Northern Ireland Troubles Bill

Mark Francois Excerpts

Committee of the whole House & 3rd reading
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

And it is not for Ministers to comment when there are legal proceedings being undergone either, as I think the hon. Lady will be aware. I will not comment on the specific incidents. I have made my views clear about why there should not be any amnesty for people involved. There was legislation introduced that meant that nobody can face a prison sentence of more than two years. We understand the kind of arrangement that that was. There were people and political parties who did not support the Good Friday agreement, and maybe these are some of the issues that were always troublesome for them. For me, it is important that at this stage we recognise that we need to get as many answers as possible for people, and that there cannot be that kind of immunity, amnesty—whatever we may call it.

The Government recognise that investigations by the legacy commission are just one aspect of addressing legacy. That is why we have agreed to establish, on a pilot basis with the Irish Government, the independent commission on information retrieval. That was originally agreed by the coalition Government and the Irish Government in 2014 as part of the Stormont House agreement, but it was never established. That is why I am pleased to be able to establish it now.

The ICIR is entirely separate from the legacy commission and will not conduct investigations. That is a very clear distinction. Its remit is, privately, to receive and retain information about troubles-related deaths and share that information, again privately, with those family members who have requested it, providing a different means by which families may obtain information about troubles-related deaths. I know, having spoken to quite a few families in Northern Ireland, that they warmly welcome that and want to see it amplified, if we can make the pilot work.

Members will see that I have tabled some minor and technical amendments relating to the ICIR. For example, amendment 235 will ensure that the ICIR is able to produce and provide a report to a requestor after its operational period has ended, in circumstances where it has concluded its work on a specific case but has been prevented from providing a report due to an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. Investigations and prosecutions in troubles-related cases are often complex and can take some time to conclude. We want to avoid a scenario where the ICIR has concluded its work on a case on behalf of families but is unable to share potentially important information with them in those circumstances, which are beyond its control.

Finally—it is not really my final “finally”; I just noticed that the word “finally” appeared and it really used to wind me up when listening to sermons that had “finally” halfway through. Anyway, finally—

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Amen.

[Chris Bryant]

Very good.

Having engaged extensively with different groups, I appreciate that there are concerns with the transparency of future prosecutorial decisions. I want to be absolutely clear: the Government do not accept any suggestion that our prosecution services bring forward vexatious prosecutions. This Government believe wholeheartedly in the approach of our prosecutorial services. It is clear that decisions on prosecutions taken by the prosecution service in Northern Ireland and in England and Wales are always taken independently, in the light of the individual facts and circumstances. However, there is a public interest in how such cases are considered, given both the context and the passage of time. Therefore, we will bring forward a number of critical new amendments.

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[David Davis]

The hon. Gentleman is exactly right. That serves to focus our minds on the fact that this was a very deliberate strategy. This did not happen by accident, and the IRA did not just take to wearing boiler suits as uniforms; this was a deliberate strategy.

The IRA’s strategy faced the state with a conundrum. Doing nothing and sitting back does not work—if the jury processes and other judicial processes do not work, that is not an option. Why do I say that? Let me go back and take the East Tyrone brigade as an example. It killed 250 people before Loughgall. During the late ’80s, it was killing people at a rate of 10 or 15 a year. Doing nothing meant that 10 or 15 innocent people would die every year because the state was not fulfilling its duty, so the only way to stop it was to catch the East Tyrone brigade in flagrante—in the act of carrying out a crime—and try to arrest them. Of course, the first aim of the state is always to act with minimum force if possible, but the circumstances did not always allow that. This was an armed set of terrorists, probably in the process of trying to kill somebody, who might then turn to kill you, and you had to stand up and say, “Excuse me, you’re under arrest.” We saw from many of these events how dangerous that was. At Coagh—the case that went through all those judicial reviews—an SAS soldier effectively had to dress up as a UDR man to be the target, and they had to wait until he had been shot at before they moved.

At Clonoe, which my hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar mentioned, there was another problem: the intelligence was wrong, which made it even more difficult. There they were facing a double-barrelled dushka machine gun, .50 calibre and capable of bringing down light armour or aircraft. A three-second burst of fire from that and the whole patrol would have been dead. That was the sort of thing we were asking our soldiers to do. I will come back to the Loughgall example, which is even worse in many ways. That was the sort of thing that we said to our soldiers, “You must do this to attempt to achieve an arrest, or at least a stop if you have to.” This is not theoretical; in the specific context of the special forces, which is what these three cases relate to, hundreds of soldiers died in Northern Ireland. If Members want to look into this, I recommend that they look up the example of Lance Corporal David Jones, who was shot at the moment of challenge, or that of Captain Westmacott. There are others, but those cases give the Committee clear examples of the sorts of risks that had to be taken—and were taken—by our brave, honourable, decent and law-abiding soldiers.

[Mr Francois]

My right hon. Friend is making a powerful speech, one that explains very well why veterans have lost confidence in the coronial system. Does he agree with David Johnstone, the Northern Ireland Veterans Commissioner, who recently said:

“Because the coronial system allows for appeals, judicial reviews, all the way up to the Supreme Court, and families can access legal aid, it is lawfare on steroids.”?

[David Davis]

I agree with David Johnstone—by the way, I think he is a very brave commissioner. His predecessor was effectively fired for standing up, and he is still standing up. He is right, and to go off on a slight tangent, our other enemies learn from this, as we are seeing elsewhere in the world today. If we are not very careful, we will end up without one of the best parts of our armed forces, because we ourselves will have destroyed it.

Let me come back to Loughgall. The aim at Loughgall was to destroy the police station and kill the police officers who would be coming off shift at 7 pm—the attack was timed for 7 pm. It was not the first such operation, but the third; it came after Ballygawley, where the IRA shot and killed two police officers before blowing up the station, and the Birches, where they machine-gunned the station—fortunately, they missed people—before blowing it up. At Loughgall, the IRA team attacked the police station in two units. One unit was in a van, carrying a team armed with automatic weapons with the intention of killing the three police officers as they came off duty, and the other unit—of three men, I think—was in a JCB-style digger that was carrying in its bucket a 300 lb to 400 lb bomb.

The attack happened at 7 pm, when the police officers were due to come off shift. Inside the station at the time, because of intelligence that was known, there were three police officers and three SAS soldiers. To be frank, I find it hard to imagine the level of courage it takes to sit in a building, waiting for it to be blown up by a 300 lb or 400 lb bomb. It is beyond my imagination, but that is what they did.

The attack started when the van screeched to a halt, and a number of the unit debussed and opened fire on the police station. They fired a total of 78 rounds; I do not know whether all of them were fired at the police station, but I imagine most of them were. Inside the station, people reported being hit by fragments of bullets as they hit the steel frames of the windows and disintegrated. The digger then crashed through the perimeter fence and the bomb exploded, destroying half the building and injuring the occupants. “Injuring” is too mild a term, frankly—one occupant had a fractured skull, while others had broken bones, and two of the soldiers fell about 10 feet on to rubble. Others sustained hearing injuries.

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[Al Carns]

rose—

[Mr Francois]

On that point, will the Secretary of State give way?

[Chris Bryant]

No, I am not going to give way to the right hon. Gentleman.

[Mr Francois]

Will the Secretary of State give way?

[Chris Bryant]

I am not going to give way to the right hon. Gentleman.

[Mr Francois]

Because you know you are wrong. I am the shadow Veterans Minister.

[The Second Deputy Chairman]

Order. The Secretary of State is not obliged to give way.