North Africa and the Near and Middle East

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend invites me neatly on to my next paragraph. As he rightly says, last week voters also went to the polls in Morocco to choose a new Government, following the constitution passed in a referendum in July. That is an important part of Morocco’s progress towards greater democratic accountability. We urge Morocco and Tunisia to turn these democratic gains into real reform that meets the long-term aspirations of their people. That is the answer to my hon. Friend’s question; we have advocated democracy in these countries, and where they have turned to democracy and are holding free, fair and respected elections, we must respect the outcome of democratic votes and not try to second-guess the electorates of those countries. The test for us is not their domestic programmes—that is up to these countries—but whether they are able to continue choosing Governments in the future, having further elections and having alternating Governments in the future. Many African countries, for example, Zambia, have recently set a good example in that regard. That is the test. I do not think that we should couple our support for democracy with regular or constant criticism of parties that engage in the democratic process in these countries.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Is it not worth taking into account that although the Moroccan Islamist party may be the largest single party, it obtained only just over a quarter of the vote and, as in Tunisia, non-Islamist parties in both these elections have emerged with a large majority of the popular vote? That indicates that public opinion is not necessarily going to be dominated by the Islamist point of view.

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a very important point and what he has described has indeed been the pattern so far in Tunisia and Morocco. In addition, we must not prejudge how these parties will develop. Understandably, there is some anxiety about that, but they will find in many countries that they are under pressure increasingly to secularise their policies in order to deal with the practical concerns of their people. We will see over time—but only over time—how they develop.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I begin by apologising for the fact that I will not be able to hear the winding-up speeches, but I look forward to reading them.

I agreed with the shadow Foreign Secretary’s observation that patterns are emerging in the Arab spring, and I wish to draw attention to one pattern that has not given risen to much comment but which is very significant. Although turmoil has affected every country in the Arab world from Morocco to the Gulf, it is significant that the greatest turmoil and the revolutions have taken place and dictators have fallen in the republics, whereas the monarchies, with the exception of Bahrain, despite experiencing significant disturbances, have not seen such substantial violence or attempts to overthrow the system.

It is worth asking why that might be. It is over-simplistic and incorrect simply to say, “It is to do with those countries that have oil and those that do not”, because clearly Morocco and Jordan have minimal amounts of oil while Libya has a great deal. I think that it is about legitimacy. I am not suggesting that there is antipathy towards republicanism as such in the republics of the Arab world or that there is a love for monarchy, but these are dictators who have acted cruelly, who achieved power by force—or, in the case of Assad, whose father took power by force—who have maintained it by the cruellest methods of despotism and who therefore have not earned their people’s respect.

Admittedly, the monarchies have not been democracies but authoritarian states, some of which have exercised their power in a way that we and many of their own people would consider unacceptable, but nevertheless in the eyes of a significant proportion of their own people they still have that legitimacy without which a modern Government cannot expect to survive.

[Mike Gapes]

I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman. Does he also accept that certainly in Jordan and Morocco there have been progressive improvements towards democracy—too slow perhaps and possibly temporary but nevertheless a reform process—which has not been the case in some of the other countries?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I was coming to that point. The hon. Gentleman is correct. There is something else that Jordan and Morocco have in common: both the King of Jordan and the King of Morocco claim descent from the Prophet, and many of their people accept the legitimacy of that claim. Furthermore, the King of Saudi Arabia does not call himself “King of Saudi Arabia” but “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”—Mecca and Medina—to emphasise, as he would argue, his spiritual not simply secular role. But the hon. Gentleman is correct: the other phenomenon in many of these monarchies is that they have been prepared, however hesitantly, to begin the process of reform, which might help them to deal with their long-term problem.

[Daniel Kawczynski]

I am pleased that my right hon. and learned Friend is raising this issue. I would add that there are many people in Libya who wish for a restoration of their constitutional monarchy and very much regret that the national transitional council is proposing a presidential system without any plebiscite to find out what the people wish.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

As it happens, I have met the Crown Prince of Libya in the past few months. It is, however, up to the Libyan people. They were pretty good at getting rid of Gaddafi, and if they want a restoration of the monarchy, it should not be too difficult for them to insist at least on a plebiscite so that the Libyans can decide.

I raise this question not simply to praise the monarchies. In the longer term, they face exactly the problem that the north African countries and Syria face now. They do, however, have a window of opportunity. Their peoples are saying, “We, too, want more liberal, accountable government and the rule of law, just as the rest of the world has increasingly had it. Because we accept your legitimacy and because we acknowledge that you are introducing reform, however tentatively, we are prepared to give you the benefit of the doubt for the time being.” However, I predict that if, in five to 10 years from now, not much real progress is made—if the kings, emirs and sheiks remain autocratic rulers in all but name—then revolution will come to those countries as well.

The crucial country is Saudi Arabia, where even that tentative process of genuine parliamentary reform has not even begun yet—it will always be slower for all the reasons that the House is familiar with. Saudi Arabia needs to embark on that process. Prince Nayef—a man who does not have the liberal inclinations of King Abdullah—has been chosen as the new crown prince, although whether he will be more pragmatic when he one day becomes a monarch remains to be seen. However, Saudi Arabia needs to realise that it cannot simply be immune from this extraordinary revolutionary fervour, which has affected Saudis as well as those in other Arab countries.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that there have been demonstrations criticising the monarchy in Saudi Arabia—which have been brutally suppressed—that the army has been sent into Bahrain and that there is almost unparalleled control of the media in Saudi Arabia, even compared with the previous regimes all over the region?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The hon. Gentleman is right that even in the monarchies there are human rights problems, including in the United Arab Emirates in the past few days. Ministers have resigned from the Kuwaiti Government because of protests over various developments there. In Saudi Arabia, it is more a protest of the Shi’a minority. They are big minority—20% of the population—but they can never aspire to power, and if the Saudi Government have sense, they will try to achieve a policy of reconciliation with them.

I want to turn to a second point—one that came up briefly in the earlier exchanges—about the role of Islamist parties in the region. Like most people in the United Kingdom or the west generally, one feels more comfortable if secular parties win elections; however, we should not get too over-exercised by the fact that parties that call themselves Islamist are doing rather well in a number of countries in free elections. The first point, which is perhaps the most important, is that, from the point of view of al-Qaeda, what is happening with Islamist parties in those countries is a disaster. The whole point of al-Qaeda is to reject a parliamentary route to power, to reject the sharing of power and to insist that only by revolution combined with terrorism can the Islamist ideal be achieved.

What we are seeing, not just in Tunisia and Morocco, but with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt too, is a recognition—for a number of reasons and motives—that, at the very least, power will need to be shared. There is a public declaration of a commitment to multi-party democracy and the rule of law. Of course there will be people in those parties who do not share those values, but so far the evidence supports the view that those declarations are what those parties are about. As I mentioned when I intervened earlier, opinion surveys in Egypt suggest that elections in Egypt are likely to be similar to the two elections so far. The Muslim Brotherhood will do well—it will probably be the largest party—but all the evidence so far, including independent surveys of opinion, suggests that it will not form a majority by itself. It, too, will have to share power, which is crucial.

Earlier I mentioned another factor in relation to Egypt which seems not to have been commented on, but which is significant. If the House accepts that the most important reason, apart from a general desire for the rule of law and freedom, for the revolutions in Egypt and elsewhere was a demand for economic progress—those countries are economically stagnated, having fallen woefully behind Brazil, south-east Asia and countries of the far east in their economic development—that means that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt faces a particular problem. Anyone ruling Libya will have vast amounts of oil wealth and will be able to afford to act in an extreme way—if that is the way they want to go—because they do not need the co-operation of the rest of the world. The Muslim Brotherhood knows perfectly well that if it were to acquire power in Egypt and then use it as though it had the right to impose an Islamist system on a population that did not want it, that would immediately destroy any possibility of overseas investment in Egypt. Who would invest in Egypt if it seemed to be going the way of Iran? The people of Egypt would never forgive an Egyptian Government who destroyed the prospect of economic growth by pursuing a theocratic agenda. I believe that the Muslim Brotherhood understands that perfectly well and that the first priority of any Egyptian Government has to be to reassure the outside world that Egypt will be an attractive place to come as a tourist and to invest in its resources, in order to help build the economy.

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that as a consequence of the 25 January revolution and the uncertainty, Egypt has seen enormous capital flight, so much of the risk and the economic disaster that he outlines has already happened?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Yes, of course, that has happened over the past few months, but it could be reversed if there were a prospect of stability and progress. The tragedy of Iraq is that the Iraq war went on long after the military conflict, with the whole economy destroyed as a consequence. It is only now that Iraqi oil production has got back to its original level. Libyan oil production should be back in a year or 18 months or so—perhaps even earlier. Tourism will return to Egypt when there is stability, but not without it. Any party that destroys that prospect will not be thanked.

Let me turn briefly to two other issues. The first is Syria. There are serious limits to what can be achieved by the outside world in relation to Syria. I pay tribute to the people of Syria who I never expected for a moment would be able to survive eight months of this appalling treatment by their own Government. I assumed wrongly that it would be like the tragedy of Iran and that when the Government used the police, the security forces, the prisons and the torture chambers, the Syrian opposition would, within months, have been pushed under ground, though not destroyed. That has not happened as it did in Iran. The Assad regime is doomed; the question is how we can assist that process.

I welcome the fact that the Government have already opened up contacts with the Syrian opposition. That is highly to be encouraged. I make just one additional point. It seems to me that, although for all the reasons that are increasingly understood, there cannot be a military dimension to the help we give the country, what the Syrian opposition need most is for their morale to be boosted and for them to be able to demonstrate to the people of Syria that they are increasingly winning, not losing, this conflict. That is the significance of the Arab League’s decision and the imposition of economic sanctions. That is how the United Kingdom, the European Union and the United States can make an impact—by demonstrating solidarity with those in Syria who are seeking change.

The final area on which I want to comment is, of course, Iran. There has to be very serious doubt as to whether the current policy of economic sanctions has any prospect of working. However much they are extended, there is no evidence that the Iranian Government are terribly interested in dialogue or even in a carrot-and-stick policy.

One problem—we have heard about it elsewhere— is the attitude of Russia and China. The question is whether there is any way in which the Russian and Chinese Governments can be persuaded to change their position. Russia is acting in an utterly illogical way, even given its own national interest. It is difficult to understand why Russia, with a large Muslim minority of its own and considerable destabilisation in the Caucasus, should acquiesce in the growth of nuclear weapon capability in Iran. If one looks for a Machiavellian explanation, there is a very simple one. The Machiavellian explanation for Russia’s opposition to what is happening with Iran is that it does not want sanctions to work and hopes that the Israelis or the Americans or both will use the military option. That would have the dual benefit of destroying or damaging Iran’s nuclear capability, without Russia having to share the responsibility and thus benefiting both ways from the consequent developments. That is a Machiavellian explanation. I hope it is not true, but I am not yet convinced because I cannot think of any other reason why Moscow should behave as it is.

If there is to be any prospect of economic sanctions working, the only opportunity I can see for success takes us back to the Arab League. As the Foreign Secretary has remarked, the Arab League has already acted in an unprecedented way—first with Libya, when it called for the international action to be taken. As a consequence, Russia and China, which would otherwise have vetoed the international action, came round to allowing the resolution to be passed. Secondly, the Arab League has acted impressively in the case of Syria.

In respect of Iran, however, there is an extraordinary silence. Were it not for WikiLeaks, we would not have been made aware of any public comments showing not just the distaste of Arab countries, but their absolute horror at the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon as a result of the geopolitical impact it would have on the region as a whole and on account of their perception of their own security. The situation is extraordinary. As any of us who meet Arab Ministers, Governments or leaders privately will be aware, this is at the top of their agenda: what is the west going to do to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon?

It was thanks to WikiLeaks that King Abdullah was quoted as saying that the head of the serpent must be cut off—a clear endorsement of the kind of military action by which some Members do not seem to be too enthused. The question is, why can the Arab leaders not express their views publicly? If they did, they would put a great deal more pressure on Russia and China. Those who put that question to them, as I have, are normally told, “We must have equivalence between Iran and Israel. We cannot just call for sanctions against Iran, because Israel has a nuclear weapon, and unless Israel responds as well, it would not be acceptable.”

I must say that I find that a pretty pathetic and unconvincing argument. Israel has had nuclear weapons, rightly or wrongly, for probably some 30 years. Of course the Arabs do not like it—they hate it—but they are not frightened of Israel’s nuclear weapons. If they were, they would have moved towards acquiring nuclear weapons themselves some 30 years ago, but they have not made the slightest effort to do so. They know that, while Israel is a threat in other respects, it possesses its nuclear weapons—rightly or wrongly—essentially in order to protect its very existence as a state should it be subjected to unassailable odds in some conventional conflict.

The Arabs have learnt to live with that, but they do not find it acceptable in the case of Iran. They know that this is all about Iranian nationalism. The Shah, as well as the ayatollahs, was interested in acquiring nuclear weapons, although he did not do much to achieve it. Iran’s traditional enemy is not Israel, but the Arab states themselves. If the Arab states are deeply disturbed by this prospect—if they believe, privately if not publicly, that it is a much greater threat to their security than Israel’s nuclear weapons have ever been or are ever likely to be—they must be as bold in respect of Iran, through the Arab League and individually, as they have so splendidly been in respect of both Syria and Libya.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran would be horrific for the Russians and possibly the Chinese as well? According to indications that I have received from contacts in Russia, the Russians are pretty horrified by the idea.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

All of them ought to be horrified by it. China itself has a Muslim extremist minority on its western borders, in Xinjiang, and it is very much affected by what happens in central Asia. None of these countries wants nuclear weapons—we understand that—and we are not, or should not be, necessarily asking them to support military intervention. We are talking about a peaceful alternative to resolve the single most important problem that currently exists in the middle east, apart from the Israel-Palestine issue. That is the basis on which we should act.

I remain very heartened by what is happening in the Arab spring. It will be three steps forward and, occasionally, one step back, and some countries will not prosper as well as others, but the results in Tunisia—the first country of the revolution, and the country that has gone furthest—are very impressive so far. We shall need to see how the Egyptian elections proceed, but Syria is the key. When—not if—the Syrian regime falls, we shall see a situation that has become absolutely irreversible in the middle east. That will not only help the people of those countries, but will mean that for the first time in its history Israel will be surrounded by countries that, to a greater extent than ever before, respect and understand the rule of law, democratic values and accountable government, which should not harm but help prospects for the long-term relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

National Referendum on the European Union

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 24th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I am against the motion, in part because I think the timing, given the financial chaos in Europe, is highly inappropriate. But that is not the main reason that I would give to the House as to why the motion is unwise. It purports to give three choices to the House and to the country as a whole—in the European Union, out of the European Union, or renegotiation, but as has been pointed out earlier in the debate, that is not really a third option because it is renegotiation with a view to purely a trade relationship in Europe. That is, in effect, leaving the European Union because it involves no sharing of sovereignty. I fully concede that any membership of the European Union at the end of the day must involve, as it always has done, some willingness to acknowledge that sovereignty has to be shared.

[Mr Redwood]

Has not my right hon. and learned Friend noticed that the motion refers to trade and co-operation to encompass the current Conservative policy?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

No, I am sorry, that is not the case because present Conservative policy is about sharing sovereignty in certain areas where it is overwhelmingly in our national interest. When we consider what the real options are, the real debate is not whether we should be in Europe or out of Europe, but what kind of European Union we are prepared to be members of.

The assumption of this debate and many other debates is that one side or the other will win. We will either have an even closer union or the European Union will ultimately implode. That might be what will happen if the European Union does not use its own common sense and look to see whether there is a third route.

[Mr Baron]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Not at this moment, if my hon. Friend will allow me.

There is a third route and we are already partly along that way—that is, an à la carte Europe, where each member state decides what degree of integration it is prepared to accept in view of its own national history, rather like France being a semi-detached member of NATO for 30 years because it believed it to be in the French interest, and NATO did not collapse as a consequence.

I say that we are already part of the way there, because at present, of the 27 member states, only 17 are members of the eurozone. Ten states are not, some because they do not want to be, and some because they could not join even if they wanted to. We are not part of Schengen, nor are the Irish. The neutral countries such as Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland have never been fully involved in defence co-operation because of their neutrality.

The problem at present is not that there is not an element of à la carte, but that there is a fiction in the European Union that that is purely temporary—that it is a transition and that we are all going to the same destination and the debate is merely about how long it will take us to get there. No, that is not the case. What we need is a European Union that respects the rights both of those who have a legitimate desire, in terms of their own national interest, for closer integration, and of those of us who do not choose to go that way. That has to be argued and negotiated, sometimes on the basis of considerable acrimony.

[Mark Pritchard]

My right hon. and learned Friend talks about renegotiating and repatriating powers. What powers and what timetable does he envisage?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

As I said, the idea of an à la carte Europe is already partly there, but it should not just be a privilege; it should be a right. What we need, not just for the United Kingdom, but for all the member states, is a European Union where we will not stop France and Germany if they wish to move to closer integration and fiscal union—that ultimately is their business—but nor must they seek to impose a veto on the level of integration that we should have.

There is an irreducible minimum because, as I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, a member state cannot simply not participate in the single market, but that does involve substantial sharing of sovereignty in a way that a free trade zone does not. That point does not seem to have been acknowledged by many of the critics. If there is, as we have at present, free movement of labour, that is not consistent with a purist view of national sovereignty, but it is crucially in the interests of the United Kingdom.

[Mrs Main]

rose—

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I have already given way twice. I am sorry, I cannot give way again without losing my own time.

Those are the points of the real debate that we must take forward. It so happens that this is not just a theoretical option. There is a strong possibility that because of the chaos in the eurozone, there will be a need for some treaty change. That will require to be agreed unanimously, and that provides my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary with what is likely to be an excellent opportunity to take that debate forward and to argue that if other countries wish to go further, we wish to consider the question of the kind of European Union we and perhaps other countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Poland would be content with.

On that basis, I say to the House that we cannot constrain the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister in the incredibly difficult negotiations that will take place. To have a debate that might lead to a referendum on whether Britain will remain in the European Union or leave it entirely is such a massive distraction from the real concerns that this country and the rest of Europe have to address. [Interruption.] I am sorry, but I am entitled to my view, just as all my hon. Friends are entitled to theirs.

I am conscious that many Members wish to speak and so will conclude my remarks. There have been other occasions of this kind when people have had fundamental differences of principle. I recently read a quote that struck me as highly relevant to our debate. It was from a politician who belonged not to the Conservative party, but to the Labour party. In 1957, Aneurin Bevan, a great believer in unilateral disarmament, spoke to a Labour party conference that was likely to carry a resolution in favour of unilateral disarmament. He told his own party:

“if you carry this resolution and follow out all its implications… you will send a British Foreign Secretary, whoever he may be, naked into the conference chamber...And you call that statesmanship?”

It was good advice then and remains good advice now.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

It would be foolish for anyone to suggest that NATO had not made foolish mistakes with regard to Afghanistan in recent years, or that the matter will come to a conclusion in the way that would have been hoped. It is equally unwise, however, for the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) to suggest that the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan will simply constitute a retreat, or for the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) to say that the whole presence in Afghanistan has been an unqualified failure.

Let me go back to the point that the House was reminded of by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron): we went into Afghanistan to ensure that the country could not be used again as a base by the Taliban. One only has to ask whether it was ever possible or realistic in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 for us not to have seen international action, given the Taliban’s refusal to deny sanctuary to al-Qaeda as a continuing base for terrorist operations at that time. The decision made at that time, with the unqualified approval of the United Nations Security Council, was the right one, and we should never lose sight of that fact. Mistakes have been made since then, as my hon. Friend has rightly pointed out, but the question today is not whether it was all a mistake but how we can maintain what has already been achieved.

I agree with those on both sides of the House who have said that al-Qaeda is now effectively out of Afghanistan. It is no longer able to use that country as a base, so there is no long-term rationale for the presence of combat troops there. That does not mean, however, that the matter is now entirely resolved. The question now is: how do we leave in a way that will not enable al-Qaeda to return? At the moment, we do not know whether by the time we leave there will be a coalition Government including the Taliban, or peace in Afghanistan—in which case we can be relatively relaxed that there will be no future for al-Qaeda there. It is equally possible either that the Taliban will not agree to a coalition Government and that we will leave without their being part of a joint agreement, or that they will be part of a coalition but will have their own agenda, which will be one that will not give us comfort.

Although I welcomed what the Prime Minister said today and have no difficulties with it so far as it went, it seemed to me that it left open certain serious gaps. He said that as far as the Government are concerned, our future relationship with Afghanistan after the withdrawal of our ground forces will be based on our diplomatic, developmental and trade relationships. He said that the only military dimension would be the support we would give to the development of a military academy. All of that is very sensible and desirable, but we have to ask about something that is not just a British problem, but primarily a problem for the United States. How can we help to ensure that an Afghan Government who may not have full control of all the territory of Afghanistan when we have withdrawn will be able to prevent the use of parts of the country that they might be unable to control, even with their fullest efforts, as a base for terrorist operations?

I believe that the international community, including Russia and China, should be arguing for two things. First, we should be asking for the basis of the withdrawal of combat forces to lead also to an agreement with the Afghan Government, because this can happen only with their support and agreement, and preferably to a treaty sanctified by the United Nations, for the continuing facility of air support for the Afghan Government if that should prove necessary. If there are areas of Afghanistan that the Government do not control, and if there is evidence that those areas have been infiltrated by al-Qaeda, we should have the legal authority—in co-operation with the Afghan Government and through the use of special forces and other means—to eliminate that threat if and when it arises.

We must remember that when the Taliban Government were eliminated, that was done not by NATO ground forces but by air power combined with Afghan Northern Alliance ground forces. In exactly the same way, at the end of current operations when all of our combat troops are withdrawn, having Afghan ground forces, which will be very strong, with the back-up of potential air support and the potential deployment of special forces purely to deal with terrorist threats, will be the way to provide the long-term security that the right hon. Member for Rotherham seemed to doubt would be available.

In the light of your comments, Mr Deputy Speaker, I shall keep my comments very brief, but there is a second proposal that should also be part of the international response. We know that Russia and China are just as concerned about a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan as NATO or the west might be—for obvious reasons, given their own domestic and internal problems. What is needed for Afghanistan, as part of that country’s future, is an internationally recognised declaration of neutrality. Afghanistan should become a neutral state, rather in the way that Austria became a neutral state in 1955 as a way of ensuring the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from that country and the ability of that country to develop in peace. Austria is now in a situation very different from that of Afghanistan. Only by having regional support for an independent Afghanistan that cannot give sanctuary to terrorist forces will we have the level of confidence that we need to produce the desired result.

[Mr MacShane]

I am conscious that others want to speak, but may I gently put it to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, for whom I have immense respect when it comes to foreign affairs, that China and the Kremlin might not be totally unhappy to see America and the west bogged down as badly as we are in Afghanistan?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

For other reasons, the right hon. Gentleman might be right, but we are not going to get bogged down because there will be a withdrawal of NATO forces. The Russians have said publicly, through the Foreign Minister, that a premature NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a disaster, so they are obviously concerned about the power vacuum that could result.

I believe that the real concern—this goes back to the struggles that there have been over Afghanistan for 150 to 200 years—is about Afghanistan’s future status. Of course the Russians and the Chinese will not wish to see Afghanistan as some American client state—why should they?—but there is no need for that to happen. It should not happen, and it must not be allowed to happen. Equally, Afghanistan will not be strong enough to defend itself without maximum international regional support from its neighbours—not just Russia and China, but India, Pakistan and Iran, all of which have an interest in the situation, and all of which could live with a truly neutral Afghanistan that was not the client state of any of the big powers.

We must not see the withdrawal of combat forces as the end of international military involvement. I hope that it will be, but there has to be a fall-back position if a terrorist threat re-emerges. The real solution is a combination of a treaty arrangement with the Afghan Government combined with an international status for Afghanistan, which the Afghan Government would welcome; they have already said that they would be interested in and attracted by such a proposal. That would give the kind of political and military security that ought to give confidence.

[Mr Baron]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the best way of achieving progress in talks with the Taliban is to make those talks unconditional?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I do not have any privileged information, but I am pretty certain that they already are. Whatever the formal public position, there is no doubt that talks are going on and that Americans have been involved in discussions with the Taliban. I bet that they were not simply discussing what the agenda would be or what preconditions would apply. It is a slow steady process, and I am sure that it has begun. It should have begun some time ago, and I hope that it leads to progress, but we cannot assume that it will do so. Even with the best will on our part, there is no certainty that the Taliban will wish to co-operate. They may think that they can win without such an agreement, so we have to have a structure in place, both internationally and among western countries, that takes into account all the possibilities, including the Taliban not being willing to co-operate.

Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 14th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

The hon. Lady will have to be disappointed with the position of all European countries, because we have all withheld a decision on the question of Palestinian recognition and membership of the UN. It is vital to remember that the way to a secure Israel and a viable, prosperous Palestinian state is through negotiations between the two. She is right to be frustrated or exasperated by the time that the negotiations have taken. Nevertheless, there is no way to lasting peace in the middle east other than through those negotiations.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Will the Foreign Secretary impress upon the Israeli Government in a friendly but firm way that the only manner by which they can avoid an overwhelming vote in favour of a Palestinian state at the General Assembly is if the Israeli Prime Minister gives an unequivocal commitment in support of a two-state solution, as proposed by President Obama, and a commitment to enter into early and meaningful negotiations to that end?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, I agree with that. My right hon. and learned Friend is right that it is important for Israel to show a readiness to negotiate in the light of President Obama’s speech and what could happen at the United Nations in September. Indeed, one advantage of the United Kingdom and other EU nations considering our position on this matter over the next few months is that it will maximise the pressure on both Israelis and Palestinians to enter such negotiations.

Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

In the short time available, I shall concentrate my comments on two matters: first, the conclusions we should draw from bin Laden’s demise, and secondly, the remaining challenges faced by the international community with regard to Libya.

Bin Laden’s demise was of course an historic event. We should not underestimate the significance of the US special forces operation, or of the extraordinary intelligence operation that their achievement represented. The timing of the operation is significant in that it happened right in the middle of the Arab spring. What could better demonstrate the ultimate irrelevance of what al-Qaeda has to offer? There is reason to believe—a massive amount of evidence has emerged from throughout the Arab world—that the lure and attraction of, and the significance of and interest in, al-Qaeda are beginning to wane. Al-Qaeda not only does not feature in the demands of the hundreds of thousands of people who demonstrate throughout the Arab world for reform and change, but it has been positively rejected by many as they advance claims for universal values.

However, if we begin to believe that the attraction of al-Qaeda is waning in the Arab world, I caution the House against coming to a similar conclusion with regard to Pakistan. We are in a very different time zone there when it comes to the possibilities of change. Bin Laden may have been of Saudi or Yemeni origin, but we should remember that ultimately the al-Qaeda movement originated in south Asia, not in the Arab world. We also know that that happened in the context of experiences in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is perhaps significant and not irrelevant—I do not want to anticipate events—that the only revenge act so far in response to the assassination of bin Laden has come not from al-Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban, but from the Pakistani Taliban, who feel, and who have expressed sympathy for al-Qaeda and endorsed it.

That is significant for how we see developments in Afghanistan. There is a powerful argument for saying that if our original purpose for going into Afghanistan was the threat of al-Qaeda operating from within the country, that reason is now much less valid than it has been at any time in the past few years. However, the question of the timing and method of our withdrawal from Afghanistan must take into account not just the implications within that country, but to an even greater extent, the possible consequences for the destabilisation of Pakistan. Up to now, we have primarily worried about the consequences of al-Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban using the border as a refuge zone, but in some ways, things are now the other way around. As the right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) said, the problem in Pakistan is of far greater significance to the wider stability of the world, and it must be given priority. I hope that that is taken into account.

On Libya, I pay tribute to what has already been achieved. There is no doubt that Benghazi would have experienced an incredible massacre, and that Misrata would have been overthrown by Gaddafi, but for the efforts that have been made. However, those who have warned of the dangers of stalemate pose a real question. Without wanting to criticise the Government—I am aware of the international constraints on what they can do—there is a fundamental inconsistency in arguing that the mission is purely humanitarian at the same time as making it clear that it cannot be completed until we have, in effect, regime change.

The question, therefore, is this: how does one square that circle, and can it be squared in a way that does not breach the UN resolution? Whether we like it or not, that is the framework within which we must operate. As I see it, there are only three ways in which that stalemate can be broken over a reasonable period of time. First, implosion in Tripoli is quite possible. In the past few months, a significant number of leading Gaddafi adherents have defected. It is not impossible or inconceivable—it could happen next week or next month—that many of the senior adherents who remain, including generals and Cabinet Ministers, will simply fade away and disappear. I suspect that even Gaddafi’s immediate family will eventually not wish to share his bunker. Saif al-Islam and some of his colleagues might prefer to be in the south of France rather than the quagmire that Gaddafi’s regime could become.

That is one option, but we cannot count on it, and certainly not in any short time scale. The second option is a very slow process of gradual disintegration of the regime. That might be happening already because of the combined impact of economic sanctions and the fact that the oilfields are primarily in the east of the country, with very little utilisable refining capacity in the west, plus all the other forms of political, diplomatic and other pressure that is being put on the regime. However, by itself, that will not deliver the outcome that we need to bring this matter to a conclusion for many months, and possibly for several years. It is a serious option, but do we want to contemplate that the international action will take that long?

That leads me to the third option. What do we do, and what can we do within the UN resolution, to help the insurgents who are struggling for freedom and the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime? We have had a crucial watershed in the past couple of weeks in how the British and other Governments treat those insurgents. This is perhaps the first debate in which they have not been described as rebels. For many months, that was the description used not just in this country, but elsewhere, but that is no longer the case. The insurgents have been invited to open an office in London, they are being treated as serious politicians, and they are rightly considered to have greater legitimacy than the Gaddafi regime, which I welcome. However, we also know that they do not have the military capability to achieve the result that we all want.

The question is whether that can be achieved within the terms of the UN resolution. If it requires us—I do not complain about this—simply to protect civilians, what happens if there is hand-to-hand fighting in Misrata or Tripoli? It could not be stopped by air power or an international coalition; it could be stopped only by the people on the ground. Only they could protect civilians in such a situation. Therefore, I argue—and I believe that some of the legal advice agrees—that if we could be satisfied that the provision of military assistance to the insurgents would help to protect civilian lives and deal with the threat to civilians in Libya, it would be consistent with the resolution. In those circumstances, that kind of help should be considered. In reality, of course, that sort of help is already being given. The French, the Qataris and several other countries are already providing it, whether or not they acknowledge it publicly.

Were that help to be provided—I am talking about training as well as weapons—two things would happen. First, those around Gaddafi would know that the game was up, and gradually, as the insurgents became more of a disciplined, trained military force, it would become obvious—in their view, as well as in ours—that the regime was finished. Secondly, Misrata and the east of the country would gradually be united under insurgent control, and Gaddafi’s remaining power would be so restricted as to be insignificant. That is the real challenge, not just for the British Government, but for the international community, and I believe that we can respond to this situation positively within the terms of the UN resolution.

Middle East and North Africa

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s concern. Other Ministers and I went to the NATO meeting in Berlin to ask for an increased tempo in the military operations, as well as increased support from other countries for military operations, some of which we have secured. He will have heard us talking about Italy earlier. However, when he says that the situation needs to be brought to a conclusion more rapidly, he is really calling for a military effort that is very different in its scale and in its nature. I would say to him that that would not be in accordance with UN resolution 1973. The large-scale use of ground troops, for instance, would not be in accordance with the resolution. Whatever we do, it is vital to keep the legal, moral and international authority that comes from working within the United Nations resolutions. I must therefore resist his demands for a more rapid or overwhelming military solution to the situation. We have to continue to intensify the pressure on Gaddafi through diplomatic, economic and military channels, but we must stay within what is legal and internationally supported.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Does the Foreign Secretary accept that the Government’s twin fundamental aims of protecting civilians and requiring the departure of Gaddafi cannot be achieved by coalition air power alone—or, indeed, by diplomatic and economic pressure—and that the achievement of those aims will require giving military support to the insurgents? I welcome the fact that instructors have been sent to Benghazi, but does the Foreign Secretary not agree that much more military support could be given that would be consistent with the UN resolution, which allows all necessary measures for the protection of civilians throughout Libya?

[Mr Hague]

The first point to make to my right hon. and learned Friend is that these are not instructors. I would not refer to them as instructors. It is a military liaison team; it is working on headquarters organisation. I stress that these officers are not involved in arming or training the forces of the opposition side in Libya. Our position—my right hon. and learned Friend has brought it up before—is that we will help with non-lethal equipment. The British Government have taken no decision to arm or equip the opposition forces with lethal equipment. I have expressed our view of the legality of that before, which is that the arms embargo applies to the whole of Libya, but that it is legal under the UN resolution to supply equipment to protect civilian life in certain circumstances. Other nations may wish to do that or to interpret the resolution in a different way. We interpret it in that way and believe that the best way for us to help is to supply the non-lethal equipment that I have mentioned.

Libya (London Conference)

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Wednesday 30th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for continuing the wide support for the idea of a contact group. It received unanimous support at the conference yesterday, which is why it was so easy to proceed with it and, indeed, with recognising the role of the UN Secretary-General in offering to lead the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the attendance or otherwise of the Arab League and the African Union. The Arab League was well represented at yesterday’s meeting. The Secretary-General, Amr Moussa, was not able to come and he explained to me why he could not, but he sent his chef de cabinet, an ambassador, who made a powerful speech at the conference on the Arab League’s strong support for implementing the UN Security Council’s resolutions and for the action taken so far. No one should be in any doubt about the position of the Arab League. It is true, of course, that the African Union did not attend; there were divisions within in it over whether it should. We are in constant touch with the African Union and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development is in almost daily touch with its chairman. I have had several conversations about this issue with President Museveni of Uganda. Clearly, the African Union does not have a united position, but we will invite it to engage with the contact group that we are establishing and we will keep our regular communication going.

On the question of arming the rebels, the Prime Minister made the position clear at Prime Minister’s questions. We have said that everything we do must comply with the Security Council resolutions, which also relates to the right hon. Gentleman’s last point. It is a point I make constantly—that everything we do must be consistent with those resolutions. It is acting strictly in accordance with UN resolutions that gives a legal, moral and international authority to our deeds, which has not, of course, always been there before. As I have already told the House, and as the Prime Minister said in the debate a couple of weeks ago, the legal position is that the arms embargo applies to the whole territory of Libya. At the same time, our legal advice is that resolution 1973 allows all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas and that this would not necessarily rule out the provision of assistance to those protecting civilians in certain circumstances. Clearly, there are differing views internationally about the legal position, but I have explained what is the view of the British Government. As the Prime Minister told the House, we do not rule it out, but we have not taken any decision to provide that assistance.

In response to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), the Prime Minister also indicated at Prime Minister’s questions that the Government would indeed proceed with caution on this subject, as the shadow Foreign Secretary asked us to do. Questions of advisability, as the right hon. Gentleman quite rightly says, are different from questions of legality. We will always be very conscious of that. Of course, if we changed our policy, we would certainly want to inform the House, but we are not currently engaged in any arming of the opposition or rebel forces.

Of course we want to know about any links with al-Qaeda, as we do about links with any organisations anywhere in the world, but given what we have seen of the interim transitional national council in Libya, I think it would be right to put the emphasis on the positive side, as the Prime Minister did earlier. From everything we saw from our meetings with members of the council yesterday and from telephone conversations I have had with other members, I believe it is sincere in its commitment to a pluralistic, open Libya. The council published yesterday what is in effect its manifesto, which states its commitment to freedom of expression and freedom of the media, to the development of political parties and civil society and so forth. I think we should welcome that and I think there is a genuine and strong desire in Libya among the opposition groups to bring those things about. It would give the wrong impression of those groups, from everything we have seen and everything that our diplomat, Christopher Prentice, saw in Benghazi, to accentuate any allegations of links with other groups outside Libya rather than to accentuate those intentions that they clearly hold dear to their hearts.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the International Criminal Court. I mentioned in my statement how strictly we uphold its work. The United Kingdom has always done so under successive Governments and it will continue to do so. That does not mean that we can control what happens to Colonel Gaddafi, but we are not proposing to grant him any exemption from the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. That was something that we proposed should be part of UN resolution 1970.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the conditions set by President Obama on behalf of the coalition when the military operations began. Yes, those conditions still apply—the conditions of a real ceasefire, not just a pretend ceasefire. It does not mean the regime sitting in the middle of a town like Misrata and still being engaged at close quarters with the civilian population it is trying to kill. Clearly, a credible ceasefire involves disengaging from those areas. Events have moved on since President Obama made his statement, which was about not advancing on Benghazi. Since then, that has become less relevant, although we do not know whether it will become relevant again. We understand and interpret the requirement for a ceasefire and an end to violence in terms of those general conditions, which involve disengagement in order to fulfil the UN resolution. That reinforces our continuing rigid approach to enforcing the UN resolution and to staying within the UN resolution. We must also keep the international unity and moral authority that our conduct of affairs so far has given us on this issue.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

May I strongly disagree with the shadow Foreign Secretary and welcome the statement by the American and British Governments that military supplies to the insurgents would be permissible under the UN resolution if that were appropriate to protect civilian-populated areas? Does my right hon. Friend agree that the physical safety of the people of Tripoli and other parts of Libya will be ensured only if there is a speedy end to this civil war leading to the departure of Gaddafi, and that that cannot be achieved by coalition air power alone, but only if the insurgents—they are no longer rebels, as there is no longer any legitimacy for the Government in Tripoli—are properly assisted to bring this war to an end as soon as possible so that a no-fly zone is no longer required?

[Mr Hague]

I can go so far with my right hon. and learned Friend. He is quite right about the utter absence of legitimacy for the Gaddafi regime now, and I accept his welcome for the statement of the legal position on the supply of arms that we have set out; the United States Government also provided their version of that position. Nevertheless, I underline what I said to the shadow Foreign Secretary—that questions of advisability and policy would have to be examined in this regard, not just questions of legality. One can make the argument that my right hon. and learned Friend makes, but one can also make the argument that introducing new weapons into a conflict can have unforeseeable and unknown consequences both for the immediate future and for the longer term. Such considerations would have to be very carefully weighed before the Government changed their policy on this matter.

North Africa and the Middle East

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Thursday 17th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

It is important for the hon. Gentleman to remember that, thanks to the commendable organisation, immense bravery and skill of the Royal Air Force and the special forces, people such as his constituent were lifted out of the desert in Libya and brought safely home. That is something of which we in the House should be proud, rather than trying to find fault with the way in which the exercise was carried out. I am sure that people who are rescued in those circumstances will be grateful for what the United Kingdom did for them. Certainly the people of 43 other nationalities in whose evacuation from Libya we assisted are very grateful for our assistance.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Hague]

I will give way, for the last time, to my right hon. and learned Friend the former Foreign Secretary.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

My right hon. Friend told us that a new Security Council resolution might be in the process of being tabled. If I understood him correctly, he said that part of the thinking behind it related to evidence that Colonel Gaddafi might be seeking to breach the arms embargo restrictions. Does he agree that it would be intolerable for the Gaddafi regime—which is already very heavily armed—to be able to continue to obtain additional armaments while the insurgents who are fighting it are being denied access to any military equipment because of legal advice that the arms embargo has been drafted so tightly that it extends beyond the Gaddafi regime to other elements in Libya? If there is to be a new Security Council resolution, will my right hon. Friend do all in his power to ensure that it clarifies the fact that the embargo is directed against the Gaddafi regime, and does not prevent the provision of help for those who are fighting it?

[Mr Hague]

The situation described by my right hon. and learned Friend would indeed be intolerable. That is why the proper enforcement and policing of the arms embargo is an important and legitimate subject for the resolution. However, I do not want to leave my right hon. and learned Friend in any doubt about what the Security Council intended by the arms embargo in resolution 1970. It was clearly intended to apply to the whole of Libya. Any change would have to be embodied in a further resolution: that is the legal position, as understood by the Security Council and all its permanent members. The solution, or attempt at a solution, that is most likely to be agreed by the Security Council is a thorough and full enforcement and policing of the arms embargo, rather than amendments to an embargo that was agreed nearly three weeks ago.

Libya and the Middle East

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 7th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for much of what he said. He pays tribute to the bravery of the troops involved in extracting people from the oilfields two weekends ago, and he is absolutely right to do so. I welcome his welcome for the upgrading of the status of the Palestinian delegation. It is good that that is supported across the House.

There is clearly a good deal of agreement too on the overall outlines of western policy in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman stated, as we have, that all options should remain on the table. He underlined the importance of working closely with the Arab League, which should be continued in many different forms. I do not know whether that will be possible at the European Council this week, but we are in close touch with many of those Arab nations about all the options that may be necessary over the coming weeks and months. Close consultation and co-ordination with those nations will need to continue.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the multilateral aspects of humanitarian aid. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development is in continuous close touch with Baroness Amos and all the organisations and people the right hon. Gentleman mentioned, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and others. We will keep up that work, including on co-ordinating our humanitarian and logistical assistance with France—we have co-ordinated it to a degree—which has also worked well.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked about matters that were raised in the House last Monday, so I will not go over all of them again, except to say this on his question about whether there has been a variation in policy on the no-fly zone and whether our policy is out of step with that of other nations: the policy is exactly as stated by the Prime Minister here at the Dispatch Box last Monday, which is that contingency planning should be done for a no-fly zone. It is exactly the same position as that expressed by Secretary Clinton last week, and exactly the same as that expressed by the French Government, as the French Foreign Minister and I made clear at our press conference last week. I think from what the right hon. Gentleman says that it also enjoys the support of the Opposition in this House, so I think we are aligned on this policy.

On the deployment in Benghazi, the factual points the right hon. Gentleman stated in his question are correct. On consultation with officials and who decided what and so on, we should be clear that when our staff go into a potentially dangerous situation, a level of protection is provided for them, based on professional and military advice. We do that in many places around the world, and it was, of course, important to do so in this situation. As I explained, I authorised such a mission to be made to put a diplomatic team into eastern Libya with protection. Of course, the timing and details of that are operational matters decided by the professionals, but Ministers must have confidence in their judgments, as I do, and must take full ministerial responsibility for all their actions and judgments, as, of course, I do. The Prime Minister and other Ministers were of course aware that we would attempt to put a diplomatic team into eastern Libya.

On the overall impact of British foreign policy on the Gaddafi regime and others, they are aware, as is much of the world, that we have led the way at the United Nations Security Council and drafted the resolution that was passed last weekend, that we led the way at the UN Human Rights Council, gathering the signatures that led to the suspension of Libya, and that we are at the forefront both of implementing the assets freeze and other measures that are putting pressure on the regime and of getting the message through in Libya that reference has been made to the International Criminal Court. The impact of British foreign policy on this situation and on the Gaddafi regime is extremely powerful, and that is how it will remain.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Having as Defence Secretary helped to enforce the no-fly zone on Iraq to protect the Shia and the Kurds, I am well aware of the important benefits this can produce in the right circumstances, but does the Foreign Secretary agree that to take forward proposals for a no-fly zone in Libya two fundamental conditions must be satisfied: first, the United Nations Security Council must give explicit endorsement for such an operation; and, secondly, there must be unambiguous evidence that the Libyan revolutionary council representing the insurgents actually wants the very substantial degree of western military involvement that a no-fly zone would represent, because there is clear indication that many of them believe that Libyans should liberate their own country? Will my right hon. Friend confirm that this proposal is unlikely to go anywhere until and unless these two conditions are satisfied?

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. and learned Friend is correct that all the contacts we have had with opposition forces in Libya suggest that they believe Libyans should be responsible for liberating their country. However, it is also only fair to point out that in those conversations they have already explicitly asked for a no-fly zone, and they do not see a contradiction between those two points.

My right hon. and learned Friend is right that many conditions should be attached to trying to implement a no-fly zone. The way I would state them at this moment is: there should be a demonstrable need that the whole world can see; there must be a clear legal basis for such a no-fly zone; and there must be clear support from the region—from the middle east and north African region—as well as from the people of Libya themselves, as my right hon. and learned Friend says. Those are the necessary conditions for such a no-fly zone to be created.

Middle East

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 14th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman asks a wide range of questions, and I shall try to go through them. I thank him for his words about the staff of the Foreign Office, and about what they have done and continue to do in Yemen, as well as in Egypt. I know that it will mean a lot to them to be appreciated in all parts of the House.

I also thank the right hon. Gentleman for his support for what I have said about the middle east peace process. As I understood it, he supports the intensification of our measures on Iran, which I talked about in my statement. These are conscious changes in policy. It is a conscious change in policy for not only us, but the United States to say that a settlement in the middle east should be based on 1967 borders. It is a conscious change in policy to say that now, on top of the measures agreed in the European Union last year, the peaceful pressure on Iran must be intensified. To be joined by the Opposition in those changes of policy gives strength to them, and it always counts for a great deal in foreign policy for this House to speak in a united way.

I might have to take the right hon. Gentleman’s questions in reverse order, but I will try to get through them all. This leads us naturally to a discussion of the peace process, which I have discussed with my Israeli counterpart. Foreign Minister Lieberman visited London on 24 January, and we have also had more recent discussions with the Israeli Government. Indeed, the Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) was there over the weekend, underlining the point that the events in the region strengthen the case for making a success of negotiations on a two-state solution. I hope that recent events will be a jolt to many among the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, showing them that, in the next few years, the opportunity to find a two-state solution will slip away unless there is a renewed readiness to engage in the process.

I am concerned about instability on the Palestinian side of the negotiations. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the reported offer by the Palestinian chief negotiator to resign. There is also the prospect of elections among the Palestinians. This instability also underlines the importance of finding a way of getting the direct talks going again soon. The United Kingdom is very active diplomatically in trying to do that, and we will continue to be so.

The right hon. Gentleman asks about the prospects for the E3 plus 3 negotiations with Iran. There will be prospects for those negotiations only if Iran approaches them entirely differently from the way in which its negotiators approached the meeting in Istanbul on 21 and 22 January. The preconditions that Iran set for that meeting were entirely unrealistic, as Iran knew. It is important that it should be prepared to discuss its whole nuclear programme with the E3 plus 3 if such negotiations are to succeed. The door remains open to negotiations with Iran, but, so far, it has not proved willing to enter it.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about Yemen. There is of course a serious threat to our national security from the operations of al-Qaeda in Yemen. The recently well-reported cargo bomb plot was evidence of that. We are active in Yemen. The right hon. Gentleman will be familiar with the fact that the Department for International Development is very active there, with £50 million of support in the current year helping to provide more schools, to increase the number of doctors and to help with microfinance projects. That is valuable work, but we could do a lot more if we had the agreed framework of working with Yemen that we are calling for through the Friends of Yemen process, including the detailed development and poverty reduction plan. We received details of that plan just as I arrived in Yemen, and we are now examining it. I regard our work on the affairs and stability of Yemen in the coming months to be of great importance in the conduct of our foreign policy.

We certainly agree with the right hon. Gentleman’s points about the future of Egypt. I think I mentioned in my statement that we want detainees to be freed. We also want to see a clear timetable for elections. There is an expectation that they will take place in six months, but not yet a categorical commitment. It would be wise to meet that expectation. As he and I have both said, however, democracy is more than about holding elections. What matters even more than the date is that the process between now and then should allow new political parties and civil society in general to grow and prosper. That is why it is important that emergency laws should be lifted, and that we and other nations—not only European nations but democratic Muslim nations such as Turkey and Indonesia—should join in the building up of civil society in Egypt. As the right hon. Gentleman said, that space between the National Democratic party and the Muslim Brotherhood has not been filled before. The Opposition parties in Egypt are small and weak.

We retain, as the previous Government did, certain contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood—in particular with those who were elected Members of Parliament in the 2005 elections. There has been normal contact with them, and that contact continues. Those people have clearly taken part in recent events in Egypt, although they are insistent that they will not be contesting the presidency of the country. We will maintain our contact with them, and judge them by their behaviour.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the seizure of assets. Yes, the requests made by the Tunisian Government are being acted on. The freeze has been implemented, investigations are taking place, and the ways in which our authorities should co-operate with that are being followed up.

The specific request from Egypt was received this morning. That is why there is a difference between what the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt) said on the radio yesterday, when that request had not been received—and had certainly not been seen by Ministers—and the information put out this morning, which is that such a request has been received and will be acted on.

To clarify an issue for the right hon. Gentleman, it is not the Serious Fraud Office, but the Serious Organised Crime Agency that is involved in the investigation of assets acquired through corruption. We, of course, have to abide by the law on this matter. That means that we will act on requests from foreign countries, but that Ministers can direct an investigation or a seizure and freezing of assets only if they are in possession of evidence of criminal activity or of a threat to our national security. We are under certain constraints if no request is received. Nevertheless, the European Union is able to implement an assets freeze for wider purposes, which is what my right hon. Friend the Chancellor is discussing with his colleagues in the EU tonight. We are acting on this expeditiously, and I thoroughly agree with the general sentiment that the right hon. Gentleman expressed about this issue.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

In unreservedly welcoming the Egyptian revolution and similar uprisings elsewhere in the middle east, may I commend the Foreign Secretary, his predecessor and, indeed, the United States Government for insisting on having good working relationships even with autocratic regimes in the middle east which, regardless of their internal affairs which we deplore, have pursued moderate and constructive policies, seeking dialogue with Israel and working in a peaceful way towards a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine? Does the Foreign Secretary agree that any other approach would never have served the best interests of that region?

[Mr Hague]

I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. That is the policy he pursued when he held my office. It is important to do that in any practical approach to foreign policy. In fact, I would go a little further than my right hon. and learned Friend, as it is also important to have some kind of dialogue with autocratic regimes even when they have not always pursued moderate and sensible policies. As I mentioned, I visited Syria just over two weeks ago, where, of course, we disagreed. I disagreed in our meetings with President Assad about Syria’s relationship with Iran, about the country’s human rights record and the about the situation in Lebanon. Even with such countries, however, it is important to have dialogue. Diplomacy in foreign policy is not just about talking to people with whom we agree.