Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Thirteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMaria Eagle
Main Page: Maria Eagle (Labour - Liverpool Garston)Department Debates - View all Maria Eagle's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesUnder ECHR and common-law provisions, we cannot extend a sentence beyond what was handed down by the court. Of course, that was the big problem with the old IPP sentences, where people could stay in prison forever; indeed, there are still people in prison under IPP sentences.
We have to work within the envelope—within the maximum sentence handed down by the court originally for the offence originally committed. The judgment is essentially to be exercised by the Parole Board on how best to protect the public, by striking a balance. Do we leave people in prison for the whole time or do we release them a bit early with a period on licence? That is a judgment that the Parole Board has to make to best protect the public. In some cases, if it thinks that the risk is very high, it may consider that the whole term in prison is the best way.
Take the example of the six years. The Parole Board may say, “Well, six years in prison is better than five years in prison followed by one year on licence”. It is a judgment that the Parole Board must make. We cannot reasonably go beyond that six years, because that would be potentially unjust: we would be punishing someone and imposing a sentence that was longer than that originally handed down by the court for the offence of which they were convicted. That would be contrary to natural justice, common law and ECHR provisions.
That is why the measure is designed as it is, and I hope that makes sense.
The old IPP sentences had their problems; they were much too widely used and were not originally intended to be that widely used. There was an issue about them, certainly. However, would not that kind of sentence—one that was indeterminate but able to be cut short when the individual concerned could demonstrate that they were no longer dangerous—be the answer in some of the kinds of tangents that the Minister is talking about?
The Minister seems to be tying himself in knots, to say, “Well, it’s going to be either three years or six years, but we all know that the person is coming out at the end”. Originally, IPP sentences were legislated for to deal with this very issue, but of course they ended up being too widely used. Is there not a better way of reintroducing some kind of IPP sentences that would enable greater safety but be much more narrowly used?
Can I clarify whether the hon. Member is talking about potentially indeterminate sentences?
She is. Okay.
We debated this issue internally, when we were designing the clause. Clearly, one of the options considered was reintroducing some form of IPP sentence, which is, as the hon. Lady said, indeterminate, meaning that it could go on forever. That was not done because there is potentially an inherent injustice. We have been using the example of kidnap, so let us keep using it. If someone commits that offence and the judge decides that six years is the right sentence, to then say that that person, having been given a fixed sentence, could spend the rest of their life in prison because of a risk that they might offend later—they had not committed a more serious offence; it is just that they might—struck us as being inherently unjust.
Do hon. Members remember the film “Minority Report”, where people were incarcerated because it was judged that they might commit an offence in the future? If we get into the territory of imposing a penalty, which could be imprisonment forever, because someone might commit an offence rather than because they actually have committed an offence, we are straying into potentially slightly dangerous territory.
I was not suggesting that; I was not suggesting that people who have been given determinate sentences should then arbitrarily suddenly find themselves with an indeterminate sentence. What I was suggesting was that perhaps there are a small number of cases for which it would be appropriate to reintroduce the possibility for judges to give indeterminate sentences again. The problem with the IPP was that it was much too widely used; I think the wording was too broad and it was much too widely used by sentencers. But the purpose of it was to deal with just these cases that the Minister is talking about.
I am not suggesting that somebody who has been given a determinate sentence should then arbitrarily be given an indeterminate sentence. However, if an indeterminate sentence for public protection was available in very narrow circumstances to judges, would that not fill this gap in a more coherent way than the way in which the Minister is trying to do it?
Clearly, if the original offence for which the offender is sentenced is one of the more serious ones that we have been talking about—for example, even offences that we consider to be moderately serious, such as committing grievous bodily harm with intent, have life sentences—the judge can, if he or she chooses, impose a life sentence and set a tariff for consideration for release, so there is flexibility. We are talking about cases where the original offence is not one of those very serious ones that has a life sentence, but one that has a fixed determinate sentence. I think the hon. Member is asking if we can give the judge the power to say that, even though the original offence has a fixed maximum sentence of, for example, only five years, they will override that and say, “Actually, for some reason that is not to do with the original offence, but is just to do with some other assessment of public risk, I will give you an indeterminate sentence.” I think that is the question.
Not quite. I was suggesting that perhaps the Minister should legislate for indeterminate sentences in particular circumstances and give the judge that discretion, but in a much narrower band of offences than those that ended up getting indeterminate sentences in the past. Indeterminate sentences have all been abolished now—they cannot be used. If I might say so, it seems that the Minister is trying to deal with the very issue that they were introduced to deal with in a very convoluted manner.
No, we are trying to do deal with the issue of prisoners who become dangerous, or who clearly pose a danger to the public, while they are in prison, but without doing what IPPs did. IPPs were abolished for a reason in 2012: people who committed a particular offence with a fixed sentence of, say, five years could end up in prison forever. As I have said, for more serious offenders the judge has the option of a life sentence, but we do not think it is right that someone could commit an offence with a fixed sentence, such as five years, and end up in prison for life, not for an offence they have committed, but for one that they might commit in the future.
This is the best way of balancing that public protection consideration against natural justice—that the punishment should fit the crime—and avoid a “Minority report”-type situation where someone is incarcerated for a crime that they may commit in the future, but have not yet committed. This strikes the right balance. We stay within the envelope of the sentence handed down by the judge. The judge has the option in serious cases to hand down a life sentence already, but we have just changed the release provisions.
We have debated the clause relatively extensively, Sir Charles. It strikes the right balance between natural justice and protecting the public. On that basis, I commend it to the Committee.
Of course, there was also the North Liverpool community justice centre, which I think the Minister may have referred to, which extended the problem-solving court technique to all kinds of offences, not only specifically drug or alcohol offences, domestic violence or mental health issues, and it was very successful.
Indeed, that was the case. We have so much to learn from the best practice around the country, but also from what happened before this Government varied those types of courts when they came to power in 2010.
In total, the Government have committed to piloting five problem-solving courts, targeted at repeat offenders who would otherwise have been sent to custody. The Bill builds on those proposals by laying the legislative framework for the pilots to take place—specifically, clause 128 introduces schedule 13, which will give problem-solving courts the power to periodically review community and suspended sentence orders, and to commit an offender to custody for a breach. The pilot of problem-solving courts is welcome.
The evidence is clear that problem-solving courts have proven hugely effective—for example, in restoring confidence in the criminal justice system among marginal communities. As the Government’s own response to the Lammy review set out:
“Trusted figures in the CJS were described as those who had taken the time to get to know an individual, their background and specific needs and vulnerabilities.”
Moreover, if rolled out nationally, the pilot of problem-solving courts would also play an important role in reducing the huge burden on our courts system, while ensuring short custodial sentences are used only if completely necessary.
Although the Opposition support the powers in clause 128, we have some concerns, and I would be grateful if the Minister responded to them this afternoon—sorry, this morning. It is still morning!
First, as Women in Prison points out in its helpful briefing:
“In order to be considered for a problem-solving court approach, a person must first enter an admission of guilt for the alleged offence.”
The briefing goes on to note that the review conducted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) found:
“Black, Asian and minority ethnic people are more likely to plead not guilty to alleged offences. We know that experience of racism and lack of trust in the criminal justice system prevents people from feeling that they will be treated fairly if they plead guilty.”
I know that we have already raised this issue in debate, but therein lies a difficulty that the Government will have to contend with as they pursue their pilot of problem-solving courts. As the Prison Reform Trust explains, while, on one hand, problem-solving courts have been useful at restoring confidence in the criminal justice system for those in marginalised communities, for them to be wholly successful,
“pilots must work with people who enter not guilty pleas, and on added measures that are likely to increase confidence in the process.”
I know the Minister said that the Government would do what they could to overcome that problem, but what that is, or could be, is still far from clear. Can he be more specific by explaining what steps the Government are taking on the issue of not guilty pleas and to avoid exacerbating the disproportionality that already exists for black, Asian and minority ethnic people in the criminal justice system?
Secondly, if problem-solving courts have already shown themselves to be effective in providing rehabilitative alternatives to custody, why have the Government chosen to pursue such a limited pilot rather than a larger national roll-out? Thirdly, what will the Government do to resource properly the probation and other services that work with offenders who are dealt with through problem-solving courts? The Minister knows, as I do, that resources are thin. If they are not there, the system will fail. Finally, will he report back to Parliament on the success rate of the pilots, and if so, what would the Government look for before they could commit to a national roll-out?
I will be very brief on clause 129. While clause 128 and schedule 13 provide the legislative foundation for the pilot of problem-solving courts, clause 129 and schedule 14 would enable the courts involved in the pilot to impose drug-testing requirements as part of a community sentence or a suspended sentence order. As the House briefing sets out, a court would be able to impose drug-testing requirements only where the two following conditions are met: substance misuse has contributed to the offence to which the relevant order related, or is likely to contribute towards further offending behaviour; and the Secretary of State has notified the court that arrangements to implement drug-testing requirements are available in the offender’s local area. Taken hand in hand with clause 128, the Opposition are happy to support clause 129.