Intelligence and Security Committee

Debate between Malcolm Rifkind and Keith Vaz

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I am privileged, as Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, to introduce this debate on not only the Committee’s annual report but the work of our intelligence agencies over the past year. It has been a particularly interesting year, in which we have seen a sea change in our intelligence agencies and the role that they play in the public debate of the nation: not only has the Justice and Security Green Paper been published by the Government, but only last week the Foreign Secretary, for the first time in our history, gave a lecture on the record—a public lecture—on the role of intelligence in foreign policy; over the past few months, the heads of the various intelligence agencies—the Secret Intelligence Service, the Security Service and GCHQ—have either given lectures or been interviewed on television or in the press about the work of their agencies and the role of intelligence; and the Intelligence and Security Committee has said in its annual report that we look forward to having, at least on one or two occasions, public sittings, for the first time in the history of the Committee, and we know that the Government see that to be appropriate. The fundamental reforms that we will be discussing today on the nature of the Intelligence and Security Committee and on the wider question of intelligence oversight mark a fundamental departure from the practices of the past.

Some might be entitled to ask, “Does this mean that secrecy is not as important as it used to be?” They might suggest that our secret services do not have to be as secret and that the secrets themselves do not require the same protection. Anyone who had that view would need correcting quickly and comprehensively. Of course there are secrets, and the basic role of these agencies is to carry out secret activities on behalf the nation as a whole.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

I welcome what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said about this important matter. When the Select Committee on Home Affairs has sought evidence from the head of MI5 in the past, we have had to travel to its headquarters for a private briefing, sometimes with darkened windows. I welcome what he said about the fact that the heads of those agencies will be giving evidence to his Committee in public so that they can be cross-examined. Does he know when the first such sitting might be?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The heads of the agencies have been travelling to the Intelligence and Security Committee to give evidence—albeit in secret, not in public—for a good number of years, so precedent is not being broken. Some thought is being given to holding public sessions, and I certainly hope that will prove possible over the next few months. I cannot give an absolute commitment to that effect, but it is certainly what I would expect.

The nature of secret operations remains as crucial as ever. A much more mature approach is being taken to what Britain needs to remain secret and what is a legitimate question of public debate, even if the intelligence agencies are involved. When I first entered this House, and right up until the 1990s, the very existence of the intelligence agencies was never officially declared or admitted and those who led the agencies were very private figures whose identities were never revealed. Much has changed since enactment of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, but to this day some aspects of that approach remain very much in our eye. The question that must be asked is whether that is acceptable in a modern society. We have three intelligence agencies that collectively receive some £2 billion of taxpayers’ money each year. That is serious money that inevitably needs not only private scrutiny but a degree of public scrutiny, too.

Secondly, the very fact that they are secret agencies in an open society means that there is a need for Parliament and the public to take a serious interest not only in the private but, where possible, in the public way in which the agencies operate. Of course, there is a third consideration, which is that as the very activities of the agencies involve the power to intercept communications or carry out operations that, without the authority of a Secretary of State, would be unlawful, they have a privilege that is not available to the rest of the community. If one thinks that this debate is taking place in the middle of a hacking inquiry when exactly that kind of interception was carried out by those who did not have lawful authority, one can see a clear illustration of why the needs of the agencies should be subject to a degree of transparency.