European Union Bill

Michael Connarty Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Neil Carmichael]

Many apologies, Mr Speaker—it is a long time since I have had quite so many interventions. The key thing here is the quality of the decision. If a Minister came along and tried to defend a decision that this House was unhappy about, this House should say so. That is the right approach.

[Michael Connarty (Linlithgow and East Falkirk) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Neil Carmichael]

I will, but it is the last intervention I will take.

[Michael Connarty]

May I suggest a much simpler piece of logic to explain why the new clause would probably not be helpful? If the hon. Gentleman has ever attended a European Committee, whose members are supplied with a large volume of documentation that they are supposed to read before debating the issue and taking a position when voting, he will realise that most do not read it. The more information that is supplied on European matters, the more paper that is provided, which will not be read.

[Neil Carmichael]

That is a really good point to end on. The hon. Member for—

[Michael Connarty]

Linlithgow and East Falkirk.

[Neil Carmichael]

Right. [Laughter.] That is longer than Stroud.

That is an important point to end on, because I do not think that everyone does read everything they should, and we have come across that in the past. The European Scrutiny Committee is under the excellent chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for— [Hon Members: “Stone.”]—for Stone (Mr Cash), but one of the things I noted before becoming a Member was that scrutiny of European measures, if carried out at all, was not thorough. I have done some research and found that decisions have literally been nodded through, which is characteristic of these kinds of issues. It is far better for this House to consider the outcomes seriously, because it is the outcomes that matter. That has always been the case in decision making. Sometimes the process that we use needs to be scrutinised because the outcome is not so good, and clearly we might want to test that.

We should never undermine the capacity of a British Minister to represent our interests and make adjustments to his or her position while in negotiations with other nation states. I repeat that if we were having this discussion about the United Nations or NATO, for example, I do not think we would be talking in these terms, because we understand the value of empowering Ministers to make decisions on our behalf and report back with outcomes that are to our liking.

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[Mr MacShane]

We will see what happens on Friday. I am concerned, as all hon. Members ought to be, that because we are not in the euro—for perfectly good reasons—Britain is not as fully involved as the other deciders in many areas of decision making. We will leave that to be revealed in Friday’s meeting and future discussions.

I am very attracted to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty). We can now, in the House of Commons, announce the new Connarty law: there is a precise ratio whereby the more paper provided on any European decision, the less real discussion and debate there is thereon. I hope that he will agree that that new Connarty law should be enshrined as an official part of how we do business in Europe.

I remember that for the constitutional Convention, on which my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston valiantly represented the House of Commons, the then Foreign Secretary and myself set up a special Select Committee and published everything. We had regular meetings for the sake of accountability, but not a single Opposition Front Bencher ever came to them and they were often inquorate. The hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) was valiantly present at every meeting, but his party leadership was absent. Again, that reflects the Connarty law—the more opportunity and information right hon. and hon. Members are given on Europe, the less inclined they are to take it up and debate it.

[Michael Connarty]

I think that what I said was that the more paperwork that is provided, the less it is read. Information can and should be given, and Ministers do not give it often enough from the Dispatch Box or in evidence. They try to hide information. It is paperwork that frightens people, not information.

[Mr MacShane]

I am very happy to have that minor revision to the Connarty law—the more paper people are given on the European Union, the less it is read, debated and discussed.

[Michael Connarty]

indicated assent.

[Mr MacShane]

Good, we have now established that once and for all.

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[Mr Shepherd]

That is the argument, and I am glad that it was so briskly conveyed. On that note, I urge the House to support the new clause.

[Michael Connarty]

I hope not to delay the House for too long. I am actually a signatory to this new clause, but I hope that the hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) will withdraw it. It was an attempt to ask for a process in which information should be provided to make sense of any proposal under section 4, which is mentioned in clause 5 on statements to the House. The truth is that there is a problem with the understanding of, and interest in, the decisions made in the European Council, which are then enacted by this Parliament and which affect the citizens, businesses and communities that we represent.

The hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) is always keen for us to be more informed, but I am not sure that the new clause would achieve that. Listening to the debate, I have become more and more convinced that more and more documentation does not mean more and more information. We need to look carefully at how the House treats the process involved. There are, I think, six members and one former member of the European Scrutiny Committee here today, and we tend to take a lot of interest in these matters, but there is not the same breadth of understanding, information gathering or discussion of European matters in the generality of the House.

Much can be explained by changes in the structure of how Parliament deals with European issues. We used to have European Standing Committees, with specific designations as A, B and C, specific remits and a fixed membership of 13 each, and they debated every single issue that came from the European Council about which the European Scrutiny Committee was not happy. What happens now is that a randomised group of people chosen by the Committee of Selection turn up now and then and the Committees have no sense of a specific remit. They are still foolishly called A, B and C as if they still have specific remits, but when a Minister brings forward provisions to change our position and bring in new law on the basis of a directive, regulation or other proposal from the European Commission, very few people understand what that Minister is doing.

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[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

I am attracted by the hon. Gentleman’s argument about the need for a change in the way this House deals with European policy. Is not the logic of his argument, however, that we need to go back to an earlier stage, whereby we as legislators should be involved, pre-negotiations and pre-discussions, in thematic debates and policy statements so that we can make some input to the Commission and the institutions of Europe? Does he accept that?

[Michael Connarty]

I not only accept it; I fully endorse and applaud it. There is a work programme that comes forward from the European Commission, and it is debated in Westminster Hall, but very few people turn up: that is the reality. We have tried to engage a number of Select Committees by referring to them matters of interest to the European Scrutiny Committee, which continues to be chaired ably by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash). We are trying to engage Select Committees in those issues so that the European Scrutiny Committee and then the House could be advised of any European matters of substance that should be considered.

We could therefore change aspects of the apparatus we use before reaching the point to which the new clause refers, where a Minister is recommending a referendum. When this clause is triggered, the Government will have decided that they want to do whatever it is the referendum has been called to consider. It will be a referendum on a Government proposal, perhaps for a new treaty or a new decision that will change our relationship with Europe.

Let me finish by providing one example. We took a decision a long time ago—it was probably agreed across the Chamber because it was politically sensitive for us not to opt into all of the Amsterdam treaty—whereby we did not become members of the Schengen group of countries. That group is effectively all the European Union countries apart from us. Frontex, the new border police, is now trying to throw a ring around Europe and it is going to be heavily pressurised by migration from other parts of the world—particularly from Africa, and perhaps very quickly from north Africa. We are not a member of Frontex because we are not a Schengen country. We sit on the board—Frontex has been quite nice to us, even though we did not sign up to it—so we asked whether any of our officers engaged in a Frontex operation could have the same protection from prosecution as other Frontex officers. We are told “No, because you are not a member of the Schengen group.” The train is leaving the station very quickly to protect the rest of Europe, and the United Kingdom is running at the back waving a little flag saying “Can we join? But we do not want to be full members.”

We ought to be fully informed of the consequences of decisions such as that. I am not talking about those who are, for reasons of prejudice, Eurosceptic and against doing things on an EU basis, in the belief that they can somehow be done on a bilateral basis with 26 other countries. If we had been fully informed, we would have concluded that membership of Frontex was important enough for us to take the step of joining the Schengen countries and being a real part of Europe.

Although such information and debate would be extremely useful, that will not be made possible by the new clause, and I therefore hope that it will be withdrawn. However, we need to make those changes in the Chamber if our constituents are to understand that we know what we are talking about in Europe, and that we are acting on the basis of analysis and proper information rather than prejudice.

[Charlie Elphicke]

It is a privilege to follow the extraordinarily interesting and thoughtful speech of the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty). The debate on the new clause has been largely underpinned by a dislike and distrust of the European Union and its works, and I share that distrust. Many Members feel that an organisation that spends vast swathes of our money and imposes massive increases in our budget contributions in return for no obvious value, at a time of great downturn across the continent, is not an organisation that is in touch with this country—or any other country. They do not trust an organisation that feels so remote from the electors of this country and every other country in the European Union. Even in Germany, an increasing number of people are finding the European Union and its works troubling.

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[Michael Connarty]

I could share many happy memories of that lady turning up in Standing Committees of which she was not a member and holding Ministers to account because of her interest in the subject. Cross-border health care, for example, although not her speciality, was a cause célèbre for her.

I compliment the previous Government and the present Government for continuing to send draft Council conclusions to the European Scrutiny Committee. That is what a lot of Members, such as the hon. Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke), have been talking about—actually seeing the proposals that are before the Council before they are discussed in the Council. The difficulty is that they are “limité” documents and are therefore semi-confidential. If there was a method that allowed a Committee or group of people in Parliament to have that responsibility—as is done in Denmark and Finland—and to interrogate the Minister on those documents, it would be a great step forward.

[Mr Lidington]

That is certainly an interesting suggestion. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his compliment. We intend to continue the practice of supplying “limité” documents whenever appropriate.

There is sometimes an issue about where the boundary of responsibility should lie between the European Scrutiny Committee and the various departmental Select Committees. If I have one reflection to offer from my experience in the 10 months that I have held my responsibilities, it is that parliamentary debate on this country’s engagement with the EU tends to take place in a metaphorical annexe. It is as though Parliament had constructed a separate, padded building, where the equivalent of the teenagers with their drum kits could get up to what they wanted. There is a serious question to be asked about whether our arrangements do justice to the fact that the European decision-making and legislative process should now be regarded as part of the mainstream of politics in the UK, rather than as something that can be relegated to an annexe.

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[Michael Connarty]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, whose speeches I always read, if not always hear. He is very erudite and thoughtful in what he proposes, but today he seems to be saying that this Bill should be raised to a higher level than all the others passed by this House, apart from the European Communities Act 1972, which was given that status, which he opposes, by the courts. He is trying to put this Bill on a par with that Act, and although he does not like the process whereby the courts allocate that status, he says that it should also be allocated to this Bill, by this place.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The hon. Gentleman has half got what I have been saying and has half misconstrued it. I do not think it right that laws passed by Parliament should be put on a different level based on what judges think of them retrospectively. I do not think that that is a democratic way of deciding which law is important and which is unimportant. One may think that the judges will always get it right, but what if they decided that the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 was amazingly important and this Bill was not, so that the 1991 Act could not be impliedly repealed, but one giving people a vote in a referendum could be? What I am saying is that it is better for us to take this power upon ourselves and say, “Okay, this is an important Act. We’re going to put that in, and say that it is exempt from the Parliament Act 1911.”

The hon. Gentleman asked a good question, which is: why start with this particular Bill? The reasons for starting with this Bill are, first, that the judgment putting the 1972 Act on to a higher plane is relatively recent, and secondly, that I was elected to Parliament only last May and have therefore not had the opportunity before to propose such a measure on a major constitutional Bill, other than the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. The reasons for starting with this Bill are because of that judgment, and because I am now in a position to do this. It would have been a good thing to do earlier, on other constitutional Bills, including on devolution to Scotland.

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[Charlie Elphicke]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I conclude my remarks.

[Michael Connarty]

First, may I compliment the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) on the eloquence both of the construction of his new clause and of his delivery in arguing for it? I believe that the new clause is flawed. He suggested that the evidence that we had received—he kept referring to Lord Justice Laws’ ruling—was correct, but we received evidence from many other people that it was incorrect. It was suggested that we could not establish two tiers of laws just because a judge decided to make a remark in court, and that all laws, including the European Communities Act 1972, stand the same and can have implied amendment and repeal.

If Parliament decided to pass a law here that was contrary to a ruling, directive or regulation of the European Union, it would still stand as a law. The dilemma would then be whether the European Court of Justice would have the right to overrule that decision or whether we would press on our courts our decision in the new Act, which would cause a judgment to be called for in the European Court. If no one called for such a judgment on an Act that we had passed contrary to a regulation or directive of the European Union, it would continue to apply. It would not be knocked down, and no penalties would be imposed on the UK, unless someone called for the European Court of Justice to make a judgment on that new Act. So it was nonsense to suggest that in 1972 we had suddenly created an Act that was incapable of implied repeal or amendment.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The evidence that we received focused on the “notwithstanding” approach—that is, that one could not accidentally repeal, or move, an Act that was contrary to the 1972 Act; one would have to do it explicitly. That is different from most other Acts of Parliament that can impliedly be repealed. This is where we come back to Lord Justice Laws’ judgment, which has been de facto accepted.

[Michael Connarty]

Just to remind everyone who reads these tomes, the 1972 Act embodied a decision by this Parliament that laws, directives and regulations drawn up by the European Union should take primacy over an Act covering the same area passed by this Parliament. It was our decision to use our sovereignty to give that primacy as part of the deal of going into the European Union.

My understanding of the evidence is that if we passed an Act that did not contain a “notwithstanding” clause or set out to be a deliberate challenge, and that simply put in place a law that we wished to have, it would have to be challenged and taken to the European Court of Justice before it created any conflict. So the question is: do we accept that that was right and that the judges have the right to do that?

I suggest that if the hon. Member for North East Somerset genuinely wishes to see that change, he should not apply to the good offices of the 1911 Parliament Act. I agree with the hon. Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) that it is wrong that we should appeal to an undemocratic institution. I believe that we should look to a justice Act of some kind to determine that judges cannot make such a ruling or decide that there are two kinds of laws in this country. Some people think that the European Union takes up a lot of time, but I think that the more important laws are those that will determine what is going to happen to people’s pensions in this country or to their employment rights. I hope that the hon. Member for North East Somerset will come back to the House with a justice proposal, which I would be happy to support, saying that the courts cannot make a ruling that overrules the right of this democratic Chamber to decide the law of this land.

[Austin Mitchell]

I am trying to follow the argument, but, being a European argument, it is very difficult to follow. Surely the situation is that if we pass a law that negates the implementation of a European Union law in this country, our courts would have to accept the European Union law rather than ours. We could not pass such a law unless we specifically exempted it from the European Communities Act 1972.

[Michael Connarty]

My hon. Friend’s point is correct, but that is not what we are talking about. He describes a situation in which this or any Government decided to challenge the original decision. A law could be passed that would continue to run contrary to European Union law; I believe that that is happening in many countries. We and the Norwegians are the most obsessed with trying to get everything right in terms of fitting in with European directives. A challenge could be made, however, and we would then have to decide whether it was right for us to negotiate a change in the relationship or to abandon our law and accept the ruling of the European Union. At the moment, that does not happen.

My main point is that we in this democratically elected Chamber can overturn these decisions at any time if we have the will to do so. We are not bound by them for ever. Like any other law, we will be able to challenge this legislation in this Chamber, which is why I do not believe that we have to go through the rather tortuous, although eloquently described, process of applying an amendment to the Parliament Act 1911.

On the ability of the Lords to protect us from changes to our democracy, they have not protected us from this shabby coalition, which is proposing a law that would guarantee that the coalition would run for five years—a proposal that I spoke against in the first debate in this place after the election—unless the shabby minority part of that shabby coalition, the Liberal Democrats, decide to pull it down, because no other person in this place could do that. If the Lords could protect us from that, I might have more confidence in the 1911 Act.

[Mr Cash]

I should like to endorse the general thrust of the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), although I must qualify that slightly by saying that I do not take the view that there is a difference between different types of statute. However, that does not make a material difference to the thrust of his argument, which is that we must at all costs preserve the right of this House ultimately to make the decisions. Indeed, in the 1870s—it might have been earlier—the statesman John Bright put forward the proposition that led to the Parliament Act 1911, some 30 years before it was implemented, precisely because he did not believe in privilege, in aristocracy or in the House of Lords as it was then constituted.

The reality is that we can achieve the objectives by adopting the new clause without necessarily accepting that the House of Lords could not become an elected body if that were the view of this House in due course. I do not accept the proposition put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) because so long as we have a second Chamber, the House of Lords will be the House of Lords—irrespective of whether it is elected.

The question of constitutional statutes has been introduced as a notion, but it is not intrinsic to the argument. What is essential is to ensure that we do not allow the Supreme Court to adjudicate over and above the decisions taken by our Parliament. That is the key issue. Some futile commentators—and, if I may say so, some Members of this House—mislead themselves from time to time by suggesting that sovereignty is not such an important issue. The reason for its importance is very simple: we Members are elected to make decisions, and all the other issues, such as dealing with burdens on business and so forth, stem from that. That explains my view of the European Union, which is that, where necessary, the sovereign Parliament should override through the “notwithstanding” formula to which my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset rightly referred and which I have employed on a number of occasions when I have been supported by Conservative Front-Bench Members—for example, when we were in opposition and with respect to the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, and on other occasions.

What we need to insist on above all—it cropped up in the previous debate—is that this House on behalf of the electorate represents the democratic process whereby we are voted in to make decisions. We must insist on that at the expense of judicial supremacy. Even though I am the first to say that it is for the courts to interpret legislation, it is not for them to make it. That is the fundamental point. I thoroughly endorse both the sentiments and the wording of the new clause.

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[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Well, they do have a say through the Government they elect, and the Government do negotiate these things in the multi-annual packages. As I said in a debate on a previous new clause, this is one way of making sure that if the Government decided it was practical for us to have a rise in the amount of money being spent in the European institutions, the people would have a say on how much it would be. I accept that own resources is covered in some ways in the Bill, but I thought I would phrase the new clause in such a way that it would give the Minister a chance to tell the House exactly what the British Government’s views are on matters of taxation coming in at the European level. My new clause would at least introduce the principle of referendums on own resources decisions bringing about substantial changes in EU taxation, and require future Governments to go through a more exacting process to agree to such changes, which would expend significant political capital if they were proposing something clearly out of line with what the British people want.

The new clauses address the crux of the debate, which is the scrutiny of European matters. We in this place do not do scrutiny half as well as we should. On Third Reading, I hope to speak about how we might improve scrutiny and what the Government should do.

[Michael Connarty]

I want to speak briefly in support of new clauses 3, 4 and 5. They get to the meat of the discussion we should have been having with the Government before they introduced this silly Bill. It is silly because it is never likely to be used, as there are so many ways that a Government Minister of any political complexion who wishes to continue with the European project can get measures through Parliament, such as by saying that they are insignificant or that it is not necessary to have an Act of Parliament. Therefore, I do not think that the Bill’s measures will be used a great deal. It is based on the premise that the Government want to put in place the measures they introduce, and presumably a Government of any complexion will know that they need a majority in the House in order to introduce any measure that they might decide is significant enough to be dealt with by a referendum or an Act of Parliament.

In reality, therefore, the Bill is a bit of a public relations exercise. But the new clauses are not. They would address the things that are wrong at the moment with the process of dealing with the emergency brake. It should be in place and it should be used properly in a way that gives a Government a chance to speak on behalf of their Parliament and their people in the Council in a fundamental way. New clauses 3 and 4 are very attractive, because would give teeth and meat—a bit of beef—to a Bill that lacks that completely. The Bill is a list of things which might be on the mind of the body politic and perhaps the anti-European press, but it does not have any substance. The new clauses have substance, as they lay out clearly how the brake should be used.

There is absolutely no doubt that new clause 5 is necessary. It deals with a tax and we should have had a similar clause, somewhere along the line, on the giving away of our social security rights. It is clear that people who come to this country to work see social security as an extra payment that does not come out of the pocket of their employer. When someone leaves their family back in Poland, where they still have their house, to come to this country to work, they get all the benefits required under our social security legislation—tax credits, child tax credits and so on—which they often send back home. They also often end up with a council house, because they then bring their family to this country and live in overcrowded conditions, and they leave their house back there being paid for by the British taxpayer. All those things might have been examined seriously if we had had a provision such as new clause 5 to deal with how social security would transfer.

Clearly the own resources arrangement is a tax and will be about creating a European tax as a substitute for VAT. I have been at conferences and seminars called by the Commission in other countries to press that point heavily, and thank goodness Treasury officials were there to argue hard against such an arrangement. We might say that it was one of the three red lines, because we said that tax was a red line that would not be crossed. However, the own resources debate will clearly be pressed again and again by the Commission, which will try to convince us that the proposed arrangement is not a breach of one of those red lines. New clause 5 would put up a nice barrier that we would have to cross purposefully and decisively if we wanted to move away from that red line. I commend the hon. Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) for his tenacity, even at this late stage, in tabling well thought-out new clauses. I do not think that they come from a Eurosceptic, anti-European view; they would just be common sense and make good legislation.

[Mr Cash]

I wish to speak about my amendment 1, because it is important not only in principle, but in practice as we move forward on the negotiations taking place on two main issues. The first is European economic governance as a whole and the other is the, as yet, unformulated competitiveness package, which is coming up in the lift and being promoted vigorously in some other parts of the European Union.

The issue turns on the Bill’s proposal for the circumstances in which a treaty or an article 48(6) decision attracts a referendum. Under clause 4(4)(b), we would not have a referendum where

“the making of any provision that applies only to member States other than the United Kingdom”

came into play. It might sound obvious that we would not want to have a referendum if it did not affect us but, unfortunately, that rather innocuous wording raises a substantial and profound problem.

I remember Chancellor Kohl talking in the 1990s about the need to move forward with a two-tier Europe and he used the analogy of a convoy. The Minister for Europe is doubtless aware of what is coming up in the lift, but he should also be very worried about it because it is one of the greatest and most serious problems that we face. Many people, including distinguished commentators from the Financial Times and other newspapers, take an interest in these matters and get to the root of what is going on in Europe at the moment. Rather than merely having a convoy of ships travelling at different speeds with the slowest eventually being required to catch up—that was Chancellor Kohl’s analogy—these proposals on European economic governance are the equivalent of having an aircraft carrier of the eurozone and a rowing boat of the other member states that are left behind.

I do not believe for one minute that we should be in any way trapped or lured—to use the Prime Minister’s words—into engaging in the kind of European economic governance proposals that apply to the eurozone or to the competitiveness package on their own merits. Given the record of the European Union, neither has worked, is likely to work or will work. But there is a danger in our acquiescing in allowing the other member states to go ahead by participating in the given procedure, be it the ordinary legislative procedure, the special procedure, the special purposes vehicle or something that arises by virtue of a treaty. The key test is whether it

“substantially affects all or any of the political, economic, fiscal, social or constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and other Member States of the European Union.”

That is how my amendment 1 puts it.

If something falls into that category, as I firmly believe these proposals do, it clearly affects our fundamental relationship with the European Union in such a way as to require a referendum. We went through the arguments about the constitutional treaty and all that followed from it, and we went through the subsequent arguments about the Lisbon treaty and insisted on a referendum on it, because these things affected this fundamental relationship. I am talking about the Conservative party, rather than the coalition, which is quite a different thing. The basis on which we presented our argument for a referendum was that the treaty was creating a fundamental difference in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

I cannot think of anything more likely to demonstrate that fundamental difference than the implementation of these procedures, irrespective of the legal niceties of defining the transfer of powers or competences—I could argue that there is, but that is not the issue I am raising. I am saying that the key question is the substance of what is being done, not merely the choice of specific words employed—not in the Bill, but merely in the coalition agreement—about the transfer of powers or competences. I defy anybody to find the words in the Bill which say that wherever there is a transfer of power or competence there will be a referendum. That is not what the Bill says; it chooses a list of circumstances, specifically but not generically, where a referendum will be required. That is a fatal flaw in the Bill, but the real problem is the substance of what is being decided in a given treaty or article 48(6) arrangement. To my mind, the creation of a two-tier Europe, with the United Kingdom bound into it by acquiescence, puts us at risk because it creates the aircraft carrier of Europe and we are left in the rowing boat.