Immigration

Debate between Mark Field and James Brokenshire

Thursday 9th July 2015 Westminster Hall

[James Brokenshire]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention and welcome her contribution to the debate. The Scottish Government have raised the issue of post-study work, which is the point that she is making. I have a number of observations about that. Student numbers continue to increase, notwithstanding the assertion that they might go down because of the changes we have introduced, and the UK remains open for study at our world-leading academic institutions.

As for post-study work, it is available through the tier 2 route. Students who find graduate employment may take up that route, in which case they are not counted against the cap. One of my challenges to many firms and businesses is, “What are you doing to harness that? What are you doing about working with universities and using the existing tier 2 provisions to make the most of graduates coming out of our universities?” There are ongoing discussions between my officials and the Scottish Government, and the Home Secretary will consider some advice and meet the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Justice to discuss that and other shared matters of interest.

As for a separate arrangement for post-study work in Scotland, under the Fresh Talent scheme that operated until 2008, one of the issues that arose was that many international students granted entry under that route then chose to move to London and the south-east, rather than staying in Scotland. The issue needs to be considered with care, given the practical impact of some of the schemes.

[Mark Field]

Will the Minister give way?

[James Brokenshire]

I will give way briefly to my right hon. Friend, because this is a particular interest of his.

[Mark Field]

The Minister has summed up some of the difficulties that we face in getting a policy that works as intended for all parts of the United Kingdom. He came up with some robust statistics, but I have two small observations to make. First, he referred to the percentage increase in applications, which is not necessarily the number of students coming here. Secondly, we are lucky in many ways that we are seeing a phenomenal increase, an explosion, in the number of middle-class Chinese, Indians and the like, so we should expect a significant percentage increase in the number of students. However, the worry is that we are getting less of the percentage increase, while rather larger percentages are going to universities in Canada, Australia and the United States, for example.

[James Brokenshire]

I have only a couple of minutes left, but I am sure that we will return to the subject on another day. We have seen increases in the number of Chinese students, but I look forward to continuing the debate another time.

We will introduce a new immigration Bill to clamp down on illegal immigration and to protect our public services, ensuring that we have the right emphasis. The Bill will tighten up access to public services and protect them against abuse by people who are here illegally. It will build on the provisions in the Immigration Act 2014. The reforms will, for example, speed up the removal process by extending the power to require individuals to leave the UK before bringing an appeal against a decision in all human rights cases, unless there is a real risk of serious, irreversible harm as a result of the overseas appeal. As I have indicated, that power is already making a significant difference.

Separately from that Bill, as the Prime Minister has said, we are going to get better at training our own people. To support that, we will consult on helping to fund businesses that use foreign labour through a new visa levy. That will address the skills issue, which a number of Members have touched on today. By improving the training of British workers, we should be able to lower the number of skilled workers we bring in from elsewhere. We have touched on the shortage occupation list, for example, which is set by the Migration Advisory Committee. I emphasise that a separate list applies in Scotland, reflecting some of the different circumstances. However, I draw Members’ attention to the fact that we have asked the committee to advise on significantly reducing economic migration from outside the EU—should an occupation always stay on the list? How can we reskill? Do we have a long-term, sustainable approach to the policy?

Counter-Terrorism (Statutory Instruments)

Debate between Mark Field and James Brokenshire

Monday 16th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

The right hon. Gentleman will know that David Anderson, the independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, is examining the RIPA issue very keenly. We await his report, which we expect to be completed before May and which I sincerely believe will help to inform further consideration of the Act during the next Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman will also know that the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 has an end date of 31 December 2016, which means that Parliament will have to return to the issue—informed, I am sure, not only by the independent reviewer’s report, but by that of the Select Committee.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I appreciate that we have the commissioner’s report, that the independent reviewer’s report is imminent and that there is a time limit of December 2016. However, given the grave concern that exists about, in particular, the powers and constraints affecting journalists, will the Minister assure us that he will keep the matter under general review, and that, if a problem arose, even with these orders, by the end of the year—or, indeed, within a matter of months—he would be willing to come back to the House and look at it afresh?

[James Brokenshire]

I assure my right hon. Friend, whom I congratulate on becoming a member of the Privy Council, that the matter will be kept under close scrutiny and review. We have published draft clauses, which could be enacted quickly in the next Parliament, to regularise the position. We recognise that this is an interim measure, and we want it to be enshrined in primary legislation that the House would have a full opportunity to debate. I should add that the code of practice provides for requests to be flagged up to the commissioner, and thus allows additional scrutiny to take place. I hope that that reassures my right hon. Friend.

The commissioner also recommended further changes to the guidance in the acquisition code, and we have sought to implement that recommendation. The code is now clear about the need to consider more than rights to privacy—in particular, the right to freedom of expression must be taken into account when that is appropriate—and it also contains new guidance on the considerations of necessity, proportionality and collateral intrusion, including unintended consequences.

The revised acquisition code enhances the operational independence of the authorising officer from the specific investigation for which communications data are required. It includes new, enhanced protections for those who may have professional duties of confidentiality or privilege. However, it is important to remember that we are debating communications data, not the content of communications.

The retention code sets out how the Government implement the requirements in the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 and the Data Retention Regulations 2014. It covers the following issues: the review, variation and revocation of data retention notices; communications service providers’ ability to recover their costs; data security; oversight by the Information Commissioner and safeguards on the disclosure; and the use of retained data by communications service providers.

The House will be aware that both codes underwent public consultation. The Government received about 300 submissions from organisations and individuals suggesting amendments and providing comments on the codes. I am grateful to all who took part. We have published a summary of the submissions received and how the Government have responded to them. The Department considered all the responses to the consultation and many of the suggestions have been adopted in the final drafts.

I would like to address briefly the final instrument in this motion: the Authority to Carry (Civil Penalties) Regulations 2015. They establish a penalty regime for breach of any requirement of the authority to carry scheme 2015, which this House approved on 10 March. A carrier may be liable to a penalty for breach of the following: a requirement to seek authority to carry a person; a requirement to provide specified information by a specified time; a requirement to provide information in a specified manner and form; a requirement to be able to receive communications in a specified manner and form; or a requirement not to carry a person when authority to carry has been refused—this is an important part of the code.

The scheme specifies that it is the requirements set out in detailed written notices issued to carriers under the Immigration Act 1971 or the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 that must be met under the scheme, rather than those requirements being specified in detail in the scheme itself.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Mark Field and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

We have had an interesting and informative debate focusing on the broader aspects of the ability of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies to do their job in a fast-moving environment where technology continues to change, and their ability to continue to protect us in those circumstances. I will argue that we have an eroding capability and although the measure will deal with one element, there is still more that we need to do. That is a point on which my hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith) has intervened on other speakers in the debate and he is right to make the point. I will come on to the possible next steps in the context of the various reviews that are taking place.

The gap was highlighted by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth). I know that his Committee is looking carefully at the issue of privacy versus security. The need to strike a balance between them and some of the issues arising from that have rightly been played out in the context of interception, data retention and communications data. I look forward to the publication of the Committee’s report, which I expect to be extremely informative in this regard.

[Mark Field]

Without giving a preview of anything in the Committee report, I think it is important, for the benefit of the House and those Members who take the matter very seriously, that we should remember that privacy and security are not a zero sum game. Although my hon. Friend uses the word “balance”, as many of us do from time to time, there is also a sense that these are important safeguards individually and in their own right. One of the broader recommendations that we make from the evidence we took from a wide range of people is that the notion that there is a balance and a zero sum game should be dispelled.

[James Brokenshire]

I appreciate the comments of my hon. Friend. As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, he will recognise the challenges. He is right to underline the significance and to reiterate what I said on Second Reading—that security and liberty should be mutually reinforcing. His point about it not being a zero sum game is well made.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), who speaks for the Opposition, identified a list of 10 points, and I will do my best to respond to some of them. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) underlined the role of sensitive categories of person and additional safeguards that may be provided in respect of them when we consider communications data and the ability of the police to request such data. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) pointed out, we are looking at metadata—who said what to whom, when and where—rather than the content.

It is clear from the contributions that we have heard that gaps in communications data capability have a serious impact on the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to carry out their functions—the point that was made clearly by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) and the shadow Minister. One such gap is internet protocol address resolution. The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 maintained our lawful data retention regime. It did not create any additional powers, nor did it address any of the gaps in capability. To respond to the point made by the hon. Lady, we remain confident about the manner in which it did that in seeking to address the points raised by the European Court of Justice.

Clause 17 amends that Act—DRIPA—to ensure that communications service providers can be required to retain the data necessary to link the unique attributes of an internet connection to the person or device using it at any given time. Every internet user is assigned an IP address to ensure that communications service providers know which data should go to which customer and route it accordingly. Addresses are sometimes assigned to a specific device, such as a broadband router located in a home or within the work environment, but they are usually shared between multiple users—hundreds or even thousands—and allocated automatically by the provider’s systems. Many providers currently have no business reason for keeping a log of who has used each address. It is therefore not always possible for law enforcement agencies accessing the data to identify who was using an IP address at any specific point in time.

The provision would ensure that these data are available to law enforcement. It would improve the ability of the police and other agencies to identify terror suspects who may be communicating with each other via the internet and plotting attacks. It would also help to identify and prosecute paedophiles, organised criminals, cyber-bullies and computer hackers, and to protect vulnerable people. For example, it could be used to identify a child who has threatened over social media to commit suicide. The IP address has direct relevance to all these issues and it is evidence that can be brought before the court. In the context of the previous debate, it is often instrumental in bringing prosecutions. Communications data are used in about 95% of all serious crime prosecutions, so they have a direct utility.

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[James Brokenshire]

This issue is not going away, and we need to make further changes. I can see the eroding capability of our law enforcement and security agencies. While this plugs an element, there is still more to be done to ensure that our police and security services are able to protect us, and that there is evidence that can be presented in court. On these issues relating to communications data, we are talking about evidence, not merely intelligence. These are hard pieces of information that can be presented in court to secure prosecutions. This is really essential because of the underpinning that it provides to our prosecutorial system.

The Bill does not incorporate provisions on weblogs, but apps and weblogs can be directly instructive in this respect, and the House will need to confront that in, I hope, an informed way. The reviews that the Intelligence and Security Committee and David Anderson are undertaking will inform that debate rather than its being completely informed by belief or emotion, important as those elements are to ensure that it is properly reflective of the view of our communities and the public. We must ensure that the facts are there as we examine the picture, in order to provide the basis for a rational debate when the House considers the legislation it will need to pass before December 2016.

[Mark Field]

Does my hon. Friend accept that another issue, which was skilfully outlined by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), is arbitrage, in the sense of authorities being able to choose one piece of legislation rather than another—for example, as he said, RIPA rather than PACE? Given the complications arising from there being more and more legislation in this area, is it not almost essential to move towards a consolidation to ensure that we entirely understand our rights and responsibilities?

[James Brokenshire]

I am sure that that issue will be presented in representations made to David Anderson as part of his examination. Clearly, none of us will wish in any way to prejudge the way in which that evidence is presented. He intends to report back by May. That is the right timing to ensure that the new Parliament after the next general election has the benefit of seeing his report, which will have examined these issues in close and careful detail.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North asked about the role of the interception of communications commissioner. He will oversee the acquisition of data retained under clause 17, just as he oversees the acquisition of all communications data retained under DRIPA. The Home Office will ensure that he has the necessary resources to discharge his function.

The hon. Lady referred to multiple requests for traffic and subscriber data. Public authorities can request communications data only when it is considered necessary and proportionate for one of the purposes set out in DRIPA. A communications service provider could disclose only data that have been requested. It is an operational matter for the public authority as to how it makes such requests for data. Where it holds limited information at the outset of the investigation, it is likely that it will need to make more than one request, which means there may be multiple requests relating to a particular criminal inquiry.

The hon. Lady highlighted the issue of costs. The totals that were put into the impact assessment published alongside the Bill were based on studies of IP resolution conducted by the industry and prior work with service providers and the industry on similar projects. This has been an informed process in which there has been consultation with individual service providers likely to be most affected by the provisions of the Bill.

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for tabling new clause 2 to highlight the oversight of the acquisition of communications data retained under these provisions. The data retention regulations passed earlier this year specifically require communications service providers, subject to a data retention notice, to retain data in such a way as to ensure that they are available without undue delay in response to requests. I assure the Committee that in the vast majority of cases, data retained under this obligation are disclosed in a timely fashion. Of course, things may not always work perfectly, but there are systems in place that seek to resolve such issues should they arise. Indeed, there are industry groups that work on precisely that. The law enforcement community works closely with the communications service providers, and the Home Office seeks to establish the best technical solutions to support that.

The issue that we hear about more often than that highlighted by the hon. Lady is the broader one of key categories of communications data which communication service providers do not currently retain and which are therefore unavailable to the law enforcement and security agencies that require them. The hon. Lady raised the issue of additional regulations. The provision amends the definition of “relevant communications data”. The regulations use that definition, so there is no need to amend further or to put it in other regulations, because the intention is that they will follow the change being made to this Bill.

On deep packet inspection, no solution will provide for the retention of or access to the content of a communication. Obviously, it is for the companies themselves to decide how best to implement the legal requirements that would be put upon them, but I wanted to make that point clear.

On compatibility with the European Court judgment, we are confident that the legislation passed by Parliament this summer, and this Bill, are fully compliant with all relevant legal provisions.

Although I share the Opposition’s wish to see the most efficient and timely provision of data, I do not believe that the special review proposed by new clause 2 is required. Indeed, if there are concerns they can be referred to David Anderson as part of his review. With that assurance, I hope the hon. Lady will be minded to withdraw her amendment.

In new clause 1, the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington raises the specific and important issue of the position of journalists and others in relation to sensitive provision. He and I debated the issue when the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 made its way through Parliament this summer. Let me be clear that a free press is fundamental to a free society, and the Government are determined that nothing be done to put that at risk. Although most of the focus in the debate has been on journalists, the same issues arise equally in respect of other sensitive occupations, as Members have highlighted. Individuals should be able to speak freely and frankly to their lawyers if we are to have justice in this country. Similarly, patients must be able to speak freely to doctors, and constituents to their Members of Parliament.

I do not believe that anyone would question that those are important principles, but equally I hope that no one would take issue with the proposition that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies need the tools to carry out their vital roles. They carry out a difficult job day in, day out, protecting the public from crime and from terrorism. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides a clear legal basis for many of their critical investigative powers, including the acquisition and disclosure of communications data. The current process is clear and accountable and includes a strong and rigorous system of oversight. I have already explained what communications data are, but they do not contain the content of the communication.

I should like to point out that the interception of communications commissioner has said that communications data

“do not contain any details of what was said or written by the sender or the recipient of the communication. As such, the communications data retained by CSPs do not contain any material that may be said to be of professional or legal privilege—the fact that a communication took place does not provide what was discussed or considered or advised.”

The point that the data do not attract any form of legal or professional privilege is important. Nevertheless, the Government recognise that they are sensitive data that need to be protected accordingly.

The process of acquiring communications data requires a designated person—a senior officer of a rank stipulated by Parliament—to examine applications for such data, which can be authorised only when the officer is fully satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate to acquire those data. The applications are facilitated by individuals known as single points of contact, who are trained in this area and can provide expert advice and support to the designated person.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Mark Field and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

If my hon. Friend reads the judgment, he will see that the Court upheld the principle of retention of data as contemplated in the Bill. A number of frameworks on the purpose for which data are retained were referred to, but we are clear that the regime the House is contemplating this evening, in the context of the Bill and how it sits alongside the existing regime of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, does provide a legally robust approach to enable our police, law enforcement and security agencies to combat organised criminality and to provide the national security that is needed. The powers we already use are intrinsic to delivering on that. The Bill makes it clear that regulations cannot specify a retention period longer than 12 months. We reflected on the judgment of the Court. As the Home Secretary said in her opening statement on Second Reading, different time periods could be allowed in relation to specific types of data.

We are maintaining that focus on proportionality and necessity not simply in terms of giving a notice, but in keeping it under review. The European Court considered that the period of retention should be based on objective criteria to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary. On the basis of law enforcement surveys in 2005, 2010 and 2012, we consider that a maximum period of 12 months strikes the right balance between the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to investigate crimes and an individual’s rights to privacy. Unlike the current regime, under which all relevant communications data is retained for 12 months, this approach will mean that data could be retained for a shorter period than 12 months if considered appropriate, and that different types of data could be retained for different periods.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a perfectly good and sound case and I am pleased that he used the phrase “the necessity of proportionality”, which is crucial. But does he accept that there is no longer a clear-cut distinction between data and content? The worry of many outside this House, therefore, is that there will be an opportunity for ever more power to be retained by CSPs and thus by the state. Can he give us some assurances that the Government will keep this matter constantly under review?

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend has expressed his views on a number of occasions on the need for continued focus on the balance between individual freedoms and collective freedom, because that collective freedom relies on our being able to conduct our affairs and to live our lives free from those who would do us harm. Sometimes people have sought to describe them as if they were in parallel, but I see them as mutually reinforcing; security and liberty must go hand in hand to develop and defend the fundamental principles that we have as a society, so to frame it separately misses the point.

My hon. Friend raises the important issue of how technology is evolving; it is constantly changing. That is why we see the import of the review by David Anderson, the independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, to look at the issues more broadly, and at existing legislation and capabilities. We will come on to that, I am sure, in some of the subsequent debates in this Committee where that might be teased out in further detail, but my hon. Friend makes an important point.

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[James Brokenshire]

Absolutely. My right hon. Friend makes a very good comment for me to conclude on. Clause 3, which will provide such strengthening, has given us the opportunity to have a constructive and helpful debate.

[Mark Field]

rose—

[James Brokenshire]

I will give way one last time before I sit down.

[Mark Field]

The debate has been worth while. I have some sympathy for the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark), who made a legitimate point. Equally, however, it is quite right that the Minister cannot give a categorical assurance along the lines that she ideally wants. Clause 3 tries to ensure that economic well-being must be underlined by national security. I hope that it goes some way to giving confidence not just to the Members in Committee, but to our many constituents who feel very strongly about this matter—trying to narrow the scope of the Bill and therefore of the power of the state.

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend makes his customary point about ensuring that there is such clarity. I am sure that we will return to this issue, but for the reasons I have outlined, I hope that the right hon. Member for Knowsley is minded to withdraw his amendment and that the clause will stand part of the Bill.

Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

Debate between Mark Field and James Brokenshire

Thursday 7th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

Informal discussions have taken place to work through the detailed and technical issues that need proper consideration and ensure we strike the right balance. I welcome that dialogue. Before I return to the substance of my right hon. and learned Friend’s point and respond formally, I will take an intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field).

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I hope the Minister will recognise that the concern expressed by all of us as members of the Intelligence and Security Committee is that the terms of the Bill are far too broad. If the Government remain unwilling to go along with amendment 73, will he give some consideration to these issues being dealt with in detail in the memorandum of understanding? It may be that some of the technical difficulties to which he referred would be more appropriately dealt with in that forum.

[James Brokenshire]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. There is scope to deal with this further in the memorandum of understanding. I reiterate that it is not the Government’s intention to try and stop the ISC from continuing to do things in the way that it does at the moment as a consequence of the changes contemplated in the Bill, and I am content to reflect on providing further clarity in the memorandum of understanding to address some of those technical points. We have a framework in the legislation. While we may have found it challenging to get the precise legal wording right for an amendment because of those technical areas, I am willing to reflect on how we can seek to encapsulate the existing arrangements, under which the ISC conducts its affairs, in the memorandum of understanding.

These exchanges highlight some of the difficulties in putting changes in the Bill in a rigid way. In some ways, because of the nature of the evidence, they probably lend themselves to being addressed more effectively in the memorandum of understanding. If it will help the House, I am happy to give that commitment on how we may best address those challenges in greater detail in the memorandum of understanding. I hope right hon. and hon. Members will accept the spirit in which that commitment is given.

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[James Brokenshire]

This relates to operational matters and inquiries by the Committee. We have had discussions about the exploration of operational matters—this is a new aspect of the Committee’s work, as the right hon. Gentleman will acknowledge—and about how to frame that. Detailed consideration has been given to the specific matters that an inquiry may cover, and that is supplemented by the memorandum of understanding in respect of the first two limbs. Clause 2(3)(c) is intended to cover the ordinary information that is being provided. I think it was accepted in Committee that that paragraph dealt with the concerns of the ISC about ordinary matters that would be provided in that course. It states that

“the ISC’s consideration of the matter is limited to the consideration of information provided voluntarily to the ISC by”

the agencies, following those kinds of inquiries. These are issues that have customarily been dealt with by the Committee in its ordinary course. A relationship is established between the Committee and the agencies, and information is provided in that ordinary course, and we have sought to reflect the current practice.

[Mark Field]

The Minister will have gathered from the contributions from the right hon. Members for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) and for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) that the Committee currently goes well beyond the constraints of the original legislation. Does he recognise that the use of the word “voluntarily” will give rise to concern outside this place that the Committee remains the poodle of the Executive or, to a certain extent, of the security services? He is right to suggest that it will make relatively little difference to general day-to-day operations, but one of the ideas behind the Bill was to make it crystal clear that we are not a poodle of the Executive or the Prime Minister of the day, and that we are not under the control of the security services. The whole idea of this is that we should be in a position to demand, and ensure that we get, material, rather than being at anyone else’s beck and call.

[James Brokenshire]

I absolutely agree and direct my hon. Friend to the provisions in schedule 1, particularly the part on access to information, which sets out clearly the rights of the ISC to obtain further information. That clear reform has been taken forward through the Bill. I would certainly endorse and underline my hon. Friend’s point. The ISC has not been a poodle in any sense in its existing format and that position would be strengthened even further under the Bill. The ultimate purpose of the reforms it contains is to ensure that scrutiny is enhanced further—for the very important reasons we have discussed.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Mark Field and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

I certainly do not accept that characterisation, and I am very happy to come on to amendment (a). We regard national security as a top priority. The right hon. Gentleman has heard me say that, and I stand by those words. He will know the responsibilities that Ministers hold in dealing with such matters, and the very careful consideration that we apply when considering changes to legislation.

Amendment (a) to Lords amendment 11, which stands in the names of the right hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members, would replace the 42-day transitional period with one of 365 days. It brings us back to an issue that was debated at length during the Bill’s passage through this House and the other place. To that extent, it takes us back over a number of points that have been debated and discussed in great detail, and my response is unchanged: I believe that the amendment is simply not necessary.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the Metropolitan police and the Security Service have confirmed to the Home Secretary and myself that extensive preparations are being made and that arrangements will be in place to manage the move from the control orders system to the TPIMs system effectively. Indeed, the Home Secretary received a detailed briefing from the Metropolitan police only last week on the transitional plans that it has drawn up. However, the police recently advised us that a slightly longer transitional period was needed, as it will fall over the Christmas and new year period. We have consequently increased the transitional period to 42 days, which will assist in the effective management of the process of transition in individual cases. It was for that reason that the Lords amendment was introduced.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I would not in any way wish to accuse the Minister of being soft on terrorism, but equally, given the relatively small number of people who are currently subject to control orders—about nine—does he not see that it might be more sensible to have an overlapping system of control orders and TPIMs for the difficult period of unknown threat around the Olympic games? There is some sense in that, given that at most nine people would be affected.

[James Brokenshire]

We have considered the issue very carefully, and as I said on Report, we have received assurances from the police and Security Service that effective arrangements will be in place to manage the transfer to TPIMs when the new regime comes into effect. What I said on Report remains the case: the police and Security Service have been developing the additional capacity and capability needed to prepare for the transition to the new TPIMs regime. That preparation has been ongoing for a considerable time.

I should be absolutely clear that the additional resources are not simply about providing additional human surveillance capacity. The police and the Security Service are using the additional money to enhance their use of a range of covert investigative techniques, including human and technical surveillance. Inevitably, some of the benefits from the additional resources will take time to be fully realised, as it will be necessary to take the time to train and deploy additional staff in order to derive full benefit from technical investment. However, the key point is that at the point of the transition to the new TPIMs arrangement, effective arrangements will be in place in both the police and the Security Service.