Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Richard Fuller]

rose—

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

rose—

[Shabana Mahmood]

I am going to make some progress. I have been quite generous, and I will take some more interventions a little later.

On annual renewal, covered in new clause 7, there is a symbolic and practical importance to Parliament asking itself every year whether the powers that it has given the Home Secretary are still necessary and in holding the police and the Government to account for how those powers are used. That is an important measure of checks and balances. As we discussed in Committee, it also concentrates the mind. It requires the police and everybody else to consider regularly whether we truly need these powers, whether the risk is such that we cannot do without them and whether some mechanism might present itself that would enable more people to be brought within the criminal justice system rather than be kept outside it.

Our debate in Committee featured the idea of exceptionalism—the idea that these powers are an exceptional part of our legal framework and should not be permanent. Of course, the Bill did not originally have the provisions of new clauses 3 and 4 in it, and I am grateful that the Government have made some movement and taken on board some of the arguments made in Committee in support of more regular review and renewal of the powers. However, I do not believe that the new clauses go far enough, or that review every five years would meet our concerns about how the Bill and the new TPIMs regime will operate in practice.

There are a number of reasons for our concerns. The first, which the Minister touched on, is about resources. We have real concern about the additional resources that the police have said will be required under the new regime because there will be a higher risk under TPIMs. We are concerned about how they will be deployed and come on line ready for the police to use. Given that uncertainty, annual renewal and an early opportunity for Parliament to consider how the new TPIMs regime is getting on would be very welcome. It is necessary also because of the draft Bill that the Government printed only about four days ago as it would bring control order powers back into the system by way of emergency legislation. We have a number of questions about how that alternative regime may operate, which we will come to in the next group of amendments.

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[Paul Goggins]

If the hon. Gentleman is referring to people who have absconded from their control order, I think he will remember from our discussions in Committee that that relates principally to the very early days of control orders. From recollection, there has not been an abscondence for four years, and that related largely to foreign nationals who were the subject of control orders. However, he made a powerful point earlier on the need to ensure that people are properly trained to carry out surveillance.

Given the toxic mix that I described, on 11 August I raised with the Prime Minister the possibility of delaying this Bill—certainly some elements of it in relation to relocation. He said that he would look “carefully and closely” at what I said. I have written to him since. I have not yet had a reply but I hope that I will soon. I will look carefully at his argument if he, as the Minister earlier suggested he would, sticks to the Government’s current position, because I think that that is a risk too far.

I am happy to pay tribute to the principled position that the hon. Member for Cambridge holds and sticks to doggedly. It is different from the principled position that I hold but, because he is consistent it allows us to have a good debate. He accused me of using amendment 8 as a last-ditch attempt to keep control orders going. I humbly put it to him that that is not the case. I believe that the risks associated with the early introduction of this weakened legislation, in a year of great risk, are too great. I join hon. Members on both sides of the House when I put public safety above all else.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Listening to the debate and arguments about the comparative merits and demerits of TPIMs compared with control orders, and listening to the exchanges on whether a sunset clause for five years is better than annual review and renewal, I am reminded of what Talleyrand is meant to have said about Voltaire and Robespierre: when I think of either, I prefer the other. We are all caught in a situation where there are clearly problems with control orders, but we should be under no illusions: there will be serious problems with TPIMs too—problems of principle and of practice.

May I deal first with the sunset clause and the question of renewal? I have a lot of sympathy with the argument of the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) and others that the practice of Parliament in annual renewal and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 has not exactly inspired huge confidence in the robustness of that challenge or the thoroughness of that review. But just because Parliament has perhaps had a habit of being derelict in its duty in relation to annual reviews, we do not have the right to dismiss the case for subjecting measures as exceptional as these are to annual review.

We are always told that one Parliament should not bind another. When it comes to exceptional measures, one Parliament simply should not discharge itself from due consideration. It is not enough for us to say, “If we go for the five-year sunset clause in the absence of annual reviews, Members such as the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and other concerned Members will be diligent enough to create opportunities for themselves by way of Adjournment debates or use of the Backbench Business Committee to subject these things to review.” There are things that we as a Parliament should hold in common responsibility. The due protection of civil liberty, alongside the due protection of public safety, are among them.

I accept that these measures—whether control orders or TPIMs—will be put through, but for exceptional measures that depart from the normal criminal law and give Executive power to use secret intelligence and to deploy strict controls on an individual’s freedom, this Parliament should not just say, “We are content to let that run for five years and see where we stand thereafter.” If Parliament is going to approve these measures, it should at least give itself the duty to look again in a year to see whether they are still needed in this form or whether there should be improvements.

[Richard Fuller]

Annual review is just a veneer; to see that, we need only consider the number of Members present to debate it. I also believe that it is always whipped through by the Government party. The people under these control orders have never had the advantage of having been brought to a proper trial, and what they want is some certainty. They want certainty that this Parliament will handle its responsibilities thoughtfully and thoroughly, and that would require conducting a thorough review that could then be used to advise the Government and inform Parliament in a real debate. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that that would be a major difference?

[Mark Durkan]

I am sorry to disagree with the hon. Gentleman, but I do not believe that it will be a tonic to the mental health of people under these orders if they know that Parliament will not seriously discuss the matter for another five years. I do not see what relief or redress that offers them. I agree with the hon. Gentleman, however, about the issue of our pretending that annual review will somehow of itself offer comfort to people under these orders in that it might result in their being reprieved from their exigencies. I would not give that false comfort or promise, and nor should we.

Based on the experience that we have all had of the many previous annual renewals, the hon. Gentleman also makes a valid point in saying that the Chamber might take its responsibilities in this regard somewhat lightly, but let us therefore be exposed to condemnation for such dereliction of duty and for not turning up every year to consider renewals duly and properly, rather than pretend that it is sufficient to do that on a five-yearly basis. Considering the issues at stake under this Bill, the attendance for the current debate is not particularly unimpressive in comparison with the likely attendance, which the hon. Gentleman indicts, for an annual review debate.

We should not kid ourselves about the false merits of a five-year sunset clause as opposed to an annual review, and nor should those of us who might vote in a Division to keep a version of annual review delude ourselves about the extent of the impact of annual reviews. However, annual reviews might ensure that the various other parliamentary means of scrutiny—whether through the Backbench Business Committee or Select Committees—are used to condition such reviews and, perhaps, explore more of the alternatives.

In the context of our deliberations today, I and others regret the fact that good amendments that were submitted on police bail and the conditions that could be attached to that are not available for us to discuss. Through discussing them, we would have been able to consider possible restrictions in cases where the police so far have only limited evidence that is not amenable to their taking the case to full prosecution. For such cases, there are means within the standard criminal law that can be deployed and developed, and amendments were tabled that offered that option. Through having annual reviews, some such alternatives might build up more of a head of steam. I am not saying we need annual reviews in the same style as in the past, but if we were to use annual reviews and the other parliamentary means now available to us, we could make more of this system.

Focusing now on the substance of the Bill, control orders are a poor tool and a crude weapon, but whereas TPIMs might appear to be softer, even when looked at through the bubblewrap of all the claims that the Government make for this Bill, they are also a poor tool and a crude weapon. Some of us have experience of how counter-terrorism measures can be deployed in counter-productive ways. They can act as grist to the mill of those who would radicalise others and try to spread subversion and dissident tendencies. They can also be used in ways that get in the way of good police work, and good police interface and engagement with communities whose sympathies and confidence are essential in holding the line against terrorist and subversive tendencies. We should therefore always tread lightly in relation to measures brought before us and offered as necessary and justified on the basis of countering terrorism.

Parliament should be particularly wary when we are given the assurance that these powers will not merely be activated on the basis of secret intelligence by mysterious Executive servants who may or may not appear before Select Committees or anybody else in Parliament, because there will be a degree of judicial oversight through posts such as special advocates. We should be very wary about being casual about any provisions that involve constant reference to words such as “special” and features such as “secret,” but that is precisely what we have in the TPIMs cocktail that is before us, and it is the same cocktail that was before us in relation to control orders. We as a Parliament should at least be trying to provide some sort of antidote to that, or diluting it through putting in place the kind of scrutiny and challenge that an annual review might provide.

I have listened to the arguments for and against these amendments. I am not impressed by the Government’s arguments, including those of the Liberal Democrats, in favour of their proposed measures. I support the Opposition on annual renewal, while not being under any illusions that that will be any great shakes in itself, but I certainly do not support the Opposition in trying to insinuate that somehow this legislation is dangerous in itself and exposes us to new risks because it damages control orders. I do not believe control orders have been necessary or effective in the way that they have operated. In fact, that has been dangerous in some regards, because sometimes both the terms and conditions of control orders have been interpreted randomly and capriciously, so that not only have people’s movements been restricted, but people have been made amenable to prosecution, and the threat of it, for supposed breach of unreasonable conditions.

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Just today, I heard from somebody who used to be under a control order who said that there were a number of such instances. On one occasion he had to wait to sign in because there was a queue at the police station, which led to him signing in two minutes late. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is important that this Government also look at such details, because unreasonable conditions will make the whole system completely ridiculous?

[Mark Durkan]

Yes, I fully agree with that point about the ridiculously pedantic and capricious use of conditions to get something on these people, when they demonstrate no greater threat than the fact that they find it difficult to cope with increasingly bizarre conditions. Therefore, I do not hold the same brief as the Opposition for control orders and the existing legislation, which is why I do not support them on the amendments that suggest that control orders are somehow better; but neither do I fall for the Government’s false argument that TPIMs are substantially different, because they involve a large part of the same mix as control orders. I never bought the product “I can’t believe it’s not butter” and I am not going to buy “I can’t believe it’s not control orders.”

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

I want to speak briefly in favour of new clause 7 on annual reviews, but only because it is the least worst option on the table. It is deeply concerning that, despite pre-election promises and having voted in the past against the massively controversial and now, I would argue, totally discredited control order regime, the coalition Government are trying to push through a Bill that in so many respects simply rebrands the very worst aspects of that failed regime. Despite the spin that was put out when the Bill was presented, it contains the same fundamental mechanism of detention. Restrictions on a terrorist suspect while further investigations continue will in many circumstances be reasonable and in the public interest, but what is so offensive about control orders and their close relatives, TPIMs, is that both are imposed by the Executive, not by a court. The continuation of a system of Government detention entirely outside the rule of law is neither effective nor just, and that is why I hope that, as the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) said, we can make these annual reviews more rigorous. Perhaps we can use them in the way I imagine people on control orders hope they will be used: for proper, rigorous scrutiny.

Today, I was in the same room as the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) and I, too, heard from somebody on a control order. I heard some shocking stories, and not just about that person waiting to sign in at a police station and being deemed to be two minutes late and therefore, supposedly, in breach of a control order. There were even more ridiculous accounts. People are being written to because they have not kept properly clean the flat in which they are supposed to be in internal detention. All kinds of ridiculous methods are being used to misuse the kind of tools being put before us today. That is why, at the very least, we need the option of an annual review.

Everyone agrees that public safety requires that terrorists be held in prison, but let us not forget that this regime is about terrorist suspects, some of whom will be entirely innocent—as, indeed, was the gentleman we spoke to today. So, when considering these matters, which are central both to our security and to our core democratic values, it is critical to remember that the concern is not whether we would like to see terrorists subject to punitive restrictions, but whether we want a system that allows innocent people to be treated outside the rule of law. It is not the action of a democratic state to hold someone without telling them what they are charged with. That is the definition of a living hell: to hold someone without telling them what the evidence against them is, leaving them with no opportunity to defend themselves. The many past miscarriages of justice should weigh heavily on our consideration of these matters.

I am disappointed that the amendments I co-signed with the hon. Member for Cambridge, on police bail, were not selected for debate. I realise that I cannot now debate them, but I would simply say that public safety is best assured when suspects are charged with a crime and, if found guilty, imprisoned, rather than left in the community to abscond—as a number of controlees have done—or, crucially, to act as an advertisement for extremism because the regime is so unjust and impacts not just upon them but on their families and communities. Police bail would have enabled us to get away from that and properly to investigate people who are suspected of a crime, rather than leaving them in this no-man’s land, which discredits us enormously as a country.

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[James Brokenshire]

The right hon. Gentleman’s question is premised on various assumptions that I just do not accept. He can make his point but the Bill and the enhanced measures that sit alongside it have been part of a very considered approach in relation to the overall legislative framework, which has not been rushed but has been considered. It has very much at its heart our responsibility to protect the public, but it also recognises that there is a balance to be struck. We believe that the balance has previously been wrong and that it needs to be adjusted, as contemplated by the Bill, to ensure that our counter-terrorism measures are appropriate, necessary and focused on delivering safety and security in a way that is judged appropriate on the basis of the evidence.

The draft enhanced TPIM Bill contains provisions that mean that if it is brought into force while a temporary enhanced TPIM order is in force, a decision taken under that order should be treated as a decision under the new enhanced Bill. The regime provided by the emergency TPIM order is intended to be the same as that provided by the enhanced Bill. In other words, the new clauses are intended to be complementary. They set out the various provisions and matters that may, or in some cases that must, be secured by a temporary enhanced TPIM order, to give effect to the regime set out in the emergency Bill. This includes in particular setting out the more stringent restrictions that would be available, and the fact that an enhanced notice may be imposed only where the Secretary of State is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. Once made, the temporary enhanced TPIM order would remain in force for 90 days, or a shorter period if specified in the order. It must be laid before Parliament as soon as practicable. While it is in force the Secretary of State can repeal its provisions at any time.

The 90-day period is intended to cover, but not significantly to exceed, the period during which Parliament would be unable to pass the emergency legislation. After parliamentary business resumes, the Government can introduce the enhanced TPIM Bill, if they judge it appropriate, to replace the powers conferred by the order with powers under primary legislation.

These are essential provisions. The power that they provide may never need to be used. Indeed, we would all prefer that the exceptional circumstances for which it and the enhanced TPIM Bill are intended never arise. None the less, it is necessary for a responsible Government to ensure that the enhanced TPIM powers can be brought into force in all circumstances in which they may be necessary.

[Mark Durkan]

Does the Minister not recall that when the previous Government introduced the Counter-Terrorism Bill with provision, at that stage, for 42-day detention, which was to be the subject of a parliamentary debate and vote when the powers were activated, the then Opposition rightly argued that it would create dangers for Parliament and eventually for the judiciary, potentially, to activate parliamentary control in relation to measures that were being taken against known individuals? Questions were asked, such as how a parliamentary debate in such a situation would be informed. What information would be in the media and in Parliament, and how could we ensure that, if there was a prosecution, that did not destroy the basis for a fair trial? Exactly the arguments that the Opposition used against the previous Government’s measures surely apply in respect of the arguments that the Minister has just made for his enhanced TPIMs.

[James Brokenshire]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s case, and care will be required, but the House often considers topics in relation to which matters are before the courts. The emergency legislation deals with the principles, not with individuals. The House has demonstrated clearly that it is able to do that and to consider and debate matters where care is required.

Amendments 1 to 4 address situations where more stringent measures are needed to protect the public than those available under the Bill. Amendment 1 would in effect place a version of the enhanced TPIM proposals formally on the statute book through the Bill. We debated an almost identical amendment in Committee. It would add a new paragraph to schedule 1, allowing the Secretary of State to impose any measure, in addition to those otherwise specified in schedule 1, on an individual where

“there is a serious terrorist threat”

and where such measures are

“necessary for the protection of the public.”

It reflects the position in the enhanced TPIM Bill that the test for imposing such additional measures would be raised from “reasonable belief” of involvement in terrorism-related activity to being satisfied on the “balance of probabilities” that this is the case.

Amendments 2 and 3 offer an alternative approach to providing for the use of additional measures to that set out in amendment 1. Instead of provision being made on the face of the Bill, the Government would be able to add further measures to schedule 1 by order. Amendment 2 envisages that Parliament would approve those measures in advance; amendment 3 provides for retrospective parliamentary approval and so seeks to address other concerns. Amendments 1, 2 and 3 highlight a difference in approach between those on the Opposition Benches and my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Government Benches.

The Government’s position is that the Bill provides a robust and effective set of measures to manage the risk posed by suspected terrorists whom we cannot prosecute or deport, and it will be complemented by additional funding for the police and Security Service for covert investigation. The Government consider that more stringent powers will be required only in exceptional circumstances. So although the Government agree with the Opposition that there may be a need for additional measures to those contained in schedule 1, we believe, as we flagged up in our counter-terrorism review, it is right that those more stringent powers are not on the statute book or available at all times through an order-making power, as amendments 1, 2 and 3 would provide, but are contained in draft emergency legislation that is introduced only if required. This is also reflected in the Government’s approach to extended pre-charge detention.

Furthermore, the Government consider that it is appropriate for the measures available to the Secretary of State to be set out on the face of primary legislation, and to have been agreed in advance by Parliament. That is the clear approach adopted in the Bill before us, and it is also the approach that we have taken in the enhanced Bill. Indeed, I would argue that the more stringent nature of measures available under the enhanced Bill is an even greater reason for them to be clearly defined and agreed by Parliament, rather than decided on an ad hoc basis by the Secretary of State. The Government are therefore not in favour of amendments 1, 2 and 3. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask hon. Members not to press them.

Amendment 4 is specifically concerned with what would happen if the additional measures are required during a period when Parliament is dissolved. The same issue was raised during pre-legislative scrutiny of the emergency Bills for extended pre-charge detention. The Government have listened to the concerns expressed and new clauses 5 and 6, which I have already outlined, directly address the point. I trust that this means that Opposition Members will be content to withdraw their amendment.

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[James Brokenshire]

I am not quite sure how to respond to the lack of coherence in the previous contribution—the Opposition fundamentally oppose something, but then say that they support new clauses 5 and 6—but I shall seek to respond to the points that have been raised in the course of the debate.

I again return to the counter-terrorism review. The measures are not a surprise—it is not as though they were not set out clearly back when the counter-terrorism reported in the early part of this year. The review concluded that

“there may be exceptional circumstances where it could be necessary for the Government to seek Parliamentary approval for additional restrictive measures. In the event of a very serious terrorist risk that cannot be managed by any other means more stringent measures may be required.”

Therefore, to suggest that this situation has just happened and that it was not foretold highlights the lack of reading of the counter-terrorism review when it was published earlier this year.

The Government consider that the enhanced powers will not routinely be needed, and that the standard TPIM Bill will provide robust powers to protect the public. We also consider that there may be circumstances in which more stringent powers will be needed. However, such powers should be introduced only at that time—they should not be routinely available on the statute book.

Obviously I accept that there is a clear difference of opinion. During previous contributions from Opposition Front Benchers, I was minded to believe that control orders were the default. That appeared to be the approach taken by the previous Government, which is why this Government undertook our counter-terrorism review and why we have sought to rebalance the provisions contained in the legislation.

I appreciate the points made by right hon. and hon. Members about the term “exceptional circumstances”. As I have said, that would be when we are faced with a serious terrorist risk that cannot be managed by any other means. It would be inappropriate to say, “Would it apply in this or that control order case?” I am not prepared to second-guess future developments in the threat picture, and the circumstances might be hard to predict. However, credible reporting could point to a series of concurrent attack plots, all of which appear imminent, or it might apply in the wake of a major terrorist attack when there is the prospect of further attacks to follow. Parliament will need to approve the emergency legislation for it to come into force. Ultimately, therefore, it would be for Parliament to determine whether the circumstances are exceptional in that way.

In response to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), I would highlight the fact that clearly there are additional safeguards for the new clauses to cover the period during a general election, when the House is unable to pass emergency legislation. The enhanced measures will be subject to a higher legal test. The Secretary of State must be satisfied that the person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity on the balance of probabilities, which is a higher threshold than reasonable belief, which is the test for imposing standard TPIMs.

The comprehensive judicial oversight of standard TPIM notices will also apply to the enhanced measures, including a requirement for court permission before imposing measures; an automatic and full High Court review of the decision to impose the enhanced TPIM notice, and each of the measures specified in it; and rights of appeal against decisions taken by the Secretary of State when the measures are in force. Therefore, the intent is that the broader safeguards will apply in the context of those situations.

I hear what my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge says about his discomfort with the contexts in which we would need such provisions. We are all in that situation. Equally, we have considered carefully the potential of alternatives. He highlighted the possibilities of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. However, careful reflection on both sides of the House leads us to consider that that would not be a useful or usable route in dealing with the circumstances that we are contemplating. The 2004 Act has been considered on both sides of the House, but its mechanisms and its structure do not lend themselves easily to the scenarios and situations in which we would consider using TPIMS—indeed, the Act was in many ways directed more to dealing with floods, epidemics and those sorts of problems. Although I understand why my hon. Friend raises that point, as hon. Members have done in the past, we consider that the 2004 Act does not provide a workable mechanism to cover such circumstances.

We believe that the draft emergency Bill would provide a mechanism to deal with a situation while Parliament was either sitting or in recess, although we accept the need to legislate in this Bill to cover a period during a general election. I am pleased to note that the Opposition are prepared to support the new clauses that are contemplated, although clearly there are differences over the emergency Bill itself. However, a Joint Committee will obviously be established to consider, scrutinise and examine the matter in detail in the way one would expect from the House and no doubt to improve, make suggestions and make amendments to the draft Bill.

[Mark Durkan]

The Minister has talked about these extra bat belt powers, shall we say, that might be available to the Home Secretary and activated by a draft Bill. I have a question about the parliamentary situation that would then be created. If those powers were activated in relation to a particular threat, hon. Members would receive all sorts of instructions and advice not to mention specific cases in the Chamber, but the chances are that the media would be full of suggestions and innuendos against particular individuals or locations. In those circumstances, how would Parliament discharge the awkward responsibilities that the clause would give it? The Opposition in the previous Parliament made exactly those valid arguments against the then Government’s measures in respect of 42-day detention activated on the basis of parliamentary approval.

[James Brokenshire]

I know that the hon. Member has made that point before. I responded to him then as well. I think that the House is able to debate the principle of the underlying issues, although in relation to detailed, confidential briefings and so on, we would seek to provide more detailed information to Opposition spokespeople on privy counsellor terms, as appropriate, in order to assist debate. However, we believe that Parliament is able to consider emergency legislation in that way. In many ways, it is important to put out the draft legislation now to ensure that there is a mechanism—a tool—that has been considered coolly and calmly outside some of the febrile situations that understandably arise in the sorts of horrendous situations that, sadly, we have seen in the past. That is why it is important that we have the scrutiny that would be applied by a Joint Committee—and obviously it is for the House to resolve the matters around that. That is an important way of ensuring that legislation is considered in a more rational way.