Covid Security at UK Borders

Matt Western Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2021 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Robert Courts)]

Let me begin by thanking all hon. Members who have contributed to today’s debate. We must keep this horrendous virus under control so that we can roll out the vaccines as quickly as possible and get back to our normal lives. I do not doubt that the whole House, whatever Members’ views, is united behind and resolute about that common goal.

The Government have always sought to steer a protective but practical course through this crisis based on scientific advice. In the fact of a lethal enemy, we will continue to act in the best interests of the British people. We will continue to protect lives. We will continue to distribute our world-leading vaccine programme, because that is what will defeat the coronavirus. We will do everything to ensure that we can support an economic recovery that is as strong as it is safe.

The delivery of an effective vaccine, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Huw Merriman) has noted, is the best way to protect the most vulnerable in our society, to save thousands of lives, and ultimately to support the easing and removal of restrictions so that we can return to an era of safe international travel, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling) and my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti) have said.

The whole country owes a debt of gratitude to the incredible health workers who are administering the jabs, as the hon. Members for Denton and Reddish (Andrew Gwynne) and for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols), among many others, have said. Vaccines have already been administered to 9.3 million UK residents and key workers—that is more than in the rest of Europe combined. As my hon. Friends the Members for Harborough (Neil O’Brien) and for Newbury (Laura Farris) have noted, that is due to the decisions that this Government have taken.

However, we cannot rest while the vaccines are being rolled out, and we have to take measures to protect our health and safeguard the NHS. That includes taking firm action to address the risk of new variants of the virus entering the UK and spreading through the population, potentially hampering that vaccine effort. There is no single measure that mitigates that risk entirely—it is the layers of actions that we have discussed today, in combination with the vaccine programme, that will turn the tide on the coronavirus.

As the Home Secretary set out last week, in the light of increasing concerns around new variants, mandatory quarantine measures for those arriving from high-risk countries are an essential next step to safeguard public health, and I assure the House that we are working urgently and will share those details shortly. But I stress that this essential step is just one part of a wider co-ordinated strategy to protect the nation. From the start of this pandemic, we have taken a robust approach to prevent imported cases of covid-19. That has included self-isolation requirements and the use of travel corridors to manage entry from high-risk countries. We have kept that approach under regular review, and changes have been made when the scientific evidence demanded it.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Robert Courts]

I am sorry, I will not, because I am so short of time.

That is why we acted quickly to suspend all travel corridors following the surge in cases this winter; it is why we recently introduced pre-departure testing requirements, whereby passengers require a negative test before being allowed to travel to the UK, to further protect against imported cases; and it is why all international passengers arriving in the UK are required to complete a passenger locator form.

On enforcement, recent statistics show that enforcement action and the hard work of border officials has resulted in almost full compliance from those entering the country. Border Force has made 3 million spot checks, and it now aims to achieve 100% checks to tackle PLF and PDT non-compliance at the border, along with 100% covid compliance checks.

National Security and Investment Bill

Matt Western Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Enhanced protection of our national security is obviously at the heart of the Bill. It has come not before time, too. It has had a gestation period of something like seven years since the Intelligence and Security Committee first raised the matters that it addresses directly. As a member of the Committee, I will not repeat what my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chair of the ISC, or the senior Opposition member of the ISC, the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), have said with regard to oversight of investments. I think the point has been well made, and I totally accept that the Minister gets those points.

Let us be clear, though, that if a potential enemy state can get critical information and technologies, it is highly likely to do so. In truth, as we all know, the UK is a primary target for a broad range of national security attacks from both foreign intelligence agencies and organisations, as well as companies, which certainly are operating at the moment. If a company that is British and world leading in a technology—for instance, artificial intelligence or robotics—is bought by a foreign investor from a country that is not particularly friendly to the UK, we must have a system to ensure that British technology, ideas and even hardware are not simply hijacked and possibly used against us. We have to stop that.

Unless the United Kingdom curbs the right of foreign firms and investors to obtain technologies through the means of mergers and acquisitions and similar, our advanced technologies could easily find their way into weapons systems of foreign, potentially hostile states. These days, weapons systems should be much more broadly defined. They include possible attacks on the way we live. For example, using the internet to turn off water purification and supplies or just sewerage would have a dramatic and immediate impact on British society. I reckon that is a weapons system these days. In future, investors will have no choice but to notify the Government if the ownership of certain businesses is to change hands. That is good news. I note, too, that the Secretary of State will also have the power to call in other businesses if he or she has concerns about national security. That is good, too: it allows for sensible flexibility.

In contrast to others who have spoken, I think we should be careful about defining exactly what national security involves because it changes all the time. It is difficult to pin it down. We know what it is, but I am worried about defining it.

Within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy will now sit this new investment security unit, which will be tasked with supervising sensitive sectors of our economy. I know that those sectors have yet to be fully defined, but most are pretty obvious—defence communications, energy, cryptography, satellite and space technologies and many more. But in the fast-moving modern world that we live in, it will also be important for the investment security unit to look actively at seemingly innocent technologies and systems, which in the wrong hands could bring our society to a grinding standstill. Others have mentioned the national grid: if that could be disabled by the simple means of remote instructions, the whole of the country’s electricity supplies could be turned off. Just think of how difficult that would be!

Keeping sovereign control over the methods of controlling something like the national grid is crucial. I presume and hope that the investment security unit will spend some time looking out for non-obvious threats. Having once been an intelligence officer, I know that trying to identify the threat, the signals that identify what is about to happen, is really difficult because they are embedded in a plethora of noise. But this investment security unit will have to try.

I am pleased that the Bill extends the current screening powers to allow the Secretary of State to investigate the acquisition of sensitive assets in intellectual property as well as the straightforward acquisition of companies. In short, I support the Bill and I am pleased that it has at last reached this stage.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab) [V]]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart). I join my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) and others in thanking the Bill Committee, the Clerks and others who supported us so well—including the expert witnesses from whom we got to hear during that fortnight. I had not sat through Second Reading, but we had a particularly enlightening series of sessions.

I wish to speak to new clauses 5, 6 and 7, which I will be supporting, along with the Bill.  I emphasise how strongly colleagues and I feel about how important national security is, and how much Labour prioritises it. That is why we welcome the Bill, following, as it does, unfortunately, the leadership of states such as the United States, Germany and the EU; perhaps we are just that much behind the curve. I am sorry to say that it is clear that the Government failed to recognise the clear and present danger of the commercial strategy of other powers. Although I very much support the Bill, as it introduces the greater powers for Government to intervene when corporate transactions threaten our national security, it is late, perhaps even a decade or more late.

As so many have said, national security has traditionally been viewed quite narrowly. Perhaps we have had the light touch of economically liberal Governments welcoming investment when in fact those acquisitions are aimed at reducing the competition, improving margins and protecting domestic interests. Also we have seen the purpose being to asset-strip those businesses of their intellectual property, often at considerable cost to the UK in terms of our knowledge base and expertise, but with the risk of seriously damaging our supply chains and having the consequent economic impact. Often this results in those businesses moving overseas. So overall, although the Government’s proposal brings the UK in line with other countries on national security, there is the need for greater powers on mergers and acquisitions, particularly in respect of what may be deemed to be beyond security but actually in the national interest, as in the US and France, where they have the powers to block takeovers of companies deemed strategic or that have major implications for national interests.

I am afraid that the past 10 years show that consecutive Conservative and coalition Governments have been persistently slow and muted in intervening to protect national security in a series of cases: Huawei and 5G has been cited frequently this afternoon: Pfizer and AstraZeneca—the proposal of course failed, but we can only imagine what would have happened to the cost of vaccines had those two companies merged and had we been reliant on one major player; Google and DeepMind; and now Nvidia and Arm technologies. Among a great many others, we have also had the takeover of GKN by Melrose and the acquisition of Cobham aviation. They are now owned by businesses based in a friendly state, which is okay and acceptable, but it is questionable how we are prepared to let some of these important businesses—important leaders in technologies—be disposed of, with the assets, the research and the intellectual properties of those businesses moved offshore, to elsewhere.

New clause 5 seeks to define national security. Interestingly, the right hon. Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma), the former Secretary of State, has stated that the Government had a very narrow interpretation of national security. It was surprising what came to light in the Bill Committee, where we heard that, as I understand it, in drawing up this legislation the Government had failed to engage with the Intelligence and Security Committee in the first instance. That was a shortcoming. The evidence sessions proved more than enlightening, particularly when we were hearing from some of the expert witnesses. Some of what we heard was deeply disturbing. The words spoken by Charles Parton of the Royal United Services Institute were some of the most alarming of all. He said:

“we should not underestimate the degree to which Xi Jinping and the Communist party intend, as Xi said to the first politburo meeting, to get the upper hand against western democracies… When you add that to his policy of civil-military fusion—using civil in the military context—and the fact that he has set up a party organisation specifically to push that forward, and the change in investment policy away from things such as property, football clubs and other things, very much towards benefitting China and its technology, we have to be a lot more careful than we have been in the past.”

I think he said that, perhaps deliberately, with extraordinary understatement. Perhaps most alarmingly, he added:

“I am not aware of a really good assessment of just how much technology has been bought, the targets and so on. Maybe the Government have one—I don’t know—but I do not think that they do.”

––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 6, Q2.]

Perhaps that is something that the Minister could answer when he sums up.

National Security and Investment Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Matt Western Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 10th December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Sam Tarry]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. Those are valid points, and part of what we are driving at here is to be more prescriptive. The feeling is that we essentially need to allow the loops in the net to be closed enough such that we catch some of these companies. We do not want a situation where a number of companies have portions of them being owned by, for example, China or another country, and do not fall foul of any of the provisions currently in the Bill. In time, that could mean that countries and entities that were hostile to Britain’s strategic goals ended up having quick and strategic access to things around nanotechnology, agriculture and a range of other areas where they had essentially got their hands into something that I think should be protected far more closely by the UK.

To give an example, in the US—this is already under way—a Palo Alto-based venture capital firm backed by the Chinese Government had dozens of US start-ups in its portfolio. On 15 November 2020, the Office of the US Trade Representative said that 151 venture capital investments in US start-ups had featured at least one Chinese investor—up from 20 in 2010. We are not saying we do not want Chinese investment, but what we do not want is a situation where we are unable to have a grip when we find that loads of our technology companies —our most cutting-edge firms—are essentially all part-owned by the Chinese Communist party or one of its subsidiaries. That is why we have been more prescriptive in many parts of the new clause.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making some important points. One of the striking things about, for example, Canyon Capital Advisors is how the US authorities intervened when it was looking to take over a particular US tech company. However, when it came to Imagination Technologies, of course, the UK Government did not.

[Sam Tarry]

That is exactly the kind of example on which we are trying to use the new clause to provide more clarity and give more force to the Bill so it can deal with these sorts of thing. If, for example, public investment by Chinese venture capital groups in western countries—whether it be this country or others—is visible but is actually just the tip of the iceberg, that is going to be a real problem. One lesson that Richard Dearlove described clearly to the Committee was that we need to take a longer medium-term view that goes beyond just being the most free-market and economically attractive investment prospect, particularly given the rise of those geopolitical challenges. The Chinese are being explicit about what their goals are. They do not want to build Britain up; they want to take us for as much as they can get. This is about protecting ourselves and ensuring that those smaller things, which may just be going on under the net and may not hit some of the parts on mandatory notices, not the big headline-grabbing things, could be looked at.

I agree with an earlier comment made by the hon. Member for Glenrothes that one problem is that, while we need regular advice from intelligence services and of course it needs to come through to the Secretary of State, having a regularised timeframe in which we know that those things will get full scrutiny is incredibly important. Parliamentarians and the public will want to see if there are any patterns developing in types of investments and the way those investment vehicles are used to buy into some of the most advanced British technology companies.

This new clause does not require the Secretary of State to publish a list of countries; it simply requires that the Secretary of State, working with the agencies, maintains a list of state-driven risks, which feed into national security risks. Our drive, as the Opposition, is our concern that the Minister does not recognise the state-based nature of those major security threats.

If this new clause is accepted, it would provide those guarantees and the extra ability to bring together the agencies that would be able to compile that list of state-driven risks, which can then inform decisions. In that context, it is vital that the country is assured of the Government’s ability to act on intelligence and expertise in protecting British security against hostile actors.

National Security and Investment Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Matt Western Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 11th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 10th December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady. I remind her that the legislation requires the Secretary of State to act in a quasi-judicial way, not as a political figure. I appreciate that by a normal reading, “appears” may appear unduly casual, but that is merely a question of the form of legislative drafting, which is consistent, I remind her, with previous relevant legislation.

In addition, I reassure the hon. Lady that the principles of public law apply in any case. The Secretary of State therefore needs to act reasonably in fulfilling his functions under the Bill. That includes having a reasonable basis, supported by sufficient evidence, for coming to the conclusion that a person appears to be an overseas public authority prior to disclosing information. I hope I have provided the Committee with sufficient reassurances, and I therefore hope that the Opposition will withdraw the amendment.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

I just want clarification from the Minister on the point of that being semi-judicial.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

Quasi-judicial.

[Matt Western]

Quasi-judicial; sorry. How does that square with the responsibilities of the Minister in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy?

[Nadhim Zahawi]

It is not a strange concept that a Minister acts in a quasi-judicial way in making such decisions.

I will now briefly turn to clause 55, which makes provision for specific restrictions in respect of information received under clause 54 from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. For the regime to function effectively, the Secretary of State needs access to the right information at the right time in order to make decisions with the fullest range of evidence available. One such source of information that might be invaluable to the Secretary of State is HMRC. Although the Government expect that the Secretary of State would seek first to secure the information he needs from the parties, it is important that such information can also be provided from elsewhere in Government, if it is held there.

Clause 55 provides that where information is received by the Secretary of State from HMRC or an onward recipient pursuant to clause 54, it may not be used for purposes other than the Secretary of State’s function under the Bill, and nor may it be further disclosed without HMRC’s consent. Clause 35 provides that disclosing information in contravention of clause 55(1) is an offence, as is appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Even though the Minister has worked well with the CMA, as he has just said, and is assured that the relationship will work well, he has put it into legislation just to make sure that it does.

[Matt Western]

My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test has stolen my thunder—had I known that he was going to stand up, I perhaps would not have done so. It is interesting that paragraph (a) says “must” but paragraph (b) says “may”. Another valid point, beyond the semantics, is about the substance and the resource of the CMA, and whether there should be provision for that in the Bill. Can the Minister comment on the capacity of the CMA to support the demands and obligations set out in the clause?

[Chi Onwurah]

I will say a few words to the clause—reflecting the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test, in particular—because there seems to be a theme in the Bill. I know that the Minister believes that the Bill is beyond improvement, and that he is reluctant even to contemplate any changes, as he said in response to the hon. Member for Glenrothes, but he must recognise that a consistent theme seems to be that requirements, or “musts”, are placed on others and the discretion—the “may”, if you like—is with the Business Secretary. The Minister himself observed that we are keen to allow the Business Secretary the necessary discretion to fully protect our national security, but does he see not that that would better achieved by clearly circumscribing the Business Secretary’s actions?

I also support my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington in his recent contribution. Throughout this Bill, we need to ensure that the resources are there when placing requirements on bodies. I hope that the Minister can give such reassurances. On that basis, we recognise that the clause should stand part.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 56 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57

Data Protection

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

National Security and Investment Bill (Tenth sitting)

Matt Western Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Chi Onwurah]

I genuinely thank the Minister for the clarification that equity investments will be included in this bit of the Bill.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

We are focusing greatly on small and medium-sized businesses, but this can also happen to slightly larger organisations, which might be outside the commonly used definition of an SME. When a larger business is distressed because it has lost a major customer and finds itself in financial difficulty, it needs that cash injection, so that sort of assurance is important.

[Chi Onwurah]

As always, my hon. Friend makes a really important point, and one that I had not thought of. The point about this being applicable to medium-sized businesses is absolutely right. In some ways, medium-sized businesses can often be at a critical point; cash flow is so important, and they could suddenly become very distressed, but with the right cash flow or the right injection of capital, they could expand greatly.

Will the Minister consider this? During the pandemic, when certain innovations have become incredibly important, and cash and support are needed to significantly increase the volume of production—of a vaccine, shall we say, with which the Minister is intimately concerned—a delay of 30, 70 or whatever days will create a huge problem for a medium-sized or growing business, as well as for small businesses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for that, which brings me to the point that I wanted to make in response to him. I discerned that that seemed to be his point—that the Bill may cause harm to companies, but that rather than seeking redress under the Bill, or this clause in particular, they should seek redress or some kind of compensation through the well-oiled machinery of Government that provides support for small and growing businesses. I am afraid that that response will be met with undiluted cynicism among the many small and medium-sized businesses that have dealt with Government.

Again, we are talking about a fast-moving situation. Perhaps the Minister will provide examples of where, on such timescales, support has been provided. More importantly, if that is a consequence of the Bill, why would it not be addressed in the Bill, especially as we have a clause that seeks to address this issue in the case of notices of final order. I gave the example of OneWeb satellites, which was a major investment that took some time to come about, and we were not clear whether it was a strategic asset or national security. Clarity is critical.

[Matt Western]

This is important. I take on board exactly what the Minister is saying, but I am sure he can assure me on this. To give one specific example, Imagination Technologies is a fantastic company, which lost its major customer, which was Apple. Chinese-backed investment—private equity—then came in. The US refused the company the chance to buy into a US business in 2017. I would love to think that whoever was in BEIS in 2017 looked at it closely and offered support. This might be beyond our remit, but it is important that such businesses are reached out to. Will someone in the Minister’s team confirm that the Government tried to support Imagination Technologies?

[Chi Onwurah]

I very much hope that the Minister or his Department will respond to that. My hon. Friend gave an example of an innovative company in need of support from the Department. Presumably it was similar to the cases we are discussing now, and that support was offered. If confirmation is not forthcoming, we should perhaps look for it via a parliamentary question, which might help us.

I want to say one word about amendment 28, which seeks to ensure that the term of the reporting does not undermine what is reported or its effectiveness. The Minister said that if the £100 million barrier was crossed, another report would have to be made on any further expenditure. However, the amendment concerns a small amount of expenditure in a given period, followed by a larger amount, and whether the periods in which the expenditure was made might mean that a report did not have to be made. The Minister also did not address the question of why £100 million was the right threshold for making a report. On that basis, I wish to press the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

National Security and Investment Bill (Ninth sitting)

Matt Western Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 8th December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Nadhim Zahawi]

With your indulgence, Mr Twigg, I intend to speak first to clause 23 stand part, then to amendment 22 and new clause 4.

We are committed to the regime providing as much clarity, certainty and predictability as possible for businesses and investors. It is therefore right that we are setting out how long the Secretary of State may take to carry out a full national security assessment and make a final decision on a trigger event following a call-in notice.

Subsection (3)(a) provides for an initial assessment period of 30 working days. The Government have taken advice from the security community, and we consider that in the majority of cases 30 working days will allow for a full national security assessment and for the Secretary of State to decide whether to clear the trigger event outright or to impose final remedies on it.

More complex cases are possible, however, and it is important that a longer period is available for the Secretary of State to consider them. The clause therefore enables the Secretary of State to issue a notice to extend the assessment by 45 working days to assess the trigger event further, for example to determine the extent of the national security risk or to decide on appropriate remedies. That is referred to as the “additional period” under subsection (3)(b). The clause also provides for the assessment period to be further extended beyond the additional period, but only with the written consent of the acquirer. That is termed a “voluntary period” under subsection (3)(c).

The Government are clear that extensions should not be used lightly. The clause therefore includes specific legal tests for their use. To extend the assessment into the additional period, the Secretary of State must reasonably believe, as the hon. Lady referred to, that a trigger event has taken place, or is in progress or contemplation, and that this has given or would give rise to a national security risk. The Secretary of State must also reasonably consider that the additional time is required to assess the trigger event further.

To agree a voluntary period extension with the acquirer, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, a trigger event has taken place, or is in progress or contemplation, and that this has given or would give rise to a national security risk. The Secretary of State must also reasonably consider—the third bullet point the hon. Lady mentioned—that the period is required to consider whether to impose final remedies or what those remedies should be.

What the Secretary of State may not do is simply extend the assessment period because it is convenient. The clause is drafted in this way to ensure that we protect the investors and businesses that the hon. Lady quite rightly cares about, as do Government Members, and allow them to operate and thrive in our economy. I hope that hon. Members feel assured that the Government have sought to carefully balance the flexibility required for the Secretary of State to deal with the most complex cases and the need to provide businesses and investors with clear time lines.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

Just to understand and clarify the point about how realistic the voluntary period might be, in terms of getting the written agreement of the acquirer, in the Minister’s experience, how realistic is it that a business would accede to that? The business might be under financial pressure, looking for cash or a financial injection, which is the whole point about bringing in private equity. How will the Government ensure that that is possible, when all those other pressures are coming into play?

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman; it is a great question. We are all worrying about the small and medium-sized businesses that his particular angle would very much apply to. He will recall that, in the evidence sessions, we heard evidence to suggest that business founders and directors are best placed to know if their business has a national security angle, so the Secretary of State will clearly work with those business owners, innovators and pioneers to try to mitigate the national security risk while making sure that they can survive and thrive. It is in no one’s interests for them not to do well in the United Kingdom; that would probably create a greater national security threat.

[Matt Western]

Just to be clear, if a business is desperately seeking that inward investment, surely it would be less likely to write and agree with the Secretary of State about the additional period, because it is desperate for the funds.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I absolutely hear what the hon. Gentleman says. The issue then becomes one of national security. As we heard in the evidence sessions, most founders and directors know exactly what they are inventing and what their intellectual property is, and therefore whether there is a national security risk, however nascent the business may be.

I briefly turn to amendment 22. I am grateful for the Opposition’s continued, and in some ways unexpected, push for ever greater powers for the Secretary of State, who I am certain will be most delighted. The amendment would remove the requirement for the Secretary of State to agree the use of a voluntary period or a further voluntary period with the acquirer to consider whether to make a final order or what provision that final order should contain. I do not believe that would be the right approach.

We have set much store in the statutory timescales provided for in the Bill. It is vital for the businesses and investors that we all care about that they have confidence in when they can expect decisions so that they can plan accordingly, which goes back to the point of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington about planning for an investment or fundraising event. That is why any extension of the assessment period, beyond the collective 75 maximum working days of the initial period and the additional period combined, requires agreement from the acquirer in recognition of the fact that the process is being lengthened beyond the customary timeline. Enabling the Secretary of State to do that unilaterally would be a matter of concern for business and investment communities alike.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. We have had that debate already, and we have set out clearly what we think is appropriate to be in the report, notwithstanding what we might do in future if that allows investors to have greater clarity.

[Matt Western]

I was going to make exactly the same point as my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test. Surely the intent behind the question is how we make the operation of the provision much more efficient. We are starting from a zero base. The suggestion that we consider future demands and implications is a constructive one.

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I see where the hon. Gentleman is coming from. The House has many levers at its disposal, including the Select Committee process, to probe the effectiveness of the new regime.

I shall now make some headway. The provision is designed to ensure that orders reflect changing circumstances and do not remain in force for perpetuity without further consideration. Parties subject to orders may themselves request that the Secretary of State vary or revoke their order. This is another mechanism to ensure that orders remain appropriate. The Secretary of State must consider such requests unless the request relates to a final order and, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, there has been no material change in circumstances since the order was made or last varied, or if the party concerned has previously made a request to vary or revoke the order since that request.

National Security and Investment Bill (Seventh sitting)

Matt Western Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Chi Onwurah]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg, and to see the Committee reconvened to debate this important Bill. On Tuesday, we had a lively, informative and generally collegiate debate in which we learned a significant amount about the Bill and each other. We learned, for example, that the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs has an interest in low pay, the hon. Member for South Ribble is a scientist, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has a great interest in defending business investment, and my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test knows well the difference between “may” and “shall”, and entered Parliament at the same time as yourself, Mr Twigg. We learnt that my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South has a great interest in defending our national security through supply chains. We learnt that I have a tendency to mispronounce and misplace my hon. colleagues’ constituencies—something that I am working on. We also learnt that the Minister feels this Bill is perfect in every way, clause and subsection, such was his reluctance to accept the most constructive and helpful amendments—I would say—put forward by the Opposition. As we look at our amendments today, I gently point out to the Minister that that is not a view held by everyone across the House, even by Government Members. I note the letter sent yesterday by the Intelligence and Security Committee pointing out several aspects that we have raised, requiring clarification and significantly indicating its intention—or desire—to be a greater part of both the scrutiny of this Bill and its implementation. I hope that in today’s deliberations we will meet with more support from the Minister.

We had lively debates on Tuesday and some votes, which as I have indicated that we did not win. Amendment 16, in my name and those of my hon. Friends, is a probing amendment. We seek to understand that the Minister fully understands the provisions of his Bill. That is an absolutely appropriate thing to do, as hundreds of thousands of business and individuals will be impacted by it and will have to seek to understand it. It is appropriate that we test the impact of the Bill now, particularly as the Minister has many competing duties, and, as we understand, is taking on more onerous ones.

Clause 12 contains supplementary provisions in relation to determining when a trigger event that takes place over more than one day is to be treated as taking place, and determining whether a trigger event is in progress or contemplation in circumstances where a person has entered into an agreement or arrangement that enables them to do something in the future that would result in a trigger event taking place. The amendment, as we have framed it, would considerably expand the scope of events that could be considered trigger events. In effect, it would give the Secretary of State power to call in events under contemplation, by leaving out from “does” to the end of line 11 and inserting:

“establishes that arrangements are in progress or contemplation which, if carried into effect, would result in a trigger event taking place”.

As we have discussed, the Bill gives significant powers to the Secretary of State and the amendment would significantly expand notification volumes. There are many minor transactions where parties agree that someone might have the right to buy more shares in the future, and, in themselves, these transactions do not create direct influence and are unlikely to create a threat to national security. We recognise that the amendment would require all such minor transactions to be notified; it would seek to reflect the potential intention that these minor transactions may be part of a greater contemplation of something which would lead to a trigger event.

We recognise that Government would already have the power to intervene, through notification, once a trigger event takes place, so this amendment brings all possible future trigger events into scope, not just actual, or likely, future events.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. On the point on these disguised elements, does my hon. Friend agree that the issue is about not simply shareholding, but, as we heard in the evidence sessions, membership of boards, and how voting rights might not necessarily be in line with shareholding percentages, and that they can be distorted at a future date?

[Chi Onwurah]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. He makes a good point, which reflects why we are proposing this amendment to test the Bill. As he says, influence can be exercised in a wide range of ways.

I will elaborate on this later, but we must recognise that hostile parties will not sit back and see the Bill, then say “Oh well, that’s fine; we won’t try anything against the United Kingdom’s security,” as a consequence. They will seek ways to game and effect an influence regardless. Changes to the relationships between voting rights and shareholdings, for example, might be one way where they could seek to bypass the Bill.

I recognise that this is a wide-ranging amendment, but I seek to understand how the Minister feels that the Bill, as it stands, can address the kinds of concerns that my hon. Friend has just raised. This also reflects—I emphasise this again—the approach that we are taking, as the Opposition, on the Bill. The first priority and central plank of that approach is to put our national security first, and to do everything that we can to secure the strategic and economic resources on which our security relies; that focus on putting national security first motivates this probing amendment.

As my hon. Friend indicated, there can be a number of contingent investment transactions where parties agree to future events that transfer controls or influence. For example, a buyer might buy a low share of a company today, but might acquire with it the right to influence its shareholding in the future to levels of material influence.

I think the Minister will agree that we must watch out for these disguised transactions. They can start with innocuous levels of shareholdings, but set the ground for harder-to-notice increases in influence. At the moment, the Bill leaves out these transactions from the scope of notification, so the Government could not intervene. The amendment is therefore intended to probe the Government’s approach.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sam Tarry]

I agree. It is Small Business Saturday this weekend, and I imagine that many SMEs will be telling us when we are back in our constituencies about exactly these kinds of issues: the uncertainty, and the decisions they want to take about investment in staff, in technology and, of course, in equipment.

With this amendment we are trying to focus on ensuring that businesses have as much clarity as possible, so that they can begin to plan. If that uncertainty is ended, as we come out of the covid crisis and move forward from the debacle of Brexit, it will be better for businesses to have clarity, so that they can begin to take the positive decisions that will hopefully create jobs.

It is already challenging for firms to engage in such a tricky process. Remember that small and medium enterprises will not have the vast resources that are perhaps available to the multinationals or mergers-and-acquisitions-type companies from which we heard evidence. It will be far more frightening for SMEs to face such things given everything else they are dealing with at the moment.

The amendment would go a long way towards ending uncertainty for SMEs and ensuring that the Government act with clarity and, of course, with competence. It would require the Government to publish guidance on the form and content of the notices that firms will have to fill out. There will always be a degree of paperwork for businesses, but this is about ensuring that it can be filled in as quickly as possible. The recommendation is that guidance should create efficient forms and content requirements, and that it contains some indication of how long the Government will take to accept or reject a mandatory or voluntary notice,

[Matt Western]

My hon. Friend is making some important points. The issue here, as he is illustrating, is simply that the pressures that SMEs face in particular are about cash-flow and attracting inward investment. They do not have the resources or the capacity to cope with those sorts of approaches and will be under huge pressure. That is why the amendment is so important.

National Security and Investment Bill (Eighth sitting)

Matt Western Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

I appreciate what the Minister has had to say. He is clearly confident that the fine print of this clause is not going to be a problem. I slightly beg to differ: I think it may be. I also wonder whether the Minister has considered the extent to which what is already there—or, should I say, what I think is already there—in the Enterprise Act 2002 effectively restricts the Minister in his actions, in much the same way as this clause does, except that the restriction is much clearer from a legal point of view. That is to say, by relying on the restrictions that are already in the Enterprise Act, the Minister would probably not act any differently from how he would under this particular clause, but by relying on that element of the 2002 Act, his actions would be far less potentially actionable.

Before the Minister gets carried away by the idea that the legislature, or in this instance the Opposition, is clamouring for the Secretary of State to have far more powers, that is not our case. Our case is that it would be rather wiser to restrict what the Secretary of State may do through clearer legal definitions, which are already there, than through the rather woolly definition that is in the Bill. Before the Minister goes home thinking, “I have free rein to do whatever I like now”, that is not so: it is not so according to the Enterprise Act 2002, and it is something we want to stand strongly by. We do not want to underscore the idea that the Minister can act unreasonably, especially since the phrase “acting unreasonably” has a long pedigree, both in terms of civil action and administrative law over a long period of time.

I am sorry that the Minister does not accept our case, with all the caveats on it, although it may be that he is less inclined to accept the case now that we have highlighted the fact that there are caveats on what the Minister can do. I do not think we want to press this amendment to a Division, but we do so rather more in sorrow than in anger, because we think this could have been a prudent way to proceed with this Bill.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

As always, my hon. Friend is making important points. I was surprised to see the letter from the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which dates back to its 2013 report. Does my hon. Friend agree that if that Committee had been involved and consulted before this legislation was drawn up, some of the issues he is raising could have been brought out into the open and addressed better?

[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend is right. I think that, because things have changed so substantially over the past decade or so, we tend to see things in a way that we may not have easily seen them just a few years ago. Indeed, the expert witnesses who were before us made considerable points on the question of how naive we had been on some previous occasions; we had not really taken into account some of the implications of what we were doing, because we did not have a clear picture of the consequences of those actions.

My hon. Friend is right—I suppose this is to some extent wisdom of the stairs—that if we could have considered things at that particular point the way we see them now, we would have expressed ourselves in much firmer and more watertight ways. However, I do not think the fact that we did not do so then is any particular excuse for continuing not to do so now. The idea that we may miss out on the ability to get proper information that can point us in the direction we want to go, albeit possibly by very roundabout means, and that we deny ourselves that particular possibility because we have written something in the legislation that stops us doing it does not seem to me to be fully learning the lessons that we might have done from 2013 onwards.

However, far be it from me to lecture the Minister or otherwise on the wisdom of these things; I am sure he is able to decide that subsequently for himself, just as I have challenged him about the wisdom of the Secretary of State’s investment agreements a little while ago concerning Bradwell. I am sure he knows in his heart that that is an appallingly naive thing to have done in those circumstances, and we might have thought differently had that taken place even today. That is the spirit in which we are moving this amendment. As I say, we do not wish to press it to a vote, but I hope the Minister will be able to consider those points and think about how this section might best be applied in the circumstances we have before us today. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Grant]

I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification. As I say, I fully understand what the Government are attempting to achieve. I would expect that, in those circumstances, the Minister would block the acquisition if there was a serious failure to comply by anybody who was in practice beyond the reach of UK criminal prosecution. I would certainly hope that in those circumstances the Secretary of State would use the other powers to ensure that they could not become a controlling influence on any strategically important UK undertaking.

As I said, I do not want to divide the Committee. I did not even feel it was appropriate to table an amendment, partly because I could not think of a way of amending it that would make it any better. Having made those points, I am grateful for the Minister’s clarification, and we will leave it to future Secretaries of State to implement it as best they can.

[Matt Western]

I will pick up on one issue, which concerns subsection (3)(a). I would like some clarification from the Minister. I am trying to get my head around what is meant by

“a qualifying entity which is formed or recognised”.

Could he give an illustration of what is meant by “recognised”? I assume that this is about some takeover, merger or acquisition. Could it be some sort of shell company or some other form? Perhaps the Minister could clarify what is meant by recognition under the law.

[The Chair]

Well, the Minister has not intervened. I call Dr Alan Whitehead.

National Security and Investment Bill (Fifth sitting)

Matt Western Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend makes a point about the market failure that we have experienced over the past decade and its relevance to or inappropriateness for national security. The Government actively encouraged inward investment from China and let the market be totally open, without any control whatsoever, which is one of the driving factors in the challenges we face today, especially with Huawei, as outlined in last night’s debate.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. He is absolutely right. This is particularly relevant to amendment 3, as we shall see. This Government, and previous Conservative Governments of the past 10 years, have maintained an ideological position that bypasses the question of national security and leaves Government responsibility much curtailed and focused purely on our defence capabilities and requirements without considering the impact of our technology and R&D. As the debate on the telecoms Bill showed, the Government are not considering the impact of the telecoms sector on our short-term and long-term security.

On the specifics of amendment 3—these principles guide the reason for the amendment—the Secretary of State would have to draw up a multi-agency review or act on the recommendation of Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee prior to issuing a call-in notice.

The Bill marks the total transformation of the UK’s existing merger control process and the provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002. It would move us away from 12 reviews in 18 years to a potential 1,830 notifications a year. It would shift the locus of merger control from the experienced Competition and Markets Authority to a novel unit of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. As we heard in our expert evidence, the world is looking at the UK and seeing a pretty seismic change. We recognise the need for such a change, but we do not accept that the skills and knowledge to implement and monitor such a change reside wholly in BEIS.

The Minister is a modest man, and he may not want to share with the Committee the fact that he has recently been made the tzar for vaccine acquisition and delivery across the nation, but that is one of the many responsibilities of his Department. I hope he will agree that is a considerable responsibility, but the responsibility of identifying and understanding the national security implications of 1,830 notifications a year is a particularly great challenge. As someone who champions the importance of trade and economic growth, he will agree that there is potentially a conflict of interest—we have seen this for many years, as my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington suggested—between the trading implications of foreign direct investment and access to finance and the national security implications. This is such a huge shift that we cannot rely on discretionary judgments made potentially to suit political ends alone. We cannot rely on BEIS alone because the Department may have a conflict of interest in its separate role of boosting UK investments.

This is a critical point, and I hope to hear from the Minister how he or the Secretary of State will prioritise the role of the Department in boosting investment in the UK and in scrutinising these 1,830 notifications. We need to ensure a robust contribution from across Government and the agencies in guiding these decisions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Western]

My hon. Friend is making incredibly important points. There are really two issues. One is the volume that will be coming through, as she articulated earlier, but there is also the multiplicity of the challenges and where they may come from. This is not simply about the most obvious security challenges or risks. It is not necessarily about defence contracts or telecoms; it could come from all sorts of areas. It is the soft areas that are perhaps the most vulnerable. That is where the expertise of the different Departments will come into play, and that is why a multi-agency approach is so important.

[Chi Onwurah]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Perhaps I should have emphasised that point more.

When we look at the examples of Huawei or DeepMind, which was allowed to be sold to Google in 2014, we are looking backwards. We now recognise the security implications. Artificial intelligence is a key security capability, as I think the Minister will agree, given that it is one of the 17 sectors for which notification will be mandatory. At that time, it was difficult and I take it—perhaps the Minister will contradict this—that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills did not recognise the security implications of the acquisition.

The key question is, what are the acquisitions now that will have security implications in five or 10 years’ time? That is what the Secretary of State needs to know in order to make the decisions we are discussing. It is no injustice to the Secretary of State and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to say that alone, they are not in a position to know that. Deciding from where in the world the great threats to our security may come is not purely technological, although it requires technological expertise, and it is not even purely geopolitical. Last night we heard a lot about China and Russia. In future, we may be looking at other emerging threats. This is an attempt to improve the Bill by ensuring that there is a multi-agency approach.

[Chi Onwurah]

I do not think it would be appropriate to be prescriptive at this point. Some of the agencies I have in mind are the Intelligence and Security Committee, the National Cyber Security Centre and our security services—MI5 and MI6. I am very happy to hear from the hon. Gentleman what agencies should be involved, but the key point is that we need multiple agencies.

[Matt Western]

If the University of Cambridge were approached by a Chinese academic institution with an offer of funding to collaborate on some project, for example, surely that would need the intervention of the Department for Education. It is obviously not just about the intelligence services; it would need the engagement of the DFE and not just BEIS.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank my hon. Friend for that important point. I am reluctant to continuously mention China, because this is not an anti-China Bill per se, but we heard in oral evidence of the real concerns about Chinese influence in our higher education institutions. He is right that the Department for Education may have an important input to make about securing our future national security.

In defining the agencies that need to be involved in this multidisciplinary approach, we could look at the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which has nine voting departments, two non-voting agencies and additional White House representation on its decision-making committee. I know that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has done some work on comparisons with other countries, in particular our Five Eyes allies. There are models to take.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Western]

This is about putting it on a different footing; it is as simple as that. As was said by Sir Richard Dearlove and others in the evidence sessions last week, with the sort of agenda that a Government of any political colour may have, we have seen particularly over the past decade an embrace of, say, China, and the investment in our nuclear power stations provision as well as in other areas. Now, that could have been Russia, and if it had been Russia, what would the advice have been? What would the agenda of the Government of the day have been? Would it have been as embracing? That is why it is really important to understand from the ISC what its views are and to put this in a different setting, as my hon. Friend has said.

[Chi Onwurah]

Another excellent contribution from my hon. Friend, who raises a delicate, nuanced, important point. Governments of all colours may have trade and geopolitical agendas that lead to, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) described it, a “hug a panda” approach, whereas the ISC, which we have seen mark its independence of thought both as a Committee and in its contributions in parliamentary debates, has a duty, a responsibility and an understanding to see beyond short or even medium-term political ambitions and to focus wholeheartedly on the security of our nation. That is where its support is invaluable.

I will finish my comments on the amendment by quoting some of our parliamentary colleagues with regard to the Intelligence and Security Committee. On Second Reading, the Chair of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), said that

“there is a real role for Committees of this House in such processes and that the ability to subpoena both witnesses and papers would add not only depth to the Government’s investigation but protection to the Business Secretary who was forced to take the decision”.—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 238.]

I think that is powerful advocacy for the amendment. A member of the ISC, the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), said that

“we need mechanisms in place to ensure that that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope. That is why—this point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) and I emphasise it on behalf of the ISC—Committees in this place missioned to do just that need to play an important role.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 244.]

We had support in the evidence sessions, support across the House and, most importantly, we have the support of the ISC itself, or at least its agreement that the amendment would be a constructive improvement to the Bill.

Finally, I will say a few words on amendment 5, which would require the Secretary of State to notify the Intelligence and Security Committee before making regulations under clause 6 and would provide a mechanism for the Committee to respond with recommendations. Regulations made under clause 6 would likely define the sectors that pose the greatest national security risk and would come under mandatory notification requirements. With the amendment, the ISC would be able would to provide both scrutiny and challenge to these sector definitions. The Committee will understand that the driving reasons behind the amendment are similar to those behind amendments 3 and 4, which is of course why the amendments have been grouped together, and would seek to improve the Bill through putting in place a requirement for parliamentary scrutiny specifically on the definitions.

As we have said, the Bill gives the Secretary of State major powers, and it demands mandatory notification of investments in large parts of the economy, with 17 proposed sector definitions already. I really cannot emphasise enough how broad those definitions currently seem. I know it is the intention that the definitions should be tightly drawn. However, I speak as a chartered engineer with many years’ experience in technology. Three or four decades ago, we might have talked about digital parts of the economy, but now the economy is digital. Similarly, in the future, parts of the economy not using artificial intelligence—from agriculture to leisure to retail to education—will be looking to use it.

National Security and Investment Bill (Sixth sitting)

Matt Western Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

I am not sure that the Minister has; it is always a pleasure to hear his dulcet tones. In all seriousness, is this not open to interpretation with a change of Secretary of State, in the way that we have seen in the US with a change of President, and how that President chooses to define what national security means?

[Nadhim Zahawi]

I am grateful for the hon. Member’s contribution. Of course, no Government can tie the hands of future Governments, if that is his argument.

Moving on, I commend hon. Members for their interest in the process and function of the regime, made clear through amendment 9, which provides for additions to the statement about the exercise of the call-in power. It aims to ensure that the regime created by the Bill is properly resourced with the right numbers of skilled staff. The hon. Member for Ilford South was thoughtful in his concern about that. However, I would say to him and other Members that the purpose of the statement is to set out how the Secretary of State expects to exercise the power to give a call-in notice. It will provide information on the types of scenarios where the Secretary of State may consider there to be a national security risk. It would not be appropriate to add details about how the regime will be staffed.

Furthermore, internal arrangements on resource and skills are a matter for the Secretary of State and, of course, the permanent secretary at BEIS. I reassure hon. Members, however, that the Bill compels—this is the lever for Parliament, in my view—the Secretary of State to publish an annual report, which will provide information on the number of mandatory notices accepted and rejected, the number of voluntary notifications accepted and rejected, and the number of call-in notices and final orders made. That review is incredibly important in measuring performance. The exact details and requirements for the annual report are set out in clause 61. I will not go through all of them.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments and hope that Opposition Members feel able to withdraw them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend makes a crucial point. As we have constantly said, this is about risk and the hierarchy of risks we face. Risk is always sensitive to what is happening in terms of the global economic outlook. As she rightly points out, Brexit and leaving the transition period will be a seismic event for our country. It will have a massive impact on our currency and the strength of the pound. Combining that with the covid situation means that we have to be careful. We have to be vigilant and ensure that we defend our national interest. That is why it is important that our mindset involves taking a holistic view of our national interest, particularly in the turbulent times in which we find ourselves. This is fundamentally about saying that our national security is not for sale. Our national security does not have a price tag, and it has to be the primary consideration.

With those contextual comments in mind, I move on to amendment 6, which considers a particular aspect of our economy. It focuses on the asset side of the ledger in terms of this Bill—namely, critical national infrastructure. Our amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations. Going back to China, it is remarkable how much of our critical national infrastructure is in the hands of Chinese enterprises or state-backed investment vehicles. This is happening now, right under our noses, and needs to be taken into account in discussing this amendment.

In essence, our amendment offers a way to ensure that critical national infrastructure is given particular and extra consideration in the national security and investment assessments within the regime. Given that the Bill fails to define national security, it does not, by definition, reference critical national infrastructure.

To drill down further, the Government’s consultation on the Bill lists the 17 sectors that might come under the regime’s mandatory notification process, but it does not explicitly list the UK’s critical national infrastructure. In fact, there is not a direct overlap. Five sectors are not included in the 17 that are in the consultation, but they are in our critical national infrastructure. The 17 range from advanced materials, advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, civil nuclear, communications, computing hardware, critical suppliers to Government, critical suppliers to the emergency services, cryptographic authentication, data infrastructure, data infrastructure, defence, energy, engineering biology, military and dual use, quantum technology, satellite and space technologies, to transport. However, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines 13 areas as critical national infrastructure, including several sectors that are not included in the 17: food, Government more broadly––not just critical suppliers––health, space and water.

If we look at the impact of the pandemic and think about what critical national infrastructure means, we see that the 17 sectors are already out of date. Given our experience with covid and the concerns about food supply, that is clearly an issue we need to examine closely. Water is crucial to our wellbeing as a nation, yet it is not included in the 17. Our amendment argues that critical national infrastructure should be taken as an asset class. If defined as an asset class, the landscape moves and the definitions of sectors move, but there is clarity about critical national infrastructure always being within the scope of the Bill.

[Matt Western]

As always, my hon. Friend makes important points. To amplify those, if we had been sitting down and writing this Bill 10 years ago, which would have been a pretty good thing to have done, with hindsight––

[Mark Garnier]

When you were last in government?

[Matt Western]

I think I chose my time horizon pretty well. Had we been doing so, we may not have been considering these 17 categories, traffic light systems, underground systems, public transport or railway infrastructure in a way that we have to nowadays because we understand just how interconnected things are. We understand what the threats and risks are from these sorts of investments from possibly rogue organisations, states or businesses.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend. This is genuinely not an attempt to make a party political point. There is no doubt that we should have seen the impact of the rise of China long before 2010. This is something that has been going on for a long time. President Xi Jinping was appointed in 2013 and there has been a qualitative shift in China’s outlook and the way in which it is engaging with the world. There is an increasingly aggressive and assertive set of economic policies. One of the experts said that the objective is to dominate the global technology scene. That is an explicit objective in the Made in China 2025 vision that the President and the Chinese Communist party adhere to. While we are not trying to make party political points here, a lot has changed in the last seven years.