Marco Longhi
Main Page: Marco Longhi (Conservative - Dudley North)(3 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMy hon. Friend has put her finger on the main objection, but it is not the only objection. It will cause a great deal of confusion, and I do not think the courts will like it. They will therefore try to find ways around it, as courts tend to do in such circumstances, and there will be uncertainty over whether something was lawful, and whether it was lawful for all purposes. Again, I will come on to those issues, but this just opens cans of worms. The Government also assert that this is a simplifying and clarifying measure, but it will have exactly the opposite effect.
I take issue with the hon. Member’s characterisation of how the courts may work under the new jurisdiction of the Bill, when it is enacted. He also mentioned the expert advice that we heard the other day. Jason Varuhas, professor of law at the University of Melbourne, stated:
“I think these remedies are welcome, because they provide for a greater remedial flexibility for courts—for courts to tailor remedies in their discretion, to the exigencies of the particular facts of the case. It is important to bear in mind that these remedies will be discretionary and the courts will take into account a range of relevant considerations in exercising that discretion. Courts are well versed in exercising remedial discretion—courts can be expected to respond to the justice of the particular case. What the Bill does is to give the courts more options.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 10, Q6.]
It is a pleasure to be able to follow the hon. Member. Colleagues will be pleased to know that I will be trying to hold their attention for only about three or four minutes.
I am certain that the hon. Member will have regard for the assertion by the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), that the Bill is a power grab by Government. Would he not agree that that is an odd thing to say, given that the Bill provides the courts with additional powers around remedies in a way that ensures practicality and efficiency, and enables courts to give consideration to the effect of remedies in a way that is not readily applied in the current framework? That surely serves to evidence the shadow Secretary of State’s lack of understanding of what our courts actually need and of the flexibilities built into the Bill. As the Minister said on Second Reading, far from weakening quashing orders, as the shadow Secretary of State said, these new remedies
“strengthen quashing orders and thereby strengthen judicial review.”—[Official Report, 26 October 2021; Vol. 702, c. 233.]
On prospective remedies, I would like to give two examples that show that this concept is not new but has precedence in our legal system. Judges have limited the retrospective effect of quashing orders in some instances in the past, such as in R (British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors, Musicians’ Union & Ors) v. Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills & Anor in 2015. Therefore, these remedies do not change the position of judges but act to encourage a wider use of the new quashing order modifications.
It is important to state that these remedial modifications are not being pursued to bypass Parliament but are in fact focused on resolving practical issues that arise during judicial review cases. The concept of prospective-only orders is not novel or unique. Under the Scotland Act 1998, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, courts in the devolved Administrations have a power to make such orders where decisions are outside devolved competence. The Government wish a similar concept to be available in all cases of judicial review in England and Wales.
May I point out that there is no presumption in any of the devolved legislation, and that is primarily what we are arguing about here? It is not about having the ability to do this; it is about the presumption that it has to be a default position.
Courts will none the less still have discretion, as I understand it, so they can decide, case by case, what framework they intend to follow.
These are discretionary quashing order modifications, and courts will have regard to the constitutional separation of powers. It is not foreseen that the Government will stop having to work with Parliament to pass retrospective legislation in future.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Mark. I will—necessarily, since we are almost at the end of this sitting—keep my remarks extremely short.
I do not think anybody in this room would not trust our judiciary’s knowledge, its significant experience, or its wisdom to make sensible, measured judgments in each case. At present, a finding of an error of law nullifies the decision completely. I will give one example—there are many, but we are short of time—in which a suspended quashing order could have been useful. Despite what the shadow Minister says, it was applied for by the then Labour Government under Gordon Brown. That case, which has already been mentioned, is Ahmed v. HM Treasury (No. 2).
In that case, a number of individuals had their assets frozen because they were believed to be terrorists. The court decided that the decision to freeze those assets was unlawful, which left the Government in an invidious position, because they were concerned about the use of those assets for security. Indeed, over five days, Gordon Brown’s Government passed a law to retrospectively make that asset freezing lawful, before then passing more definitive legislation.
We do not want the Government to be put in that sort of position. Had the judiciary then been able to pass a suspended order, as the Bill proposes, it would have been able to say that the effect of the asset freezing was lawful for a period, allowing the Government to take appropriate national security measures. As others have said, the addition of a suspended quashing order means extra tools in the judges’ toolbox. It is an opportunity for our esteemed and extremely expert judges to make sensible decisions—the right decisions at the right time—for the cases before them.