English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMiatta Fahnbulleh
Main Page: Miatta Fahnbulleh (Labour (Co-op) - Peckham)Department Debates - View all Miatta Fahnbulleh's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPithy answers, please.
Tracy Brabin: The mayoral precept is democratically held by the mayor for the public. It would be for transport projects; it would be allocated to something specific. For example, the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, uses it for young people’s travel. The Bill widens the opportunity to use the precept, but none of the public would be happy if you were paying off debts. It is fundamentally for betterment of and investment in communities, in the way that the police and crime commissioner precept is held to deliver better outcomes, whether that is more police community support officers on the street or initiatives around violence against women and girls. It is democratically held by the mayor. We have not introduced it as yet in West Yorkshire, but others have.
Donna Jones: I will be very brief because I am conscious that there are lots of Members on the Committee. The referendum limit is the prohibitor. Essentially, a mayor, like a police and crime commissioner and a council, can precept to the level that they want, but you have to have a referendum if you are going over that limit. Although the Government are right to want some checks and balances, so that you do not get areas that are really out of kilter with others, a referendum is prohibitive: it becomes very political, and it is very costly to do. Therefore, I think there should be a simpler mechanism if a mayor wants to precept above the Secretary of State’s agreed level. Perhaps that could be with written consent from the Secretary of State, as opposed to a referendum.
Ben Houchen: I am not a fan of mayoral precepts generally. I have not raised one, and have promised ever since I was elected not to raise one. Some transparency could be brought to the legislation. You have mayoral precepts, you have transport levies, and there is lobbying from a number of mayors around tourism taxes and so on. From a constituent point of view, forgetting the rights and wrongs of it, all that could be consolidated into a single precept, rather than having a separate transport levy, which can be quite opaque, particularly where you have new combined authorities. Some of those taxations are merged into combined authorities, and who has actually raised the levy can be quite lost. It ultimately all comes into the combined authority once it is established, but the Committee could take away the question of how that could be consolidated to streamline the precept. From the public’s point of view, the mayor has the ability to raise a mayoral precept; there is no reason to have a transport levy as well. For transparency’s sake, that should be clarified as a single levy, if you are going to have one.
Q
Tracy Brabin: I will be pithy—and congratulations on your role, by the way; I know that we have a champion by our side. What is important is the way that we can collectively come to a consensus on the Mayoral Council and say, “The mayors are agreed that this is the next step,” and then the Government have to explain why we cannot have it. There is also an opportunity for individual mayors to have something of value that relates to them and their region specifically. The key to that, Minister, is surely for it to be as straightforward and efficient as possible, rather than hoops and processes.
As mayors, one of the things that we are discussing at the moment is taxi licensing. Just to give you the numbers, 49% of private hires operating in Greater Manchester are licensed by authorities outside of the 10 local authorities. We know, from Baroness Casey’s work about violence against women and girls, how that is a weakness in the system when it comes to the safety of young women. As mayors, we are looking to the council to help us to understand how we can do that more efficiently, but that may be something that affects only some urban metro mayors and not others. It is about how we can collectively ask, which is a really fast-track process, but then there will be individual conversations.
Donna Jones: I really welcome the right to request. Following on from what Tracy just said about mayors and their unique geographical areas, in my patch, I—or whoever is successful next year—will have the largest island, aside from Ireland itself, of course, that we represent in part of England: the Isle of Wight. That piece of water creates a lot of problems for the Isle of Wight in terms of the supply chain and the skills market; things are a lot more expensive on the Isle of Wight.
One of the things that I am really pleased about is that the Government are looking, through the Bill to establish Great British Railways, which is coming forward, to give mayors greater powers around the planning, performance, improvement and project management of rail networks in their areas. I argue that that should be extended to ferries, particularly for my area. The Isle of Wight has three main transporters: Wightlink and Red Funnel are the two car and foot passenger ferries, and Hovertravel is a hovercraft that runs until 6.30 pm every day. For a lot of people who live on the island, it is cost prohibitive to travel off it and back. If it is not included in Committee or picked up by you, Minister, I will be requesting the right to have a regulator power over the ferry companies that operate across the Solent, because of course they need Crown permission to operate across that piece of water.
Following on from Tracy’s point about the uniqueness of certain geographical areas, I think that there are other good things, such as lane rental approval. I love the idea of that. Utility companies are given permission by the highway authority to dig up the road, and it goes on and on. That has an effect on transport, pollution and people’s travel to work time, and it has a knock-on effect on economic growth in the area, putting people off travelling to or from work or taking up jobs. We have to look at that. Giving mayors the ability to effectively tax or fine companies every day they go over the set period of two weeks, or however long it would be, is absolutely key. I could go on—there are some brilliant things in here—but I welcome what you are trying to achieve.
Ben Houchen: The right to request is an interesting one. There is a bit of an academic argument about the Government wanting to standardise mayoral powers so they are same across the board, but then the right to request, if done correctly, would allow for differentiation. There is an issue about whether we are looking for a standard model or whether we want more of a patchwork. That is for members of the Committee to think about, but it is important: at the nth degree, if you have differentiation through the right to request, you could have areas with hugely different powers. That is going to create political problems, with people feeling like one area has more control than another.
Administration from a central Government point of view is also difficult. Irrespective of devolution, there is always a clawback into central Government. That is probably right, rather than giving us carte blanche over everything, but it goes back to the strategic question about what you want to happen. The ultimate right to request—this is where you are going to have proper devolution that allows for earned autonomy over time—is the relationship between combined authorities, the Department and the Treasury. The key question that needs to be answered is how you get the combined authority to have an accountable officer within the organisation. Where I think combined authorities should get to is being treated as geographical Departments. We should be treated in the same way as a Department, bidding into Budgets and spending reviews, with our full, eclectic mix—from housing to transport and everything in between—and we should be accountabledirectly to the Treasury.
The only thing holding that up is the internal civil service mechanism of having an accountable officer outside Whitehall. That sounds flippant, but it is a difficult thing for the civil service to deal with; once you deal with that, it negates the need for a right to request or anything else, because over the years organisations will mature with that direct relationship with the Treasury.
It also gets into some key niggles that I know other mayors care about: “Why do you therefore need organisations like Homes England?”. If you get into the right to request, you do not need them. At the minute we are already doing half of what Homes England does. The Government have again gone into this halfway house of strategic partnerships, instead of taking the bold leap they should have taken: where you have mayors, you do not need Homes England, so make them the financially accountable body and ensure there are ties back in to central Government for oversight and value for money. Something more strategic could be done, but for me it goes back to the point that the Government did not want to address the strategic question of where devolution is going over the next five or 10 years.
Q
Tracy Brabin: Thank you for that question; I know your mayor has raised that with me. The strategic overview is really helpful, because some councils might have different processes. Uniformity across mayoral strategic authorities can only be helpful. I would say that the majority of mayors feel that that is a solution to some of the problem, where we have seen cowboys from way outside people’s patches, not necessarily with the same expectations on their vehicles or safety and so on, and we do not know who they are. It is important to have that clarity for the safety of the public.
Can I just ask you to keep your answers fairly short? We have two very important questioners coming up. I call the Minister.
Q
Before you answer, can I ask you to direct your answers to the speaker or the Chair, rather than to each other?
Andrew Goodacre: Running a high street business, whether it be retail or whatever else, is expensive, and the costs are going up all the time. When you talk to those business owners, they will tell you that the three biggest chunks are labour, business rates and rent. If your rent is only ever going to go up because the lease stipulates it and there is no negotiation around that, irrespective of what the economic climate might be or what has happened in the local area to perhaps take footfall away to a different part of town, your business is left with ever-increasing costs and no power to change it. That just does not seem right.
If there is pain because of a change in the area, the landlord, the property owner, has to feel some of that as well. At the moment it is only ever faced by the commercial tenant who has a difficult decision to make: either they go with the higher rent in the hope that they can compensate for it or they leave the business. They should not be faced with that choice, in fairness. These are hardworking businesses. People have probably been running those businesses for many years. There needs to be a more sensible, mature conversation taking place between landlords and commercial tenants. I think it does happen; I think there are good examples of it. But if we leave it to best practice, if we leave it to the industry and good actors dominating, we will be waiting another 20 years and sat here moaning about upward-only rents, so we do need to remove it.
Allen Simpson: Two quick points on rent reviews. The first thing is that upward-only rent reviews also drive up business rates because of the link between rateable values and rents. So the Government’s intention to reduce business rates expenses for businesses relies on addressing upward-only rent reviews. They do bake in inflation in the way that you say. There is an A/B test here, which is that the pubs code, of course, banned them some years ago. That has increased the amount of time that the average pub tenant stays on site. It has not led, that I can see, to any other negative outcomes, so there is evidence that it does actually increase tenancy rates.
Q
Andrew Goodacre: We touched on good examples, and we should look to learn from them. On local engagement, you need local leadership, but they need help sometimes. That help could be internally from the next level of authority up, or it could be from an external body. One body that I thought was beneficial to high street regeneration at a local authority level was the high streets taskforce that was set up as part of the Institute of Place Management for Manchester Metropolitan University. It has now ended as a body, although in name it carries on because stakeholders—we were one of those stakeholders—would meet on a quarterly basis to discuss opportunities, challenges, good news and bad news on high streets and high street regeneration. We would share those ideas and share them back with the high streets taskforce, and they would help that local decision making.
Quite often what you find is that people know what they want to do. They just do not quite always know how to do it. A think-tank independently managed and run could help them with that “how” and the implementation of their ideas. If you do not bring it back as it was, something similar would really help that local decision making, because sometimes the pride is there, the passion is there; they just do not always have the nous to make it work in the way they hoped for.
With regard to high streets, I see it from a retail point of view, but I recognise the fact that high streets are increasingly dominated by experiential elements—cultural, leisure, more hospitality driven—and I have no issue with that. It does mean that we need better change of use of some of the retail sites that become empty. I know planning is part of this whole issue, so speeding up the planning process is important.
Ideally, I would like to bring homes back into high streets where the possibility exists. There are some large, empty buildings. I live quite near Stratford-upon-Avon and I still go past a VHS store that closed in 2016. It is still empty. I find it remarkable that a landlord can let a big place like that stay empty for so long. We have not looked at the opportunity of what more we could do with that, or what we could do differently with that. If we can bring homes and people back into high streets as places where people want to live, preferably with affordable properties for younger people, I think you would start to create local economies that would drive some of those high streets as well.
Allen Simpson: The question is what level you devolve at. Clearly, we are all nimbys. Nimby is an irregular verb—you are a nimby; I am concerned about my local environment. There are circumstances in which we need to find ways of treating high streets like strategic infrastructure. There will be asymmetric benefits and costs if you live close to a high street or, as people used to, above shops—that is less common than it was—versus being in the surrounding community. Sometimes local politicians do need help. We have seen an approach to that in London that the Committee will have views on.
I am very much in favour of hospitality zones, which have specific licensing approaches, where there is some form of recognition that you get to a “yes” more quickly. There is a specific question around Andrew’s point about bringing people back into former high street or commercial areas, in the City of London or elsewhere, around agents of change. I am very in favour of placing a burden on developers to fit the development around hospitality, rather than buying a flat next door to a pub and then being annoyed that there is a beer garden, for which I have zero sympathy.
Q
Andrew Goodacre: That is a good question. What works well at the moment is the business improvement district model. Where it falls down slightly again depends on the people involved. A good BID represents the voice of local businesses, which are paying through business rates, because the levy is on the business rate, as we know. What I saw in Enniskillen at that time was a BID that really listened to its stakeholders, shared ideas with them and took back the feedback. One of the things introduced there was an Enniskillen gift card that could be used in any shop in that area—ideal for the tourist market that it is trying to appeal to.
We should establish BIDs; the problem with them is that they can be very indifferent, in terms of their make-up and the quality of them. Again, the funding often becomes a point of contention because you are adding to business rates, which is already a massive point of contention for most business owners. In a way, I would like to see BIDs funded in different ways, through the devolution White Paper. Their performance would therefore be a bit more targeted. Part of their performance metrics should be the ability for them to show that they have engaged, understood and taken forward what local business people want, in my case, within their high street.
Allen Simpson: An observation: if you are looking to drive growth, by definition you are looking to bring in businesses that are not there or do not exist, so to some extent your problem is how you consult businesses that do not currently exist. To some degree, it is less about having consultation with specific businesses and more about having an approach that is pro the foundation of businesses in a given area. Clearly, there will be examples where licensing rules could be better consulted on so that existing businesses can expand, but I wonder whether it is less about consultation and more about taking a proactive approach to growth.
We will now hear evidence from Gareth Davies, Comptroller and Auditor General at the National Audit Office, and Bill Butler, chair of Public Sector Audit Appointments. For this panel, we have until 3.40 pm.
Q
Gareth Davies: I will start, and then Bill can come in with some facts and figures on the current state of play with the firm’s contracts. First, it is important to say that, before I did this job at the National Audit Office, I was an auditor in local government, so in the past I have had a foot in both camps. Audit in the public sector is a fundamental part of our democracy; in local government, it is a fundamental part of local democracy.
Ensuring effective local accountability through independently audited council accounts, governance and value for money arrangements is a fundamental part of a healthy, functioning, tax-paying society. There is no doubt that we have run into some very serious problems with that in recent years, such as big backlogs of unaudited accounts. When those backlogs start to be cleared, at first we are seeing disclaimed audit opinions, which are essentially the auditors giving no assurance on those accounts. That is an unprecedented and unacceptable position to find ourselves in for a significant amount of public money. People have a right to expect audited accounts as a bare minimum when they pay their council tax and business rates, so this is a big system failure that needs fixing as quickly and robustly as possible. That is my starting point.
The obvious question is: why has this happened? Unusually, we have a natural experiment in the UK on this. No other devolved country has the same problem as England, with a failure of local government accountability and audited accounts. Everybody has had a pandemic and changes in auditing standards and so on, but only one country has dismantled its audit machinery and expected it to function nonetheless. Those changes were not implemented in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, so we do not have to look far for the explanation. That is why I welcome the creation of the Local Audit Office in the Bill. It is the right measure to correct that problem. It is necessary, but it is not sufficient. We will want to explore what else will be necessary.
The reason it is necessary is that it brings back together the essential functions that make for a robust audit regime. That includes letting the contracts with the firms to do the work, specifying that work; holding the firms to account for delivery on time and to the right quality standard; supporting the firms with technical advice and help with tricky issues, many of which we are seeing across local government; and robustly speaking with local government about where problems need to be fixed.
It also includes working as a partner with local government to improve the quality of accounts, and make them less burdensome to local authorities and more useful to taxpayers and businesses. There is a big agenda beyond just the creation of the Local Audit Office—it is a necessary but not sufficient requirement.
Bill Butler: I should also declare an interest, although mine is slightly more historic than Gareth’s. I spent 35 years in local government audit before I escaped. As you can see, Chair, I have been dragged back. I hope I am not going to sound too much like an echo, but I agree with everything that Gareth said. The effective audit of public bodies, which are funded by compulsory taxation and not by voluntary shareholders, is fundamental to proper democracy, governance and the financial credibility of English local government.
The world looks down on the large number of disclaimed audit opinions. We should not underestimate what bankers in New York and the large accountancy firms are thinking. When they look at that, they cannot comprehend how we have ended up in this position. We therefore strongly welcome the commitment to reform, the changes in the Bill and the creation of the Local Audit Office.
We particularly like the fact that it will reestablish a co-ordinated local audit system, and bring together responsibility for audit appointments, the code of practice, audit quality and the performance of auditors, because local government audit is in a very bad position. The only option available that anybody could think of to tackle the increasing backlog of delayed accounts was to disclaim opinions. It is really important that we do not replace a backlog with disclaimed opinions. Currently, there are 273 bodies that have received disclaimed opinions—51% of the bodies in England and Wales that we are responsible for appointing to. That is up to ’23-’24. Of those, 236 are for two or more years, and 53—that is 11%—are for four or more years. In total, that means there are 716 sets of accounts in English local government for which there is no assurance from the auditors. Gareth did not mention this, but it also affects his opinion on the whole of Government accounts, which he has had to disclaim owing to the disclaimers in local government, which affect and knock on to the credibility of Government across the country.
We also think that there is a risk to the broader proposed local government reform because of the bad apple in the barrel. If you are constituting a new authority and you are incorporating an authority with a number of years of disclaimed opinions, sorting that out will get in the way of the effectiveness of those bodies at exactly the time when you want them to be focusing on their new responsibilities and opportunities. I will say the same thing as Gareth, but in a slightly different way: we cannot envisage a solution without the Local Audit Office, but it is not the solution. Bold action is required to cut through the Gordian knot that exists at present. The sector seems unlikely to resolve the underlying issues without, as Gareth has made clear, support both to those bodies preparing accounts and to those auditing the accounts.
Q
Gareth Davies: The first would be skills and capacity. This sector has suffered from a loss of skilled expertise. Public audit is not interchangeable with company audit; it is a specialist field—you are auditing political institutions and reporting in the public interest. It is a different skillset, with some common areas with the rest of the auditing profession, and it attracts people who are interested in how public bodies become successful and how they achieve value for money, and so on. The pool of experts in that area has reduced sharply, so the system faces the challenge of building up that body of expertise and skills.
It is not just the auditors. In the past, the auditors did a lot of the training, and people then went on to careers in local government, the rest of the public sector and other sectors. It was a breeding ground for the finance function of local authorities. Individual local authorities cannot typically sustain large training programmes of accountants on their own, so having a regime that supports the development of that skillset is vital.
The other essential is getting hold of local government financial reporting and radically simplifying it, streamlining it in a way that can still be incorporated into the whole of Government accounts. That is always the caveat, and the reason for some of the complexity, but I do not believe that it is an impossible task. At the moment, the accounts are too easily dismissed as only of interest to the auditor because they are long, complex and quite difficult to follow in many places. There is no reason why we should put up with that. I know the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy and the wider profession have started work on what professionals think would represent a high-quality, meaningful financial statement that would clearly explain to taxpayers how we have used their resources.
There is a danger that everyone focuses only on the council budget and ignores the accounts. That is dangerous, because the balance sheet matters as well as annual expenditure.
Bill Butler: I can save quite a lot of time by saying that I agree with all of that. This may happen on a number of occasions, and we have not shared briefs. If you start with those who prepare the accounts, that needs to be revitalised. It is moribund, and people are looking at the scale of this task and finding it difficult. Some of this can be the support that Members and Ministers can bring to bear in terms of its importance, because—again, echoing Gareth—it is not considered to be interesting and it is too easily put aside, but that is not going to get any better. There is a real risk that it will get worse unless preparers are properly supported, and unless it is clear what revisions are possible to make the accounts simpler and deliverable.
There are issues around how we encourage colleagues who work in the audit firms. That is a broader issue, because they are bound by the technical standards imposed across the firms by their relationship with the Financial Reporting Council. However, at the moment, that seems occasionally to act as a block to overcoming that risk. We need to be honest about the fact that that risk assessment is there and about what we can do around it.
As Gareth said, we have been looking, with CIPFA, at reforming local government accounts for some considerable time. The clock has now ticked down, I think. One of the things I hope for is that the commitment shown to reform so far carries on across these broader areas, not of all of which are susceptible to legislation, but all of which would be, I hope, susceptible to encouragement.
Gareth Davies: I would like to add one other thing, because an important bit of the full picture is governance arrangements in local authorities. I know that the Bill includes provisions on audit committees, but it is important that local authorities have robust audit committee-type arrangements. I am not prescriptive about exactly what form they should take, but meaningful engagement with internal and external audit and a connection to the governance of the authority as a whole through its political leadership are essential to good governance. That means having somewhere where difficult questions can be asked and answers gained.
In quite a few of the disasters we have seen in local government finance in recent years, it is the governance arrangements that are primarily at fault in not picking up on excessive risk-taking and lack of understanding of the nature of the risk being taken on, and so on. It is another example of where a more robust audit system will not, on its own, solve everything—although it will definitely help, because it will bring those questions to the audit committee table—but the audit committee itself needs to be a functioning, robust and effective part of the governance of the authority.
Bill Butler: If I may say so, these are not things that can wait for the Local Audit Office, which has a massive task to perform anyway. If we wait, these problems become intractable, and the organisation’s chances of succeeding, if it has any at all, are very low,. They are issues that need to be addressed now, while we have the opportunity and—I hope everybody agrees—a pressing need.
Q
In a local authority, there is the collection fund, which essentially covers all the income that it is due to collect, then there are pension schemes, the dedicated schools grant, the housing revenue account and the parking revenue account, where there are slightly variable legal ringfences. All of those pose risks and many of them are impacted by elements of the devolution proposals affecting who will be responsible for decision making and what that revenue might underpin in terms of borrowing or day-to-day expenditure. Will you give us a sense, from your experience, of what the risks are, what the potential opportunities are and where changes are needed to, for example, the ringfences, and your views on the inclusion of the dedicated schools grant in the annual, legal council tax-fixing process, which might help or hinder the proper management of some of those financial risks.
Gareth Davies: Do you want to go first, Bill?
Bill Butler: Yes, then you can agree with me.
We will now hear evidence from Mark Stocks, head of public sector assurance at Grant Thornton UK. For this panel we have until 4 pm, unless we are interrupted by a vote—I am sorry about that, Mr Stocks.
Q
Mark Stocks: I have done this for a rather long time. I was an auditor with District Audit back in the day, then with the Audit Commission, and I am now with Grant Thornton. I have seen quite a lot of changes. The division of the Audit Commission duties has probably been the most impactful change, because it has created quite a confused landscape in terms of what the priorities are. The National Audit Office maintains responsibility for the code, which sets out the basis of our work, but our primary regulator has been the Financial Reporting Council, whose focus tends to be on the accounts. Public Sector Audit Appointments sets out the fees, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales decides whether we can act as a key account partner. That is quite difficult to cope with.
Throughout my whole history as an local auditor, the accounts have been important, but it has been equally important that I spend my time on value for money. I have to look at the financial sustainability of authorities, as well as their governance and performance. That has changed, to be candid, over the last 10 years. The code changed, so we spent less time on value for money. Then it changed again, so we spent more time on value for money. However, our primary focus in the last five years has been on the accounts, which has led to a confused environment in terms of how local auditors have acted.
In terms of what the Bill does, bringing in the Local Audit Office is crucial. Somebody needs to speak to the Government about the issues that auditors are seeing and what is actually happening out there, because some of the pressures on local government are quite immense. To be candid, I need somewhere to go and someone to speak to when I am concerned about what I am finding—someone who can say, “Let’s do this, or we’ll speak to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.” The changes in the Bill are crucial for a functioning local audit in the future.
Q
Mark Stocks: You only have the private sector. It provides all of local audit now. We are used to working with the PSAA, so I do not see any issue in working with the Local Audit Office. It will make it easier; we will have a single code and a single arbiter of what quality is for a local auditor. I think that will be easier for us, as the private sector auditors, than it is now. I would not want the Committee to go away thinking that there is no commitment to this from the private sector. It was a difficult procurement the last time round, but the PSAA did manage to appoint sufficient auditors and we remain committed—I certainly remain committed—to a successful local audit system.
Q
Mark Stocks: It is still fragile. I thought Gareth and Bill were accurate in what they said. We need to have more capacity so that we are not reliant on just a few suppliers. For that, there has to be consistency in terms of message. We need to get to grips with local authority accounts. If I went and did a set of NHS accounts, they are perhaps 100 pages long. The average local government accounts are 200 to 250 pages long, so the work involved is immense. That is why it takes longer, so we have to get that right.
We need to start to deal with some of the risks in local government, to be candid. It is quite difficult to deal with the breadth of what local government does. If you add on top of that the financial issues that they face and the issues that are asked of them in terms of policy, that layers on quite a scope for auditors, which means that we have to bring in specialists to do some of the work. I do not think that will get any easier under the current landscape.
Q
Mark Stocks: Local government accounts are complex. These are highly complex sorts of businesses, if I can use that phrase, that deal with any number of services. What we see now are local finance teams who are stretched, to be candid. There has been a lack of investment in them over the years. Gareth talked about trainees going from the Audit Commission into local government, but that does not happen now. There is a bunch of people who are around 50, who may be disappearing in the short term, so we have to sort out the strength of local government finance teams. As I said, we also need to sort out the complexity of the accounts.
In terms of the standards, all local government accounts are under international financial reporting standards, and that will not change. That is a Treasury requirement. How that is interpreted and what is important in those accounts is open to judgment. The emphasis from the LAO on whether it is more important for us to audit income or to audit property will make a difference to what local auditors do. I would always argue that it is more important to audit income.
It is very difficult to standardise anything that we do, because local government is not standardised. I can take you from a district authority that spends £60 million, most of which is housing benefit, to an authority that spends £4 billion and has significant regeneration schemes and companies. The skillsets that you need and the ability to standardise is very difficult. You have to have the right skills to do the work.
We will now hear evidence from Zoë Billingham, director of IPPR North, and we welcome back Professor John Denham, professorial research fellow in the department of politics and international relations—that is a long title—at the University of Southampton and director of the Centre for English Identity and Politics. We will have until 4.40 pm for this panel.
Q
Professor Denham: Thank you very much, Minister. It is absolutely crucial that the Bill underpins a really robust legal framework for devolution if it is to last—it cannot be for one Parliament. I will talk today about work that I have developed with Sir David Lidington—so that was a Labour Minister and a Conservative Minister coming together to say, “You need to have a consensus that lasts; otherwise, the Government changes.”
This is where I would say we are at the moment: there are many good things in the Bill, but there are some real areas of weakness that could lead to it being undermined quite quickly. It depends on financial commitments to integrated settlements and long-term funding, which are not even mentioned in the Bill. The Bill creates no forum in which finance can be discussed between strategic authorities and central Government. One of the ways in which that could be mitigated, at least to some extent, is to put the mayoral council on a statutory basis. Mayor Brabin said earlier today, “Well, the mayoral council is where we talk about new powers for mayors.” The mayoral council is not in the Bill. If Ministers decided tomorrow that it was not going to meet any more, it would not. It has no terms of reference and no secretariat. The mayors have no legal right to put items on its agenda.
I would give that as one example of where things could be embedded much more deeply. Parliament would have to come back and say, “We are going to abolish it”, in order to stop that meeting happening. If that sounds very radical in our system, every other European nation with a devolved system of government has a layer between the devolved level and central Government. I would suggest that it will be of benefit to Ministers, too. It is probably possible to manage relationships with a relatively small number of powerful mayors, but when there is one for every part of the country, there will be a cacophony of people demanding special treatment for their areas. The ability to corral that into a proper process would be an advantage.
This has to be embedded. Prior to this, regional arrangements lasted for about 10 years before Government lost interest in them. If you want this to be here in 30 years’ time, doing the Bill, but adding to it, is crucial.
Zoë Billingham: I absolutely agree that it is essential that devolution through this Bill should be put on a statutory footing. I would highlight a few things that I think achieve that entrenchment, in addition to the legal aspect of that. First, the broadening and deepening is absolutely essential, with the right to request in combination with that, so that strategic authorities can decide what further powers they wish to request from Government. I agree with John that the integrated settlement is a really important entrenchment to give places the flexibility they need to demonstrate how different places make different choices about how they spend public money. That will be essential to showing how devolution can deliver differently according to the needs of different places.
The moves towards votes at 16 and returning to a supplementary vote system for our mayors is absolutely essential to broaden the number of people who can take part in in local democracy. I would urge the Committee to consider going further in a few areas in the Bill, to build on that entrenchment from a statutory footing. Fiscal devolution has so far been completely omitted from the Bill. We at IPPR North have been looking at options, including a visitor levy to start with, to start the process of fiscal devolution that we think will really help to mature the model that we have today. Accountability is another key area. I know that you have talked in previous sessions today about LPACs, and we absolutely agree that we need to beef up the accountability of mayoral combined authorities—that is a two-way street, but I am sure we can get on to it later.
Finally, in terms of public support, the flip side, if you will, of further empowering and rolling out devolution to the country is demonstrating to the public what devolution can deliver for them. The evidence shows that in places that have more powers and freedoms, voting turnout and engagement with local democracy go up, so we think it is important not just for the economy, but for democratic reform.
Q
Secondly, we need to ensure strong scrutiny and accountability for any institution. We heard in the last session about some of the challenges with local government accountability and scrutiny. I am interested in your views on what we need to do to strengthen that and the provisions in the Bill to build on that.
Zoë Billingham: First, to your point on the democratic engagement of mayors, I do think, and I stand by the evidence that suggests this, that the more powers that mayors get, the more they are able to demonstrate to the public how they can tailor and do things differently in their places, according to what the public want. That is essential for the responsiveness of democracy; therefore, I also think that votes at 16 and the return to a supplementary vote are helpful additional aspects to this Bill, in terms of demonstrating that the Government are serious about broadening engagement with mayoral combined authorities.
I would also pick up the proposal in the Bill for neighbour area committees. Something along those lines is essential. We know that, as currently drafted, the Bill is proposing full unitarisation of local authorities to a 500,000 population level, which is far larger than we see in local government in our European counterparts, for example. There is a question about how those unitaries engage with those communities, not on an ad hoc basis, but as an ongoing community conversation. I wonder whether, for instance, the neighbourhood area committees could be predominantly made up of community representatives and young people, so that they do not replicate the district level that the Bill proposes to abolish, but instead create an ongoing, democratic renewal at that local level.
Secondly, to pick up your point on scrutiny, this is essential. If you speak to local leaders, mayors included, they are absolutely game for it. It is not something that central Government are imposing; it is an essential part of both enabling the further devolution of power and resources, and ensuring that the current model is not undermined because there is not enough scrutiny in place for what is already there. I totally support the proposal for a local public accounts committee—we have built on that idea ourselves at IPPR North, looking at mayoral accounts committees, which bring together overview and scrutiny, and local public accounts committees.
We think that those committees need to represent place leadership; this is no longer narrow lines of inquiry about certain budgetary lines or solely about audit. It must be much broader. This is about place-based leadership, not only by the mayor and the mayoral cabinet, but by other public leaders locally who could be brought in front of such committees. We think that is a really important thing to go hand in hand with the future of devolution.
Professor Denham: May I pick up and develop a couple of those points? There is no doubt that the Bill has a danger of an upwards movement of power: things are being moved from local authorities to strategic authorities and mayors have more autonomy. I understand why that is being done, but the Bill needs to build in a healthy counterpoint to that. I, too, would go beyond the neighbourhood governance proposal, which sounds a bit narrow and a bit prescriptive, as though the same model will work everywhere.
Sir David and I proposed what we called community empowerment plans, and we proposed them even when we did not know there was going to be local government reorganisation. The strategic authorities should have a legal duty to set out how they will engage with local people across the whole range of activity—I should have declared an interest, in that I am the honorary president of the Hampshire Association of Local Councils—
Hear, hear!
Professor Denham: So I am familiar with town and parish councils, and there are some very good ones, including in Mr Holmes’s constituency. But they are not uniform everywhere within the area, so a single prescriptive approach is unlikely to work.
There has also been, in the last 10 or 15 years, a transformation in our understanding of deliberative, participative engagement with local communities by many local authorities. We need both the strategic authorities and the unitary authorities to set out, in a document that should be challengeable, how they propose to do that. I think that would be useful.
Secondly—I will embarrass her—Zoë has written the best policy paper on local public accounts committees, so I will not say any more about that, except that I agree with Gareth Davies in an earlier panel: the challenge here is not local council audit, but the whole of public spending across a mayoral area. I was delighted to see the new Secretary of State backing the concept of total place, which is something I was involved in as a Minister 15 years ago; but, if that is going to work, you cannot combine that with upwards accountability to departmental accounting officers.
Local authority scrutiny has very good people, but it is not up to the job. You have to create a new local institution, the local public accounts committee and, picking up on what Mayor Houchen said earlier, make the chief executive within the area the local accounting officer. So you have a complete audit model at local level that is not then channelled upwards through departmental accounting officers. I think that is what we need to work towards. Those two things would not only empower local people, but ensure that you have local scrutiny of what is being spent and what is being done with their money.
Q
Richard Hebditch: As I mentioned, these are potentially very powerful bodies, as the Bill collects powers and duties from other legislation, rather than being a stand-alone piece of legislation. The health duty is potentially important. We would like to see duties around climate and nature. Those are long-term issues; they are not the kinds of things where, as a mayor or an authority, you are under short-term pressure—or, necessarily, pressure from central Government—to deliver, but they are really important. In the collection of duties from elsewhere—on local transport plans, for example—there are duties to have regard to national policy, but not in terms of the exercise of your functions, so these strategic authorities will be powerful delivery bodies in their own right, not simply as plan-making and strategy bodies, which makes it important to have those climate and nature duties as well.
Naomi Luhde-Thompson: The Labour Government in Wales introduced a different format in the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015—a public authority duty. It has a series of goals, and each public authority has to carry out those duties in relation to their functions. I should declare that I am a member of the Eryri national park authority, so I have a very close view of how this is actually carried out. It comes to the point about where the public interest is in the proposals in front of us. There is growth and a bit about health, but where is the public interest? It does not seem to me to be properly explained or described in the Bill that this is all about delivering on the public interest—what is the Government’s role in doing that?
There is a bit of confusion between the two Bills. Look at the health duty in this Bill and then look at the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, which is obviously in the Lords at the moment. There is no consultation for health groups in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, but there is a health duty on the combined county authority. It is just not connected. On the spatial development strategies, it is not particularly mentioned as a group, but there is a duty on the CCA, so it is really important to examine the connection between the two a bit more closely.
Q
At the community level, we obviously want to build in a way that is sustainable, but we need to make sure that there is public consent. I am interested in how we ensure that strategic planning powers sit alongside community engagement and community consent to make sure that there is a whole place sense of the direction of travel and the development that needs to happen, in a way that builds public support.
Naomi Luhde-Thompson: On public participation, the UK is a signatory of the Aarhus convention. Article 393 of the trade and co-operation agreement is really clear that when you are doing something that has an impact on the environment you must have a proper process of public participation. It must happen at an early enough time to influence the outcomes; otherwise, what is the point of having people involved? You are literally just asking them, “What colour do you want the gates to be?” You are not asking them to be involved in the full decision.
The issue that you have here—I will talk about the products that are produced—is that, if you look at the spatial development strategies, it specifically says in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in proposed new section 12I of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004:
“No person is to have a right to be heard at an examination.”
That is completely the opposite of what you have on local plans: any person who makes representations must be given the opportunity to be heard in front of the examiner. That is not going to send out a strong signal that you actually want people to participate in the making of these spatial development strategies.
It is not a sell-out event to go to a plan examination, so I do not think that you need to be worried about that. I do, however, think that you need a right to be involved at that stage, and it cannot be at the discretion of someone else. I think that is one of the issues: if you have to wait for somebody else to give you consent or permission to enter that space, you do not have a right to enter it, because it is at somebody else’s discretion. That is why the formulation of such a right of access—a right to participate—is really important.
Your other point was about the duties, and how that is carried out. I would be really interested to see how the local growth plan is supposed to comply with, for example, the environmental principles policy statement. How does it combine with that? How does it combine with the spatial development strategy? What is the interaction there? It is quite complex, if you look at the organogram of the different plans that, if you are a member of the public, might affect and shape the place in which you live, and therefore what the purpose of all these plans are—whether they are there to achieve sustainable development in the public interest—and how you are supposed to get involved in influencing the outcome of the decisions that are made through these plans.
Richard Hebditch: It is probably also worth talking about the resourcing of all this. As people have discussed, we have the local government reorganisation at the same time. The new format for local plans, which are out of date, has new housing targets as well. Then we have the SDSs—spatial development strategies—on top of that. How do we make sure that we have the resourcing to develop all those things, which are happening at the same time? We then have wider planning reform, and we might have another planning Bill in the new year. There is a lot of potential chaos at the same time. I am sure the Government want to address that, and the resourcing for planners to develop the SDSs is very helpful, but there is a risk of not necessarily having a clear road map for how you get to that place. As I was saying, we are very supportive of the idea of spatial development strategies and the strategic layer, but the journey there is going to be quite chaotic. I think it would be good to look at issues around workforce skills and the timing of all the different things that are going on.
Q
Naomi Luhde-Thompson: I think we need to reflect on what became of the regional spatial strategies, and on whether that was an issue around social licence and public consent. Obviously, an examination was attached to them in their development, and there was accountability in different formats. If it is not clear to people that they are going to be involved, you will just get disempowerment and disenfranchisement, and then people are just going to say, “Well, it’s nothing to do with me. I haven’t been able to be involved, and I haven’t been able to have an influence.” Those routes to influence and to participate properly, which means having an impact on the outcome, need to be very clearly laid out so that people can participate. I agree with you that it is a whole discussion. Planning is the way we organise ourselves in space, in society and in places. That is what it is supposed to be, so we need to make it like that.
Your point about democratic accountability is really important. One of the things that the Better Planning Coalition has been looking at is the national scheme of delegation, which will have a huge impact on whether there is democratic accountability for planning decisions at local level. If people realise what is happening only when the bulldozer turns up at the end of the road, that is obviously a failure of the system. If they feel that a decision has not been made in a way that is accountable, if there is no one for them to go and talk to, and if they do not have public speaking rights at planning committees any more and cannot have their say on that decision, I think that will lead to a democratic deficit.
Q
We will now hear evidence from Sacha Bedding MBE, chief executive of Wharton Trust and a member of Locality. For this panel, we have until 5.20 pm.
Q
Sacha Bedding: We welcome the community right to buy. It is a good step, a big step, and it is important. Communities often do not feel that they have those rights, because they do not, and when they see a treasured building or space go up for sale, and they have no opportunity to purchase or reclaim it—lots of these things are already ours—they feel disillusioned and hopeless. To have an avenue and pathway to change that will be important and helpful. It will need to be properly resourced; I think we should look again at a community ownership fund or a successor to it. Places that do not have capacity but have a willingness and desire should be supported in creating that. But it is a great opportunity for the people of this country.
Q
Sacha Bedding: I watched some of the proceedings, and I understand why there is a desire for an expansion of parish councils. It is what we look like, and it is a reflection of this at a local level, but it is not right for everywhere. There are places up and down England where organisations like mine—Locality has hundreds of them as members—have the opportunity to create an active role in making sure that decisions reflect the will, the want and the need of the people who are going to be affected by those decisions.
That will happen only if we do not prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution to what neighbourhood governance looks like. Neighbourhood governance should mean that when the people in that community are asked, “Do you feel you have a stake in this place and the opportunity to shape where you live?” the answer is yes. At the moment, our opinion is no: roughly 80% of people say they do not feel they have that stake in their community. We see that in election turnout: the by-elections in Hartlepool, which I know well, had turnout of under 20% or 15%. That is an issue, and I am afraid that it is not going to be solved by creating another layer of councillor. I live in a parish area, by the way. Where parish councils do tremendous work, perfect—build on it—but where it is not right, let’s not mandate it. Let’s be creative and braver than we have been so far.
Q
Sacha Bedding: The first thing is that we have to make it accessible. I will always advocate for a community organising approach, because I think that releasing people’s agency, so that they feel that they can take action on the things they care about, is a route to that. However, whether it is asset-based community development, old traditional community development or community organising, that is where we start. We start where people are, not where we would like them to be.
If we can do that and resource that, there are thousands of people willing to roll up their sleeves and get involved where they live. I see it every day; you see it in your constituencies every day. This is not some great big secret—it is just, “Go out and ask them.” On the flipside of that, our sector, like every other sector, has been hammered for a long time, but releasing the skills and talents of local people to take action on the things they care about will answer that question.
Q
Sacha Bedding: I do not work in an area of environmental concern. If there are environmental opportunities in places, the broader the scope of what we consider an asset of community value to be, the better, in my opinion. I do not think we should prescribe that it must be bricks and mortar. For us in Hartlepool, things such as long-term plans for neighbourhoods should include the sea. That is our greatest asset, after the people who live there, and every community plan could involve the sea, for example. The environmental opportunities are there; whether we can distinguish whether they are social or environmental does not matter—let us expand the scope.
However, we should also look at the right to shape public services, because too often the people who are receiving services do not have a stake in the design of those services and the right to control investment. That is a big one. I do not mean, for example, Hartlepool getting 10 nuclear modular power stations, although that is great news; I mean at the neighbourhood level, where houses can be built, or not built, as we have just heard. People should have a stake in that decision. If you want more housing built, work alongside people who live in that community now. Do not just internally exile them, flatten the houses and say, “Hard luck, son.” That is not an answer.
The more expansive the assets of community value are, the better. The opportunity to expand the community rights is there, and it makes more sense for everybody. On homelessness strategies, where people are still on the streets and we are spending hundreds of thousands of pounds, or a literacy strategy, where one in three people is illiterate and that works with cohesion, if people can bring those together, they will coalesce around a place, and they can do that far better if those rights are enhanced.