Yemen

Debate between Mark Field and Diana Johnson

Tuesday 26th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mark Field]

As I mentioned in the answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone), we obviously recognise that Iran has an important part to play, not least because it is the state sponsor of Hezbollah. We will continue, in whatever way we can, to make representations to the Iranian Government—we do that out in Tehran, obviously, but also in the international community—and to try to impress on others the importance of their influence. As he says, it has all too often been a malign influence, and it needs to change.

[Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

To follow up on that question about Iran, what further measures can the Foreign and Commonwealth Office bring into play to make sure that Iran, which obviously has a proxy in this conflict in Yemen, is brought to account for what it is doing?

[Mark Field]

On bringing Iran to account, the hon. Lady is absolutely right that it has had a proxy in what has happened, as it has for some years, not least in encouraging the Houthi insurgents. We have recognised that if Yemen is to have unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, Iran clearly has an important part to play. We hope it will use its influence with the Houthis to encourage a de-escalation of the current crisis and to end their attacks on coalition countries, but also to support the moves back towards a political track.

As I have often said here about diplomacy, sometimes it is a matter of taking three steps forward and a couple of steps back. Stockholm was definitely three steps forward, and I think we are in a far better place today than we were six months ago. Equally, we do not want those advances to slip away. Iran has had an important part to play in that process, and will do in the years to come.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Mark Field and Diana Johnson

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s observations on amendment 5. As with the previous grouping, the amendment was tabled to give us the opportunity to look at the specifics of clause 17 and to understand fully the thinking behind the Minister’s approach. I take on board what the right hon. Gentleman has said, which may be correct, but the amendment allows us to debate what would be disclosed and what information would be available.

I have just bombarded the Minister with a whole range of questions and I know that, as usual, he will be very thorough and go through each in turn. However, I want to turn briefly to new clause 2, which seeks to move on from the retention of data to a review of whether the form of storing the data is allowing the key authorities to access it in a timely manner. I will say, so everyone understands where I am coming from, that this proposal aims to probe the Minister’s argument, and to look at the clause to see what more can be done and whether we need to be aware of any issues for companies.

My concern arises from the police’s apparent problems in pursuing the majority of suspected paedophiles identified through Operation Notarise. My understanding is that Operation Notarise identified between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals whom the communications data suggested were taking part in online abuse. From that, only 700 people have been named, investigated and arrested, so well in excess of 20,000 IP addresses have been identified, but that information has not been translated into named users. At this point, I am not even talking about arrests, but about identifying the users to enable effective safeguarding interventions.

Once a user is identified, even if it is just an address, the police can make several key checks: first, against the police national computer to see if there is a known sex offender living at the address; secondly, against the Disclosure and Barring Service database to identify anyone who might be working with or have access to children; and thirdly, against the Department for Work and Pensions database to see if a child is registered at the property for the purpose of claiming child benefit.

At the moment, the police do not know how many of the people they have identified are known sex offenders working with children or living with children. Most people would see that as unacceptable and would believe there should be a response. This could start with a review of the degree to which the difficulty of linking IP addresses to users is behind the police’s problems with moving this forward.

Finally, I turn to the amendments and new clauses tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), and by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), on the degree to which RIPA is being used to access the records of certain professionals, including journalists. They address a real concern that Members and the general public have about the use of RIPA to access the records particularly of journalists and those in the media.

As the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), has said, this issue has to be addressed. Indeed, a key concession secured by the Opposition during the passage of the DRIP Bill was that a review of RIPA would be conducted by David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and that it would include the use of RIPA to look at the records of journalists. It is because we have confidence in that review that we do not feel amendment 11 is necessary.

However, that is also why the Opposition have a great deal of sympathy with the aims of new clause 1, which would require a court order before relevant authorities could access communications data that could be covered by a professional duty of confidentiality. The clause does not state whether the role of the court would be simply to ensure that due process is followed, or to apply some test of proportionality or necessity. However, the clause provides for the right of appeal for the individual. That means that an individual would have prior knowledge that their communications data were to be disclosed to law enforcement agencies. It is also important to note that the clause would apply not just to journalists but to doctors, lawyers and others, including Members of Parliament, when a professional duty of confidentiality could be construed.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

The hon. Lady referred to journalists, but how broadly would she or her colleagues define “journalists”? We are living in a world of bloggers and of a whole range of individuals who would consider themselves to be part of the media overall, but presumably she would not necessarily want each and every one of those self-professed journalists and bloggers to be caught by these potentially restricting and constricting provisions, essentially watering down elements of RIPA?

[Diana Johnson]

I have the disadvantage of speaking first on this group of amendments, and obviously, this is not my amendment, so I am very much looking forward to hearing what the proposers feel would happen. However, the hon. Gentleman raises an important point, because we are not only talking about a limited group of people who describe themselves as journalists and who, in the past, we would have been able to identify clearly. Perhaps the proposers of the amendment would be able to address that when they speak to it.

I want to make a further point about the broad definition of professional duty that concerns me, especially when combined with the right of appeal. As I have said, a large number of professionals have some form of duty of confidentiality, and in many cases it is not clear, particularly when discussing communications data, how that potential duty of confidentiality would be separated from other investigations about which we would not allow the individual to have prior knowledge. There is a clear case for preventing a journalist from being targeted for their sources unless there is an overwhelming need to do so. However, the case is less clear in respect of other professions, particularly as we may be investigating issues involving criminal misconduct. Let me give an example for the Committee to consider: the case of Myles Bradbury, the doctor recently convicted of a string of horrendous sexual assaults of boys in his care. As a doctor, he would potentially have been covered by the new clause, especially in respect of some of his communications, and the Committee would be concerned about that. If he had been alerted to the fact that the police were investigating him, he would have had some time to delete much of the evidence which was then used to lead to his prosecution. I just give that as an example of the care we have to take in considering these matters.

I hope the Minister will respond in detail—I am sure he will—to the issues I have raised on this group, particularly the need for the drafting of clause 17 to be made much clearer so that the general public can be reassured about exactly what it is attempting to do.