(1 year, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes, I can do that. I thank my hon. Friend for his question, particularly in the light of how he has been personally affected by the tragedy. I can give him that assurance. Some steps have already been taken, partly through the changes made in 2020 to the statutory professional standards for policing. That will be further reinforced by the updated code of ethics, which will be published by the College of Policing, following its announcement yesterday, with the exact purpose that my hon. Friend has just set out in mind.
It is unconscionable that 18 months after the collapse of the criminal trials, there has still been no Government response to the bishop’s report. The fact that we will have to wait until spring, whenever that is, shows that the work is not finished, more than five years after that report was written and published. It is outrageous that the Government have done nothing to sort this out in that time.
The Minister keeps referring to the consultation on the independent public advocate. That happened in 2018. The Government have not yet responded to their own consultation on the independent public advocate. But I can get the Minister off the hook. My Public Advocate (No. 2) Bill will be considered again in the Chamber this Friday. If the Minister were to stop his Whip objecting to it for the 12th time in this Session, we could get it into Committee and start this legislation rolling. It is a key part of the Hillsborough law, along with the duty of candour and the equality of arms at inquests. With the support of Labour Front Benchers, the Minister could do himself and his Government a favour by getting that legislation through.
As I have said, we are working quickly on the comprehensive response. The hon. Lady says that nothing has happened since 2018, but with great respect I do not think that is entirely accurate. I have referenced the professional standards for policing introduced in 2020, which introduced a duty to co-operate. I have mentioned the pathology review that has happened. I have mentioned the consultation on the independent public advocate, and I can tell her that that is being very actively worked on by the Ministry of Justice as we speak. We have had changes made to the exceptional case funding at inquest, so the means testing has been removed. A lot has been done. But I do accept that a comprehensive Government response is required. Since arriving at the Home Office, I have asked for that to be done as quickly as possible, and it will be.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am not Lord Chancellor, though.
We might separate the “cause” part from the “allow” part because “cause” and “allow” are somewhat different.
If we separated “cause” and “allow”, would we not be in the same position of not being able to prove which of the parents did the deed?
The “allow” part could conceivably apply to both where there are two parents. It can probably be established that they must have been aware of the abuse because they must have noticed the kind of abuse we are talking about, but it cannot necessarily be proved that they did it or even that they caused it. Currently, it is “cause or allow” in the same offence, with the same maximum penalty. One could make a case that the “cause” bit is more serious than the “allow” bit, so they might have different maximum sentences. I have a commitment from the Lord Chancellor that I can relay to the Committee.
I am going to be pedantic now, but if the offences are separated yet the cause cannot be proved, the charge will have to be on the “allow” bit, which is the lower level of offence.
Yes. We could have different maximum penalties for each of those, and even the lower one could be higher than the current penalty, so we could still make progress from where we are today.
I have a commitment from the Lord Chancellor that he will look at this in broadly the way that I described, also looking at the 1933 Act.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill Committees“Rare” is a relative concept. Would the Minister like to tell us how many people were remanded in this way during, say, the last year for which he has figures?
I am afraid that I do not have that precise figure to hand: I was relaying reports I have received from people who are active in this area. I can certainly see if that figure exists, and if it does, I would obviously be happy to share it.
The intent behind this amendment is clearly to ensure that prison is used only when strictly necessary. Of course, when somebody has a mental health crisis, for example, prison is not ultimately the best place for them to be, but there may be limited circumstances in which it is necessary to use remand for someone’s own protection—as a last resort, as I say. There is a risk that if we abolish this power without being absolutely clear what the alternatives are, vulnerable people could be left exposed. The Government agree with the sentiment behind this amendment, but we want to be certain that there will be no unintended consequences and no gaps created as a result.
Clearly, the provision of alternative accommodation in those circumstances is the most desirable outcome. We need to think carefully and make sure we have covered the full range of circumstances that may arise. That is why the Government have committed to a review of this issue. We have already written to the all-party parliamentary group on women in the penal system to set out our plan for this, so that is in the public domain. I know the Howard League for Penal Reform has been campaigning in this area and it will be consulted as part of that review.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I welcome the fact that he is going to conduct a review. In doing that, could he see whether any research already exists or do some research on what the outcomes are for the small number of people who are remanded in this way? I can certainly see circumstances in which they might end up in a worse state than they would have done had they not been remanded in such a way. That is important if the Minister is considering whether to get rid of these provisions.
Yes, that is exactly the type of question the review should consider, along with the counterfactual question of what would happen if this measure is not used. Both alternatives need to be considered to reach an informed decision.
Having spoken to new clause 4, let me turn now to new clause 20. As the hon. Lady says, it moves the discretion away from a judge and makes it the witness’s choice whether the section 28 recording is conducted. We want to encourage as many eligible people as possible to make use of the special measures that are available, and we have taken a number of steps to ensure that objective. For example, the revised victims code, which came into force just a few weeks ago, on 1 April, focuses on victims’ rights and sets out the level of service that victims can expect to receive from criminal justice agencies. The code also enshrines victims’ rights to have their needs assessed by the police or a witness care unit in order to determine whether they are eligible to give evidence using special measures and would benefit from doing so, to help relieve some of the stress involved in giving evidence. We want to ensure that every single eligible witness is identified, and that the matter is actively considered.
Does the Minister accept that many of these offences leave the victims feeling powerless? Powerlessness, and having things done to them, is part of the horror that arises from such offences. To give victims agency—to allow them to decide for themselves in those proceedings what would work for them—would be a powerful fillip to their psychological wellbeing, so that the court system is not then doing to them, after they have had the perpetrator doing things to them, and all the while they are feeling powerless. The Minister could do a lot of good by accepting the provision.
That is exactly the kind of question the taskforce will be considering. Under the 1968 Act, theft is a triable either-way offence, which means it can be tried in the Crown court or the magistrates court. One matter the taskforce might consider is where the more serious of those offences are prosecuted. The option of the CPS seeking to have more of the cases tried in the Crown rather than the magistrates court could be explored, and that is a topic the taskforce most certainly may consider.
It is also worth mentioning that, in addition to the work of the taskforce and the existing powers relating to a maximum sentence of seven years, there is a lot more the Government are doing. For example, in the area of animal welfare, we are introducing legislation to recognise animals as sentient beings and putting animal welfare at the heart of Government policy decision making. We have also supported calls for increasing the penalty for animal cruelty from six months to five years under the Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Act 2021, which received Royal Assent in April.
The Minister is making an interesting point about classifying animals in law as sentient, which is overdue. Does he foresee such a change leading to changes in this legislation? Theft of a sentient being appears to be a somewhat different offence from theft of what is currently seen as an object with monetary value.
On monetary or emotional value, the Sentencing Council guidelines recognise emotional value and non-monetary worth. The hon. Lady asks about the interaction between the 2021 Act and sentience, on which we are looking to legislate. That is the kind of topic that the taskforce will have in mind. It is an interesting point, and I will ensure that it features in the taskforce’s deliberations.
Given the work that the taskforce is doing across a far wider area than the criminal offence, and given that the criminal offence already has a maximum of seven years and that emotional value is recognised, I feel that the taskforce is doing the necessary work to step up action in this area. We recognise that there is a problem. More needs to be done, and the taskforce is doing it.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the shadow Minister for his speech. Interestingly, it pulled in two different directions. On the one hand, he quoted the Bar Council’s concerns about whether the jury principle might be undermined, but then he moved a series of amendments that would considerably increase the scope of the clause. Those two points clearly pull in opposite directions, perhaps suggesting that the clause as drafted is about in the right place.
As the shadow Minister eloquently laid out, once again, clause 164 permits a stranger—a so-called 13th member—to enter the jury room where that person is a British sign language interpreter, to assist a deaf juror in participating in the proceedings. Both sides of the House have agreed that that is a good idea. The shadow Minister read out a quote from the Bar Council that raised some concerns about the sanctity of the jury room being infringed. That is of course an important principle in law. I sat as a juror at Croydon Crown court during the summer recess a couple of years ago, so I know that that is something that the system protects fiercely, and rightly so.
I assure the shadow Minister and the Bar Council that several safeguards are in place to ensure the BSL interpreter cannot unduly influence proceedings. They have to sign an agreement that includes confidentiality and other provisions, and undertake not to engage in any behaviour that might be of concern. They swear an oath to the same effect, and breaking it would be a criminal offence. Only BSL interpreters on the proper register can be used, so someone cannot be picked off the street and wander in; it has to be somebody who is on the approved register to start with.
The shadow Minister asked about the possibility of error. I believe that the intention is to have two BSL interpreters present just in case one makes a mistake or loses attention for a moment, so there is a safeguard there. Of course, if any member of the jury witnesses behaviour that concerns them, it is always open to them to report the matter to the trial judge. I hope that the safeguards that I have just outlined address the points that the shadow Minister and the Bar Council raised.
If jurors break their oaths and say things outside or reveal things that they should not, there can be contempt proceedings and punishments. Will the same punishments apply to the interpreters? The Minister has set out a number of contractual arrangements, which are all well and good, but will the same obligations lie upon the interpreters as lie upon jurors?
Yes, I believe—in fact, I know, because it is written down in front of me; that is not quite the same thing, but let us assume it is for these purposes—that the provisions create a new offence where a BSL interpreter intentionally interferes in or influences the deliberations of the jury in the proceedings before a court. Yes, there are now criminal provisions being introduced by the clause.
I understand the spirit in which amendments 147 to 161were moved by the shadow Minister, and he mentioned that the hon. Member for Nottingham South assisted in their development. I understand that widening the type of people who might be able to assist could help a wider range of jurors, but there are some concerns about going too far, too quickly.
As the shadow Minister pointed out, this is a significant step. It is a significant departure from centuries of established practice. Allowing a 13th person into the jury room has never been done before. There is a feeling among the stakeholders we consulted—the judiciary, the Bar and so on—that we should take this one step at a time. Let us start with British sign language interpreters and see how that goes. If it is made to work successfully, as we hope it will be, we can look in due course at widening the range of people who might be accommodated.
There are also, I should add, potential capacity constraints. For example, I am told that there are 150 registered BSL interpreters, but only 32 speech-to-text reporters, so one might have issues with the number of available people. This is an important step. Let us take this one step first and then review it on an ongoing basis to see whether we need to go further.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesUnder ECHR and common-law provisions, we cannot extend a sentence beyond what was handed down by the court. Of course, that was the big problem with the old IPP sentences, where people could stay in prison forever; indeed, there are still people in prison under IPP sentences.
We have to work within the envelope—within the maximum sentence handed down by the court originally for the offence originally committed. The judgment is essentially to be exercised by the Parole Board on how best to protect the public, by striking a balance. Do we leave people in prison for the whole time or do we release them a bit early with a period on licence? That is a judgment that the Parole Board has to make to best protect the public. In some cases, if it thinks that the risk is very high, it may consider that the whole term in prison is the best way.
Take the example of the six years. The Parole Board may say, “Well, six years in prison is better than five years in prison followed by one year on licence”. It is a judgment that the Parole Board must make. We cannot reasonably go beyond that six years, because that would be potentially unjust: we would be punishing someone and imposing a sentence that was longer than that originally handed down by the court for the offence of which they were convicted. That would be contrary to natural justice, common law and ECHR provisions.
That is why the measure is designed as it is, and I hope that makes sense.
The old IPP sentences had their problems; they were much too widely used and were not originally intended to be that widely used. There was an issue about them, certainly. However, would not that kind of sentence—one that was indeterminate but able to be cut short when the individual concerned could demonstrate that they were no longer dangerous—be the answer in some of the kinds of tangents that the Minister is talking about?
The Minister seems to be tying himself in knots, to say, “Well, it’s going to be either three years or six years, but we all know that the person is coming out at the end”. Originally, IPP sentences were legislated for to deal with this very issue, but of course they ended up being too widely used. Is there not a better way of reintroducing some kind of IPP sentences that would enable greater safety but be much more narrowly used?
Can I clarify whether the hon. Member is talking about potentially indeterminate sentences?
She is. Okay.
We debated this issue internally, when we were designing the clause. Clearly, one of the options considered was reintroducing some form of IPP sentence, which is, as the hon. Lady said, indeterminate, meaning that it could go on forever. That was not done because there is potentially an inherent injustice. We have been using the example of kidnap, so let us keep using it. If someone commits that offence and the judge decides that six years is the right sentence, to then say that that person, having been given a fixed sentence, could spend the rest of their life in prison because of a risk that they might offend later—they had not committed a more serious offence; it is just that they might—struck us as being inherently unjust.
Do hon. Members remember the film “Minority Report”, where people were incarcerated because it was judged that they might commit an offence in the future? If we get into the territory of imposing a penalty, which could be imprisonment forever, because someone might commit an offence rather than because they actually have committed an offence, we are straying into potentially slightly dangerous territory.
I was not suggesting that; I was not suggesting that people who have been given determinate sentences should then arbitrarily suddenly find themselves with an indeterminate sentence. What I was suggesting was that perhaps there are a small number of cases for which it would be appropriate to reintroduce the possibility for judges to give indeterminate sentences again. The problem with the IPP was that it was much too widely used; I think the wording was too broad and it was much too widely used by sentencers. But the purpose of it was to deal with just these cases that the Minister is talking about.
I am not suggesting that somebody who has been given a determinate sentence should then arbitrarily be given an indeterminate sentence. However, if an indeterminate sentence for public protection was available in very narrow circumstances to judges, would that not fill this gap in a more coherent way than the way in which the Minister is trying to do it?
Clearly, if the original offence for which the offender is sentenced is one of the more serious ones that we have been talking about—for example, even offences that we consider to be moderately serious, such as committing grievous bodily harm with intent, have life sentences—the judge can, if he or she chooses, impose a life sentence and set a tariff for consideration for release, so there is flexibility. We are talking about cases where the original offence is not one of those very serious ones that has a life sentence, but one that has a fixed determinate sentence. I think the hon. Member is asking if we can give the judge the power to say that, even though the original offence has a fixed maximum sentence of, for example, only five years, they will override that and say, “Actually, for some reason that is not to do with the original offence, but is just to do with some other assessment of public risk, I will give you an indeterminate sentence.” I think that is the question.
Not quite. I was suggesting that perhaps the Minister should legislate for indeterminate sentences in particular circumstances and give the judge that discretion, but in a much narrower band of offences than those that ended up getting indeterminate sentences in the past. Indeterminate sentences have all been abolished now—they cannot be used. If I might say so, it seems that the Minister is trying to deal with the very issue that they were introduced to deal with in a very convoluted manner.
No, we are trying to do deal with the issue of prisoners who become dangerous, or who clearly pose a danger to the public, while they are in prison, but without doing what IPPs did. IPPs were abolished for a reason in 2012: people who committed a particular offence with a fixed sentence of, say, five years could end up in prison forever. As I have said, for more serious offenders the judge has the option of a life sentence, but we do not think it is right that someone could commit an offence with a fixed sentence, such as five years, and end up in prison for life, not for an offence they have committed, but for one that they might commit in the future.
This is the best way of balancing that public protection consideration against natural justice—that the punishment should fit the crime—and avoid a “Minority report”-type situation where someone is incarcerated for a crime that they may commit in the future, but have not yet committed. This strikes the right balance. We stay within the envelope of the sentence handed down by the judge. The judge has the option in serious cases to hand down a life sentence already, but we have just changed the release provisions.
We have debated the clause relatively extensively, Sir Charles. It strikes the right balance between natural justice and protecting the public. On that basis, I commend it to the Committee.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesDoes the Minister accept that despite the Government’s intentions, good as they may be, to reduce disparity, the reality is that it is not reducing and has not reduced since the report was published? Does he therefore accept that the Government need to do more?
I have not seen the up-to-date data for the past year, but I accept that we need to pay continuous attention to these issues. We need to make sure that the justice system always behaves in a fair and even-handed manner. Clearly, we accept that we need to be eternally vigilant on that front.
To return to the topic of this clause, it is simply about making sure that the decisions taken by previous Parliaments are reflected in the way in which judges take their decisions. We also need to ensure that departing from what Parliament has specified happens only in exceptional cases. Believing as I do in parliamentary sovereignty, that seems reasonable to me.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI have been listening carefully to the Minister’s response. Will he undertake to get back to Opposition Members and indeed the whole Committee before Report?
I almost said that without being prompted, but, since I have now been prompted, yes, I will.
I hope that the commentary I have given on the operation of the clause addresses the many points quite rightly and properly raised by the hon. Member for Rotherham and the shadow Minister. I have undertaken further to investigate two points, and I hope that on that basis the Committee is content to see the clause stand part of the Bill.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles. Clause 2 increases the maximum penalty for common assault or battery against an emergency worker from 12 months to two years’ imprisonment, thereby delivering our manifesto commitment. Our emergency services place themselves in harm’s way to protect us, and it is therefore right that we treat with particular seriousness any assault committed against an emergency worker, which is why we seek to legislate to increase the maximum sentence for assault against them from 12 months to two years’ imprisonment. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to our emergency services for the work they do on our behalf and on behalf of all our constituents, keeping us safe, looking after us and protecting us. I am sure the whole Committee will be united in expressing that sentiment.
We consulted last year on extending the maximum penalty from one year to two years and found overwhelming support for the move. In evidence last week, we heard representatives of policing and emergency services expressing strong support for the move as well. It will give courts the ability to pass higher sentences, reflecting the seriousness and severity of these offences. The clause does not change the definition of emergency workers. That is set out in section 3(1) of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018 and covers police constables; National Crime Agency officers; prison and custody officers; fire, rescue and search personnel; and those people providing NHS services. The clause simply amends the maximum sentence that appears in that Act from 12 months to two years.
It is worth saying that, where more serious assaults occur against emergency workers, such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm or grievous bodily harm with intent, those offences will be charged as those more serious matters, which of course have higher sentences. Actual bodily harm has a maximum sentence of five years; GBH, under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, also has a five-year maximum; and GBH with intent has a maximum sentence of life. We of course expect more serious assaults on our emergency workers to be prosecuted and sentenced accordingly.
It is worth noting that the proportion of defendants in assault cases against emergency workers receiving immediate custody went up last year compared with the year before, from 17% to 25%, and about 10,000 cases were successfully prosecuted and sentenced. This legislation is being used on a fairly wide basis.
No amendments have been tabled to the clause. I believe it commands widespread support across the House and among the public. I do not want to detain the Committee longer than necessary. I think I have covered the key elements of the proposals, and spoken about the importance of the work of our emergency services and the tribute that we pay to them. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
I do not wish to detain the Committee for long; I have just a couple of points. The Minister set out that the consultation has gone on. It was obviously a manifesto commitment of his party, and I generally approve of manifesto commitments being implemented. Even if I might not agree with all the ones that were in his manifesto, I can see the point, but am I not right that the original intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who introduced the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act, was to have a two-year maximum, but it was reduced during the passage of the legislation to one year as a consequence of the Government of the day wanting it to be one year?
I understand that there have been consultations and a manifesto commitment since, but from where does this Damascene conversion come? It seems to me that the Government originally said, “We’ll support the legislation if the maximum is one year,” and within months of it being implemented they were saying, “It’s got to be two years,” which was what my hon. Friend actually wanted. He cut it in order to get Government support. I am interested to find out where that conversion came from. Was there some sudden bit of evidence that convinced the Government that my hon. Friend was correct, in which case I congratulate the Government on being willing to change their mind. I would be interested to hear from the Minister where that change of heart came from.
Secondly, I notice that the British Association of Social Workers and the Social Workers Union have submitted a petition to the Government, which I understand has quite a few thousand signatures, asking them to amend the legislation to include social workers in the definition of emergency workers. No doubt there are arguments for and against that, but I wonder whether the Minister has anything to say about whether the Government have any intention of doing that.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend raises a very good point. As we face the future, the use of technology will be critical in making our justice system faster, more efficient and more accessible. I have already laid out how we have expedited the roll-out of a cloud video platform which facilitates remote hearings. We have been doing quite a lot of work with the police on video remand hearings, where a prisoner who has been arrested and is in a police custody suite has their remand hearing with the magistrates done by video link, rather than being taken to the magistrates court. Quite a lot of that has been going on. We are also just beginning to roll out the common platform, which is an IT system that integrates many parts of the criminal justice system, the Crown Prosecution Service, defence, prosecution and the courts themselves. That work is being trialled pending a full roll-out. My hon. Friend also mentioned a smart tagging, a point, as he said, raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury. We have this year procured a large number of additional GPS tags, which we are now using. We are moving in that direction. The measures he referred to in the sentencing White Paper, which we published, I think, back in September, will, I can tell him, form part of legislation arising in the relatively near future.
Many court users and their representatives are asking for courts to be closed again because of increasing covid outbreaks. Her Majesty’s chief inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service told the Justice Committee yesterday of concerns that some courts are not safe. He said, “I particularly would not wish to be in a court at this time.” Is the Minister planning for courts to close again? What impact will any such change in policy have on the Crown court backlogs that we are concerned about today?
We are not planning to close down the court system, and the Lord Chief Justice made that very clear when the current lockdown was announced. As I have said, we have invested a quarter of a billion pounds in making our courts system covid-safe so that it can keep operating. The hon. Lady cited some remarks by the CPS inspector at the Committee yesterday and I have to tell her, in all candour, that those comments are inaccurate and inappropriate. The proper authorities for determining the safety of our courts system are Public Health England and Public Health Wales, not the inspector of the CPS, and they, having looked at the measures we are taking, have found them to be appropriate and found that our courts are covid-safe. The proof of that pudding is in the eating. As I said earlier, the number of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service staff who have tested positive for covid is in line with the number in the wider population; courts are not especially unsafe, because of the measures we have been taking and will continue to take. I hope that reassures witnesses, defendants, jurors, lawyers—anyone using the courts—that our courts are safe. Justice should, will and must continue to be delivered.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
General CommitteesLike my hon. Friend the Member for Witney, the hon. Member for Hammersmith has had a long and distinguished career as a practitioner of of the law, and we are always interested in what he has to say. The idea of identifying common mistakes and drawing them to the judiciary’s attention is a very good one. Perhaps my officials can work with the Judicial College and the Judicial Office to see whether a list of common errors could be compiled and circulated to the judiciary. A couple of studies have been done; the hon. Gentleman referred to one of them, another was done in 2012 looking at Court of Appeal overturns of unlawful sentences, and another by the Criminal Appeal Office in 2018. I am sure we could draw on that work to identify whether there are common themes, and if there are, the idea of drawing them to judges’ attention is an extremely good one. We will investigate the hon. Gentleman’s idea with a view to taking it further.
There are two substantive clauses in the Bill because the Bill does two things. First, clause 1 provides a “clean sweep”. It takes the existing sentencing procedures and ensures that sentences passed are in accordance with the law applicable at the time of the offence. It is not uncommon for sentencing courts to deal with offenders who committed offences several years previously, when a different sentencing regime applied. There are many examples of when this happens, and if the sentencing provisions have changed between the time of the offence and the time of sentencing, it is not immediately clear which provisions apply. As we have heard from two practitioners on this Committee, it is no wonder that barristers and judges are keen on change.
The so-called clean sweep mechanism provided in clause 1 attempts to remedy the anomaly by removing the need for the sentencing court to identify and apply historical versions of sentencing law. Instead it will apply the sentencing law prevailing at the time of sentence rather than at the time of offence. As a result, when an offender is convicted after the start of the new sentencing code, sentencing procedural law as enacted in the code will apply, regardless of when the offence was committed. However, from a common law and human rights point of view—an article 7 point of view—it is important to provide exceptions, to ensure that offenders sentenced under the sentencing code are not subject to a harsher penalty than they would have been had the sentencing law at the time of the offence applied. Although current sentencing law will apply, there is an exception if the minimum sentence or the maximum sentence has increased, to make sure that a harsher penalty is not applied. That respects an important common law principle, as well as an article 7 human right.
Of course, when there is a moving target or a snap change is made, as the clean sweep does—it says, “Stop that. We start here.”—exceptions have to be made. However, we already have 12 categories of exception set out in the Bill. Will the Minister undertake to ensure that we do not have 50 or 100 categories by the time we reach the end of this process, thus building in complexity again? I understand the importance of the points he makes about the Human Rights Act and not doing rough justice under the common law, but if our aim is to put things right, we should keep it simple.
The hon. Lady makes a good point. The aim is to simplify, yet we have these exceptions. A balance has to be struck. We cannot, as responsible legislators, do anything that violates the long-established common law right she refers to, or breaches human rights. We want to keep it as simple as possible. It is worth bearing in mind that sentencing law sets generally the maximum and in some cases the minimum sentences, but it is always up to the independent judiciary to decide exactly what sentence they hand down. I take the hon. Lady’s point about the exceptions, though. I hope we have enunciated those comprehensively, particularly in schedule 1 to the Bill, and that we will not have to add to them as rightly warns against.
The second substantive provision, clause 2, provides for various pre-consolidation amendments, which are listed in schedule 2. They are almost entirely highly technical in nature. They are explained in detail in the explanatory notes, but essentially they tidy up and correct small historical anomalies before the sentencing code is enacted. I will give one example to illustrate:references in schedule 9 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to now repealed petty sessions districts in Northern Ireland are replaced with references to their replacements, administrative court divisions. That is the sort of technical amendment we are making via schedule 2. There is a list in the explanatory notes that we can examine in more detail during the Committee stage of the Bill, if required.
Let me be clear: everything we are doing, both in this Bill and in the sentencing code that will follow, is essentially about clarifying and simplifying. In none of these provisions are we changing substantive sentencing law. It is a simplification exercise. Nothing is being changed in the way that sentencing policy operates. It is simply a clarification exercise, which is supported by the judiciary, barristers and academics. It has been scrutinised at some length in the other place, which has among its Members some very distinguished former judges, and it is the culmination of four or five years’ work by the Law Commission. I thank the commission for the extraordinary work it has done, especially the outgoing criminal law commissioner, David Ormerod, who led the work.
The Bill has one simple purpose: to pave the way for the sentencing code. That code will make the sentencing process easier, quicker and more transparent. The Sentencing Bill, which creates the code, was introduced in the House of Lords on 5 March under the special procedure reserved for Law Commission consolidation Bills. I commend the Bill to the Committee as an important and, some have said, long overdue step to simplify a very complicated area of law.