(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAs always, my right hon. Friend makes a very good point. The Mental Capacity Act allows for advance directives on a whole variety of choices, including withdrawal of treatment, decisions on care or financial elements, and decisions on having treatment as opposed to not having treatment. It creates that ability and it is deemed robust enough for those purposes. It must therefore follow that it is robust enough for the purposes of the Bill.
I just want to probe the hon. Member on the capacity to make a future directive. Is he saying that, under the terms of the Bill as drafted and its reference to the Mental Capacity Act, it would be possible to say, “I may not be eligible now—I may not even be suffering from a terminal illness—but at some future point, because I have capacity today to make this decision, I should like to choose assisted dying”? Would that decision then be honoured at that future date, without any further intervention or assessment?
The hon. Member makes an interesting point, which I had already considered; in fact, I have tabled a new clause that would address it. It is not grouped with the amendments now before the Committee, but I will touch on it, if I may.
There is an argument that, if an individual with an advance directive has gone through the two-stage test in the Bill and then loses capacity, the advance directive should hold weight. My new clause 6 would deal with that point. Sections 27 to 29 of the Mental Capacity Act deal with exclusions from advance directives, including issues around voting rights, marriage rights and Mental Health Act implications. There may be a mechanism, for example, to exclude an advance directive that deals with assisted death, either through the Bill or through an amendment to the Mental Capacity Act. But I do not disagree with the hon. Lady; she raises an interesting point.
I am conscious that the hon. Member for Ipswich sought to intervene before me, but may I press the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley slightly on his point? When I asked Professor Sir Chris Whitty during oral evidence whether there could ever be a defined list of conditions that he would define as terminal, he was very clear that there could not be. Someone may suffer from a range of conditions. Most people who develop cancer survive, so cancer is a terminal illness, but not for everybody.
The question of what is and is not a terminal illness is quite contested; it is not clearcut. As the hon. Member for Bradford West says, it is quite possible that diabetes could be a terminal illness if someone refuses treatment for it. I am not entirely clear why the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley is saying that it is clear from the legislation what is and is not a terminal illness. As we heard in oral evidence, it is not clear.
Order. I remind Members that the Committee will discuss terminal illnesses, and extending the list relating to terminal illnesses, under a later clause. Let us remain in scope this morning and continue the debate on the amendments before the Committee.
I will keep my answer very brief by saying that I will return to hon. Lady’s point when we come to the clause on terminal illness, when perhaps I can elucidate, improve and work on my responses in a way that is conducive to understanding.