(5 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberLet us remind ourselves of what has happened when it comes to voting for something that would take us through Brexit and end this chaos. On the Friday before last in the third meaningful vote, 89% of Conservative Members voted for the Prime Minister’s deal. That included something like three quarters of members of the ERG, who compromised hugely to back that deal. Of the Opposition, all but seven Labour MPs voted against the deal and delivering Brexit and for continuing the chaos. That is the truth of the matter. The hon. Gentleman should not blame the Government for the lack of a deal; it is his side that has consistently voted against any deal on offer. That includes Labour Back Benchers who are in the difficult position of having constituencies that voted to leave by 60% and 70%, but who now think they know better.
The conspiracy of chaos includes the Independent Group Members, who have a strong vested interest in continuing the chaos and debate on Brexit—
I have not finished criticising the hon. Gentleman yet. If he will wait for the criticism, I will take the rebuff. Those Independent Group Members have a strong vested interest in continuing the chaos and debate on Brexit, because the minute it is resolved—and it will eventually be resolved—their common purpose is gone. They will have to come up with some non-Brexit policies that they can all agree on. Now I shall give way.
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I say just one thing to him. Members of the Independent Group voted the way they did because we recognise, along with many Members of all parties, that leaving the European Union will be a disaster for our country and that therefore we should put any proposed deal back to the people to give them the final say.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House notes the European Council Decision of 22 March 2019 taken in agreement with the United Kingdom extending the period under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union, which provides for an extension to the Article 50 period to 22 May 2019 only if the House of Commons approves the Withdrawal Agreement by 29 March 2019; notes that if the House does not do so by that date the Article 50 period will only as a matter of law be extended to 12 April 2019 and that any extension beyond 22 May 2019 would require the UK to bring forward the necessary Day of Poll Order to hold elections to the European Parliament; notes that Article 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement refers to the Political Declaration between the UK and EU agreed on 25 November 2018, but that the EU has stated it remains open to negotiating changes to the Political Declaration; notes that the House is currently undertaking deliberations to identify whether there is a design for the future relationship that commands its support; notes that even should changes be sought to the Political Declaration, leaving the European Union with a deal still requires the Withdrawal Agreement; declares that it wishes to leave the EU with an agreement as soon as possible and does not wish to have a longer extension; therefore approves the Withdrawal Agreement, the Joint Instrument and the Unilateral Declaration laid before the House on 11 March 2019 so that the UK can leave the EU on 22 May 2019; notes that this approval does not by itself meet the requirements of section 13(1)(b) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018; and resolves that it is content to proceed to the next steps of this process, including fulfilling section 13 of this Act.
May I begin by thanking all Members for coming to the House on a Friday, and by apologising for the fact that we have had to convene today? The reasons we are convening today are partly to be found in the fact that today is 29 March, and as this House voted some months and years ago, it was today that should have been the day on which we left the European Union. However, we are—
Precisely: we are where we are. I intend not to review how and why we have arrived at this point, but to explain the motion that the Government have placed before the House.
On 21 March, the Council agreed a decision that if the withdrawal agreement is approved, we have a legal right as a country to an extension to 22 May 2019. If this withdrawal agreement is not approved, that extension will expire on 11 April. That means that any other extension that this House might desire to be agreed by the Union would be at its discretion, subject to the veto of 27 leaders. Therefore, by this evening, if the 11 o’clock deadline expires and the agreement has not been approved, that legal right will expire with it.
I will readily tell the House—although I will come to this very point later in my speech: the Government could choose, if they wished to, to seek to change the political declaration with the EU. It is because of the Government’s consistent failure to do that, because of its consistent failure to reach out across the House, that they find themselves in the difficulty they have created today. But I shall return to that point a little later.
We cannot separate the withdrawal agreement from the political declaration because both parts are essential to the process. It is like selling your house without having any idea where you are going to live afterwards. We would not have the withdrawal agreement without the political declaration. Article 50(2) refers to
“setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.”
My hon. Friend the shadow Solicitor General in his brilliant speech quoted the Prime Minister’s the statement on 14 January. I will repeat one small bit of it. She said:
“One cannot be banked”—
referring to the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration—
without the commitments of the other.”—[Official Report, 14 January 2019; Vol. 652, c. 826.]
Yet the motion before the House today explicitly tries to bank the commitments of one without the commitments of the other. I do not see how that can in any way be consistent with what the Prime Minister told the House of Commons on 14 January.
The second reason why I shall vote against the motion is one of the consequences of passing this motion. The aim—the Attorney-General was frank about it—is to gain an extension to 22 May rather than 12 April by satisfying the requirement of article 1 of the European Council decision of 22 March, which stated:
“In the event that the withdrawal agreement is approved by the House of Commons by 29 March 2019 at the latest, the period provided for in article 50(3) of the Treaty of European Union is extended until 22 May 2019.”
The problem, and my intervention on the Attorney General was trying to address this, is that if we passed this motion and got that extension, by the time we got to the week beginning 20 May, if at that moment we have not yet resolved the question of our future political and economic relationship and the UK decided that it needed to apply for a further extension, the EU is almost certain to refuse any such extension on the grounds that we have failed to take part in the European elections. That is because paragraph 10 of the decision of the European Council, which said:
“If the United Kingdom is still a member state on the 23-26 May 2019”—
which we would be if we asked for and were granted an extension beyond 22 May—
“it will be under the obligation to hold the elections to the European Parliament in accordance with Union law. It is to be noted that the United Kingdom would have to give notice of the poll by 12 April 2019 in order to hold such elections.”
Since it would be impossible on 20 May to give notice to hold elections on 23 May, it would be impossible to comply with this requirement. Therefore, what the motion before the House today means is that, if it were carried, it would in effect rule out any possibility of a further extension under article 50 beyond 22 May. So if, at that point, we have not reached agreement on the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration, this motion would mean the UK leaving without a deal on 22 May. The House voted this week by 400 votes to 160 to reject for the third time leaving with no deal. The only other way forward would be to revoke article 50 to buy ourselves a little bit more time, but the Prime Minister has repeatedly told the House that she would refuse to do so.
Does that not mean that the motion before us should be called not the Withdrawal Bill proposal but the Prevention of the Right of the British People to vote in a European Election Bill proposal?
That would indeed be the consequence if the motion were passed. I will be perfectly frank with the hon. Gentleman. If there were a way round the problem of participation in the European elections, I think many people in the House would seek to find it, but it is clear that the EU in the form of the Commission and the Council and the legal advice has said that that is not possible, and therefore, in effect this is a no-deal motion.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberNot for the first time, I want to talk about the EEA. Just to be absolutely clear, the EEA arrangement is distinctly inferior to the bespoke, deep trade relationship that we would like to negotiate under what I would call plan A, which is the Prime Minister’s policy. Equally, however, it is distinctly superior to WTO rules, if we fail to get a deal and we need a fall-back position. I have always set out that view.
I just remind everyone of a key point that we might have overlooked. People say that they would not want free movement to continue after we leave the EU but, whatever happens, it will be continuing through the transition, and we will not even have an emergency brake, a vote or a say. Even an EFTA member will have a say through co-determination rights in the EEA. It also has to be said that the issue would still be under the jurisdiction of the ECJ, rather than the EFTA court, which is a non-political court.
I have always very much argued that we should support the Prime Minister because we want to get that bespoke deal, and I still believe we will get it—it is the best option available to this country, for all the reasons that have been set out, particularly by those who campaigned to leave. It would be very odd if someone took the view that I have and then, just on the eve of an important negotiation, voted to completely change the Government’s negotiating stance. We should be backing the Prime Minister to achieve that deal. The question is what would happen if we did not have one later in the year, and I sincerely hope that we do not get to that point. I simply warn colleagues not to trash this option too much. It is not so much about burning bridges; we could be concreting over the only escape hatch credibly left to us if we get into a crisis.
Let me just address the immigration point, because the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell) raised it in his very good speech. When I intervened on my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, he confirmed that if we end free movement in this country, we also end the fact that we legally restrict unskilled immigration to people from the European Union and, effectively, open it up to 90% of world’s population. That is a legal fact; we will no longer discriminate. Although we will “control” it, it is non-EU immigration that is now rising sharply. EU migration is falling sharply. Why is it falling sharply? In my view, and from what I hear from employers—this is a very welcome thing—it is because the economies of Poland and Romania are growing, and the well-qualified people who have come here to work on farms and so forth are getting good jobs back in their own countries. My hon. Friend the Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham (Daniel Kawczynski), who is of Polish descent, is agreeing, and that is certainly the situation I have found.
We in this Chamber need to debate unskilled immigration: whether we open it up to everyone, whether we have a visa system and whether we ourselves expect to need visas when we travel within Europe. The EEA is a good backstop, but it is not the ideal long-term position, which is why we should vote to support the Prime Minister today.
Two years ago, we were told that the EU’s unity would shatter, that we would be able to pick off individual countries and get a deal, and that the German manufacturing industry would change the German Government’s position. The reality is that the European Union has kept a consistent position throughout the negotiations. Why? Contrary to the belief of the right-wing Rexiteers and the ideological Lexiteers—we do have some—the European Union is a rules-based, treaty-based organisation for which the four freedoms of the single market are integral.
The idea that we can cherry-pick our relationship with a bespoke British deal, whereby we get the benefits of access to the single market without being a participant in the single market, is an illusion. Whether we have a red cake with great big red cherries or a blue cake with great big blue cherries, the fact is that we will not be able to eat that cake, because we cannot get a better deal or as good a deal as we have in the single market once we have left the European Union.
The reality is that the belief that we could somehow have a bespoke deal that is as good as what we have now was always a fantasy, and the reality is now coming to a head. Because we wasted so much time after triggering article 50, we have ended up in a position where the clock is ticking very, very dangerously. We still have time to stop this process. We still have time to put any deal—if we do get a deal—to the people. But at the end of the day, if we in this Parliament do not assert our control, we will face disaster.
I support Lords amendment 51 on the EEA simply because I think we need a backstop. I predict that we will come back to that issue in the future. I cannot support the Labour Front-Bench amendment to that amendment, because it would take out the EEA, and I will therefore abstain on it.
I rise to talk about Lords amendment 32. Unlike some of my fellow Scots who sit on the Opposition Benches, I will not pretend to speak for all of Scotland in this debate, but I will speak for my constituents, 54% of whom voted to leave the European Union. That should come as no surprise to those familiar with my constituency and its fishing communities. A University of Aberdeen study conducted before the EU referendum reported that 92% of British fishermen across the UK planned to vote leave. In a YouGov poll after the referendum, 79% of voters across the UK—not just fishermen—who expressed an opinion believed that the UK should leave the common fisheries policy. Some 16% agreed to a two-year transition period, and only 6% were in favour of remaining in the CFP.
I support Lords amendment 32, but I would like to clarify what it means for our fishing industry. The amendment does not in any way compromise control over our waters. We will still be leaving the CFP. We will not be subject to the European Fisheries Control Agency and neither will we be required to align with current or future EU fishing regulations. Although the amendment avoids the prevention of the UK replicating EU law if we so require, the UK Government’s ability to diverge from the EU and to pull out of EU agencies, including in areas such as fisheries or agriculture, should not be ignored or forgotten in the wake of the amendment.
The amendment stipulates that nothing in the Bill will prevent the UK from replicating in domestic law any EU law made after Brexit, or from continuing to participate in, or have a formal relationship with, EU agencies. More importantly, it does not require the UK to align with the EU or to participate in new agencies, and nor does it introduce a presumption that the UK will do so. It does not change the fact that the UK will automatically leave the CFP and regain its exclusive economic zone as an independent coastal state when we leave the EU.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI support amendment 57, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), along with several others, but I wish to speak specifically to new clause 9, which I have tabled and which is on the saving of acquired rights in Anguilla. I do not think there has been any discussion at all of Anguilla in any of the proceedings on the Bill so far.
Before Christmas, I tabled a written question to
“ask the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, whether the implementation phase of the UK leaving the EU will be the same for Anguilla as the rest of the UK; and if he will make a statement.”
On 22 December, I received the following answer:
“Both the EU and the UK have been clear that the Implementation Period will be agreed under Article 50 and be part of the Withdrawal Agreement. Both sides have also been clear that the Overseas Territories, including Anguilla, are covered by the Withdrawal Agreement and our Article 50 exit negotiations…In these negotiations, we are seeking a deal that works for the whole UK family, including Anguilla.”
So, there was no clarity there. It is not yet clear what is going to happen with respect to Anguilla.
Why is Anguilla important? We have debated at some length Gibraltar, which has around 32,000 residents. It is a British overseas territory that has been in the possession of the United Kingdom since the treaty of Utrecht in the beginnings of the 18th century. [Interruption.] Yes, indeed, it was 1713. According to the figures I have seen, Anguilla has a population of 15,263, and it has been a British possession since 1650. Just as Gibraltar has a border with an EU country—Spain—so Anguilla has a border with the EU, but with not just one but two EU countries.
Anguilla is in the north of the Leeward Islands, and 8 miles to its south is Saint Martin or, to use the Dutch, Sint Maarten. That island is part of two EU states: the northern 60% of the island has been French territory since an agreement in 1648, and since that same agreement the Kingdom of the Netherlands has possessed the southern 40% of the island. The island of Saint Martin has a complicated history that I do not intend to go into at length, but it is important to discuss its relationship with Anguilla.
Anguilla is one of five British overseas territories in the Caribbean, but it is very much more dependent on its relations with the European Union and with France and the Netherlands than any other British overseas territory. There is an international airport—Princess Juliana—on Saint Martin, but there is no international airport on Anguilla.
Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman could walk on water.
Anguilla is economically dependent on Saint Martin. The relationship is essential for Anguilla. The northern part of the island of Saint Martin, which has been since 2007 a French overseas collectivity, has a population of 38,286. The southern part of the island is one of the four kingdoms that make up the Netherlands, the others being Aruba, Curaçao and the Netherlands proper. France and the Netherlands have a different relationship with their overseas territories than the UK has with ours, and that has changed the dynamics. For example, in September the massive, terrible Hurricane Irma hit the Caribbean and wiped out whole communities and destroyed whole towns. President Macron flew very quickly to visit this integral part of France, where there is a tight, close relationship with the Netherlands.
This afternoon, the Foreign Affairs Committee, on which I serve, is discussing the overseas territories and the response to hurricanes. I hope to get to the Committee in time to hear a representative of the Government of Anguilla’s London office give evidence, but I cannot be in two places at the same time. I hope I will be able to speak in advance and ask questions later.
The population of Sint Maarten, the Netherlands part, is around 33,000, so the total population of the island to the south of Anguilla is around 75,000. It is much larger and much more important, so there are fundamental economic questions to be answered about what will happen when—if—the UK leaves the EU.
The hon. Gentleman will know that my colleagues in the Department for Exiting the European Union have been engaging with Britain’s overseas territories, including Anguilla, through the Joint Ministerial Council and other mechanisms. Does he agree that that is a perfectly adequate mechanism that should continue, and that that means his new clause is not necessary?
No, I do not agree that it is a perfectly adequate mechanism. The report published by the Government of Anguilla’s London office last summer, “Anguilla and Brexit: Britain’s Forgotten EU Border”, points out how we do not give sufficient attention to the needs and requirements of our overseas territories. Let me quote just one example: the position with regard to overseas development assistance. Since 2014, we have virtually stopped giving Anguilla any overseas development assistance through the Department for International Development budget, in contrast to some other overseas territories such as Montserrat and elsewhere, and yet it is receiving assistance from the European Union. There is a big concern, which I will come to later, about what will happen to the continued assistance that goes to Anguilla once we leave the EU. That assistance accounts for about 36% of the capital expenditure of the Anguillan Government. That huge amount comes as a result of assistance from the European Union, and it goes to Anguilla by virtue of UK membership of the EU, but once we stop paying into EU development assistance, does anybody think that the EU will continue to finance a British overseas territory when there is no longer any relationship between the UK and the European Union? These are very complicated questions.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way and for treating us to the shorter version of his speech. Does he welcome the communiqué signed by the Government and the territories, which said that the UK acknowledged
“the importance of EU funding for sustainable economic development in some Overseas Territories and committed to ensuring that these interests were fully reflected in the UK’s negotiating position”?
Does he not think that that will be of great assistance to Anguilla and other overseas territories?
No, I do not; it is just words. It is all about what will happen in the negotiations. How much money are we prepared to put in? Will there be a payment into the EU budget in order to continue EU assistance to Anguilla, which does not come directly from DFID at this time? Those are interesting and complicated questions.
Like the UK, Anguilla lies outside the Schengen area, which also does not apply to French St Martin. Under EU Council articles 349 and 355 of the Treaty of Lisbon, French St Martin is classified as an outermost region of France, while Dutch Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Anguilla are classified as overseas countries and territories of the EU. In 2017, in a factsheet entitled “Outermost regions”, the European Union’s Parliament stated:
“Regardless of the great distance separating them from the European continent, the outermost regions are an integral part of the European Union, and the acquis communautaire is fully applicable in their territory. However, owing to their specific geographical location and the related difficulties, EU policies have had to be adjusted to their special situation.
The relevant measures concern, in particular, areas such as customs and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture and fisheries policies, and conditions for supply of raw materials and essential consumer goods.”
The outermost regions of the EU are specifically mandated by the EU and, as such, will require specific negotiation in the context of Brexit to take account of their needs. The problem that I face is that the Government have not given us any detail either in the written answer that I have secured or on any other basis as to what they will do to protect the interests of Anguilla. Unlike Gibraltar, Anguilla does not have an effective big lobbying operation, because it does not have a relationship with City financial institutions in the same way. It is very much dependent on tourism. One of its problems is that, because it does not have an international airport, flights go into St Martin, and, at present, at 10 o’clock at night, there is no means of transit from Anguilla to St Martin. Consequently, people have to stay in St Martin and not go across to Anguilla because of those difficulties in communication.
We need to be able to help Anguilla help its tourist industry, and the best way to do that would be within the framework of the European Union, but of course the referendum decision and the way that it is being implemented by the Government mean that that will not be possible. As a result, Anguilla faces some real difficulties and dilemmas: 95% of its access for tourism and other economic measures will be subject to deliberations between EU member states during the course of the Brexit negotiations. Its fuel and desalination capacity will be exposed to negotiations on whether tariffs are to be added to oil imports from the Dutch island of Sint Eustatius.
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. I do not want to interrupt his most eloquent speech, but does he not agree that the irony is that Anguilla reflects the position that we will find ourselves in at the edge of Europe should we leave? Indeed, it is a concern that the Government have not given any sensible or sufficient answers to his queries, and it bodes ill.
Actually, I do not agree. The UK has far bigger clout in the world than a small island with a population of just 15,000. My hon. Friend is right that we will be damaged—there is no doubt about it—by self-inflicted harm, but, as President Donald Tusk pointed out today, we can of course change our minds, and if we do so he would be delighted.
The position with regard to Anguilla is potentially one of a country with a problematic border. I have referred already to that closure at 10 o’clock at night. If, once we leave the EU, relations between the UK and France become worse than they are now, how do Ministers and Government Members think that we will be able to speak for the interests of this British overseas territory when we are not able to succeed today in getting everything that it needs? We would have less influence and no seat at the table. We would not be in the room and we would not be able to say anything to help it.
I do not wish to take too long, but there are important points about peoples whose voice has not been heard in this Chamber. Between 2012 and 2014, Anguilla did receive some UK official development assistance, but it was a very small sum, amounting to only £141 per person. Since then, there has not been such support. However, Montserrat received £14,000 per person and St Helena, which is even more remote, received £66,000 per person in ODA.
Anguilla is worried that after the UK has left—if we leave—the European Union, EU initiatives that currently occur within the overseas territories will no longer continue. Anguilla understands that ODA will be vital, but that support has steadily declined and its people are worried about the threat to the European Union funds. As part of the UK Caribbean Infrastructure Fund, a £300 million programme was announced in September 2015, in order to fund infrastructure such as roads, bridges and ports across the Caribbean, via the various banks and the Department for International Development, but Anguilla is very concerned about what will happen in the long term.
Does my hon. Friend agree that this is one of a number of examples? A place such as Anguilla or an industry such as farming has no sense of certainty about how or whether the Government will replace funding that will be lost after—or if—we leave the European Union. Does he think that the Government are not being clear about the future because they have not yet worked it out, or because they fear that if people see what the situation will be after we leave the European Union, they may begin to wake up to the fact that what is on offer is very much inferior to what we have now?
I actually think, in the case of Anguilla, it is because the Government have never even thought about it. Only now are issues like this coming up to bite them. We could have had an impact assessment on Anguilla. It would be nice to know whether there was such a thing; I suspect not. The Government did not give any consideration to these issues when they triggered article 50, so they probably did not even consider that.
In “Anguilla & Brexit: Britain’s Forgotten EU Border”, which was published last summer, the Government of Anguilla call for four things. First, they want a
“Common travel area between Saint Martin and Anguilla”,
and state that
“protocol 22 of the EU Treaties…provides that the UK and another EU member state…may continue to make arrangements between themselves for the free movement of people within the CTA.”
The same model is adopted for Ireland because of the historical relationships. A common travel area would be a way to prevent an economic and social disaster for Anguilla. In practice, it would mean free movement of nationals of the French and Dutch St Martin and Sint Maarten, and Anguilla, between those islands with a
“frictionless border without the need for passport control.”
It would also allow visitors flying into St Martin from any country in the world to go to Anguilla easily as tourists.
Secondly, the Government of Anguilla call for a customs union in the region
“with European countries, territories and municipalités in the eastern Caribbean.”
There has been a lot of talk about customs unions. I do not wish to repeat the debate that we have already had, as this issue will come back, but a customs union between the European Union territories in the region, the other countries in the region and the overseas territories of the United Kingdom could be really helpful in the Caribbean. Anguilla imports oil and other essential materials that it cannot exist without. It also exports fresh produce, which is predominantly sold to St Martin. There is therefore a real need for some kind of customs relationship that avoids tariffs and barriers.
Thirdly, the Government of Anguilla call for a
“Continued relationship between the UK and EU for the purposes of international development”,
as well as,
“Continued membership of the Overseas Countries and Territories Association of the European Union of Anguilla with full access to European Development Funds and support”.
Now, that may come at a cost. Are the British Government prepared to pay that cost in the negotiations? If they do not there will, as I have already suggested, be a major impact on the Anguillan economy and future development.
Fourthly and finally, the Government of Anguilla are looking to
“Stronger ties between Anguilla and Britain”.
This country has neglected our overseas territories for far too long. We do not give them the status that overseas territories have in France or the Netherlands. There is a wider issue that is not just about Anguilla and on which the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs may well comment after we have completed our current inquiry: we need a better ongoing relationship with these small communities of 15,000 people whose association with the United Kingdom goes back to the 17th century—longer, as I pointed out at the beginning, than the association of Gibraltar with the United Kingdom.
I strongly agree with the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) that the United Kingdom could strengthen her links and ties with Anguilla and could be very supportive as we go through Brexit. I trust that those on the Government Front Bench have listened carefully to what he has been saying. As far as I know, they have good will towards Anguilla. He mentioned some positive ideas about how the UK can help more and develop that relationship, which I welcome and which I suspect the Government may welcome.
I will respond briefly to the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). In her remarks—we have heard this in the many SNP speeches during the debates on the Bill—she referred again to the way in which Scottish voters had a different view from UK voters as a whole on the referendum and she implied that that had great constitutional significance. I urge her to think again. I pointed out to her that, had Scotland voted to be independent in its referendum, I do not think it would have mattered at all if, in a subsequent election—I think that there would probably have been one quite quickly—a lot of people in England had voted the other way and said, “No, we’d like Scotland to stay in.”