Media Bill

Miriam Cates Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 30th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Hywel Williams]

I can indeed recommend that production for anybody to have a look at; it is very interesting. I can also recommend the biography of Gwynfor Evans, which makes similar points.

The media industry in Wales is more than S4C. We have fantastic production companies, including Cwmni Da in my constituency, news outlets and radio—all kinds of things. The proposed authority would unite the media landscape in Wales under one regulatory roof and safeguard it from harms, including from large conglomerates. It would also focus on areas that are important to the people of Wales. The Labour Welsh Government’s expert panel on a shadow broadcasting and communications authority for Wales proposed that public interest journalism, sports and children’s media be areas of specific focus due to their cultural significance, position in relation to Welsh language ambitions and impact on long-term sustainability, among other reasons. The Welsh Government therefore propose a shadow broadcasting and communications authority for Wales. I look to those on the Labour Front Bench, as potentially the next Government, to give us reassurance that it is their intention to establish that authority, as well as the intention of the Welsh Labour Government in Cardiff.

Wales needs to have a say on its own media landscape to ensure that what works for us is what we get. Prominent commentators such as Professor Tom O’Malley and Mike Birtwistle have said that S4C should be built on shared principles of social partnership, public interest and democratic pluralism; that is, as they say, the Welsh political tradition. An independent regulator for Wales would be better equipped to regulate, defend and promote our national broadcasting and media industry in Wales and ensure that those values are represented. That is my argument in favour of a broadcasting authority.

I will say a few words on the prominence of S4C on the selection services—a point that I also raised in Committee. S4C’s content must be readily discoverable and prominent on television services, but I seek assurances that the “appropriate degree of prominence” will not lead to the limiting of S4C’s coverage to specific audiences, thereby depriving people of a wide range of broadcasts. This language matches that of the electronic programme guides code, which allowed S4C to be on channel 166 on Virgin Media in Wales until 2021. The Government should provide clear principles to guide Ofcom in drawing up the new prominence code, so that public service broadcasters’ designated internet programming services appear prominently and are easily discoverable on screens.

[Miriam Cates (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Con)]

I rise to support new clause 6 and amendment 17, both in my name. The Bill is a substantial piece of legislation and I fully support what the Government are seeking to do through it to bridge the gap in regulation between linear television and internet-based on-demand platforms.

Nobody would argue against the principle that we want to protect children from watching age-inappropriate or harmful content. That is, after all, why Parliament over many years has brought in legislation that mandates age ratings on cinema releases, restrictions on children buying DVDs and videos and, importantly, until the relatively recent past, a watershed for broadcast TV. The watershed, of course, ensures that programmes broadcast before 9 pm are generally suitable for children.

However, now that the vast majority of content watched by children and adults is accessed through on-demand streaming services, the watershed has become increasingly redundant. It does not matter if a programme was originally broadcast live after the watershed; once it is available to stream online, it can be viewed by anyone of any age at any time. That is why we urgently need to apply the same standards of child protection to on-demand video as we do to cinema releases, physical DVDs and linear TV.

While a time-based watershed clearly cannot be adapted for video on demand services, we are very fortunate in this country to have world-class expertise in applying age ratings to video content. The British Board of Film Classification has been empowered by Parliament, through the Secretary of State, to apply age ratings across all cinema and DVD releases in the UK. The BBFC does an excellent job of this, as colleagues have mentioned, and is a global leader in its field. It has produced a system of age ratings that the vast majority of the British population recognises, trusts and understands. Importantly, its ratings are based on regular consultation with thousands of people across Britain to ensure that they meet audience expectations.

We have the relevant age rating expertise already in this country, but as it stands, the Bill will not make use of that expertise. Amendment 17 would address this matter very simply by explicitly requiring Ofcom to consult the BBFC when drawing up the video on demand code. The code will set the rules for streaming platforms, including in relation to age ratings. Why would we not want to ensure that our world-renowned, Government-appointed experts are consulted as part of that?

There was a similar amendment to the Online Safety Act 2023 that required Ofcom to consult with the Children’s Commissioner, and I can see no argument against applying the same principle here. Getting age ratings right is incredibly important, as they will likely become one of the main audience protection measures that platforms employ and will, of course, future-proof the Bill. If parents do not trust the ratings, they will ignore them, and we will then not achieve our aim of protecting children.

That brings me to new clause 6 in my name, which is similar to the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Sir Gary Streeter), and I will reiterate some of his points.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am very supportive of the theme of my hon. Friend’s amendment. She made an extremely important point about consistency for parents. Those of us who are lucky enough to have children find ourselves in a forest of different media that they consume, some of which seem to decide the rules and ratings on their own—of course, there are websites to go to for third-party reference. Does she agree that it would be sensible to have a standardised view for parents, to manage consumption by their children, as it is the parents’ primary duty to manage that? We have seen in the past that the wider media industry will constantly push the boundary to try to get more under the wire for consumption by younger and younger people, such as in the deterioration of the watershed on terrestrial television. If an organisation such as the BBFC sets the tone and the standard, that must apply online as much as offline.

[Miriam Cates]

I agree with every word. The very important factor behind the BBFC is that parents trust it. It even has an app to search for any film or DVD, and it will tell parents not only the rating but exactly why it is there—swearing, violence or whatever. That detailed knowledge is crucial not only to gain parents’ trust but to create an industry standard, as my right hon. Friend said. If we have no industry standard, some companies will try to get around the requirements if there is a commercial advantage. The Bill should set out exactly that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miriam Cates]

That is precisely what the Bill will do: it will introduce a different system. At present Ofcom is responsible for regulating the public service broadcasters, which it does through the watershed, and the BBFC is responsible for DVDs and cinema. We now have a completely new landscape which resembles the DVD landscape much more closely because it is available on demand. It is therefore sensible to introduce an age-rating system based roughly on what the BBFC does, because the BBFC, not Ofcom, is the expert in that field.

[Damian Green]

I fear that we may go down a rabbit hole. Ofcom is the expert in that field, but the system is based on film classification. The age-rating system is designed for a situation where a person goes through a door and someone makes a guess whether that person was 16 or 18 or 12, for instance.

[Miriam Cates]

Will my right hon. Friend give way again?

[Damian Green]

I will give my hon. Friend one more go.

[Miriam Cates]

I take my right hon. Friend’s point. However, the BBFC classifies not just films but items that are streamed directly and never released in cinemas by tagging every rateable incident, such as a swear word or an episode of violence, and uses that system to come up with a verifiable, standardised rating that everyone understands. It is exactly the same process as the one that is used to verify a video on demand, and it is what Netflix already uses to rate its own videos.

[Damian Green]

Netflix uses it, but, as my hon. Friend herself said earlier, Disney does not. There will of course be differences. I think that overregulating will just lead to disadvantages for people who are trying to produce content, and that insisting on one system that is partly designed for one mode of operation may well not work for another operation. If Ofcom does its job effectively it will achieve what we all want to see, which is age-inappropriate content not being available to children. As I have said, involving more than one regulator normally leads to confusion and worse regulation than would have existed otherwise.

Media Bill

Miriam Cates Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 21st November 2023 Commons Chamber

[Miriam Cates (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate on the Media Bill. I wish to focus narrowly on part 4, which sets out the provisions on public service broadcasting and gives Ofcom powers to draft and enforce a video-on-demand code. The Bill proposes to do that by extending audience protection measures, for example, age ratings and content warnings, that are currently enforced for broadcast media and BBC iPlayer-only to all on-demand programme services.

A number of colleagues have mentioned how the media landscape has evolved rapidly in our lifetimes. I remember the black-and-white telly in my parent’s lounge, with the choice of just three or four channels. I remember traditional linear TV, where we would all sit around to watch a programme and we would not answer the phone or the doorbell, because if we missed something, that was it. I remember my grandparents getting a VHS player before we did in the 1980s and my grandma would record “Thomas the Tank Engine” and “Postman Pat” for us, and we would binge watch it when we went to stay with her. Of course, so much has changed since then, and when my children were young, they did not even understand the concept of linear TV. I remember going to stay with a family member who did not have a smart TV at the time and my children did not understand how they could not watch “Octonauts” right that minute.

So much has changed in our lifetime. Of course, there are many wonderful aspects of media programming in this country—we have some fantastic content that is the envy of the world—but there are also some not-so-wonderful aspects, and there is lots of material out there that may be entertaining for adults but we definitely do not want children to see. That is the point of the Ofcom broadcasting code, which says for broadcast TV:

“1.1: Material that might seriously impair the physical, mental or moral development of people under eighteen must not be broadcast.

1.2: In the provision of services, broadcasters must take all reasonable steps to protect people under eighteen.

1.3: Children must also be protected by appropriate scheduling from material that is unsuitable for them.”

A healthy family media environment relies on parents being able to keep children safe by making sure they do not accidentally come upon content that is not suitable, and on parents having control over what is suitable for their own children. It goes without saying that young children should not be watching violence, sex, extreme language and all those kinds of things. We accept that as a society, and that is why we have rules and systems in place to help parents and to stop children seeing unsuitable content.

Our traditional on-demand media—cinema, DVD and VHS—is regulated by the British Board of Film Classification, which is a highly respected organisation that has been going for over 100 years. We are all familiar with the littles triangles telling us that a film is a U, PG, 12 and so on. Our TV scheduling is regulated by the broadcasting code, which mainly relies on the watershed so that broadcasters do not put out programmes before 9 pm that children should not see. On demand presents a new challenge for our broadcasters, because the watershed does not apply. By definition, all the content is available all the time, and therefore parents cannot rely on the fact that it is before 9 o’clock to know that a particular programme is safe.

Some commercial streaming services have voluntarily adopted the BBFC’s ratings. Netflix is a good example. It has adopted the U, PG, 12 and so on ratings. That is really important, because the BBFC ratings are some of the clearest, most transparent and most respected in the whole world. The BBFC even has an app now where parents can look for any programme or film, and it will tell them the rating and exactly why that rating is given, so that parents can be fully informed about what children are going to watch.

I visited the BBFC a couple of weeks ago—I highly recommend that to Members; it is more than willing to give briefings—to see how it rates films, trailers and programmes. It is a hugely impressive organisation, with enormous levels of trust from not just the content creators but the public. It surveys 10,000 members of the public every four years to ask them about their attitudes to violence, swearing, sex, drugs and so on, to feed into its ratings, so that there is buy-in from the public.

Some services have not opted into the BBFC ratings or produced a suitable rating system of their own. The most significant player in this category is Disney+, which has an opaque system of age rating that cannot be trusted by parents. For example, the film “Avatar”, which I think most people would say is suitable for children, has a rating of 16+, and yet a quite sinister adaptation of “A Christmas Carol” that involves nudity, horror, child molestation, forced prostitution and a depiction of child drowning has a rating of 9+.

The problem is that when parents see that kind of discrepancy, and when the ratings are opaque and there is no transparency about why things are rated in the way they are, parents just remove the passwords, because they think, “I want my child to be able to see ‘Avatar’”. But in removing the passwords or changing the settings on their account, they inadvertently enable children to watch a lot of material that is not suitable for them.

Clearly, Disney+ and other streaming services need to be subject to the same standards as broadcast media. If material is unsuitable for children, it is unsuitable whatever the platform on which it is viewed, and it is the intention of the Bill to remedy that. Clause 38 will require Ofcom to review audience protection measures used by providers of all on-demand tier 1 programme services, including those that do not have their headquarters in the UK. In other words, the Bill seeks to ensure that what we might call the new media—streamed content—is subject to the same audience protection measures, such as age ratings, content warnings, parental control and age assurance measures, as traditional and linear material such as cinema, DVD and broadcast TV.

So far, so good—that is a laudable and much-needed aim—but my question to the Government is, why reinvent the wheel? Why task Ofcom with another review and developing another new code, when we already have a world-leading regulatory framework in the BBFC? Why not instead extend the remit of the BBFC—an internationally trusted organisation—and an age-rating system understood by millions who already use streaming media, so that those familiar ratings logos of U, PG, 15 and so on are visible on each and every programme on every streaming platform?

Indeed, 88% of parents find the BBFC ratings on Netflix extremely helpful, so it would make sense to standardise these ratings across all the major streaming platforms. The platforms would pay the cost—that is how the BBFC is funded, so it would not require a massive expansion of the BBFC. For example, the BBFC gives the code and the transparent materials for rating to Netflix; Netflix polices itself, and every so often, the BBFC will check that it is fully compliant with the way it regulates itself. There would be a clear advantage to extending that universal rating system across all streaming services: it would not be reinventing the wheel, and there are also serious question marks about Ofcom’s capacity to deliver on both the requirements in this Bill and the significantly increased requirements placed on it by the passage of the Online Safety Act 2023. I urge the Minister to consider amending the Bill to use the BBFC and its code, rather than Ofcom, to achieve the aims of clause 38.

I also urge the Minister to consider extending the remit of the Bill’s audience protection provisions beyond broadcast and streaming to all UK-accessible video content, including online. I appreciate that that would be a very significant expansion of the Bill, but if its purpose is to bring audience protection regulation up to date with the current and future media landscape, we are just skirting around the issue if we do not include online content. Indeed, the principle of part 4 of the Bill is to create that parity between online and offline. Nowhere is that more needed than in the much less regulated online space.

I say that principally because of the proliferation of unregulated hardcore pornography on the internet—pornography that would be completely illegal in the offline world, on DVDs or on streaming services—that is now being viewed by millions, including children, and causing immense societal damage. We are not talking about erotic magazines passed by teenage boys around the bike sheds, but extreme, violent, hardcore, repulsive and completely illegal material: violent rapes, violent assaults and incest. It is the most unimaginable, degrading material—material that is illegal offline on traditional platforms, and always has been. If we are rightly convinced that it matters what people watch—that it matters that children are protected from strong content, whether they are watching it on TV, streaming it on demand or seeing it on their phones—we have to apply the same principle to pornography.

A third of the internet is pornography; Pornhub has more users than Twitter, Instagram, Netflix, Pinterest, Zoom and LinkedIn put together. It is a $100 million industry, and algorithms draw users into more and more extreme material. The Government’s own research makes the link between viewing violent pornography and violence against women and girls, yet the average age of first viewing in this country is 11. We will never turn the tide on violence against women and girls unless we recognise the role of pornography in conditioning men and boys to link violence with sexual pleasure. That is why I urge the Minister to bring online pornography content within the scope of the audience protection measures in the Bill.

The Online Safety Act will go some way towards helping in this space: its age verification provisions will make it harder for under-18s to access that content. I very much commend the Government on accepting those amendments, which had cross-party support. But that Act missed an opportunity to crack down on online porn that would be completely illegal in the offline world—material that still proliferates online and, even with the new protections, will of course be accessed by some children. Again, the BBFC can have a role here, because it is the BBFC’s role to regulate offline porn, such as DVDs, and certain adult websites. It has a very effective working relationship with the adult industry and with payment providers, so if the BBFC establishes that a particular adult platform has on it a video that is illegal and should be taken down, it can contact the payment providers and ask them to deny payment to that website until the video is taken down.

[Jackie Doyle-Price (Thurrock) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the BBFC is also a very established brand that is trusted and understood by the public, so the public would themselves have confidence if the BBFC was given the ability to act in this space?

[Miriam Cates]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly why I am calling for the BBFC to have a much greater role in this Bill, but also for that role to be extended to the regulation of pornography. The BBFC has been going for over 100 years; other countries look to it and its ratings. It has buy-in from the public and from the content creators themselves, so it is perfectly placed to provide the kind of regulation and expertise we need. If we really want online and offline parity when it comes to audience safety—of course we do, because it does not matter where this content is viewed; it will have the same effect—we must look to include pornography in the scope of the Bill. I would go so far as to say that if the Government really want to leave a legacy of child protection and reducing violence against women and girls, nothing is more important than preventing access to hardcore pornography that is, and always has been, illegal in the offline world.

I welcome the Bill; it contains some excellent provisions. Obviously, I have focused narrowly on one aspect of it, but I ask Ministers to consider mandating that all streaming services use the BBFC’s age verification ratings, and extending audience protection measures to online content, especially violent pornography.

Online Safety Bill

Miriam Cates Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 17th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

No. I call Miriam Cates.

[Miriam Cates (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Con)]

I too rise to speak to new clause 2, which seeks to introduce senior manager criminal liability to the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) set out, we will not push it to a vote as a result of the very welcome commitments that the Minister has made to introduce a similar amendment in the other place.

Protecting children is not just the role of parents but the responsibility of the whole of society, including our institutions and businesses that wish to trade here. That is the primary aim of this Bill, which I wholeheartedly support: to keep children safe online from horrendous and unspeakable harms, many of which were mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Dame Andrea Leadsom).

We look back in horror at children being forced to work down mines or neglected in Victorian orphanages, but I believe we will look back with similar outrage at online harms. What greater violation could there be of childhood than to entice a child to collaborate in their own sexual abuse in the privacy and supposed safety of their own bedroom? Yet this is one of the many crimes that are occurring on an industrial scale every day. Past horrors such as children down mines were tackled by robust legislation, and the Online Safety Bill must continue our Parliament’s proud tradition of taking on vested interests to defend the welfare of children.

The Bill must succeed in its mission, but in its present form, it does not have sufficient teeth to drive the determination that is needed in tech boardrooms to tackle the systemic issue of the malevolent algorithms that drive this sickening content to our children. There is no doubt that the potential fines in the Bill are significant, but many of these companies have deep pockets, and the only criminal sanctions are for failure to share data with Ofcom. The inquest following the tragic death of Molly Russell was an example of this, as no one could be held personally responsible for what happened to her. I pay tribute to Ian Russell, Molly’s father, whose courage in the face of such personal tragedy has made an enormous difference in bringing to light the extent of online harms.

Only personal criminal liability will drive proactive change, and we have seen this in other areas such as the financial services industry and the construction industry. I am delighted that the Government have recognised the necessity of senior manager liability for tech bosses, after much campaigning across the House, and committed to introducing it in the other place. I thank the Secretary of State and her team for the very constructive and positive way in which they have engaged with supporters of this measure.

[Sir William Cash]

Would my hon. Friend not also like to say that the NSPCC has been magnificent in supporting us?

[Miriam Cates]

I was coming on to that—absolutely.

The advantage of introducing this measure in the other place is that we can widen the scope to all appropriate child safety duties beyond clause 11 and perhaps tackle pornography and child sexual abuse material as well. We will have a groundbreaking Bill that will hold to account powerful executives who knowingly allow our children to be harmed.

There are those who say—not least the tech companies —that we should not be seeking to criminalise tech directors. There are those who worry that this will reduce tech investment, but that has not happened in Ireland. There are those who say that the senior manager liability amendment will put a great burden on tech companies to comply, to which I say, “Great!” There are those who are worried that this will set an international precedent, to which I say, “Even better!”

Nothing should cause greater outrage in our society than the harming of innocent children. In a just society founded on the rule of law, those who harm children or allow children to be harmed should expect to be punished by the law. That is what new clause 2 seeks to do, and I look forward to working with the Secretary of State and others to bring forward a suitable amendment in the other place.

I offer my sincere thanks to the NSPCC, especially Rich Collard, and the outstanding Charles Hymas of The Telegraph, who have so effectively supported this campaign. I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash); without his determination, knowledge and experience, it would not have been possible to achieve this change. He has been known as Mr Brexit, but as he said, even before he was Mr Brexit, he was Mr Child Protection, having been involved with the Protection of Children Act 1978. It is certainly advantageous in negotiations to work with someone who knows vastly more about legislation than pretty much anyone else involved. He sat through the debate in December on the amendment tabled by the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), and while the vote was taking place, he said, “I think we can do this.” He spent the next week in the Public Bill Office and most of his recess buried in legislation. I pay tribute to him for his outstanding work. Once again, I thank the Secretary of State for her commitment to this, and I think this will continue our Parliament’s proud history of protecting children.

[Lia Nici (Great Grimsby) (Con)]

I fully support the Bill and pay tribute to the work that Members have done over months and years to get us to where we are. I support the amendments tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Dover (Mrs Elphicke), for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Miriam Cates) and for Stone (Sir William Cash), because these are the right things to do. We cannot have—effectively—illegal advertising for illegal activities on platforms. We would not allow it on television, so why would we allow it on other easily accessible platforms? With regard to content that is harmful to children, why should we not focus the minds of senior managers in those hugely rich organisations on the idea that, “If I do not do my job properly and protect children, I may go to prison.” I think that threat will focus those individuals’ minds.

Online Safety Bill

Miriam Cates Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th December 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

The last Back-Bench speaker is Miriam Cates.

[Miriam Cates (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I think you are the third person to take the Chair during the debate. It is an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Laura Farris); I agree with everything that she said, and my comments will be similar.

This has been a long but fascinating debate. We have discussed only a small part of the Bill today, and just a few amendments, but the wide range of the debate reflects the enormous complexity of what the Bill is intended to do, which is to regulate the online world so that it is subject to rules, regulations, obligations and protective measures equivalent to those in the offline world. We must do this, because the internet is now an essential part of our infrastructure. I think that we see the costs of our high-speed broadband as being in the same category as our energy and water costs, because we could not live without it. Like all essential infrastructure, the internet must be regulated. We must ensure that providers are working in the best interests of consumers, within the law and with democratic accountability.

Regulating the internet through the Bill is not a one-off project. As many Members have said, it will take years to get it right, but we must begin now. I think the process can be compared with the regulation of roads. A century ago there were hardly any private motor cars on the roads. There were no rules; people did not even have to drive on a particular side of the road. There have been more than 100 years of frequent changes to rules and regulations to get it right. It seems crazy now to think there was a time when there were no speed limits and no seat belts. The death rates on the roads, even in the 1940s, were 13 times higher than they are now. Over time, however, with regulation, we have more or less solved the complex problems of road regulation. Similarly, it will take time to get this Bill right, but we must get it on to the statute book and give it time to evolve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dean Russell]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the work of charities such as Dignify in Watford, where Helen Roberts does incredible work in raising awareness of this issue, is essential to ensuring that people are aware of the harm that can be done?

[Miriam Cates]

I completely agree. Other charities, such as CEASE—the Centre to End All Sexual Exploitation —and Barnardo’s have been mentioned in the debate, and I think it so important to raise awareness. There are many harms in the internet, but pornography is an epidemic. It makes up a third of the material on the internet, and its impact on children cannot be overstated. Many boys who watch porn say that it gives them ideas about the kind of sex that they want to try. It is not surprising that a third of child sexual abuse is committed by other children. During puberty—that very important period of development—boys in particular are subject to an erotic imprint. The kind of sex that they see and the sexual ideas that they have during that time determine what they see as normal behaviour for the rest of their lives. It is crucial for children to be protected from harmful pornography that encourages the objectification and abuse of—almost always—women.

[Neale Hanvey]

I thank—in this context—my hon. Friend for giving way.

The lawsuits are coming. There can certainly be no more harmful act than encouraging a young person to mutilate their body with so-called gender-affirming surgery with no therapeutic intervention beforehand. In Scotland, the United Nations special rapporteur for violence against women and girls has criticised the Scottish Government’s Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill. Does the hon. Lady agree that it is time to establish who is a feminist, and who is a fake to their fingertips?

[Miriam Cates]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He is absolutely right: inciting a child to harm their body, whatever that harm is, should be criminalised, and I support the sentiment of new clause 16, which seeks to do that. Sadly, lots of children, particularly girls, go online and type in “I don’t like my body”. Maybe they are drawn to eating disorder sites, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford) has mentioned, but often they are drawn into sites that glorify transition, often with adult men that they do not even know in other countries posting pictures of double mastectomies on teenage girls.

[John Nicolson (Ochil and South Perthshire) (SNP)]

The hon. Lady must realise that this is fantasy land. It is incredibly difficult to get gender reassignment surgery. The “they’re just confused” stuff is exactly what was said to me as a young gay man. She must realise that this really simplifies a complicated issue and patronises people going through difficult choices.

[Miriam Cates]

I really wish it was fantasy land, but I am in contact with parents each and every day who tell me stories of their children being drawn into this. Yes, in this country it is thankfully very difficult to get a double mastectomy when you are under 18, but it is incredibly easy to buy testosterone illegally online and to inject it, egged on by adults in other countries. Once a girl has injected testosterone during puberty, she will have a deep voice and facial hair for life and male-pattern baldness, and she will be infertile. That is a permanent change, it is self-harm and it should be criminalised under this Bill, whether through this clause or through the Government’s new plans. The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Neale Hanvey) is absolutely right: this is happening every day and it should be classed as self-harm.

Going back to my comments about the effect on children of viewing pornography, I absolutely support the idea of putting children’s experience at the heart of the Bill but it needs to be about children’s welfare and not about what children want. One impact of the internet has been to blur the boundary between adults and children. As adults, we need to be able to say, “This is the evidence of what is harmful to children, and this is what children should not be seeing.” Of course children will say that they want free access to all content, just like they want unlimited sweets and unlimited chocolate, but as adults we need to be able to say what is harmful for children and to protect them from seeing it.

This bring me to Government new clause 11, which deals with making sure that child sexual abuse material is taken offline. There is a clear link between the epidemic of pornography and the epidemic of child sexual abuse material. The way the algorithms on porn sites work is to draw users deeper and deeper into more and more extreme content—other Members have mentioned this in relation to other areas of the internet—so someone might go on to what they think is a mainstream pornography site and be drawn into more and more explicit, extreme and violent criminal pornography. At the end of this, normal people are drawn into watching children being abused, often in real time and often in other countries. There is a clear link between the epidemic of porn and the child sexual abuse material that is so prevalent online.

Last week in the Home Affairs Committee we heard from Professor Alexis Jay, who led the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. Her report is harrowing, and it has been written over seven years. Sadly, its conclusion is that seven years later, there are now even more opportunities for people to abuse children because of the internet, so making sure that providers have a duty to remove any child sexual abuse material that they find is crucial. Many Members have referred to the Internet Watch Foundation. One incredibly terrifying statistic is that in 2021, the IWF removed 252,194 web pages containing child sexual abuse material and an unknown number of images. New clause 11 is really important, because it would put the onus on the tech platforms to remove those images when they are found.

It is right to put the onus on the tech companies. All the way through the writing of this Bill, at all the consultation meetings we have been to, we have heard the tech companies say, “It’s too hard; it’s not possible because of privacy, data, security and cost.” I am sure that is what the mine owners said in the 19th century when they were told by the Government to stop sending children down the mines. It is not good enough. These are the richest, most powerful companies in the world. They are more powerful than an awful lot of countries, yet they have no democratic accountability. If they can employ real-time facial recognition at airports, they can find a way to remove child abuse images from the internet.

This leads me on to new clause 17, tabled by the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), which would introduce individual director liability for non-compliance. I completely support that sentiment and I agree that this is likely to be the only way we will inject some urgency into the process of compliance. Why should directors who are profiting from the platforms not be responsible if children suffer harm as a result of using their products? That is certainly the case in many other industries. The right hon. Lady used the example of the building trade. Of course there will always be accidents, but if individual directors face the prospect of personal liability, they will act to address the systemic issues, the problems with the processes and the malevolent algorithms that deliberately draw users towards harm.

[Sir William Cash]

My hon. Friend knows that I too take a great interest in this, and I am glad that the Government have agreed to continue discussions on this question. Is she aware that the personal criminal liability for directors flows from the corporate criminal liability in the company of which they are a director, and that their link to the criminal act itself, even if the company has not been or is not being prosecuted, means that the matter has to be made clear in the legislation, so that we do not have any uncertainty about the relationship of the company director and the company of which he is a director?

[Miriam Cates]

I was not aware of that, but I am now. I thank my hon. Friend for that information. This is a crucial point. We need the accountability of the named director associated with the company, the platform and the product in order to introduce the necessary accountability. I do not know whether the Minister will accept this new clause today, but I very much hope that we will look further at how we can make this possible, perhaps in another place.

I very much support the Bill. We need to get it on the statute book, although it will probably need further work, and I support the Government amendments. However, given the link between children viewing pornography and child sexual abuse, I hope that when the Bill goes through the other place, their lordships will consider how regulations around pornographic content can be strengthened, in order to drastically reduce the number of children viewing porn and eventually being drawn into criminal activities themselves. In particular, I would like their lordships to look at tightening and accelerating the age verification and giving equal treatment to all pornography, whether it is on a porn site or a user-to-user service and whether it is online or offline. Porn is harmful to children in whatever form it comes, so the liability on directors and the criminality must be exactly the same. I support the Bill and the amendments in the Government’s name, but it needs to go further when it goes to the other place.

[Paul Scully]

I thank Members for their contributions during today’s debate and for their ongoing engagement with such a crucial piece of legislation. I will try to respond to as many of the issues raised as possible.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), who is not in his place, proposed adding in promoting self-harm as a criminal offence. The Government are sympathetic to the intention behind that proposal; indeed, we asked the Law Commission to consider how the criminal law might address that, and have agreed in principle to create a new offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm. The form of the offence recommended by the Law Commission is based on the broadly comparable offence of encouraging or assisting suicide. Like that offence, it covers the encouragement of, or assisting in, self-harm by means of communication and in other ways. When a similar amendment was tabled by the hon. Members for Ochil and South Perthshire (John Nicolson) and for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) in Committee, limiting the offence to encouragement or assistance by means of sending a message, the then Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South, said it would give only partial effect to the Law Commission’s recommendation. It remains the Government’s intention to give full effect to the Law Commission’s recommend-ations in due course.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (First sitting)

Miriam Cates Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 14th January 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you. We will come to Miriam Cates next. Then, after Miriam, the order will be Kevan Jones, David Johnston, Christian Matheson, Dean Russell and James Wild.

[Miriam Cates (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Con)]

Q May I, too, pass on my thanks to the witnesses for appearing before us today? You have all referred to the significant financial costs to your organisations of removing the equipment from the high-risk vendors, but obviously, given the potential security implications, some are calling for the 2027 deadline to be brought forward. What would be the financial and logistical impacts of bringing forward the deadline on your organisations and your ability to operate? Would that be just too impossible—too difficult?

Patrick Binchy: In line with the previous answer, I cannot go through the specific commercials—they are commercially and competitively sensitive. But I would be happy to take such questions offline if you want to follow up on that.

Regarding the 2027 deadline, I think there is a balance here between UK connectivity and UK security. First and foremost, I would say that we have a security regime in place today. We use the Huawei cyber-security evaluation centre to check all of the technology that comes through Huawei and goes into UK networks, and we work closely with the security authorities to make sure that we are protecting the UK public today. We also have full visibility of any traffic that is transiting our network, either incoming or outgoing, so we are confident that we have the security in place today that is necessary.

In terms of achieving the 2027 timeline, that is a challenge. It is not going to be easy, because we need to balance that national connectivity against security and do it in a way that ensures that we continue to provide good-quality connectivity to the public.

There are a number of timelines within the legislation. We do not think the timeline for 2021 in terms of using equipment is a major issue. The 2023 35% cap and the 2027 are challenging, but we have plans in place. We have put our second vendor in place. They are already rolling our 5G network out in Manchester, Glasgow and Reading, and we are confident that we can meet those timelines and supply good-quality connectivity to the UK public.

Derek McManus: I think everybody, particularly in this environment, understands the immediate value of connectivity in the situation that we as UK society face. In terms of the opportunity for that connectivity to be part of economic growth as we evolve 5G and help build the economy, those are two of the competing challenges that we have to balance, while also removing HRVs and delivering diversification.

Yes, it is a matter of balancing costs in terms of investment, but we also have to recognise the customer disruption caused by removal of equipment. It is important that we maintain those other two key criteria—that important connectivity and that support to economic growth. By working together and taking the right balance, the Bill’s timescales are appropriate. I cannot, obviously, talk about the plans of individual businesses to meet the deadlines, but as an industry, I think it is appropriate.

Andrea Donà: At Vodafone, we believe that the Government’s decision to set a timeframe of 2027 truly reflects the complexity of what we have been asked to do. It is important that the deadline of 2027 does not change further. We need certainty and a fixed time plan so that we can plan for the future. Any further changes will disrupt our investment plans and will also cause undesired further disruption, as we attempt to accelerate a swap out that is, in itself, very complex, and will deliver inevitable disruption to our customers—the businesses and the public services. We are actively working with all the involved parties—the Government, Ofcom, NCSC and DCMS—to ensure that we minimise disruption. It is a complicated and difficult effort from a technology perspective, but also from the perspective of the practical implementation on the ground.

If the Government truly share our ambition to be a leader in digital infrastructure, we need to ensure that we give the high-risk vendor enough time to carry out the plans, under a very well-defined timescale and, as I said earlier, in parallel, allow the diversification agenda to grow, as well as the stability, to allow new entrants to come in and be a viable alternative to the incumbent high-risk vendor that we are swapping out.

[The Chair]

We will come on to Kevan Jones. Now I am getting the hang of this now, I do not think it is fair to always ask Patrick to be the first out of the blocks to answer the questions, so I will try to rotate so that everyone has a chance of going first.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dean Russell]

Q Thank you, Chair. I would like to understand more how the diversification strategy that accompanies this Bill will benefit you as an organisation and the public.

Alex Towers: I think we see long term that diversification of vendors would be good for the operators in the marketplace if we can get to that point. It is important to say, I suppose, as the other operators were doing earlier on, that we are not at that point right now, so we are having to manage a situation where with the market as it stands we have a small number of very large-scale, important vendors and suppliers and we are having to remove one of them, clearly, from the 5G marketplace. That creates a degree of complexity and engineering difficulty that we need to just work our way through; so there is a lot of work to do just to manage within the current market framework to replace Huawei and to bring Nokia and Ericsson to the point we want. While we are doing that, if we can at the same time create the prospects of, in the longer term, a more open marketplace with a wider range of vendors—with other-scale vendors that do not quite work at the minute in the UK market, and Howard could probably explain exactly why that is, as well as with the potential for open RAN and other types of technology and software-based models to be developed—that is good for the whole industry and could be good for UK jobs and potential UK companies and therefore also for the citizen.

Howard Watson: I certainly welcome the Government’s supply chain diversification initiative here. It is concerning that we are moving from, essentially, three suppliers in the mobile supply chain down to only two. Our network going forward will use both of those. So widening that choice over time, for all the operators in the UK, is I think a critical opportunity. Please bear in mind that most operators quite like to have a primary source and a second source. It is unlikely that we will all start deploying equipment from four or five different vendors, because the operational challenge of the person in the van maintaining that tends to limit you to a choice of two; but being able to choose two from six is a lot better than choosing two from two, of course.

We welcome the three initiatives, which I will summarise. The first is whether we can we encourage Samsung, NEC and other large vendors who build mobile networks elsewhere to enter the UK market. The second is open RAN and it really just creates through more open standards the ability to have more players in that end-to-end solution. The third area really is to have a thriving research agenda for the UK. We really welcome the £250 million allocated in the recent spending review. We already have a thriving research capability in the UK and I think continuing to focus that on antenna design, optoelectronics and semiconductors will have a role to play in diversification going forward.

[Miriam Cates]

Q You have said in your written evidence that you fully support the objectives of the Bill, to improve security in the networks, but 20 years ago we could not possibly have anticipated the kind of threats that we face today, so it is safe to assume that we cannot perceive the kind of threats that we will face in the future. Do you think that the Bill is wide-ranging and flexible enough for the Government to be able to respond to future threats and, if not, what could be done to make it more future-proof?

Howard Watson: I actually think the structure of the Bill accommodates that quite well. It allows secondary legislation and guidelines to be upgraded. We note the critical role of the National Cyber Security Centre working with Government in doing that. I think, actually, you have taken care of that well with the way the Bill is structured.

Alex Towers: Yes, I would completely agree with that. I suppose our concern, slightly, at the minute, is to see some of the detail that is going to sit underneath the Bill in terms of a code of practice, in particular, and secondary legislation, because that is where it will become clear exactly what the implications are for operators. The sooner we can see some of that detail and get into the teeth of that, that would be great; but the way the Bill is structured, to allow that sort of detail to be updated on a regular basis as the world changes around us, seems totally sensible.

[Mr Jones]

Q The debate to date has mainly been around hardware, but you raised the issue—the bigger threat, certainly that I see, is from hacking and the vulnerability there. In terms of diversification, to be honest, we will have two vendors for the next considerable time, so when we talk about the diversification strategy and getting new vendors into the market, what timescales are we looking at? Are we actually putting all our eggs into the open RAN basket? I agree that there is the possibility of advancing that sector in the UK. Realistically, we will have those two, one of which, we know, is financially vulnerable. What difference would having just one vendor make to you?

Howard Watson: Let me work through that. First, from our perspective, given that we do have quite a large amount of BT in our mobile network, which is with the high-risk vendor, we have a large swap-out programme already under way. Effectively, we already use Nokia to extend their reach, but also to introduce Ericsson. That essentially means that I will be replacing a significant amount of my network over the next seven years.

It is quite difficult for me to start introducing new opportunities and new options into that, certainly in the early part of that. For my network, I see the opportunities in the latter part of this decade, not the early part. That does not mean that there will not be opportunities to try open RAN in some of the rural areas or to conduct some trials with the other vendors that we have talked about. It is very much an industry approach that we are taking here. Some of my colleagues may be able to move a bit earlier. It is important that we collaborate and work as a UK set of operators with the Government to make sure that we have the right rich set of solutions.

We would not want to come down to just one vendor. That would certainly be a worry for many reasons, so we need to continue to ensure that, in the short term, we absolutely have the choice of two.

Alex Towers: Given the timeframes that Howard has described, it is a five to seven-year cycle of replacement for the vendor. That is why it makes sense, we think, to go big now on large-scale trials of things like open RAN. The important investment in R&D and the £250 million is a good step towards that, but we will probably need some more, because we need to be ready for the next cycle if it is going to be a workable solution in future.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Second sitting)

Miriam Cates Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 14th January 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Chi Onwurah]

Q So, what are other countries doing that you are aware of?

Hamish MacLeod: The States, New Zealand and Australia have all excluded Huawei, among others. We could supply you with a full list if that is needed.

[Miriam Cates (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Con)]

Q The Government’s diversification strategy goes alongside the Bill. Obviously, the principle driver of the diversification is security reasons, but it will also open up the networks to smaller operators—I imagine, Matthew, many of your members are much smaller companies. Do you think that it will have a positive effect on the sector, in that sense, and are there any other barriers to entry for the smaller tech companies that you can identify and that could be addressed in the Bill?

Matthew Evans: Thank you for that question. As I said at the start, we welcome the Government’s diversification strategy. It looks to tackle four issues, really, which are supporting incumbent suppliers to the UK market; attracting other global-scale suppliers; accelerating open interfaces and interoperability; and then the fourth area, which we could probably do with more detail on, which is really building on that domestic capability. I know that the taskforce that helped Government to frame the strategy is working on that aspect of it. As I say, I think we could do with some more detail.

However, we welcome the funding that has come alongside that strategy, and I think that we have a real opportunity in the UK in some of the areas where we have traditional strengths, in the software side in particular, to build some world-leading capability. As for the Bill itself, I do not think that it necessarily presents a barrier to that domestic capability; it is more in how we develop the strategy that sits alongside the Bill.

Hamish MacLeod: Just to add to what Matt said, yes, we very much welcome the diversification strategy. It is an absolutely necessary step to mitigate the risks of having to rely on two incumbents. It gives the UK an opportunity to have a leadership role in the development of exciting new technologies, such as open RAN, and, as Matt said, to grow the supplier base in the UK in the mobile sector.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Q I think we have heard from the witnesses here now and from other operators that the 2027 deadline is important, in terms of not changing. We hear a lot about diversification, but let us be honest: we are going to have to have two vendors up until 2027 and possibly for a long time after. That is because, regarding the investment decisions taken by mobile phone operators, they are clearly not going to put kit in and then suddenly take it out post-2027. So, being realistic about the diversification strategy, which I support in terms of its ambitions, in practical terms—in terms of influencing what is in our telecoms—it is going to be a long way off yet, is it not?

Hamish MacLeod: Yes. As I just said, the 2027 deadline is very important, because that will give time for realistic competitive alternatives to develop. The open RAN is being deployed in the UK in sort of rural areas and in the less high-performance environments, and that will change over time. The investments that this diversification strategy talks about in research and development will help to develop open RAN, and also in the test bed programmes. All these things will help to build the capability of alternative vendors.

Matthew Evans: Just to add to Hamish’s answer, there is a reason that we have a relatively constricted number of scale providers for telecoms, and it is the level of R&D required—that is the risk associated with each generation of technology if it is not taken up on a global scale by operators. To be realistic, we are likely to be focused around two incumbent vendors in the short term.

I think that what the diversification strategy sets out, though, and in fairness it is a strategy and not a complete plan, is a path to open up the UK market to those scale providers who at the moment do not participate in it. That is through trying to reduce the commercial and regulatory barriers that we face, such as on spectrum defragmentation and on providing a single RAN solution —at the moment in the UK, there are obviously 2G, 3G, 4G and 5G. But it also then opens up the possibility of greater use of technologies such as open RAN, which really breaks away from that proprietary architecture, whereby we have both the hardware and the software from the same provider.

That will be a challenge in the short term, but in the medium to long term there are actions that can be taken both to attract the scale providers not in the UK market and to make the UK market attractive to people who work in the open RAN area as well. So I think a dual-track approach helps to bring diversification to the UK market.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

In that case, let us go to Miriam Cates, please.

[Miriam Cates]

Q This is a question for Chris from NEC. I think that you have partially answered it already, so do not feel that you have to repeat what has already been said. It appears to me that, if the open RAN trial is successful and the open RAN technology is adopted, it has the potential to significantly disrupt the telecoms market in a way similar to how APIs have disrupted the software market. First, how do you think that it will change the shape of the industry over the medium to long term? And secondly, what experience and capabilities does NEC have that give you the confidence that you will be able to run this trial and it will be successful?

Chris Jackson: First of all, the answer is yes in terms of, “Do I think it is a game changer?” Absolutely. You only have to look at what happened in the IT industry to see what open standards have done for that, so I absolutely think it is the right thing to do and we very much support it.

In terms of NEC’s capability, if you look at the work that we have done with Rakuten and NTT DOCOMO in Japan, we have shown that we have proven experience and open RAN capabilities. We also have a long history of R&D capability, and we have the capability on the ground now, with the launch of the global open RAN centre of excellence, to take that development further forward in the UK. Those are the main reasons I think the NEC is well placed to take advantage.

A final point that I would make is that, one of the things that we are going to see, which we would want to see, is a lot of smaller companies coming into this marketplace. That is very healthy, and they would certainly play an important part in driving innovation. There is also definitely a need for large companies with strong balance sheets, and NEC certainly ticks that box.

[The Chair]

Q Do any of the rest of you have anything to add to that?

John Baker: Yes, I will jump in. Mavenir is heavily invested in the UK as well. We have addressed the 2G, 3G, 4G solution with the recent acquisition of ip.access in Cambridge. We are building up a significant open RAN solution centre in the UK and we have made several press announcements about that.

In terms of hardware versus software, we have demonstrated that with some of the networks that we have deployed, such as T-Mobile in the US, which has 150 million subscribers essentially running on disaggregated software and hardware platforms. That demonstrates that you can build secure, reliable mobile networks with a software architecture. That is the way of the future. Obviously, that now has to fit into the cycles of deployment and rip and replace that the various carriers have.