Courts and Tribunals Bill

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet). Although she is on the opposite side of the debate from me, she always speaks with huge passion on these issues. I should start with a couple of declarations. First, my wife is a sitting employment judge, and therefore the tribunal element of the Bill pertains to her. Secondly, like many right hon. and hon. Members in this Chamber, I was a barrister immediately prior to coming into this place, and I maintain my practising certificate. I hope the hon. Lady will indulge me if I pontificate on this issue for a few moments.

While I was not a criminal barrister, I did a significant amount of inquest work, so I had face-to-face, first-hand experience with jurors, and I can say without a shadow of a doubt that they are the most remarkable, ordinary people, who give up their time for civic engagement. They sit there quietly, listening to the evidence; they take their role seriously; and they sit in judgment and make findings of fact. That is a huge constitutional principle. We have talked about rights, and I am not going to pretend that there is an innate right to a trial by jury, but there is a firm constitutional principle of ensuring that justice is not merely done to the public, but that it is done with the public.

We all know about the problem of court backlogs. It would be a farce to pretend that this is not a significant and serious issue—it is a failure of the state that we have got to this place. It is a failure of successive Governments, and we recognise that across the board, but the question we have to ask ourselves is not whether trial by jury should be abandoned; it is whether the reforms that are before this House, with the scrutiny that has been undertaken and the impact assessment that accompanies the Bill, constitute sufficient evidence for making such a reform to this country’s constitution.

What the Bill asks for is very clear, and we have to be honest about it. We are asking for a shift in the balance between the state and its people, and that may lead to inequality before the law. Take the prime example raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox): that of two individuals who, on a factual matrix, committed precisely the same crime. Those individuals appear before the court, but one has a string of previous convictions. Are we really saying that a person should be denied the opportunity of a jury trial if they have not previously been of bad character? That is a nonsense, and it does not achieve what we should be seeking to achieve.

The further point, of course, is that if we are making such a constitutional change on the basis that it will enable us to deal with the backlog in the criminal courts, why is there no sunset clause in the Bill? Why are we not saying that the purpose of the Bill is to shift the dial and make progress, but that we recognise that it should not be a blank cheque for the state? We should recognise that if this change has to be made—although I do not believe it does—it should be made on a limited basis, because if we are to change a right that is older than most institutions in this country, the least Parliament should do is base its decision on more than just an assumption in the impact assessment.

Let me turn to the modelling, which was also raised by the shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy). In this House on 3 February, I asked the Lord Chancellor a question about the 20% reduction in the time taken by court hearings. He gave me a very clear answer—that he accepted Sir Brian Leveson’s findings, but that the Government would publish their own modelling alongside the Bill. However, page 10 of the impact assessment is very clear that the Government have adopted Sir Brian’s assumption. That is an assumption; it is not modelling. There is a distinct difference. Analysis is helpful, but modelling is critical, and if we are weighing up the evidence base for the Bill, we have to have more than analysis alone.

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

Can my hon. Friend give us his views as a practitioner on something that has not yet been mentioned in the debate, which is the usefulness of juries in protecting the institution of the judiciary? At the moment, if there is a string of sentencing that the Government or politicians do not like, there is not a lot they can do about it. If it is judges who are handing out those sentences, they will come under direct political attack, as we unfortunately see from time to time. The distance and insulation that a jury gives is not just a protection for the citizen, but a protection for the judiciary and its ongoing integrity.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My right hon. Friend is right. There is a reason that judges wear a wig and barristers wear a wig and gown. It provides a shield between the arm of the law and the citizen. To dilute that would fundamentally upset the settlement that has been reached over hundreds and hundreds of years.

[Alicia Kearns]

Drawing on my hon. Friend’s point, we have also heard much argument that somehow reducing down to one judge would be a fairer and less biased system. As a woman, I do not feel that one person—we have to be honest with ourselves, they will likely be a man—who does not share my life experiences is more likely to be less biased than a jury of my peers. If the Government really want to tackle this issue, they need simply to turn to page 67 of their own manifesto, where they promise fast-track rape cases with specialist courts for every Crown court location. Surely that would be a better policy. It would make sure that women, when they give evidence, are hearing from a jury of their peers, who are more likely together to understand life experiences than one individual.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My hon. Friend is right. First, there is the argument that this is of such constitutional significance that it should have been in a manifesto. Secondly, there is the argument that there was a proposal within the manifesto that the Government are not bringing forward. Thirdly, this is about getting the right settlement for the public, where they are judged by a body of their peers on the evidence before them. That is as opposed to a distant judge, who perhaps at times appears aloof, which fails to achieve that balance. We are being asked today to curtail a constitutional safeguard that has been apparent for so many years, and it goes much further than Sir Brian’s report. There were many good things in that report, but this legislation goes much further than any of his suggestions.

We have to ask what the real issues are. They are plain to see. There are too few judges and too few advocates able to prosecute or defend the cases. There are too few functioning courtrooms. Removing jury trials will not fix any of that. There is a further issue that the Government have failed to address, which is around the recruitment of magistrates. We know that in this country, recruitment cycles of magistrates have often not returned the numbers required. The presumption must be that the reason the Government did not adopt Sir Brian’s recommendation of having two magistrates as wing members was because they knew they could not recruit a sufficient number of magistrates to implement it. There is logic on that front, but if we are pushing more cases down to the magistrates court, who will be able to hear them and listen to them? Who will be able to draw those conclusions?

My final point, which I will make briefly, pertains to parliamentary scrutiny. The Bill will be rushed through this House and through Committee. It will get a mere five days in Committee, but it is of such constitutional importance. There is strong feeling across the House both for and against these proposals. Would it not be wiser in such circumstances to adopt an approach similar to what we do for armed forces Bills, for example, where we have a Select Committee of the House? Members with experience within the law and with experience of being victims could scrutinise the legislation and come back with a report. We could then do Report stage on the Floor of the House. That way, the country can know that we have given this legislation the due regard that it deserves.

There is a reason that jury trials have endured, and it is because they command the trust of the public. They ensure that the law is exercised with public participation. If the Government believe in diluting that right, they must provide the evidence for that change, and thus far they have failed to do so.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Jess Phillips]

There are so many things in the Bill that I could talk about, but I shall start where my friend, the right hon. Member for the royal town of Sutton Coldfield (Sir Andrew Mitchell), left off; I am from the royal town of Birmingham Yardley. I want to get Members to understand what we are seeking to change and clarify in law. When we are in this Chamber, we do not get sued for the things we say. I can be held accountable for anything I say—I would not say it on X, because I would not go on it—until I walk into this building. Civil action could be taken against me for work that I did leading up to that point. Let me set out what the judgment that the right hon. Gentleman talked about means. In cases in which the police or the Crown Prosecution Service make mistakes, they should of course have immunity covering all the time that leads up to them entering court, as any witness does; but that that immunity cannot cover them against civil action relating to anything that happened in the case. If I had a pound for every time I have seen terrible mistakes made by police officers or the CPS, I could get rid of your backlog—not your backlog, Madam Deputy Speaker, but the nation’s.

I want to be clear about how dangerous the overreach is that results from the Court’s decision to allow that immunity, and will refer to some cases that caused Front Benchers to change the law. These were legal cases taken by victims of rape, domestic abuse and other forms of sexual violence that have changed the law of our land. They were based on civil actions taken by those victims against the police and the CPS, including by Jade Blue, the survivor of rape who waived her anonymity and brought a claim against the CPS after it made an erroneous decision to discontinue the proceedings against her abuser. As a consequence of Jade’s civil action and campaign, and her successful claim against the CPS, the Government rolled out the early victims’ right to review scheme. That was done on the basis of civil action taken by a rape victim, but this could be threatened by this new overreach in the law, and I hope that the Minister will tell us how she intends to sort this out. If we do not allow victims of domestic abuse and sexual violence—or any victim, or anyone who is treated poorly by the police and the CPS—to take civil action, we in this place are missing an opportunity to make better laws. Frankly, if I can be held accountable, coppers and the CPS should be held accountable, too.

I understand that we are awaiting a Supreme Court judgment, but I would be interested to hear what the Front Benchers can say to allay the fears of victims of domestic abuse and sexual violence all over the country. They fear that if, say, their address was wrongly given out, they would have no recourse to civil action, despite the danger they would be put in.

My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball) gave a powerful speech. I worked with Claire Throssell for years. The shadow Minister said that victims groups do not all think the same about the jury part of the Bill; I can tell him that they all think the same thing about the presumption of contact. The fact that the shadow Minister did not even mention that he has tabled an amendment that would genuinely endanger victims of domestic abuse across the country is—I do not know what I am allowed to say—a bit cowardly. He should have stood by his words and argued the case.

As a victim who has been dragged back to court on a completely unmeritorious appeal case by people who stalk me, so that they can get me in another room, I am pleased about the changes in the Bill. In these debates, I often think that this place thinks that the very worst thing that could happen to a person is being accused of rape. I think the worst thing that can happen is to be raped and have no one believe you.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

I draw the House’s attention to the fact that I am a member of the Bar of England and Wales, and my wife is an employment judge. Notwithstanding some noble and commendable elements, particularly in clauses 12 to 17, in totality, I am afraid that this is a bad Bill. It was a bad Bill when it came before the House on Second Reading; it was a bad Bill when it left Committee; and without significant refinement, it will be a bad piece of law, should it come on to the statute books.

This is not the Lord Chancellor’s legislation; he inherited it from his predecessor. It is right to welcome his efforts on the amendment that recognises that clause 3 is unsustainable; it would be churlish not to. He has listened to the legal profession, to this House, and most importantly, to the public, who have raised serious and significant concerns. But I am afraid that the measures do not go far enough. If this Bill is the answer, then the exam question is fundamentally wrong. Nowhere can that be seen more clearly than in clause 6. That is why I am very supportive of amendment 7 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan), which seeks to remove clause 6.

The clause, as we have heard, merely moves the problem from one part of the system to another. It pushes, on a conservative basis, some 25,000 cases into the magistrates court. About 5,500 of those are likely to be trials—and not necessarily straightforward trials; they may take more than a day or two to be heard. We are asking an under-resourced and ill equipped magistrates court to deal with them. That is not the way to deal with the magistrates court backlog, which, in the last year, increased by more than 9.5%.

[Karl Turner]

I think I am right in saying that a lay magistrate is required to sit 15 days a year. Very often, magistrates sit for a day at a time; they may do a day every other week. The scenario that the Government are presenting expects a lay magistrate to sit for two or three days in a row, and potentially into a second week. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that is unsustainable?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Gentleman, as always, has his finger on the pulse on these issues. The Government’s proposals would narrow the pool of magistrates able to deal with these cases, by virtue of the time commitments that would be foisted on them.

I want to spend a little bit of time on clause 4, which deals with complex and lengthy cases. In essence, through new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the clause confines complex and lengthy cases to fraud or fraud-aligned cases. However, importantly, there is a provision that the Secretary of State can increase the number of offences captured in this provision. The danger is that there will be a slow accretion of such offences. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that misconduct in public office could be added to that list. The provision fails to recognise the very important work done by Jonathan Fisher KC in his independent review. He pointed out that these cases are not held up because of a jury; under the Bill, they would be delayed, because a judge would have to weigh up the evidence, and reach and write up a judgment. The provision also fundamentally undermines the point that facts of dishonesty—the offences in the schedule are offences around dishonesty—are matters for judgment by the ordinary citizen. Removing the jury element risks the erosion of civic ownership of these cases by the criminal justice system, and the criminal justice system’s engagement with them.

The provision would also have a chilling effect, in that the powerful narrative can be developed that these cases are being heard behind closed doors. This stems from a single case from 2005, the Jubilee line case. When the case was reviewed, the very sensible conclusion was reached that the issue came down to poor strategy by the CPS in processing the case; the issue was not jury trials themselves. Amendment 4 from my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle is therefore eminently sensible.

If the House is not with me on that, there is an alternative. Amendment 52 by the shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), seeks to limit the scope of this provision to trials where all the offences that a defendant is charged with are captured by new schedule 3ZA. That seems eminently sensible in the circumstances.

I want to mention the rule of law. If the rule of law is to be taken into account, we must have an impartial system of adjudication. That means having a fair hearing, which in turn means having the ability to challenge. Therefore, amendment 54 must be right. It must be right that in complex or lengthy cases, a defendant has an opportunity to challenge the decision that the case will be heard by a judge sitting alone.

I want to spend a few moments on new clause 25. When this Bill was brought before the House, the narrative that we heard from Government repeatedly was that it was being introduced so that we could deal with a backlog in the Crown court. It appears from the Minister’s remarks—she knows that I have enormous respect for her—that it is more of an ideological argument. The question today is whether hon. Members want to do this to deal with a backlog—a specific problem—in which case a sunset clause would be eminently sensible, or whether they are making an ideological argument, which I think is much more chilling on our society.