Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Mark Francois and Neil Shastri-Hurst

Select Committee stage
Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Francois]

I again place on record our thanks to you, Mr Efford, and to our excellent Clerks and the team who organised a very good visit down to Portsmouth, where I think we learned a lot about the operation of the service courts in practice—I certainly did. A number of issues were raised in that discussion, not least about the operation of juries in courts martial, and who serves on those jury panels, how they are selected and why. I will give two or three examples of the issues that came from that and then talk to the amendment.

The current practice, when an officer is being tried for an offence, is that only officers may serve on a jury panel in a court martial. Some people raised questions with the briefers that day about why that should be, and it is an interesting issue. The book answer from the Department was that officers should be tried by a jury of their peers, and therefore it should be other officers who serve on that panel. There is an issue that follows from that about the rank of the officer being tried and the rank of the officers that then serve on the panel. We learned about a practical constraint, which is that if a relatively senior officer is being tried, let us say a colonel or above—to take an Army example—there is only a relatively small pool of people who could be trawled to sit on that panel to pass judgment on that officer.

In the civilian world, we would not have a system where, if a professor were being tried, only graduates could sit on the panel. The civilian system is that people are chosen entirely at random from the electoral roll and are asked to do jury service, which they are mandated to do, with certain exceptions set out in statute. In the civilian world, people are not tried by people of—how can I put it?—an equivalent educational or social status. As the saying used to be, it is a jury of 12 good men and true; now it is, rightly, a jury of good men and women and true who assess someone’s guilt or innocence. In the military, we still carry out the process in this ranked, structured way.

Let us say that we had a lance corporal who was being tried for being drunk and disorderly—perhaps he had got into a bar brawl after the end of an exercise; he had gone out at the weekend, had let off a bit of steam and this had led to him allegedly committing an offence. At present, as I understand it, only senior non-commissioned officers of the rank of the equivalent of colour sergeant or above could pass judgment on that lance corporal. That raises an interesting question: why should another corporal or lance corporal, who likes a night out on a Friday as well, not be allowed to serve on that panel? Why does it have to be a colour sergeant or equivalent?

Forgive me, Mr Efford, I am using Army ranks because that is what I am most familiar with from my service, but the point holds good across all the services. Why should only a colour sergeant or above be allowed to pass verdict on a lance corporal or even a private soldier? A number of such issues cropped up from our visit. Also, as in the old saying that the Minister reminded me of, time spent in reconnaissance is seldom wasted. This was a good example of that practice.

The amendment was drafted specifically to address one of those issues—the potential shortage of officers to serve on court martial panels, especially if a relatively senior officer is being tried, when by definition the pool of available serving officers to serve on a panel is limited. We have tried to come up with a practical suggestion, which is to use retired officers of equivalent rank. I am also interested to hear what other members of the Committee think of the wider issue, which is, does this have to be as hide-bound by rank as it is at the moment? I am interested in the Minister’s view as well, not least because he has been a commanding officer.

If we are to keep the system in essence as we have it at the moment, however, would it not make sense to be able to draw on a pool of retired officers of the required rank, who might have a little more time on their hands? We would not be taking anyone away from ongoing operations, and we could take time from their lives in order for them to continue to serve in a military context in the important task of administering service justice. That, in essence, is the intention of the amendment, but we also tabled it to provoke, I hope, a wider debate—I am looking at one or two Labour Back Benchers in particular, because they were vocal about this when we were in Portsmouth, so now is their chance—about why we do things in the way that we do them, and whether there is some potential for change, but if not, why not?

I hope that I have laid out the issue fairly clearly for the Committee.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment, which was tabled in the name of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, and to set out my broader support for clause 20. I will begin with the clause itself, because it addresses the composition of the court martial. In such circumstances, it is right that we support the very sensible change that the clause sets out, with its underlying intent to ensure that the court martial is properly constituted and capable of commanding confidence across the armed forces and the wider public. Enlarging the pool of those who can sit on it is a welcome amendment.

Precisely because we support that principle, however, we also need to examine whether the system is fully equipped for the realities it faces. In that context, the amendment becomes not only relevant, but in my view increasingly necessary. The amendment proposes a simple change, as set out by my right hon. Friend, to include retired holders of the relevant rank among those qualified for membership of the court martial.

At first glance the amendment may appear relatively modest, but I suggest that, like many apparently modest changes in defence legislation, it subtly reflects something much more significant. It reflects a recognition of the demands placed on our armed forces justice system and how those are changing over time, and changing rapidly. We are operating in an era of increasing operational tempo—a phrase that is often used in defence debates, sometimes frequently.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Gentleman makes a helpful challenge. Clearly, there is no impact assessment with the amendment. However, there is a joint service publication, the RARO—regular army reserve of officers—list, and there are those letters I receive annually asking me to update my address and contact details. There are already mechanisms by which individuals can be identified and recalled for this service. Given the operational tempo that I have described, it makes sense that we ameliorate the pressure on those who are currently in active service while not impacting the flow of justice through the service justice system.

[Mr Francois]

In my experience, retired officers, particularly retired senior officers, are keenly aware of their pension entitlements. If we are paying them a pension through the armed forces pension scheme, we presumably know who they are and where they live. Via that database, it would not be particularly onerous to come up with a list of retired senior officers who could at least be invited. We are not suggesting that this should be mandatory, but we are suggesting that they may want the opportunity to serve. Via their pensions, we know where they are.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who from his time as a Defence Minister knows well how to keep tabs on those who have served our country but are now retired. The pension scheme is an obvious way to do so. In addition, he makes an important point about the willingness of individuals to engage in the process. These are people who have given enormous service to their country, and often wish to continue giving service long into their years of retirement from active service.

Our armed forces are more stretched and more globally engaged than before, and they are more frequently deployed than at almost any point in recent decades. The spectrum of threats facing our country is widening, from state-based adversaries to hybrid war, cyber-operations and persistent instability in regions where British forces are called to act with precision and professionalism. As I have set out, when operational tempo increases every part of the system is affected. It is not just about equipment, logistics or personnel numbers, but about the justice system that underpins discipline, accountability and command authority.

The question, therefore, is a relatively simple one: does our current system of service justice have the flexibility, depth and resilience required to meet that demand? Amendment 9 is one attempt to ensure that it does. It recognises that we are asking a great deal of a relatively small pool of serving officers. We are asking them not only to command forces in complex environments but, where necessary, to sit in judgment in court martial proceedings, including in cases involving senior rank, complex evidence, and often significant reputational consequence for all involved. That is not to say that these individuals are incapable of doing those tasks, but that is a heavy burden on any system. It becomes more difficult still when we consider the practical realities of availability.

Senior serving officers are, by definition, in high demand. They are deployed, rotated, assigned to strategic planning roles or engaged in operational command responsibilities that cannot simply be paused or rescheduled. At the same time, the court martial system requires a bench that is credible, experienced and capable of understanding the realities of service life. It is not enough that those sitting in judgment are legally competent to interpret the evidence; they must also understand the context in which decisions are made, the pressures under which orders are given and the operational environments in which conduct is assessed.

That combination of legal competence and operational understanding is not easily found, and it is here that amendment 9 can make a tangible contribution. By extending eligibility to retired officers of appropriate rank, we end up expanding the pool of individuals who can bring that essential combination of experience and judgment to the court martial system.

I want to be clear about what the amendment seeks to do and what it does not seek to do. It is not an attempt to dilute standards. On the contrary, it is an attempt to strengthen them by widening the field of those who meet them. It is not an attempt to undermine the authority of serving officers; it is an attempt to relieve them of some of the competing pressures that now fall on them in an increasingly demanding environment. It is not an attempt to create a separate or parallel justice system where some are tried by those who are still in active service and some are held in judgment by those who have retired. It is merely an attempt to ensure that the existing system has the necessary capacity to function effectively.

Armed Forces Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Mark Francois and Neil Shastri-Hurst

Select Committee stage
Tuesday 24th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Francois]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the words that we have used in the amendment are taken verbatim from the Minister’s letter of 9 March 2026? We asked him to provide a definition of due regard; he duly wrote to the Committee very promptly, and we have quoted the first sentence verbatim. These are not random words; this is the Minister’s definition. All we are seeking to do is place it in the Bill.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful, as always, to my right hon. Friend for his intervention, because he has hit the nail on the head. This is not something novel; it is merely codifying—formalising in the Bill—what has already been written in evidence to us, which seems eminently sensible.

It is important to consider the practical impact of the amendment on public bodies. The definition would not impose a new or onerous requirement. Public bodies are already accustomed to taking into account statutory duties and policy considerations in their decision-making processes. A requirement to think about the covenant and give it appropriate weight would fit squarely within that existing framework. It would not require extensive additional processes or resources. It would not mandate detailed reporting or specific outcomes. Instead, it would provide a clear instruction about how the covenant should be treated alongside other relevant factors. In practice, that may involve ensuring that decision makers are aware of the covenant and understand its implications. It may involve considering how policies affect members of the armed forces community and whether adjustments are needed to avoid disadvantage. Those seem eminently sensible and wise factors to put in this piece of legislation.

In education, that could mean taking into account the particular challenges faced by a service child who moves schools frequently. In healthcare, it could involve considering continuity of care for families who relocate. In housing, it could involve recognising the impact of service-related mobility on access to accommodation. In each of those cases, the duty does not require a specific result; it requires consideration of the relevant factors, including the covenant, and a balanced decision based on those factors. Amendment 8 would therefore support decision making without constraining flexibility.

We often hear concerns that defining duties in legislation may increase the risk of legal challenge. In my view, in this case, the greater clarity that the amendment would introduce is more likely to reduce that risk and be a protective factor. Where duties are clearly defined, public bodies are better able to understand and comply with them, which reduces the likelihood of disputes arising from uncertainty about what is required. Conversely, where duties are unclear, there is a greater risk of inconsistent application and challenge.

By setting out what due regard means in this context, the amendment would provide a clearer basis for compliance. Importantly, it would reduce ambiguity. It is also relevant that the definition is framed in general terms; it does not describe details or steps that must be followed in every case. That would allow public bodies to apply the duty in a way that is proportionate to the circumstances that they face. That flexibility is important given the range of functions and decisions to which the duty will apply.

The amendment aligns with the overall purpose of the Bill. The intention is to embed the principles of the armed forces covenant in the work of public bodies. A clearly defined duty would support that objective by ensuring that the covenant is considered in a consistent and meaningful way. If the duty is left undefined, there is a risk that its impact will vary significantly between organisations, which would undermine the aim of the Bill. The amendment would strengthen the Bill by supporting a more effective and consistent implementation. It would also reflect the practical realities of service life.

Members of the armed forces and their families frequently experience moves and disruption as part of their service. They rely on public services in different parts of the country and need those services to respond in a consistent and informed way. A clear definition of due regard would help to support that consistency, providing a common framework for decision making that recognises the particular circumstances of the armed forces community. It is not about giving preferential treatment in all cases; it is about ensuring fairness in line with the principles of the covenant. That includes avoiding disadvantage and, where appropriate, providing additional support. The amendment would ensure that those principles are properly taken into account.

Amendment 8 would make a targeted and practical improvement to the Bill. It would support a more consistent application of the armed forces covenant by public bodies, provide greater clarity for decision makers and those affected by their decisions, strengthen accountability, and reduce the risk of inconsistent interpretation. Most importantly, it would help to ensure that the covenant is applied in a way that has a real effect on day-to-day decision making. For those reasons, I view the amendment as a useful and proportionate clarification that would strengthen the operation of the duty as set out in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I promise the Minister that this will be the last time I intervene.

[Mr Francois]

On this point.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

Yes, on this particular point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for his intervention. This is about placing a clear, time-bound duty on the Secretary of State to secure continuity of secondary care for dependants within six months. We want their clinical need to transfer horizontally across, as opposed to vertically downwards. That is the nuisance that amendment 10 is intended to address.

Amendment 10 sets out the substance of the regulations that I have suggested that the Secretary of State introduce. They are deliberately straightforward. First, where a patient is already receiving treatment, their status should be preserved when the responsibility for their care is transferred to a different health authority—that is, a horizontal move across. In practical terms, it would mean that a patient should not lose their place in the system because they crossed administrative boundaries. Instead, they should have a seamless transfer of care.

Secondly, the amendment would ensure that patients are not required to obtain a new referral solely by virtue of having moved, which would be ridiculous. The need for a referral is, and should remain, a clinical matter. It should not be triggered by geography and movement. Requiring a new referral in those circumstances adds delay, creates duplication and serves no meaningful clinical purpose.

Thirdly, the amendment calls for clear guidance on the practical steps necessary to support continuity, including the timely and efficient transfer of patient records, the recognition and continuation of existing treatment pathways, and the preservation of procedures that have been booked or recommended. Those are not novel concepts; in many ways, they are already part of good administrative practice. What is lacking is the consistency of application across the country.

It is perhaps worth emphasising what amendment 10 would not do, as much as what it would. It would not confer preferential treatment on service families. It would not seek to move them ahead of others in the queue, nor to secure access to services beyond what is clinically necessary. Its purpose is much more modest: to ensure that service families are not disadvantaged as a result of circumstances beyond their control. That is entirely in keeping with the armed forces covenant, which commits to removing disadvantage, not to creating advantage. In that context, the disadvantage is clear; it arises not from clinical need, but from the intersection of mobility and administrative fragmentation. Addressing it is therefore both entirely justified and absolutely necessary.

There is also a broader point about fairness and the implicit contract between the nation and those who serve. Service personnel accept a range of constraints and obligations that do not apply to the general population. They relinquish a degree of control over where they live, where they move and how they organise their family life. In return, it is entirely reasonable for them to expect that the state will take reasonable steps to ensure that those constraints do not translate into avoidable hardship for their families.

Continuity of healthcare is a particularly important aspect of that understanding. Health is not a peripheral concern; it is central to the wellbeing and stability of service families. Disruption to care can have a cascading effect on education, employment and the overall resilience of the family unit. In that sense, addressing the issue is a matter not only of fairness, but of operational effectiveness. A serviceperson who is worried about the health of their family cannot fully focus on their duties. At a time of critical need, their ability to do so is absolutely essential.

Some may raise questions about the practicalities of implementing such a system, particularly in the context of devolved health systems across the United Kingdom. It is therefore important to be clear about the scope and intent of amendment 10. It would not seek to override devolved competencies or impose a uniform model of service delivery. Rather, it would require that whatever the organisational arrangements are, mechanisms be in place to ensure continuity when patients move between them.

In many respects, the steps required are administrative rather than structural. They involve ensuring that information flows effectively, that existing clinical decisions are recognised, and that waiting positions are honoured, based on clinical need. These are matters of co-ordination, communication and guidance; they do not require wholesale reform of the system.

There are already examples of good practice in this area. In some parts of the country, arrangements have already been put in place to facilitate the transfer of patients between trusts with minimal disruption to their care. The amendment seeks to ensure that such practice becomes the norm rather than the exception.

It is also worth noting that the increasing digitalisation of healthcare records and the development of more integrated healthcare systems provide a foundation upon which this kind of continuity can be built. In many cases, the infrastructure already exists; what is needed is a clearer expectation, backed by regulation, that it should be used to support service families consistently and reliably.

[Mr Francois]

My hon. Friend is making an extremely good speech. As he and the Committee know, there is a major reform of NHS England going on. At the ground level, it means that there will be far fewer integrated care boards. In Essex, we are going from three to one, and that approach is mirrored across the country. Is not my hon. Friend’s amendment therefore very timely, because—this should appeal to the Minister—we are trying to slim down NHS bureaucracy and give ICBs more power within the system? Would my hon. Friend’s proposal not tie in extremely well with the reorganisation of integrated care boards, which hold much of the budget within the NHS?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right: this is about not only streamlining the process, but giving more heft to those who wield the power to ensure that we get improved patient outcomes at the end of it. That is what we should all be seeking.

Ultimately, the question before us is very straightforward: are we content to allow a situation to persist in which service families can lose their place in the healthcare system simply because they are required to move in the course of service, or do we consider it reasonable to take targeted steps to prevent that outcome? In my view, the answer is clear. Where treatment has begun, it should continue. Where a place on a waiting list has been earned, it should be respected. Administrative boundaries should not dictate clinical outcomes. They certainly should not impose additional burdens on those who have little choice but to cross them.

The amendment provides a measured and practical mechanism to achieve that objective. It respects the structure of the NHS, acknowledges the reality of devolution and focuses squarely on the removal of a specific and identifiable disadvantage. In doing so, it gives tangible effect to the principles of the covenant. It recognises that our obligations to service families are not merely symbolic; they require a practical expression in the design and operation of public services.