversely, when it uses its general powers of appointment to replace a trustee found not to be fit and proper, it does so using flexible procurement panels. The Government’s response allows the alignment of both procedures on the second, which seems to make sense. And of course the Bill will allow the Secretary of State to make payments into the Remploy pension scheme. These are all sensible policies supported by the Opposition.

The principal case for the Bill, however, as the Minister set out, is the recognition of the case for collective pension saving. There appears to be some appetite among the public for this kind of risk sharing. Research undertaken recently by the Institute for Public Policy Research suggested as much when it found that collective pensions were the most popular option across different income levels, life stages and ages. That makes sense given that pensions are a form of collective insurance against poverty and indignity in old age. On that basis, the debate that the Bill generates is welcome.

The Minister described how the pensions landscape had changed. DB is no longer as popular as it once was; employers do not want to take on the risks of defined-benefits schemes; and increasingly we live in a world of individual defined contribution, where the risk is entirely on the individual saver and depends on the performance of the stock market. As he suggested, finding a way to share risk is a good thing, but let me point out several aspects on which the Bill is silent—aspects that are central if collective pensions are to succeed.

The first aspect—as far as I am aware, the Minister was silent on this—is the awareness that cross-generational collective pensions can, in extreme circumstances, involve a reduction in pensions in payment. This is not something that the UK is culturally and historically attuned to. In a cross-generational collective pension fund, the smoothing of risk and reward between different generations can mean, in extreme circumstances, that the pensions being paid to pensioners are cut. That is something with which our politics is not familiar and an important point about defined-contribution collective pensions that has to be considered.

The second important point is that governance is even more important in collective pension schemes of this kind than it is in other forms of pension. Managing a rolling pension fund—one that brings together the savings of teenagers, pensioners and every generation in between and that demands that each cohort is treated equally—requires substantial technical expertise. The prize, if a fund is managed correctly, can be bigger pensions, but that demands governance of the highest quality, yet the Bill is silent on governance. The Minister mentioned it in the round, but he did not talk about the governance that he wishes to see or that, more importantly, the Bill puts in place for these pension schemes. And the Bill is silent despite the Government saying in their response to the consultation document, “Reshaping workplace pensions for future generations”:

“Collective schemes are complex and can be opaque… This necessitates strong standards of communication and governance. We intend collective schemes to be overseen by experienced fiduciaries acting on behalf of members, taking decisions at scheme level and removing the need for individuals to make difficult choices over fund allocations and retirement income products”—

not a philosophy the Government are adopting at the point of retirement via their Budget reforms. What has happened to their intention that governance be undertaken by experienced fiduciaries?

I am reminded of the fankle that the Government have got themselves into over the governance of individual defined-contribution pensions. I will not give chapter and verse now, because it would not be appropriate, but the independent governance committees that the Government intend to set up for individual defined-contribution pensions—the Minister referred to them—are neither independent, nor governance. They will be in the hands of the insurance company. The mistake that the Government appear to have made over individual defined-contribution pensions, they are now making with respect to collective defined-contribution pensions.

There is nothing in the Bill about the standards of governance that CDC pension schemes will have to meet. Everything is left to secondary legislation. I say to the Secretary of State and the Minister—who asked about the attitude of the Opposition—that so much of pensions legislation under this Government has been left to secondary legislation, making it difficult for the whole House accurately to understand the consequences and outcomes of any one pension Bill or policy.

As regards collective pensions and the second aspect of the Government’s silence—on governance—the Opposition believe that the Government should follow our lead and require the schemes to have trustees and to be based on a legal duty to prioritise the interests of savers above all others. Failure to require all schemes to have trustees—this is crucial—means that some collective DC schemes will be run by trustees and others by private firms seeking to maximise their short-term returns. That is surely not in the spirit of the collective pensions on which the Minister wishes to build. Given the complexity of managing collective, inter-generational, risk-sharing pension schemes, the highest level of governance is critical, and I urge the Government to say explicitly—either today or as the Bill goes forward—what the governance criteria and rules will be.

Beyond governance, a third crucial aspect of collective pensions remains unexamined by the Bill. The Government have left entirely to secondary legislation the question of what kind of collective pensions they wish to promote. The Minister suggests that collective DC is one sort of pension scheme, but it is not: there are different forms of collective defined contribution, so clarity about which form the Government wish to see would be useful for all parties as we examine the proposals.

Broadly, there are two kinds of collective pensions that the Government might wish to promote. One is a form of collective DC that sets a target income for each saver and a probability of the target income being met on retirement—a 95% probability, say, of that target being realised. This form of collective DC demands significant assets in reserve so as to make the probability realistic. Given the substantial assets that any scheme would need to materialise, that is what we might call a heavy form of collective DC pensions.

There is also, however, a lighter form of collective DC, which is more intra-generational than inter-generational—involving risk sharing among a particular cohort rather than between generations. That lighter form of DC collective pensions is also to be welcomed, as it would bring the advantage of scaling and pooling within a generation. Fundamentally, too—I am not sure the Minister mentioned this—the great advantage of collective pensions is that they avoid the real difficulty of having to make the decision on the spot on retirement for the rest of one’s retirement. That does not happen under either the heavier or lighter form of collective DC, as a form of draw-down applies. The pension fund never ends; it continues, so a form of draw-down is possible. As I said, an on-the-spot, once-in-a-lifetime decision about retirement income might apply under the Bill.

The Government have not stated which form of collective DC they wish to see materialise from the Bill. As with governance, the Bill is entirely silent on those points. Everything is left to secondary legislation once again, and I see a pattern when it comes to pensions legislation under this Government. They bring forward a Second Reading, take a Bill into Committee and then leave so much of the fundamental detail to subsequent secondary legislation. I am not sure that that is a sensible way to proceed if we want to make substantial and good legislation. Those are some of the issues on which I would like to gain further clarity from the Government.

The Minister spent some time talking about the budget reforms, and we have heard contributions and interventions from Front Benchers about them. The Government are silent on the issues of flexibility and the interaction with auto-enrolment pension saving. They claim that all those aspects fit together very well, but I have suggested that there is a fundamental difference in approach in the spheres of building up the pension pot, auto-enrolment and turning the pension pot into retirement income.

The three tests that the Opposition have set for these reforms are sensible. We must know first what the guidance guarantee amounts to—a fundamental point on which we still have no clarity. We expect perhaps an amendment or amendments to provide clarity on the guidance guarantee. We should remember that the Chancellor promised advice, not guidance, in his Budget statement. There is a fundamental difference between the two, and the Minister subsequently clarified that guidance rather than financial advice will be provided. We await with bated breath the details of the guidance guarantee. Without top-quality guidance, the potential for successful flexibilities will be much reduced.

Secondly, we need to know how the budget reforms will impact on the pension pots and retirement income of low and middle earners. That is important. One of the weaknesses of individual DC, from which the Minister is trying to move way, is that 10 years from any individual’s retirement, the pension fund has to move assets into low-yielding bonds to avoid any risks so close to the retirement age. There is less risk, but less return. The danger of the Government’s flexibility provisions on retirement is the interaction with pension fund asset management. It now becomes the norm that individuals will cash in their pension pot at 55, 56 or 57, which means that at the age of 45, 46 or 47 the pension fund will have to move into low-risk, low-yielding assets, reducing the pension pot when cashed in on retirement.

[Nigel Mills]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but is there not a reverse problem when someone wants to keep their pension savings pot until long after the normal retirement age, so they would not want to move over to low-risk returns at 55 but leave it until 65 or later? The position is more complex than the hon. Gentleman suggests.

[Gregg McClymont]

I am rarely accused of making pensions less complex, so I shall take the hon. Gentleman’s comment as a compliment. I take his point, however; there are lots of unanswered questions about how income draw-down will work. The potential impact of the reforms on the asset management of individuals’ pension pots is crucial.

Thirdly, the interaction of the budget reforms with social care, for example, is an important issue. How do the Government view the position on the ability of local authorities, for example, to say that a pension pot is a realisable asset that can be brought inside the capital disregard for social care and other benefits? That is a significant question to which we still have no answers. The Opposition have lots of opinions, as the Minister says, but if the Government take so long to explain how any of their policies will work, it is no wonder that we spend a lot of time asking questions.

I have highlighted important issues and pointed to substantial unanswered questions about governance, about how the reforms will interact with the budget flexibilities and, more widely, about how a Government committed to automatic enrolment of individuals into pension saving can be equally committed to an individually focused policy for turning pension pots into retirement income.

Let me make some final observations. The Minister did not mention the National Employment Savings Trust and that is no surprise, because he has promised that the restrictions on NEST will be lifted, but since July 2013 we have heard nothing on when they will disappear. That is important because, if we are thinking about collective defined-contribution pensions, NEST is a trusted pension provider backed by the Government that could offer such pensions. In doing so, just as it has in the auto-enrolment sphere, it could constrain the pensions industry and drive up standards and quality, so that the products that the Minister, I and everyone would like to see delivered are delivered by the industry. Therefore, the restrictions on NEST are a problem. The Minister has indicated that he will lift them. Can we have some clarity on when they will be lifted, especially since they pertain to the Bill’s objectives?

More narrowly, technical drafting may prevent someone from transferring their pension pot to a CDC scheme unless they were an “earner” and their current employer was an employer in relation to the CDC scheme. I know it is a technical issue, but there would appear to be no good reason why a workplace CDC scheme should not be able to take in pots from any source if the person willing to transfer in thinks that they receive a good valuation for their contribution. For longevity risk, investment risk and lower costs reasons, an individual may prefer a steady income from CDC instead of draw-down or annuity.

More widely, the Bill contains no measures that will help to promote the scale which most independent observers believe is necessary for CDC pensions, and workplace pensions in general, to be as efficient as possible. The Opposition have long argued for measures to promote scale and we would like to see such measures in the Bill. The House of Commons briefing note on the Bill states on page 1:

“certain conditions such as large scale and strong governance, appear necessary for it”—

that is, CDC—

“to operate successfully.”

The Bill promises, offers and evidences neither. The Government have work to do to make the Bill as substantial as it should be in contributing to the developing consensus that collective-scale pensions are better. We welcome the Government’s approach while reserving our right as the Opposition to continue to press them, even when the Front-Bench team do not like it, on the lack of detail therein.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate and welcome the many positive measures in the Bill, which will substantially improve the pensions landscape in the UK—not before time, perhaps. I wish to touch on the two main areas that the debate is focused on: the introduction of the defined-ambition or shared-risk scheme, and the move to get flexibility at retirement age and the guidance that that involves.

We should pay tribute to the Minister for the fact that we have defined ambition in a piece of legislation; it has been almost a one-man dream for most of this Parliament, and perhaps we all thought it would not quite make it, but here it is in the Bill. If I appear generous in my praise for my coalition colleague, let me say that it was a brave thing for any politician to try to define a promise. We have all struggled with this: when is a promise not a promise? We know now that a promise is not a promise when it is an ambition. I think we were tortuously trying to work out in this Bill how to say what constitutes a complete pension promise and where something is not quite a promise but an aspiration, a hint, a suggestion or something more than a hope. I think that the Bill’s definition just about gets there, but I am not totally sure, without trying to work it through in various scenarios, that I can work out when a full pensions promise perhaps becomes a partial promise. That goes to the nub of the matter.

When we try to get into the detail of how we regulate these things and move them forward, we find how much of a promise or how much certainty or expectation can be created to allow one of these schemes to become a shared-risk scheme rather than a defined-benefits scheme or something that is no more meaningful than an existing defined-contributions scheme. Working out exactly what a good employer who is trying to be generous and helpful to their staff can say without falling foul of some of these rules will be hard. I assume that what we are trying to do is to say that under a defined-benefits scheme, if a person finishes their role on £30,000 a year, they will get a £20,000 a year pension. That is clearly a defined benefit. I suspect that what we are trying to say under defined ambition is that if a person finishes their role on £30,000 a year, and investment returns and longevity are just about what we expect, we think that we will be able to give them £20,000 a year. But if those assumptions are a bit out, we might have to put in a bit more money ourselves and they will get £18,000 rather £20,000. I suspect that that is the sort of promise we are trying to achieve with a shared-risk scheme.

It is not clear exactly how we can set the parameters. For example, when can £20,000 become £10,000? If there is a higher investment return, contributions can be reduced and we may still think that we can get £20,000. I think that we will just end up dropping back into regulatory uncertainty and all the issues that we have had on defined-benefits schemes. A lot of work needs to be done to get these schemes out in the market. We need to understand exactly how much risk the employer is running and how much certainty the individual gets; otherwise we are left with the difficult situation the Minister alluded to, where one side thinks it is an actual promise and the other side thinks it is a kind of hope. It probably means that whoever regulates these new shared-risk schemes will have an incredibly important role. In some ways, it will be even more difficult for trustees to administer defined-benefits schemes. I sense we will need a very competent and focused regulator looking at these things.

As I said in my intervention, it is a little difficult to see where the line will be drawn between defined benefit and defined ambition and between defined ambition, defined contributions plus and pure defined contributions. I suspect that before these things get into full speed, we will need one regulator doing all those things. If a scheme makes a bit of a promise and then withdraws it, does it drop out from being a defined ambition and become something else?

[Ian Swales]

My hon. Friend raises some excellent points. He does not specifically mention governance, which could make the thing slightly more complex because there is a third leg to the stool between the employer and employee. The explanatory notes talk about comparisons with schemes in other countries and use the expression “when governed appropriately” when talking about what schemes can provide. Has he any comments about the governance situation?

[Nigel Mills]

Yes. I have not been totally clear. I was alluding to the fact that these schemes will be even harder for trustees. I meant the trustees who try to govern these schemes. If we have a scheme that is giving a clear promise, we can create a set of assumptions. We will know how much funding we will need on top of our investment returns and longevity predictions. We will at least have some fixed parameters, so we can then define the contributions. If we even vary what we are promising to pay, we would have to take a really educated decision and say, “Shall we vary the promise down from £20,000 to £18,000, put up the contributions or a bit of both? Will it all be all right again in five years?” That will become quite difficult for trustees, and we will then really need the regulator to be able to check that trustees are capable and competent at dealing with shifting sands in these calculations.

[Steve Webb]

I did not respond properly to the hon. Gentleman when he intervened on me on this matter. Broadly speaking, it would not change which regulator was involved if there was or was not a bit of a promise. The Pensions Regulator deals with occupational workplace defined-benefits and defined-contributions pensions. The Financial Conduct Authority deals with group personal pensions and similar. Essentially, that is the division rather than whether there is or is not a promise.

[Nigel Mills]

That is a helpful clarification, but we have still had the bizarre situation in which the Pensions Regulator is responsible for auto-enrolment even though most of the schemes into which people are enrolled are not regulated by the Pensions Regulator. I sense that we are introducing further uncertainty into what schemes there are and people need to understand exactly what is going on.

Trying to create a new form of pension that can try to stop the bleed away from defined benefits is the right direction in which to travel. If we are to have a credible pensions industry, we need to ensure that people can have certainty or at least confidence that if they keep paying into their pension funds with their employers at the rate that they are they will have some idea what they will get rather than a vague hope that they might at some point get something suitable. That is the thing that does most discredit to the pensions industry. People end up getting so much less than they thought they would, despite what they thought they were paying and would be entitled to, that they decide the whole thing is not worth doing at all.

That question takes us to a fundamental part of pensions policy. We are spending a lot of taxpayers’ money on tax relief for pensions and if we end up with just a glorified savings vehicle with no direct link to pensions, we must wonder whether we will be distorting the investment market quite horribly. We need a clear and confident link, so that people know that the money they are putting away is meant to get a retirement income that they are happy with and is not just a super-glorified pre-tax income ISA, which I fear we might be drifting towards.

The Work and Pensions Committee considered the principle of collective schemes briefly in our inquiry on a pension governance a couple of years ago. The idea that we can somehow share risk between the generations, smoothing things out so that if there is a market crash just before someone expects to retire they do not suddenly have their pension income destroyed in a way that they cannot possibly recover from—clearly, that can be smoothed out by reducing the risk profile of investments, as is done now—looks to be a perfectly sensible and attractive way forward. I am a little intrigued about how we can go from having none of those schemes to having them in place, having enough people in them and having enough confidence that people will continue to join them to ensure that the intergenerational thing can work. Some European countries have had such schemes for 60 years and we can see how they work, but the question is how we go from zero to having three generations of people without the first lot thinking that they are taking all the risk for no advantage, although perhaps if their grandchildren join it might all be okay. I am sure that the industry will work out how to devise schemes in a way that will get people involved.

Let me turn to greater flexibility in the pension world. I can see that if we say that we do not think people are sufficiently engaged with pensions to join a scheme we must ask how we can be confident that they are sufficiently engaged to make even more difficult choices when they retire about what they want to do. There is a big difference. I might not be too bothered about pensions when I am 30, as I might have more pressing things to think about such as buying a house, paying for my children or sorting out other stuff, but perhaps when I am closer to retirement age and thinking about what my income will be in six months’ time, a year’s time or perhaps even a little further away, I will probably be much more engaged in the best choices for me and will perhaps be more inclined to go out and look at the various options.

One issue that we have had until this point has been that the option has been to have some kind of annuity that is lower than I would like. If I try to shop around, I find differing levels of things I do not like. That is not a great motivation to go shopping. If I know that I am not going to want to buy any of the things I am offered but I have to, I might as well just default to the first thing I get. There does not seem to be any advantage to shopping around.

[Dame Anne Begg]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that often when there is too much choice people are paralysed and end up grabbing at the first thing that comes along rather than the thing which is best?

[Nigel Mills]

Yes. Some data suggest that the optimum number of choices is four. If there are 20 choices in a mobile phone shop, people walk out without buying one. If there are not enough, they do not ever have a phone. We need enough choice to see a difference, but not so much that we are completely baffled by our options.

I think that we are hoping that the market will innovate certain things that will mean it will not be a choice of annuity into which we will opt for life that will give the same amount for the rest of our lives or some kind of draw-down in which we keep spending our pots and hoping that they will last. I suspect that we will end up with people taking some kind of fixed guaranteed income, so that no matter how long they live they will have the quality of life that they want, but they might be able to choose to use some of the rest of their money to fund travelling in early retirement, paying off the mortgage or doing something for their children or grandchildren. Perhaps we could have an annuity that varies, which is higher at the start, dips and then goes up at the end when people need care fees.

I think that we are hoping that most people with a small or medium pension pot will not be faced with a blizzard of hugely complicated financial products, but that there will be options that they can match to their personal choice for their retirement. That is where high-level guidance is important.

People need to understand that there are different things out there for them to look at. I suggest that they do not just immediately accept the annuity offer that their pension provider makes. They should at least think about what would suit their lifestyle, what their existing financial position is and what they and their spouse want to do. That is where guidance is very important. It is very different from financial advice, which might be, “Take out this annuity with this provider, on these terms.” I suspect there is no way to get such specific guidance, and we should never want such specific guidance. That would be a horribly expensive programme, which would only be appropriate for a relatively small band of people.

Those who retire with huge pension pots should already be taking such advice and can afford to pay for it. Those with small and medium pots will not have that advice and, I suspect, in many cases will not need to spend thousands of pounds getting advice; it would not be a worthwhile use of their money. It is people in the band in the middle who perhaps could really benefit from expensive financial advice. How we get that guidance to work, and when people receive that guidance, is very important.

I think that we shall see a move away from retirement at one’s 66th birthday, or another fixed date. People may gradually step down to working four, then three days a week. They will have small amounts of income coming in from different sources. Lifestyles will vary, and they will start varying, perhaps, in people’s mid-50s. Some people will work full time right into their 70s. Possibly, they will not want advice at the age of 65 and a half or 66; they will need to think, “Do I want my pension fund to start de-risking my investments now, at age 55, or would I rather they did that for part of my pension fund, so that I know that I will get something when I am 66 but I will keep some higher-risk investments to get a higher yield for a few more years?” When we make that guidance available, and when people can choose to receive it, will be a key aspect; otherwise, people will end up in a default fund that does not suit what they plan to do with their own hard-saved income.

It is clear that the change is a very positive step in the right direction. If people are responsible enough to save for their retirement, I cannot see them frittering the money away on the proverbial Lamborghini when they hit 66. This flexibility will give people the chance to have the retirement that they want without being ripped off by the annuity market.

Some of us had wrestled with the question of how we could fix the broken annuity market. I had come up with the suggestion of splitting the pension fund industry and the annuity market, which did not meet with much approval in the industry. But what the Government have done is far more radical. An annuity may be the right thing for many, many people; but for many, it will not. Now there will be no compulsion or expectation for people to take out an annuity when they hit retirement age. That has to be the right answer, and I fully welcome the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hoban]

I am not sure that tulips and the Netherlands are necessarily an appropriate model. One of the earliest financial crashes was in the price of tulip bulbs, so it may not be a model to follow. However, the point about sectoral and non-sectoral schemes is important. Other countries have had success where they have had a social model—a relationship between employers and employees—that we do not necessarily see in the UK. There will be questions about how to encourage more employers to come together to create these schemes. Perhaps there is a role for insurers in that regard.

Although these schemes aim to boost returns and offset some of the impact of under-saving, we need to do more to help people save more towards retirement. Auto-enrolment will help to ensure that more people are saving, but as I pointed out earlier, the DWP’s figures estimated that some 11 million people would not save enough to meet the recommended replacement income for retirement. If we look at contribution rates to pension schemes in other countries, we will see that the 8% auto-enrolment rate lags behind the rate in other countries that have established innovative pension schemes. In Australia, the contribution rate to the Super scheme is heading towards 12%, and in the Netherlands—the Minister mentioned the Netherlands, so I feel at liberty to talk about it—the contribution rate to the scheme is over 20%, which is significantly higher. We have some way to go before we match those contribution levels.

I think it would be wrong to contemplate increasing contribution rates before the roll-out of auto-enrolment has been completed, but we should not ignore the fact that people are not saving enough towards their retirement and we need to find ways to help people to build higher contributions. There are ways in which we can do that. We have not done enough to draw on the insights from behavioural economics and initiatives such as Save More Tomorrow, which has been adopted in some parts of the United States, which encourage people to increase their contribution rates when their pay rises, making a commitment today to secure increased contributions in the future. I think we can look at the way in which fiscal incentives encourage those on low incomes to save more towards their retirement, and I certainly think we can support people to make better choices on retirement. That is a significant area that we need to focus on, and it is the last point I want to touch on in my speech.

As I said at the start, we have introduced a series of radical reforms to the pensions system over the past four and a half years. However, to make the most of the freedoms that we need, we must make sure people have the necessary support to make the right choices both when they are building up their pension pot and when they choose to use it. That is why I am very supportive of the guidance guarantee. I know the Government are going to introduce amendments to this Bill, either in Committee or on Report, to introduce the guidance guarantee, and it is an important part of the package of legislation, but we must also think about how we can encourage the industry to go further to provide better guidance both before the point of retirement and afterwards. The decisions we make at the point of retirement are ones we would want to come to as individuals to revisit later on.

We need to find a service that will help those who feel they cannot afford independent financial advice without crowding out independent financial advisers, and we need to give people support to think about draw-down, annuities and the other products that are out there, to help them maximise their income over their retirement, and also to think, while they are saving, about what sort of lifestyle they want in retirement. Too often, people do not think about what they aspire to in retirement. They tend to shape their retirement around how much they have saved, rather than thinking before they retire, “This is what I would like to do. These are the holidays I’d like to have. This is the sort of lifestyle I’d like.” We need to give people more support in that regard.

I also believe we should be harnessing technology to draw together details of people’s savings—not just their pensions, but their individual savings accounts and bank savings—to end the complicating fragmentation of data. That should encourage people to look at the totality of their financial assets and use that information to engage with their retirement planning.

[Nigel Mills]

The one asset my hon. Friend did not mention is the house a person owns, which I suspect people will, as years go on, increasingly have to consider using for their own retirement, rather than passing that on to their children, as perhaps we all hope to do at the moment.

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes an important point and he is right to pick up on that omission. When we think about retirement, we should be thinking not just about pensions, but about a person’s income in retirement. Some of that will take the form of state pension; some will be interest on savings accounts; and some may come through work—depending on what age we retire at, and how we phase in our retirement. Certainly housing is a valuable asset, too, and very good work is being done by a number of organisations to look at how housing can be used, but we are still some way off having something that people will recognise as a good way to use their housing assets. As I say that, I feel a letter coming on from my former colleague Nigel Lawson on this point, but there is more work to be done in respect of how people view housing as an asset and how they can utilise that asset in retirement to supplement their income. We need to build out from the guidance guarantee, and more work will need to be done on that in the coming months.

I want to mention a point that has been raised with me and that I will probably talk about in more detail when the complementary tax Bill to this comes through later in the year: we must think about what sort of outcomes we expect people to see in retirement. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Pensions referred to a decade of innovation, but he will recollect that when we introduced reforms to liberalise the open market option, and to make that more of the default, there were some unforeseen challenges from that, and we have seen some of the consequences and the report published by the Financial Services Consumer Panel. I do think there is a responsibility on industry, the Government and the regulator to do some thinking about what good looks like under the new reforms and how we can help shape that post-retirement market. That would form an important part of the work.

I commend the Government on this comprehensive package of pension reforms. They will form a key part of our legacy, and they are an important way of expressing what we have achieved as a Government in setting down long-term foundations to help people to take more responsibility for their savings in retirement, to help them to save more in their retirement and to give them the freedom and choice that they need in their retirement. The Bill is part of that package, and I look forward to seeing how the schemes develop to help to provide people with more certainty in regard to their future pension incomes, when all they have seen up to now is increased uncertainty.

Oral Answers to Questions

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Monday 1st September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

First, I agree that the wait is too long. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has made it clear that no one should be waiting longer than 26 weeks by the autumn, and 16 weeks by the end of the year, and we will make sure that that happens. As regards hardship, PIP is not an income-replacement benefit for those out of work. It is paid in work and out of work. There are other benefits available such as employment and support allowance, which can help those people who have lost their jobs through no fault of their own.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

What scope is there for increasing the number of people who can get PIP without having to go through the medical assessment? If written evidence is clear that they are entitled to it, why waste everyone’s time by going through an assessment?

Jobcentre Plus

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Thursday 10th July 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dame Anne Begg]

We have been consistent in requesting that the Department introduce a classification tool, so the Select Committee has certainly been convinced of the efficacy of such a tool, and 70% seems not too bad. I think the figure ranged between 50% and 70%, but that is better than nothing. At the moment, it can be a bit hit and miss whether someone is even identified as homeless. Their personal adviser has to recognise that the address they have given indicates that they may be homeless. As well, people with mental health problems will not necessarily reveal all in a short, cursory interview with a complete stranger, but that kind of information would be and is useful to anybody trying to get an individual into work or back into the workplace.

Our report recognised that JCP is good at what it is currently being asked to do: it has become adept at getting people off benefit in as short a time as possible. Since April 2011, JCP’s primary performance measure has been what is called “benefit off-flow”. The old mantra “What gets measured gets done” certainly comes to mind. About 75% of jobseeker’s allowance claimants come off benefit within six months, and some 90% are off benefit within a year. But—and this is a big “but”—is getting someone off benefit quickly always good enough? Is off benefit always a good and sustainable outcome?

Our answer to those questions was a clear no. The evidence suggests that measuring JCP performance primarily by benefit off-flow is unsophisticated. Jobcentre staff are likely to say to themselves, “Let’s concentrate our efforts on people who are most likely to come off benefits quickly—we need to meet our 13-week target—and let’s keep a very close eye on anyone coming up to 26, 39 or 52 weeks on benefit too.” Who can blame them for that? That is how their efficiency and effectiveness is measured, and that is the task that they have been set by Ministers, but JCP needs to be incentivised to take a more sophisticated approach.

Our second key recommendation was that JCP’s performance measures be amended to ensure that Jobcentre staff are more clearly incentivised to get people not just off benefit but into sustainable and long-term employment.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

Does the hon. Lady agree that that would also tie in with the way we assess the Work programme providers and make much more sense in the world of universal credit, assuming that it is fully rolled out? Under universal credit, people will not be coming off benefit. Their level of benefit will perhaps decline based on how much work they are doing, but their level of work could fluctuate from week to week or month to month, so the measurement would be largely meaningless.

[Dame Anne Begg]

Indeed; that was one of the things we pointed out in our report. We drew particular attention to it in our more recent report on the implementation of universal credit, which was debated in the Chamber on Monday—that is two reports in a week, showing that we are a really busy Committee. Although we might be sceptical of how far universal credit is being rolled out, there is no doubt that, as my friend the hon. Gentleman pointed out—he is my friend because he is on the Select Committee—its introduction provides an opportunity for the Government to think differently about how to measure the real success of Jobcentre Plus.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate and to follow the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams). Members of the Work and Pensions Committee have been debating different aspects of the Committee’s work in various rooms this week, and it is a pleasure to do so again.

Trying to think back six months to when the report was published was quite challenging, and it was interesting to see what has changed since. There have certainly been various improvements to various things. I was keen that the Committee held this inquiry because, with all the changes to the welfare system, actually trying to work out where best Jobcentre Plus fits and where it can contribute the most was not straightforward. At one extreme, one could say that if the Work programme is the way to go, why do we wait for people, with all their different skills, incentives and expertise, to spend a whole year unemployed before passing them on? Perhaps we should completely divorce the welfare enforcement and welfare support roles. We could use providers to do support and Jobcentre Plus could concentrate on enforcement. It was clear from the evidence received by the inquiry—I asked that question of nearly every witness—that there was no motivation for that at all. It would have been costly and would have undermined the great work that jobcentres do in all our constituencies by providing the right amount of support at the right stages for each individual claimant. The Committee completely rejected the idea of such a divorce and we can see that jobcentres have an important role to play in the future of tackling unemployment.

We are left with what the hon. Member for Aberdeen South (Dame Anne Begg), the Committee’s Chairman, referred to as the holy grail challenge. Everyone recognises that we need to provide the right kind of support at the right time. In an ideal world, that support would be more individual and focused for some and much more light touch for others. A lot of people who fall out of work might find more pretty quickly by their own endeavours, so they do not need much money spent on them. The holy grail is how to work out early in the process which people need more intensive support and which ones can be left pretty much to their own devices.

If we could find an assessment tool to do that, it would tackle the awful situation of people who have fallen out of a job but who will struggle to find another one, even though they might have had a long and successful work history—perhaps after they have been in the job for a while, their industry has left the area completely, or their skills have become completely out of date—because nothing they have been doing before is still there for them. It is a horrible situation of someone falling through the holes, because we do not realise how much support they need to reskill until they have been jobseeking hard for six months, and they will have become demoralised by failing, and so are getting further from the labour market as the weeks go by. There is a danger of that awful progress—the longer it takes someone to find a job, the harder it gets.

I agree entirely with having a tool to identify who needs intensive support right at the start, so that we can get them the retraining, the new skills or whatever early in the process, rather than leaving it for six months, until the Work programme or, heaven forbid, even until after the Work programme has failed them as well. That has to be the right answer; a key to enable the Department to focus its resources on those who need them, rather than risking simply helping those who might not need them.

In another situation, Government policy is to ask jobcentres to do a whole new area of work, in-work conditionality. If the journey of claimants with the jobcentre does not end when they find their job—once they have found a job, we want to help, support and encourage them, and perhaps even stronger than that, to increase their hours or their wage rate to get their level of benefit claim down even further—how we find the resources and mechanisms to support people on that continued journey will be a real demand on a jobcentre. It will require a different set of skills and approaches of jobcentre staff. Helping someone who does not have a job to find one in the first place, with job searches and so on, is different from helping them to increase their skills while in work or to look for extra hours or ways of getting more skills to get promoted.

How we resource and skill that policy is important if we are to make in-work conditionality work. Otherwise, I suspect, it can only be a phone call every few months to say, “What are you doing to find extra hours?”, “What are you doing to look for a better job somewhere else?”, or “Do you realise you can’t just stay where you are, doing exactly what you are doing?”, and I am not sure that that is a helpful process to get into. Exactly how we mesh that with universal credit and changes to how advisers approach such situations leaves us looking for a relatively fundamental change in work processes. Almost certainly, that means that the existing target—how many people can you get off benefits?—will no longer be a meaningful target.

If one of the advantages of universal credit is that people can be in work for a few weeks and drop out again, but their benefits will go back up automatically, or they find more work or perhaps their hours fluctuate, the target to get people off benefits will not apply, because they will not ever be off benefits under the new definition. Currently, people move off out-of-work benefits, on to tax credits and, heaven forbid, back again. Now, however, as a way of measuring what we are trying to achieve, we will need to find a more sophisticated target, one which looks at sustained employment or at how we follow people into and through their jobs. We heard evidence to say that that was a hard thing for jobcentres to do—finding out who people were employed by, phoning up the former claimants or their employer—when neither had any great need to engage. If people have found a job and stopped claiming, phoning the jobcentre a few weeks later is not on their agenda.

[Dame Anne Begg]

The hon. Gentleman suggests that people, once they have gone off benefit, are not interested in engaging at all. One of the excuses that the DWP gave us for not doing any measure other than the benefit calculation was that people did not want to be bothered, or that employers were not interested in letting the jobcentre know that the person was still in a job.

[Nigel Mills]

That is exactly the problem—how we motivate engagement on both sides, which we will need with universal credit and any in-work conditionality. We have to find a way of gathering reliable data. It is similar to a high-level instinct, or perhaps real-time information will provide something. Perhaps the RTI feed will show that the person is still in employment or even at the same employer—if we wanted to track the data that far back—but that looks to be a pretty clunky and limited way of checking things. Unless there are flags that show when employment has stopped, flagging it back to the jobcentre, we would not know that people had ceased to be in sustained employment, perhaps meeting the 12 or 26-week target, or whatever was set in that situation. I am not sure that there is an easy solution to anything, but for us to find a set of targets and work routes that work in such a situation will be important to how the jobcentre role develops.

The next area that I want to touch on is one that was topical last summer, when we started the inquiry: what happens to people when their two years on the Work programme finishes and they become the jobcentre’s responsibility again. This time last year, I remember speaking to the staff at my local jobcentre and they were not entirely sure what they were going to be doing with people in that situation when the first Work programme cohorts finished. Jobcentres have an important role to play, because we are talking about people who have not got a job in their first year of unemployment and who then got through the Work programme for two years and have not found sustained work. We could expect them to need some intensive support, but it is a little hard to see that jobcentres would be geared up for that, having not been doing it for people in that key two-year period previously. So what would we do with them?

Last week, I was pleased to meet a new subcontractor, Acorn, which is in Derbyshire dealing with what I think are now called community work placements, a new set of rolled-out private sector providers offering a different type of Work programme service that is not the Work programme and does something subtly different. I confess that the procurement of the service and how we chose the providers has passed me by, but in the east midlands, for example, we have G4S. Luckily for the east midlands in some ways, it is not one of the Work programme providers, because we have a completely separate, third firm in Derbyshire to do things. We have, however, found a sensible programme of community placements that are not meant to be free labour for unscrupulous private sector operators, but are meant to be getting people who have gone through three years of support finding something that at least gets them used to working normal working hours and some skills on their CV, making them more employable.

[Sheila Gilmore]

Obviously, it is early days to know how the post-Work programme arrangements are working, but a complaint of many of my constituents about the Work programme was that it was not particularly intensive. If anything, it was very light touch—“Come in every seven or eight weeks”, and sometimes the only contact was by phone. It seemed to concentrate everything on CV writing and applying for jobs. If the more intensive approach is important, should it not be starting much earlier than three years into unemployment?

[Nigel Mills]

I agree. I was trying to explore with G4S when I had that meeting with it and Acorn exactly what the financial remuneration was for successful outcomes under the community work placement, and how that compared with the rewards under the Work programme for some of the harder-to-deal-with people who are further from the labour market. I was trying to work out whether we could expect Work programme providers to do such work placements if they had someone whom they were struggling with on the Work programme. Is there a need to tweak the contracts or to change the incentives slightly? We could try to get such support provided during the two years, not after the two years. For some reason, they were not totally inclined to give me a clear answer on those numbers. Perhaps it was the wrong time to ask them.

It is always about the sequencing of things—how do we step up the intensity of support at the right time? I am sure that we want a system in which if somebody really needs the most intensive support, they get it early in the process, rather than one in which we see how long we can demoralise them before we give them what they probably needed in the first place.

It is intriguing. When looking at the role of the jobcentre we thought, perhaps slightly competitively, that we had a real chance to prove that where a Work programme provider has failed, the jobcentre can help people and sort the situation out. But we have ended up with another outsourced programme. Does that suggest that in many ways we do not feel that the jobcentre’s role is to provide any intensive support to people—that its role is enforcement plus some coaching in the early days and some relatively light-touch support? I am not saying that that is my view, but it appears now that for every situation we come across we find a different outsourced programme.

Finally I want to touch on Universal Jobmatch and the role of IT. I see Universal Jobmatch as a great success. I played with the old job search system in jobcentres and looking at the new one it is clearly much easier to use—for example, people can work it at home—and looks like the right direction of travel. I share the hope that Monster has managed to fix the problem of the artificial, unethical or non-existent job placements that had been going on to Jobmatch, to try to make it as effective a system as possible. I suspect that there is no way that these things can be perfect, and that people will always be able to get through any filters to put rogue jobs on, so it is a matter of how effectively we can monitor the service and get those taken off once they are found. But clearly the problem should not have been on the scale that it got to.

As for IT, having enough computers in jobcentres—and enough staff to support people using them—is quite important, especially when we are requiring IT job searches and will sanction people who do not do them. The library in Heanor, a town in my seat, had to close for reasons of maintenance—or the lack of it—and we lost the IT provision in the town centre. It then became quite hard for claimants who did not have IT access at home and had lost their library. Trying to convince the jobcentre that it needed to find at least some temporary solution to get IT provision back into the town and to support people while the library was finding an alternative site was not as easy as I might have liked it to be.

I suspect the vision for modern jobcentres is for them to have lots of computer terminals so that IT job searches are perfectly possible. I know that one of the jobcentres in my seat was down for an early upgrade to get extra IT, but we need to make sure that every jobcentre has IT provision. If we are expecting people to use the service themselves and will sanction them if they do not, we have to make IT facilities available to them.

We can do more with the Universal Jobmatch system, as the Chair of the Select Committee remarked earlier. We ought to be looking to see whether we can make all the data on it flow two ways. Surely it can be a great tool. If someone has put their CV on it and has applied for 100 jobs but has never, ever been put forward into the best 50 applicants—or whatever number get prioritised—for the employer to see, that must surely say to somebody that that person’s CV is not good enough and they either need to produce a better one, or they need to have some training urgently to get more skills to put on it, or they are applying for completely the wrong jobs.

There ought to be a way of using the system to spot that some individual jobseekers need that kind of support—a better CV or some more skills—or perhaps even to spot that, say, there have been no jobs within a 20-mile radius that match the skills on a person’s CV in the last year, so there is no point in them keeping on applying for things that they are not going to get. That could then create a flag back to their jobcentre adviser, to say, “Something needs to happen with this person.” If we can find innovative ways of using the system to provide extra support—rather than just forcing people to go on it and mandating them to do so many job applications, some of which they are not too enthused about anyway—we might get a far better result for the investment we have made than if it is used purely as a job search tool.

Overall, the conclusion of the report is clearly that jobcentres do great work and have an important role. To share my own experience, when I have held jobs fairs in my seat the two jobcentres have been extremely helpful in getting employers and jobseekers there. They are working practically to try to tackle the problem, which is a pleasure to see in my seat.

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[Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

Like everyone who has spoken in the debate, Mr Amess, I want to say what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship. I thank the Select Committee, and welcome the work that it has done on such an important topic.

It is disappointing, however, that the Government’s response to a very good report has been so negative. Of 24 recommendations only five were agreed to; five were rejected outright and the remaining 14 were partly agreed, although in quite a number of cases it struck me that the amount of agreement was very partial indeed. The Committee is right to affirm the value of a public employment service for unemployed people. Jobcentre Plus has been admired around the world, and we have been reminded, rightly, of the recent conclusion by the National Audit Office that it continues to do an efficient job. I very much concur with that judgment.

Jobcentre Plus does an efficient job. It also does a very important job. My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore) is absolutely right to draw attention to the links between having employment and having good health. I noticed that the Prince’s Trust recently undertook research on that issue. Martina Milburn, its long-serving chief executive, makes this point:

“Unemployment is proven to cause devastating, long-lasting mental health problems among young people.”

Whether someone is in a job is a very important issue, so the task that Jobcentre Plus has is very important.

I visited Germany last year to look at the way in which youth unemployment was being tackled and visited an office in the town of Wolfsburg, Hanover, where the Volkswagen plant employs 60,000 people. I went into the office, which is jointly run by the local authority and the federal employment service, to talk about how it was supporting unemployed people, and one thing that struck me about it was that above the door it said “Jobcentre”. The people there had chosen to adopt the English term for that establishment, and the reason was that 10 years ago, when the Germans made the big reforms to their welfare system—the Hartz IV reforms—they took inspiration from what had happened in the UK. Jobcentre Plus was quite new at that time. They wanted a name that showed their ambition for a very effective, modern service, and they were inspired by the English system, so they have adopted the term “Jobcentre” for their establishments.

As we have heard, jobcentres in the UK are still doing an efficient job. Nevertheless, I am afraid that something has gone quite badly wrong in recent years. I do not think that anyone else in the world today would be inspired by what they hear is happening in our jobcentres, and the issue of sanctions, which has been highlighted in this report and debate, is a big part of the explanation for what has happened. I agree with the hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Anne Marie Morris) that it is clear that too often sanctioning goes wrong.

Of course, there are a lot of statistics about benefit sanctions. One that interested me was one that I got in a written answer on 25 March 2013 at column 986W of Hansard. I asked what the total amount withheld from jobseeker’s allowance payments as a result of benefit sanctions was, and the answer came back that the benefit withheld from fixed JSA sanctions was, in 2009-10, the year leading up to the general election, £11 million, in 2010-11 £43 million, in 2011-12 £45 million and in 2012-13, up to October 2012 only—in other words, just the first half of 2012-13—£60 million. That suggests that the amount being withheld in benefit sanctions had gone up tenfold up to October 2012, compared with the year leading up to the general election.

It is important to underline the truth that sanctions are an indispensable part of a benefits system designed to promote employment. No one should read into anything that I am saying—or, I think, what anyone else in the debate has said—that we should scrap sanctions, but there is a pertinent question, raised in this report, about whether something has gone quite badly wrong in the way in which they are being applied at the moment.

[Nigel Mills]

I apologise to the right hon. Gentleman, the hon. Member for Aberdeen South (Dame Anne Begg) and you, Mr Amess, because I need to leave for a constituency engagement shortly, but on the point that the right hon. Gentleman raises, will he therefore join me in regretting the fact that when the unions came to give evidence to us in this inquiry, they did not support sanctions having any part in the benefits system?

[Stephen Timms]

In the discussions that I have had with trade union members about this issue, the point has not been put to me that there should not be any sanctions. Sanctions have been part of the benefits system ever since the system was invented; there is nothing new about sanctions. I have not heard a case that sanctions should be entirely scrapped, but I do think that there is justified concern, partly expressed in this debate and certainly expressed by trade unions and others, including citizens advice bureaux and disability organisations, about the way in which the system is working at the moment.

We heard a good deal in the debate, and I was very interested to hear the contributions about what hon. Members have been told by whistleblowers because I have had a similar experience. One of my constituents, who works at a jobcentre, raised with me very similar concerns to the ones that we have heard about what is going on. I was very concerned by that. I forwarded her concerns to the Minister. The Minister responded, for which my constituent and I were grateful, and my constituent subsequently wrote to the Minister directly and copied me into what she said. I will quote from her letter, which said that

“staff at the Jobcentre are actively encouraged to impose benefit sanctions and are threatened with PIPs”—

I was not sure what they were, but I gather from my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) that they are performance improvement programmes—

“if they fail to get certain numbers of people off benefit per week…all too often it is the more vulnerable in society it is affecting, and probably not the customers who are too smart to be caught out by the sanctions. The large increase in people using the food banks is mainly due to the unfair benefit sanctions being imposed upon customers. I know the food bank in Hoxton has actually had to ask the JCP in Hackney to stop making so many referrals to them as they are unable to cope with the numbers”.

My constituent goes on to say that staff

“have never experienced working conditions like they have in the last few years…people who have worked so hard implementing the unpopular policies have been treated in an awful manner.”

My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East raised the concerns that people have repeatedly drawn attention to that staff in jobcentres are being given targets. There have been the odd, well documented examples of where that has been the case, although in those instances Ministers have stepped in to make it absolutely clear that there are no formal targets, but it is the case, as I understand it, that in regular staff appraisals—this was confirmed, I think, in a written parliamentary answer—the number of sanctions that an adviser has issued is one of the bits of data on the table for the appraisal. Staff understand that, understandably and probably rightly, as indicating that they are, in part, being evaluated by how many sanctions they have issued—not whether those sanctions were accurate or appropriate, but whether there are enough of them. I think that it is clear that a culture has been developed in which staff are under pressure to issue more sanctions. My constituent talked about the awful working conditions. Let us be frank: that is part of the background to the industrial action taking place today.

A good deal of the external interest in this report has focused on the question of sanctions. There is no doubt that the dramatic increase both in the number of sanctions and in the amount of money taken off people—the duration of sanctions, which my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth also talked about—has been a big factor in the growth of food banks. The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Dr Whiteford) is absolutely right to say that no one should hide their head in the sand about that. I had not quite twigged it, but my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth made this telling point. Will people who have been sanctioned for a period of months, a year or even three years carry on signing on every fortnight just so that they appear in the claimant count? Of course they will not, and undoubtedly the claimant count is being depressed as a result.

Of course, all these reports, from whistleblowers, charities and food banks, can be and sometimes are dismissed as anecdotal. However, the pretty distressing picture that staff whistleblowers are painting is consistent with what a lot of jobseekers say. A few weeks ago, I was invited by Tesco to visit a new store with its HR director. Through the impressive regeneration model that Tesco has developed in partnership with the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, the company had been very careful to recruit and train a large number of staff at the new store who had previously been unemployed. Tesco put them through an eight-week training course before the store opened. I was introduced to four of the staff who had been recruited in that way, and we talked about their experience. I asked them about their experience with Jobcentre Plus, and all four said that the main aim of the jobcentre had seemingly been not to help them but to catch them out and sanction their benefits. I think it is a real tragedy how badly the reputation of Jobcentre Plus has been damaged by the aggressive approach to sanctioning that has been introduced. It will take a lot to repair that damage.

In its briefing for the debate, Crisis told us about somebody called Billy

“who was sanctioned for turning up to a meeting that turned out to be cancelled and then failing to attend another appointment he knew nothing about because the letter arrived six days after the date of the interview”.

We have heard several such stories during the debate. I draw attention to the website “A Selection of Especially Stupid Benefit Sanctions”, which has pages of this stuff:

“You get a job interview. It’s at the same time as your job centre appointment, so you reschedule the job centre. You attend your rearranged appointment and then get a letter saying your benefits will be stopped because going to a job interview isn’t a good enough reason to miss an appointment.”

That one came from the Daily Mail.

“Your gran dies during the night. The next morning your partner calls the job centre and asks if you can come in the following day instead. The centre agrees, and you sign in the next day. Then you get a letter stating that you failed to sign in and would be sanctioned if you don’t reply within seven days. You reply, explaining the situation. The job centre gives you a six-week sanction for not replying.”

That one came from NetMums.

“You get a job that starts in two weeks time. You don’t look for work while you are waiting for the job to start. You’re sanctioned.”

That was from The Guardian.

“You apply for three jobs one week and three jobs the following Sunday and Monday. Because the job centre week starts on a Tuesday it treats this as applying for six jobs in one week and none the following week. You are sanctioned for 13 weeks for failing to apply for three jobs each week.”

That was from the Pontefract and Castleford Express.

“You have a job interview which overruns so you arrive at your job centre appointment 9 minutes late. You get sanctioned for a month.”

That one was from Consumer Action. As I say, there are pages and pages more on the website. Of course, those are anecdotal, but the jobcentre network now has that reputation and it will take a great deal to repair the damage that has been done.

A number of references have been made during the debate to the report that the Government commissioned. It is rather rare for the Opposition to be able to force the Government to do anything, but we were able, because the Government needed legislation quite quickly, to force Ministers to set up the review on sanctions, which was carried out by Matthew Oakley. Like everyone else, I am eagerly awaiting the report, which we thought would be published by the end of May but which has still not been published. I asked the Minister about that in a written answer the other day, and characteristically—of Ministers in the previous Government as well as in this one—the reply came back that it would be published “in due course.” Can the Minister give us any more detail? If she can, it would be welcome.

As we have heard, the Minister appeared to agree in her evidence to the Work and Pensions Committee that there should be a further review to consider not only Work programme or employment programme sanctions, but sanctions more generally. It was a disappointment to everybody that that commitment was not reflected in the Government response to the report, and I hope that the Minister might reaffirm the view that she expressed to the Committee.

It is particularly disappointing, although not surprising, that the Government have rejected recommendation 17 on page 47 of the report about recording the number of people who are signposted to food banks. There is no doubt that the increase in sanctions has played a big part in the remarkable growth of food banks over the past few years. The Committee recommended, as we have heard, that the Department should

“take urgent steps to monitor the extent of financial hardship caused by benefit sanctions, including by collecting, collating and publishing data on the number of claimants ‘signposted’ to food aid by Jobcentres and the reasons for claimants’ need for assistance in these cases.”

The way in which the Government have dealt with the Trussell Trust has been pretty disgraceful. When the Secretary of State was appointed, he rightly took a good deal of pride in announcing that he was lifting a ban on jobcentres referring people to food banks if they were in hardship and did not have enough money to buy food. I was the Minister for employment for a while, and I did not know that there was a ban on referring people to food banks, but apparently there was. The Secretary of State rightly said that that was wrong, and lifted the ban. The problem was that food banks started counting the number of people who were being referred from jobcentres and the reasons why they were being referred, which became far too embarrassing, so the Secretary of State reintroduced the ban on jobcentres referring people to food banks, although he said that it was all right to “signpost” people. I believe that the difference between signposting and referring is that when someone is signposted by a jobcentre to a food bank, they are not allowed to fill in the piece of paper issued by the food bank that states why they are being referred. The former approach enabled the Trussell Trust to collect data on how many people were being referred to food banks because they had been the victim of sanctions, benefit delays or other problems at the jobcentre, and the whole thing became too embarrassing for the Secretary of State so he said that he did not want it to continue.

It is a great shame that the Secretary of State has refused to meet the Trussell Trust and talk about the matter, because it has a number of sensible ideas about how the system could be made to work better, which would not cost the Government anything. The Secretary of State has accused the trust of having a political agenda simply, as far as I can tell, on the basis that it insists on publishing numbers about how many people go to food banks. That is a completely innocuous and public-spirited thing to do, but because the trust refuses to stop publishing that information, the Secretary of State accuses it of having a political agenda and being opposed to welfare reform.

Given that the Secretary of State has not been willing to meet the Trussell Trust, a couple of months ago I asked the Prime Minister if he would be willing to do so. He said that he would, and I am pleased to say that that meeting has taken place and the discussion was constructive and useful. Why on earth the Secretary of State is not willing to meet the trust for a similar discussion is a mystery to me, and I still hope that he might change his mind. I share the despair expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Airdrie and Shotts (Pamela Nash) about the extent of the reliance on food banks nowadays. The Trussell Trust makes it absolutely clear that it expects the need for food banks to continue. The scale of the dependence—a million people over the past 12 months—and the rate at which it is growing are causing the trust great concern and prompting questions about whether it can cope with the demand.

I want to mention two other points that my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South (Dame Anne Begg) has highlighted as the main recommendations in the report. Recommendation 21 on page 48 argues for

“the formulation of JCP performance indicators which promote and measure sustained job outcomes and better reflect the changing role of JCP consequent on the implementation of universal credit”.

The Committee makes the point—it is often suggested, and I think it is right—that the current measure incentivises behaviour that nobody wants. For example, if somebody goes in and out of claiming benefit—they do a couple of weeks’ work, then go back on benefit because the job fails, then do a couple of weeks’ work somewhere else, then go back on benefit—it makes a big positive contribution to benefit off-flow, because that person is coming off benefit a lot and the fact that they go back on benefit straight away is not picked up in the statistics. Of course nobody would regard that as a success in any meaningful sense of the word. It is certainly not what Ministers want to happen in jobcentres.

The Government’s response to that recommendation says:

“The current JCP performance metrics, focussing on off-flows, make best use of the data currently available to the Department, but do not track people once they leave benefit, as this is not cost-effective.”

That is the bit that I want to query. I do not understand why the Government are suggesting that it is not cost-effective to track what happens to people after they go off benefit, because the Government require Work programme providers to do exactly that. Work programme providers are remunerated entirely on the basis of whether somebody is in sustained work. Clearly, the Department has taken the view that it is cost-effective to require Work programme providers to find out that information, so why is it not cost-effective for Jobcentre Plus to do so? That seems to make no sense, and the Committee is right to highlight it in a recommendation. I hope that the change will be made before too long.

The other recommendation that I will mention was highlighted by the Chair of the Committee, and I agree with it. It is about segmentation. Recommendation 4 on page 44 of the report says that the DWP should

“continue to work to develop a ‘segmentation’ tool, to be conducted by Jobcentre advisers face-to-face with claimants, to allocate claimants to separate work streams according to their distance from the labour market and relative need for intensive employment support.”

I know that it is a long-held view among numerous people, including senior Jobcentre Plus staff, that segmentation is a rather illusory thing—my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South used the term “holy grail”—that everybody would like to be able to do: “We would like to be able to tell how much help a person will need to get back into work, but it is unachievable in practice.” However, like my hon. Friend, I am mystified as to why it can be done in Australia but not in the UK.

I know that that point has been made to Jobcentre Plus staff, who respond by saying that Australia and the UK are different, but they are not that different. I visited Australia last September to, among other things, see how the jobseeker classification instrument worked. Nobody is claiming that it is infallible. In Australia, if someone is placed in one stream and it subsequently turns out that they need a different level of support, they can change. It is not a completely inflexible, wooden instrument, and it is certainly helpful. It means that people are more likely to get the right amount of help than if there were no segmentation. Even the length of time that someone has been out of work, which is easy to establish, is a big indicator of how much help they will need.

Of course, we already have segmentation in the UK. In the Work programme, customers are placed in different payment groups, based not on the kind of segmentation for which the Committee rightly calls but on which benefit they receive—jobseeker’s allowance or employment and support allowance. That does not necessarily tell us anything about how much help someone needs to get back to work, and in practice, as I think is pretty widely recognised, it has proved hopeless.

That is one reason why people a long way from the labour market have been so badly let down by the Work programme, as the National Audit Office pointed out last week. Among claimants of employment and support allowance who spend two years on the Work programme, the latest data suggest that the rate of failure to achieve sustained job outcomes is 93%: only 7% of those attached to the Work programme achieve a sustained job outcome.

In an earlier intervention, I asked my hon. Friend about the Government’s statement, in their response to the report, that their efforts to develop a tool have produced only 70% success. Of course it would be great if we could do better than 70%, but given that it is possible for people to change their stream after they have been streamed initially and that 70% success is certainly better than streaming people simply on the basis of what benefit they have been on, it seems to me that it strengthens the case for the Committee’s argument that it would be a worthwhile thing to do.

It would be the intention of a Labour Government, should one be elected next spring, to implement a segmentation tool as the Select Committee recommends. We would like to see it in place, again as the Committee recommends, in time for the commissioning of the Work programme’s successor. It will be possible, in designing that tool, to draw on the fantastic data that providers have gathered during their experience of the Work programme. There are now numerous rich data sets giving useful evidence about how much help individuals in a variety of circumstances need in order to get into work.

I welcome the report. The Committee has done the House and the cause of employment support a great service by providing it to us. Along with everyone here, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

Universal Credit

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Wednesday 9th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Duncan Smith]

I respect the right hon. Lady enormously for the job she does, but I say to her clearly that it was on the recommendations of her Committee and the NAO that we instigated—by the way, I think this is the way ahead for all future programmes—a programme in which, at every stage and in every separate part of development, we would have approvals from the Treasury and with the Cabinet Office, which is what is going on at the moment. My point is that the answer that Mr Kerslake, the head of the civil service, gave was correct in the sense, as I have said today, that the overall strategic business case for the full lifetime of the programme is in discussion right now for that completion. However, all the elements that are relevant—the strategic business plan for this Parliament, which includes all the roll-out, all the investments, of which the right hon. Lady will be aware, and the roll-out through to the north-west—have been approved. There will be no further need for approvals this Parliament, so the reality is quite clear: universal credit is on track and is rolling against the plan we set out last year. All those approvals are agreed, and we hope that the final element, which would logically come at the end of the process, will be agreed shortly with the Chief Secretary.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

The Secretary of State has me convinced about the benefits of universal credit, but will he consider publishing the business case so that the House and the public outside can see the full benefits?

Universal Credit

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) in what seems to have become a very large meeting of the Select Committee. We will see whether that changes by the end of the debate. It is a pleasure to be in the Chamber talking about universal credit again. I forget how many times in the past year we have done so in the course of ministerial statements, urgent questions or other debates on the same topic. We may have spent more hours debating it than people have spent claiming it, but I hope that will not continue to be the case.

When my hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot (Anne Marie Morris) spoke, she confirmed that there is still general support for the principle of universal credit. I took issue with the Chair of the Select Committee in a debate last week when she rightly set out how hard welfare reform is, but we have to bite the bullet. We cannot keep tweaking and expanding over-complex systems. At some stage we need to start again with a new system that meets modern needs. We must accept that the existing architecture will not last much longer without falling over in an awful heap. We need to find a new welfare system that works for the people who claim from it, works for the taxpayer and achieves the outcomes that we want.

I hope the Government will press on with universal credit. I hope they can find a smoother path than there has been so far, but the direction of travel is right. I hope we can reach the end position more quickly than we fear. It is worth reiterating what we are trying to replace. The NAO report set out that we are trying to replace six different benefit systems that have about 13 million annual claims and pay out about £67 billion a year. Those are huge amounts of money and represent a huge complexity that we are trying to sort out.

For the investment of £2.4 billion—perhaps the Minister could clarify whether we are expecting a higher cost for universal credit than the original estimate—we are expecting £38 billion-worth of savings by 2023. The Government response quoted a £35 billion benefit; I assume that that is the net of those two numbers, and not that the estimated saving has drifted down a bit. Again, it would be helpful to understand what savings we think there will be over the period. I think there is to be an annual saving of £7 billion, so there is a huge prize for making the system work. It should be better for claimants, who will understand what they will get, and better for the people administering UC, who will understand what they should be giving out. I think that we have all been in that awful situation of hearing someone ask, “Am I better off in work or on benefits?” That is not a simple calculation. It is hugely complex to work out the answer, but we need to be able to answer that clearly.

I agree with what my hon. Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer) said when we went to see UC at work in the north-west. What sticks in my memory is the genuine enthusiasm on the part of everyone who was working with UC for the system, the ideas and the changes. However, I also remember the horribly clunky and complex IT systems that we saw, which did not seem able to talk to each other, and which required a lot of manual interventions to make the processes work. I am looking forward to going to Hammersmith in October to see the latest iteration of how UC works, and to see whether we have managed to get a much slicker and smoother system. I certainly hope that we have.

There have been two benefits from this change. We hear that the claimant commitment, which has been rolled out in my constituency, is bringing about real changes in behaviour. The contract part of that helps to make it clear to people what they are expected to do; that is working. The other area where we have seen real advantages is in the use of real-time information. Many of us, perhaps wrongly and cynically, feared that that would be the bit of the process that would fall over; we feared that Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs would struggle to make it work, and that trying to add it to its complex systems might be a bit too much. That has actually worked fine; the data seem to work, and there are even more enhancements that we can make to the use of that in the meantime, before we get to see the whole UC in action. So there have been some positive steps so far.

Only about 7,000 people are claiming UC. We have to be honest: that is a long way short of where the Government, the Committee, and indeed everyone, were hoping the UC would be. We have to accept that that is disappointing, but it is far better than rushing on with the system only to have it completely fall over, and creating a tax credits-type fiasco of the kind that we all remember from a decade or so ago. I do not remember the person who headed the Department responsible for tax credits, or the responsible Minister, having to resign. I do not remember the then Chancellor holding his hands up and saying, “I think I’ll resign in embarrassment at this farce.” It is a bit rich to call for the Secretary of State to resign when these implementation mistakes were not his fault; as I understand it, he spotted what was going wrong and sorted it out. There is no call for him to resign at all; that was a cheap and unnecessary shot.

I agree with the concerns expressed about the engagement with the Select Committee; that was a bit of a disappointment to us. Clearly, there had been a long period in which it was known that there were issues with UC. A lot of money had been wasted, and there had been lots of changes to the programme; the Committee was just not aware of that. I accept that the National Audit Office was involved, and that the Public Accounts Committee had various runs around this, but it would have felt a lot better for us, when we were trying to scrutinise the Department’s performance and finances, and the programme as a whole from a policy perspective, if we had had some kind of understanding that there were pretty major issues that would make the project look a lot different from how it was meant to look. That would have been a slightly more respectful way to treat the Committee. I do not expect daily updates on everything that is happening, but we are talking about something fundamental. That could have been handled a little better. Perhaps we would then have had a slightly less tense meeting with the Secretary of State earlier this year. I personally do not recall finding him offensive or unhelpful; the meeting was a little bad-tempered, but I suppose that when one is scrutinising someone, it can be a little difficult. I suspect that there was fault on all sides in that very long meeting.

I will come back to the Committee’s recommendation on how many IT systems we should be working on. My hon. Friend the Member for Warrington South (David Mowat) may have clarified something, but I am not sure that we can say that the new digital end-state solution is an enhancement of the current one. I think that we have always understood that a twin-track approach was being taken; we were working on two different systems at the same time, one of which would succeed the other. There are reports that the Cabinet Office recommended moving to the end-state solution earlier this year, rather than staying with the twin-track approach.

There is a fundamental question here: if we are working on two different systems, one of which will succeed the other, and there are only 7,000 or so people claiming on the first one, is it better to focus all resources on the final end-state system, and divert people, money and time to that, rather than trying to work on both at the same time, even if that means a slightly longer implementation period, and a slight further delay? Perhaps testing just one system may get us to the right position; I do not know. It may be that to make this work, we have to go through the first system before we can move on to the second. The answers that we have had on that are not clear. It looks to quite a lot of people as though there may be a more cost-effective way of achieving this, given the timetable that we are on.

I reiterate my view that this is a great reform; everyone should want to see it work. I ask the Government to press on and make it work.

DWP: Performance

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Monday 30th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

We are talking about chaos and waste in the welfare system, but I can think of no bigger risk than for a new country to try to produce a new welfare system at top speed. Who knows what damage will be done in that situation? I therefore cannot agree with the closing remarks of the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Dr Whiteford).

If we want to know what chaos in a welfare system looks like, we can look back four long years to 2010, when far too many people claimed too many different benefits for far too long, at too great a cost to the taxpayer. The incoming Government had to tackle that situation. I normally agree with the Work and Pensions Committee Chair, who is wise and learned on such issues, but I do not think she was right to imply that the solution to the risks and unknown problems of welfare reform—she was right about those—is to do nothing. We have been bolting on new and enhanced bits to the system for decades. She says, “Let’s leave it like that. If we bolt on a few more bits and make a few tweaks, we can sort it all out,” but at some point a Government had to bite the bullet and say, “We need a new system. We have to make it simpler and clearer for people to understand what they are claiming. We need to make it easier for people to know when they need to notify the Government of changes.” Fundamentally, the Government needed to make it easier to administer the system. We could not continue with people claiming six different benefits at the same time, not knowing what they were doing. That was not fair on them or on the system. That is what led to the huge amount of fraud and error that this Government and the previous one have been trying to tackle in different ways without getting the number down by very much. The only way out of the mess is a simpler benefits system that everyone can understand.

We must all accept that progress on universal credit has not happened at the speed that the Government planned and that we would all have liked, but what was the alternative? Was the alternative for the Government to press on and say, “It would be bad news to slow down. Let’s press on at full speed and hope we get it right”? That would have been a complete disaster and a terrible political decision to take. It would have risked people not getting the benefits to which they are entitled. In the early days, they might have got more than they were entitled to, before finding that they had to pay it back a few months later. That situation would have been unacceptable. We saw that with tax credits and were right to learn from the mistakes. The Government are right to say, “Look, we have problems with the system. Let’s slow it down and trial it properly. Let’s get it right before we put millions of people through it and risk making their lives even harder.” That was the right decision.

I note that the motion does not mention the positive things that the Department has done. It does not mention that unemployment is down—by 31% in my constituency in the last year. It does not mention the pension changes, which are huge steps in the right direction. Nor does it mention the child maintenance reforms. I shall not suggest that they will work perfectly first time—that would be a brave claim after the history of the last 20 years—but the system now looks fairer and tries to encourage the right behaviour, not the wrong behaviour.

The welfare reforms are very important and we need to get them right. We need people to have faith in the welfare system. What we hear on the doorstep is that people do not believe that the system is fair. They do not believe that the people who get benefits actually deserve them, but we all know that most people who get benefits are entitled to them, they claim the right amount and they try to work the system properly. The only way to change the public perception so that people see that the system is fair is to get it right, drive out the errors and complexity, and show that it is fair.

As part of that, assessments need to work. It is clear that the Atos contract was failing miserably. It was too tight a price and the company was forced to try to go for volume rather than quality. We need to go in the right direction on that. I also accept that the PIP assessments started out too slowly. The contractors were trying to get them right, but they were taking far longer than it was thought they would. What did we want the contractors to do—rush the assessments or have unqualified people perform them? That would not have been a sensible approach.

[Heather Wheeler (South Derbyshire) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the important thing about the PIP assessments is that they are done correctly? Interestingly, some people are getting a higher award because the assessments are being done properly now.

[Nigel Mills]

My hon. Friend is right. We both represent Derbyshire, a region that was in the initial phase of PIP, so we have seen how the system went wrong at the start. I would be the first to blame the contractor for some of the mistakes that were made, the speed at which the assessments were done, and how hard it was to get any information. That is now improving slowly, and I commend the Minister for making real changes that are helping. I sincerely hope that when we let the new work capability assessment contract, we learn from the problems of too little money, too much volume and too slow a pace. We need to get these contracts right because we need people to have faith that the assessments produce the right answer; otherwise, we will be in a right mess and have no one who can deliver these assessments in a way that is trusted. We need the next contractor to be supported to get this right. It needs to perform and we need to help it perform. We need to watch the next contract award carefully to make sure that it is got right. We all want a welfare system that is fair and seen to be fair, but if we cannot achieve that it will be a disaster for our society.

Oral Answers to Questions

Nigel Mills Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mike Penning]

The appeals process is a matter for my colleagues at the Ministry of Justice, and I intend to write to them today, but fewer people are going to appeal, particularly on PIP—it is much lower than predicted—and there has been more than an 80% reduction on work capability assessment. There is more to be done, but if the judges have less work to do on appeals, I will be very happy about that.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

I also welcome the improvement in the process. What lessons have the Government learned for rolling out other new assessment schemes, perhaps including a replacement for Atos in respect of WCA?

[Mike Penning]

One of the things we will look at very carefully is making sure that the contract bids are judged not just on the lowest price, but on whether the contractor can produce the capacity that is required. That is exactly what we are doing; when we release a new contract, we look at whether the contractor has the capacity and the skills to produce quality decisions.