North Africa and the Near and Middle East

Kwasi Kwarteng Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The hon. Gentleman is right that even in the monarchies there are human rights problems, including in the United Arab Emirates in the past few days. Ministers have resigned from the Kuwaiti Government because of protests over various developments there. In Saudi Arabia, it is more a protest of the Shi’a minority. They are big minority—20% of the population—but they can never aspire to power, and if the Saudi Government have sense, they will try to achieve a policy of reconciliation with them.

I want to turn to a second point—one that came up briefly in the earlier exchanges—about the role of Islamist parties in the region. Like most people in the United Kingdom or the west generally, one feels more comfortable if secular parties win elections; however, we should not get too over-exercised by the fact that parties that call themselves Islamist are doing rather well in a number of countries in free elections. The first point, which is perhaps the most important, is that, from the point of view of al-Qaeda, what is happening with Islamist parties in those countries is a disaster. The whole point of al-Qaeda is to reject a parliamentary route to power, to reject the sharing of power and to insist that only by revolution combined with terrorism can the Islamist ideal be achieved.

What we are seeing, not just in Tunisia and Morocco, but with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt too, is a recognition—for a number of reasons and motives—that, at the very least, power will need to be shared. There is a public declaration of a commitment to multi-party democracy and the rule of law. Of course there will be people in those parties who do not share those values, but so far the evidence supports the view that those declarations are what those parties are about. As I mentioned when I intervened earlier, opinion surveys in Egypt suggest that elections in Egypt are likely to be similar to the two elections so far. The Muslim Brotherhood will do well—it will probably be the largest party—but all the evidence so far, including independent surveys of opinion, suggests that it will not form a majority by itself. It, too, will have to share power, which is crucial.

Earlier I mentioned another factor in relation to Egypt which seems not to have been commented on, but which is significant. If the House accepts that the most important reason, apart from a general desire for the rule of law and freedom, for the revolutions in Egypt and elsewhere was a demand for economic progress—those countries are economically stagnated, having fallen woefully behind Brazil, south-east Asia and countries of the far east in their economic development—that means that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt faces a particular problem. Anyone ruling Libya will have vast amounts of oil wealth and will be able to afford to act in an extreme way—if that is the way they want to go—because they do not need the co-operation of the rest of the world. The Muslim Brotherhood knows perfectly well that if it were to acquire power in Egypt and then use it as though it had the right to impose an Islamist system on a population that did not want it, that would immediately destroy any possibility of overseas investment in Egypt. Who would invest in Egypt if it seemed to be going the way of Iran? The people of Egypt would never forgive an Egyptian Government who destroyed the prospect of economic growth by pursuing a theocratic agenda. I believe that the Muslim Brotherhood understands that perfectly well and that the first priority of any Egyptian Government has to be to reassure the outside world that Egypt will be an attractive place to come as a tourist and to invest in its resources, in order to help build the economy.

[Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that as a consequence of the 25 January revolution and the uncertainty, Egypt has seen enormous capital flight, so much of the risk and the economic disaster that he outlines has already happened?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Yes, of course, that has happened over the past few months, but it could be reversed if there were a prospect of stability and progress. The tragedy of Iraq is that the Iraq war went on long after the military conflict, with the whole economy destroyed as a consequence. It is only now that Iraqi oil production has got back to its original level. Libyan oil production should be back in a year or 18 months or so—perhaps even earlier. Tourism will return to Egypt when there is stability, but not without it. Any party that destroys that prospect will not be thanked.

Let me turn briefly to two other issues. The first is Syria. There are serious limits to what can be achieved by the outside world in relation to Syria. I pay tribute to the people of Syria who I never expected for a moment would be able to survive eight months of this appalling treatment by their own Government. I assumed wrongly that it would be like the tragedy of Iran and that when the Government used the police, the security forces, the prisons and the torture chambers, the Syrian opposition would, within months, have been pushed under ground, though not destroyed. That has not happened as it did in Iran. The Assad regime is doomed; the question is how we can assist that process.

I welcome the fact that the Government have already opened up contacts with the Syrian opposition. That is highly to be encouraged. I make just one additional point. It seems to me that, although for all the reasons that are increasingly understood, there cannot be a military dimension to the help we give the country, what the Syrian opposition need most is for their morale to be boosted and for them to be able to demonstrate to the people of Syria that they are increasingly winning, not losing, this conflict. That is the significance of the Arab League’s decision and the imposition of economic sanctions. That is how the United Kingdom, the European Union and the United States can make an impact—by demonstrating solidarity with those in Syria who are seeking change.

The final area on which I want to comment is, of course, Iran. There has to be very serious doubt as to whether the current policy of economic sanctions has any prospect of working. However much they are extended, there is no evidence that the Iranian Government are terribly interested in dialogue or even in a carrot-and-stick policy.

One problem—we have heard about it elsewhere— is the attitude of Russia and China. The question is whether there is any way in which the Russian and Chinese Governments can be persuaded to change their position. Russia is acting in an utterly illogical way, even given its own national interest. It is difficult to understand why Russia, with a large Muslim minority of its own and considerable destabilisation in the Caucasus, should acquiesce in the growth of nuclear weapon capability in Iran. If one looks for a Machiavellian explanation, there is a very simple one. The Machiavellian explanation for Russia’s opposition to what is happening with Iran is that it does not want sanctions to work and hopes that the Israelis or the Americans or both will use the military option. That would have the dual benefit of destroying or damaging Iran’s nuclear capability, without Russia having to share the responsibility and thus benefiting both ways from the consequent developments. That is a Machiavellian explanation. I hope it is not true, but I am not yet convinced because I cannot think of any other reason why Moscow should behave as it is.

If there is to be any prospect of economic sanctions working, the only opportunity I can see for success takes us back to the Arab League. As the Foreign Secretary has remarked, the Arab League has already acted in an unprecedented way—first with Libya, when it called for the international action to be taken. As a consequence, Russia and China, which would otherwise have vetoed the international action, came round to allowing the resolution to be passed. Secondly, the Arab League has acted impressively in the case of Syria.

In respect of Iran, however, there is an extraordinary silence. Were it not for WikiLeaks, we would not have been made aware of any public comments showing not just the distaste of Arab countries, but their absolute horror at the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon as a result of the geopolitical impact it would have on the region as a whole and on account of their perception of their own security. The situation is extraordinary. As any of us who meet Arab Ministers, Governments or leaders privately will be aware, this is at the top of their agenda: what is the west going to do to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon?

It was thanks to WikiLeaks that King Abdullah was quoted as saying that the head of the serpent must be cut off—a clear endorsement of the kind of military action by which some Members do not seem to be too enthused. The question is, why can the Arab leaders not express their views publicly? If they did, they would put a great deal more pressure on Russia and China. Those who put that question to them, as I have, are normally told, “We must have equivalence between Iran and Israel. We cannot just call for sanctions against Iran, because Israel has a nuclear weapon, and unless Israel responds as well, it would not be acceptable.”

I must say that I find that a pretty pathetic and unconvincing argument. Israel has had nuclear weapons, rightly or wrongly, for probably some 30 years. Of course the Arabs do not like it—they hate it—but they are not frightened of Israel’s nuclear weapons. If they were, they would have moved towards acquiring nuclear weapons themselves some 30 years ago, but they have not made the slightest effort to do so. They know that, while Israel is a threat in other respects, it possesses its nuclear weapons—rightly or wrongly—essentially in order to protect its very existence as a state should it be subjected to unassailable odds in some conventional conflict.

The Arabs have learnt to live with that, but they do not find it acceptable in the case of Iran. They know that this is all about Iranian nationalism. The Shah, as well as the ayatollahs, was interested in acquiring nuclear weapons, although he did not do much to achieve it. Iran’s traditional enemy is not Israel, but the Arab states themselves. If the Arab states are deeply disturbed by this prospect—if they believe, privately if not publicly, that it is a much greater threat to their security than Israel’s nuclear weapons have ever been or are ever likely to be—they must be as bold in respect of Iran, through the Arab League and individually, as they have so splendidly been in respect of both Syria and Libya.

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[Ann Clwyd (Cynon Valley) (Lab)]

I welcome this debate on the middle east, an area in which many countries continue to undergo political upheavals following decades of authoritarian rule for the benefit of those in power and at the expense of the ordinary citizen.

Much attention has, of course, been directed towards Egypt, where the struggle for democracy, accountability and transparency appears, unfortunately, to be far from over. Like many others, I hope that the military will be persuaded to give way soon to a fairly elected civilian Government. However, I shall focus on two other states in the region, which have been mentioned often this afternoon, and where the legitimacy of the Government in power has been challenged. Those Governments now have to decide whether they will undertake reform of their own volition, or precipitate greater instability, and create mistrust and suffering among their own citizens. Those two countries are, of course, Bahrain and Syria.

As has been widely reported, there was widespread protest and serious unrest in Bahrain between February and March of this year. On 15 March, after political negotiations between the Government of Bahrain and the opposition had broken down, the Government declared a three-month state of national safety, which was lifted on 1 June. Gulf Co-operation Council forces were also deployed in the country from about that time. There was a serious and heavy-handed Government crackdown on those believed to have been directing the protests, as well as on leading opposition figures.

These recent events must be put into context. Although there have been attempts by the Government of Bahrain to reform and to address human rights concerns in the recent past, particularly since the ascension to power of the current monarch, reports by well-known international human rights organisations have highlighted the use of torture by the security apparatus, impunity, unfair trials, arbitrary arrests and restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly as ongoing and serious problems not just this year, but for many years.

Amnesty International’s background report on the situation in Bahrain in 2010 stated:

“During 2010, sporadic protests took place in predominantly Shi’a villages against alleged government discrimination in relation to housing and employment opportunities. In some cases, protesters blocked highways with burning tyres and threw home-made petrol bombs at the police and security forces. Hundreds of people were arrested”—

I reiterate that this is a report on the situation in 2010, not 2011—

“particularly in August and September, in connection with protests and riots, including many leading opposition figures, most from the Shi’a majority community. Many were allegedly arrested without warrants and held incommunicado for up to two weeks after arrest.”

On the situation in 2009, Amnesty International said:

“The authorities failed adequately to investigate allegations of torture and other ill-treatment of detainees. Government critics were briefly detained and several websites were closed down. One person was executed. The government indicated it would decriminalize certain publishing offences, reduce legal discrimination against women and introduce other reforms.”

Political analysts have highlighted long-standing demands in the country for political, constitutional and socio-economic reform. In particular, calls have been made for an elected Prime Minister, an accountable Government and a fully empowered and democratically elected legislature. Previous attempts by the Government of Bahrain to address these demands have not been viewed as very successful by opposition leaders, and resulted in a lack of trust in the Government’s willingness to implement genuine and meaningful political and socio-economic reform. The protests earlier this year must be seen against this backdrop of long-standing violations and grievances.

The Bahrain independent commission of inquiry—BICI—was set up by the Government of Bahrain to investigate and report on the allegations and events of 2011, and to make such recommendations as it deemed necessary. I, of course, welcome the King’s initiative to set up this commission and to allow for the full publication of the report’s 500 pages. It presents a detailed and balanced account of events surrounding the Bahraini protest movement, the context in which it occurred and the response by Government agents. Its findings set out in considerable detail the manifestly repressive nature of the Government’s crackdown on protesters and opposition leaders.

The report states that the security forces

“in many situations violated the principles of necessity and proportionality, which are the generally applicable legal principles in matters relating to the use of force by law enforcement officials. This is evident in both the choice of weapons that were used by these forces during confrontations with civilians and the manner in which these weapons were used.”

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

What does the right hon. Lady say to the accusation that I have heard from some people in the region that Iran was very much involved in fomenting the unrest in Bahrain?

[Ann Clwyd]

If the hon. Gentleman is a little patient, I shall come to that point in a moment.

The report also states:

“A large number of individuals were prosecuted before the National Safety Courts”.

It went on to say:

“Numerous violations of due process rights were recorded…it appears that the Military Attorney General chose to rely on those statutory provisions that were the least favourable to the arrested persons and to the defendants appearing before the National Safety Courts.”

It continued:

“The manner in which the security and judicial agencies of the GoB”—

Government of Bahrain—

“interpreted the National Safety Decree also opened the door for the perpetration of grave violations of human rights, including the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and arbitrary detention.”

The report also details that many of the detainees were subjected to torture and other forms of physical and psychological abuse while in custody, and it lists the methods as follows:

“blindfolding; handcuffing; enforced standing for prolonged periods; beating; punching; hitting the detainee with rubber hoses (including on the soles of the detainee‘s feet), cables, whips, metal, wooden planks or other objects; electrocution; sleep-deprivation; exposure to extreme temperatures; verbal abuse; threats of rape…and insulting the detainee‘s religious sect”.

Those subject to this were predominantly Shi’a.

Many of those held by the authorities claim that they were forced to sign confessions or admit to committing crimes. It is especially pertinent that the report notes on more than one occasion that the actions of the authorities were “systematic”. I emphasise that word, as it shows that these violations were not the fault of a few bad apples or rogue elements; the security personnel in Bahrain were carrying out actions that were expected of them and that were implicitly, if not explicitly, condoned by superiors and other branches of the Government.

With at least 35 deaths, thousands arrested, 4,500 employees dismissed for their support of the protests, more than 500 students expelled and 30 religious sites demolished, it is simply not credible that such a vast crackdown could have taken place at the initiative of the lower ranks of the Bahraini Government alone. The report categorically states:

“In many cases, the security services of the GoB resorted to the use of unnecessary and excessive force, terror-inspiring behaviour and unnecessary damage to property. The fact that a systematic pattern of behaviour existed indicates that this is how these security forces were trained and were expected to behave.”

It goes on to say that there is

“a culture of impunity, whereby security officials have few incentives to avoid mistreatment of prisoners or to take action to prevent mistreatment by other officials.”

Some months ago, before the summer recess, I, on behalf of the all-party group on human rights, and Lord Avebury, the vice-chair, went to see the ambassador of Bahrain at the embassy in London. He was Mr al-Khalifa, a member of the royal family, and Eric Avebury, in particular, had detailed knowledge of the complaints made by some of the medical personnel—he knew some of the doctors personally. He was very specific when we put those accusations to the then ambassador, who said that he knew nothing about it but that he would come back to us with a detailed explanation of all the allegations. We heard not one word from the ambassador and surprisingly—or perhaps not—two weeks later, he was gone from the embassy, never to return. He was replaced by another ambassador, who did not give us any more information.

I remain concerned about the trials of doctors and nurses in military courts and the harsh sentences handed down. Although the King subsequently intervened and most of the health workers are now under house arrest awaiting trial in civil courts, the report’s findings on the brutal manner in which people were arrested and detained prompts the question of whether any subsequent trials can be fair and whether there is any justification for those people being held at all.

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[Daniel Kawczynski (Shrewsbury and Atcham) (Con)]

As chairman of the all-party group on Libya, I have campaigned for many years on that country, particularly with regard to human rights there. I was invited to visit Benghazi this week by the national transitional council, but I politely declined that invitation because I am very concerned that the people of Libya have not been consulted about the sort of constitutional make-up their country should have.

If we bear in mind the 42 years of brutal tyrannical oppression that Libya went through, it is not unreasonable for the authorities to ask the people of Libya for their opinion as to how their country should be formed and what constitution they should have. The NTC has decided that there will be a presidential type of system, yet many friends of mine in Libya talk of growing public demonstrations throughout that country in support of Crown Prince Muhammad, the exiled crown prince of Libya who has lived in London since Colonel Gaddafi expelled him and his father.

I declare an interest. I have got to know Crown Prince Muhammad very well over a certain period of time. He is a close personal friend of mine. I believe him to be a man of great integrity and honour. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) indicated, many of the monarchies throughout the Arab world have not had the levels of instability that other Arab countries have had. The monarch is very important in this regard.

We must not forget that 30,000 people died in Libya—some estimates put the figure as high as 35,000 or 40,000—to liberate their country from the despot.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend raises the issue of the Libyan monarchy. How likely is it, in his opinion, that the institution of monarchy will be resurrected in Libya? He refers to his friends, but does he really think that is a plausible outcome?

[Daniel Kawczynski]

Only two countries in the world have gone back to having a monarchy—I am sure that my hon. Friend knows which. One is Spain, as you rightly mouthed just now, Mr Deputy Speaker, and the other is Cambodia, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Thanet (Laura Sandys) indicates.

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[Daniel Kawczynski]

The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to hear that there are more women going on the trip than men, which is a specific wish of mine. [Interruption] No, not for that reason. We will certainly be meeting various organisations that deal with women’s rights in the kingdom. I will send the hon. Gentleman a copy of the report after the visit, if he wishes.

There is tremendous anger and hostility towards Saudi Arabia in this country. On one occasion I was sitting in the Smoking Room waiting for a vote, and I asked 15 Tory MPs what their views were on Saudi Arabia, and every single one made very hostile statements about the country. That really upset me, and I did not understand it. I think we have a Guardian-reading liberal elite who want to denigrate Saudi Arabia at every opportunity. The BBC, with its left-wing bias and determination not to report anything positive from Saudi Arabia, also contributes to the extraordinary drip, drip effect of negative press that it gets in this country.

Of course there are huge problems in Saudi Arabia, and of course there are things that we in the United Kingdom disagree with and want changing, but there has been progress, slow though it is. It is extremely important that people like me and others who are interested in Saudi Arabia engage with the country and, specifically, with people who are trying to reform it, who are democrats, and who are passionate about making sure that it improves its human rights.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Is my hon. Friend conscious of any attempts on the part of the Saudi Government to reform, if only at their own pace, and to bring in a more liberal regime, which we all hope for?

[Daniel Kawczynski]

Yes, and we will be discussing that with them.

A delegation of members of the Shura Council recently visited us and spent a whole week here trying to find out how our Parliament works, how our Select Committees work, and how we hold Ministers to account. They talked to me about their desire for reform within the Shura Council and their determination that there should be elections to that body instead of its members being appointed by the King. Because they are very interested in learning from our experience of democracy, they insisted on spending the day with me in my constituency and finding out how the Member of Parliament is held to account by his constituents, how he interacts with the local council, and so on.

The Minister will know that the Foreign Secretary has described Saudi Arabia as a strategic ally of the United Kingdom and that our relations will be cemented and even further prioritised. I hope that he will confirm that.

The Prime Minister and the European Union talked about a Marshall aid package for Tunisia and Egypt following the revolutions in those countries. I have not heard much subsequently about that huge plan, which apparently involved up to €1 billion. I hope that it will be extended to Libya. I would like to hear what progress there is on that. I hope that some of the money will be used to facilitate British companies in trading with the region.

My hon. Friend the Member for North Thanet (Mr Gale) is the chairman of the all-party group on Tunisia. He cannot be here, so he asked me to raise the importance of tourism to these countries. I hope that the Minister will agree that we should encourage citizens to visit Tunisia at the earliest opportunity, because it depends so much on tourism.

I will finish by saying that on Wednesday I will be hosting a reception in the House of Commons for the fifth birthday of al-Jazeera English. It is a broadcaster of immense pedigree. I trust al-Jazeera far more than the BBC, regrettably, for impartiality and objective broadcasting. More than 160 people are coming to the event. Because of the strike, I will be pouring the tea and serving the cake myself as we cannot get any catering staff to do so. Hon. Members are very welcome to join us on the Terrace on Wednesday.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Parker, who came to see me, said that when he was chief of staff in Basra, they were watching al-Jazeera on television and it was the only broadcaster that was broadcasting from Basra. They saw a report on al-Jazeera which said that some of the British shelling was hitting civilians in a residential area. As a result of watching that broadcast, the artillery was stopped and innocent civilian lives were saved. We have a lot to thank al-Jazeera for.

I shall leave it at that.

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[Mrs Louise Ellman (Liverpool, Riverside) (Lab/Co-op)]

I certainly hope that the aspirations of the people of the region that have been raised by the Arab spring are realised and that the lives of people throughout that region, and, indeed, beyond it, are improved. It is significant to note that before the Arab spring took place, there was very little, if any, coverage in the national media of the atrocities and lack of democracy that were a reality in those countries. Indeed, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights failed to condemn what was happening in those countries, which perhaps places a big question mark over the efficiency of the United Nations Human Rights Committee.

This is a wide-ranging debate, and I would like to comment on a number of areas. First, the Foreign Secretary mentioned the situation in Yemen. I know that the commitments made by the President to take action to bring democracy to the country are doubted by many people. I hope that the British Government will do all they can to ensure that the promises materialise and that the current regime will be replaced by a democratic one that reflects the interests of the people of Yemen.

Iran—not, of course, an Arab country—has been mentioned as an important player a number of times in this debate. I urge our Government to look at the plight of the Baha’i people in Iran and to note the continued persecution and new wave of arrests of the Baha’i minority. It is wrong that what is happening to that minority group is ignored by far too much of the world. I ask Ministers to make a statement about what they going to do to try to ensure that the Baha’i people are not intimidated or persecuted as they are now.

I shall also comment on the Palestinian-Israeli dispute and how I hope matters might be pressed so that justice can be achieved. The context of everything I want to say is that I firmly believe that the only way in which justice can be brought both to Palestinians and Israelis is to have two states of Israel and Palestine with negotiated borders, with an agreed settlement on refugees and an agreed sharing of Jerusalem. These objectives are not as far away as many people may believe. Indeed, a number of significant negotiations have come very close indeed to finding resolutions to those difficult issues. As I say, those issues will be resolved only by detailed negotiations between the parties concerned. It is right that the Quartet and others try to assist the negotiations, but a lasting solution can be brought about only by agreement between those two main parties. Calls for boycotts, sanctions and disinvestment will not bring peace and will not bring security. Direct negotiations are the only way.

It is a common call for there to be an end of the occupation to resolve this dispute. Indeed, I am opposed to occupation—the occupation of one people by another has to be bad both for the occupied as well as the occupiers—but too often ignored in debates on this issue is the fact that Israel has withdrawn from lands it occupied in its defensive war in 1967, when its existence was threatened by the armies of Arab states around it. Israel has withdrawn from territories it occupied, in response to offers of peace. Perhaps the best example was in 1979, when Israel withdrew from the whole of Sinai as part of a negotiated agreement with Egypt. Until now—and, we hope, in the future, although sadly there seems to be a question mark over this—there has been peace between Egypt and Israel. It has often been described as a cold peace, but it is nevertheless a peace. In 1994, Israel reached agreement with Jordan, which has also continued. Israel has withdrawn from territories occupied when threats were made to its very existence and peace has resulted from it. It is also the case that Israel has withdrawn from other territories it occupied as a result of attacks, but peace has not been the result.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Given what is happening in Egypt at the moment, what is the hon. Lady’s sense of the Israeli position regarding the peace treaty and what might happen in Egypt? Given her extensive knowledge, will she inform us of her opinion on this issue?

[Mrs Ellman]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I understand that Israel fervently wishes to maintain its peace treaty with Egypt. However, it is concerned about statements that have been made by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which suggest that it would like to review or, indeed, drop the treaty. Israel wishes to maintain it, and I hope that that can be achieved.

Israel has withdrawn from territories that it has occupied as a result of attacks on it, and the consequence of that withdrawal has not been peace. In 2000, Israel correctly withdrew completely from south Lebanon. The consequence of that was the occupation of the area by the Iran-backed Hezbollah, followed by attacks on Israeli citizens. Although it was a correct withdrawal from occupied territory, it did not lead to peace.

More recently, in 2005, the Israelis correctly withdraw all their 8,000 settlers and military personnel from Gaza. As we all know only too well, the result of that was not peace but the election of Hamas—refusing to recognise Israel’s existence—and the firing of thousands of rockets and other missiles on Israeli civilians in Sderot, Be’er Sheva, Ashkelon and Ashdod. The withdrawal of the Israelis from Gaza, which I fully support, did not lead to peace.

People talk as though withdrawal and the end of occupation inevitably lead to peace. I stress again that I am against occupation, but in those two instances at least, when Israel has withdrawn from lands that it has occupied as a result of attacks on it, peace has not been automatic. Moreover, when people advocate the withdrawal of Israelis from occupied lands, it is not always clear exactly which occupied lands they are talking about. Are they talking about 1967 or about 1948? Here in London a few months ago, on al-Quds day, it was evident what was meant by many of the campaigners against Israel’s policies and against Israel itself. One illustration of that was a big placard held up by a young child, bearing the unfortunate words “For world peace, Israel must be destroyed”. That is hardly conducive to efforts to find a solution.

I also note that the Palestine Solidarity Campaign’s logo features a map that does not depict Israel as existing at all. When I hear calls from that organisation for Israel to end its occupation, I question what it really means. Is it talking about a negotiated solution to the problem of land that is occupied as a result of attacks on Israel in 1967, or is it talking about there being no Israel at all? We must know what people mean, in what context they are speaking and where they are coming from if we are to assess the validity of the criticisms that they are making at any given time.

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[Mrs Ellman]

The state of Israel exists, and has every right to exist. Indeed, I know of no other country in the world in respect of which when its future is discussed questions are raised about the existence of the state itself. I agree that the state of Palestine, which does not exist at present, ought to be set up, but it can only be set up side by side with Israel on the basis of detailed negotiations about borders, refugees and Jerusalem.

Discussions have taken place, following past negotiations which ultimately failed, about the issue of Palestinian refugees. The solution to that problem can only come about by agreement between the parties, and on the basis that Palestinian refugees are to be able to return to a Palestinian state and, by agreement, to Israel and in agreed numbers, with compensation to be offered. I note that the critics of Israel often talk about the right of return of all Palestinian refugees to Israel, rather than to Palestine. That, of course, is simply code for the destruction of the state of Israel, but that distinction is seldom recognised.

There is a lack of balance in discussions on this issue. I am, for instance, increasingly concerned about the attempts to demonise and delegitimise the state of Israel. The term “Zionism” is now used as a term of abuse, which is wholly unacceptable. Zionism is the national movement of the Jewish people for a homeland in the state of Israel. Like all national movements, it contains a range of individuals and parties with very different views. Zionism is not a term of abuse, and when it is used as such, that illustrates the demonisation of the state of Israel itself.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The hon. Lady mentions Zionism in the context of the creation of the state of Israel, but does she recognise that that term does not quite mean support for the state of Israel in today’s political context?

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[Mrs Ellman]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comments and agree with what he said.

I am also increasingly concerned about the loose use of language, which is leading to a creeping anti-Semitism in this country and elsewhere, causing increasing concern among the Jewish community. I was extremely concerned to see on the website of the Liverpool Friends of Palestine a cartoon—this was viewed on 9 September—headed “The power of Zionists”. It depicts a stereotypical Jewish man—a man with a large hook nose holding a Jewish emblem in his hand—pointing to an American soldier under the heading, “Join the United States army” and at the bottom it says “and fight for Israel”. That cartoon could have come out of Nazi literature, given the depiction and the heading “The power of Zionists”. I was appalled to see that and although it has now been removed from the Liverpool Friends of Palestine website, I must ask how it came to be there and what kind of thought was behind it. I gather that it is not a solitary example of what is happening on websites of similar groups.

Some years ago, the New Statesman had a front cover with the big headline “A Kosher Conspiracy?” Underneath that headline was a cartoon depiction of a Jewish symbol—an Israeli Magen David—piercing the British Union Jack, among other things, thus raising the old anti-Semitic allegation that Jewish people are not sincere citizens of their country. After considerable controversy, and some weeks later, the editor said that he had no understanding of what he was doing when that was published, that he did not mean it to be done in the way it was done and that he did not know it was reminiscent of Nazi literature and old stereotypes, and he apologised for it. That occurred some years ago, but this loose language is now going rather further.

I read with increasing concern an article by Deborah Orr in The Guardian on 19 October about the release of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from his captivity with Hamas. After long, hard bargaining, the Israeli Government eventually decided that the only way they could secure his release was by accepting the proposed deal from Hamas that more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners should be released. The fact that the Israeli Government accepted that has been controversial in Israel for a lot of reasons, including the fact that among those 1,000 Palestinian prisoners released in exchange were extremely serious terrorists and murderers, including those who sent the bombs to the young people in the pizza parlours of Jerusalem and to the old people at the Passover service at the Park hotel in Netanya, and those responsible for many other atrocities. The Israeli Government felt that they should strike that deal because they felt that realistically it was the only way in which Gilad Shalit would be released.

I was appalled when I read Deborah Orr’s article in The Guardian, which was entitled “Is an Israeli life really more important than a Palestinian’s?” When talking about the background to the situation, she said:

“At the same time…there is something abject in their”—

the Israelis’—

“eagerness to accept a transfer that tacitly acknowledges what so many Zionists believe—that the lives of the chosen are of hugely greater consequence than those of their unfortunate neighbours.”

That is basic anti-Semitism.

I am sure that Deborah Orr is not anti-Semitic, and indeed, she later published an apology of sorts, in which she stated:

“Last week, I upset a lot of people by suggesting Zionists saw themselves as ‘chosen’. My words were badly chosen and poorly used, and I’m sorry for it.”

Deborah Orr did say that, but just as I was concerned a number of years ago when the New Statesman felt that it was perfectly in order to have the sort of front page it had—one headlined “A Kosher Conspiracy?” and questioning Jewish people’s loyalty to their country, the United Kingdom—I am concerned that Deborah Orr, not an anti-Semite, thought it was all right to write about Zionists in terms of the word “chosen” in that derogatory manner, when the Israeli Government had done all they could do to secure the release of a soldier. The conditions came from Hamas, not from the Israelis. These are all great warning signs that loose language is now causing more anti-Semitism to be around and to cause disquiet within British society.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

The hon. Lady has alluded to references in sections of the British media. My concern is ensuring that she would not besmirch the entire range of British media with the accusation of anti-Semitism, because that is a grave charge. I just wanted clarification on that.

[Mrs Ellman]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I do not refer to the whole of the British media. I made my comments in relation to one instance in the New Statesman and I referred to Deborah Orr’s article in The Guardian. I also note that the editor of its readers’ section has recently acknowledged that the way in which The Guardian has used these words has helped to encourage the growth of anti-Semitism. My comments are very specific: they related to the journals and articles that I mentioned. This is not about the British media as a whole, which do not all share this weakness and looseness of language.

What matters most is that there should be a resolution to the long-standing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. I reiterate what I said at the beginning of my contribution, which is that the only way to bring that about, on the basis of two states living side by side in security and peace, is through a resumption of direct negotiations. I hope that our Government will continue to do all they can to ensure that that comes about.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

How very jealous George Canning would have been in 1823 to see the scope and ambition of this debate. Triumphant from Waterloo and Trafalgar, with the greatest economy and Navy in the world, he hesitated to get involved in affairs in France and Spain, whereas we have skipped in this debate from toxic waste in Somalia to minorities in Sudan, the situation in Yemen and the Baha’is in Iran. We have touched elegantly on the military in Syria and in Egypt, on elections in Morocco, on Islamists in Libya and in Tunisia, on refugees in Niger and on the fishermen of Mauritania. How jealous he would have been.

Given that we can pack the House for a debate on the fair fuel tariff, one would imagine that we would now find the journalists leaning over the railings, the Gallery packed and the House stuffed, with everyone desperate to get involved at this moment of deep crisis when the middle east and north Africa are teetering on the edge, and Europe is in trouble—but no. Why not? It is because at the heart of our problems in the middle east and north Africa is the situation of Britain for the past few decades. As our relative economic power declines, our ambitions become ever greater and our rhetoric becomes ever more inflated. We wish to get involved in countries that would have been obscure to us at the time of our greatest power, yet at the same time we hollow out the institutions on which we depend to deliver our policy.

Let us consider the middle east and north Africa and what we have done in this Arab spring. On Tunisia, the reality is that we had abandoned not just Mauritania but Tunisia itself to French diplomacy and French policy. In Libya, we contented ourselves with kissing Gaddafi on the cheeks and handing out a doctorate to his son at the London School of Economics and our connection with Egypt was contained to snorkelling as guests of Mubarak in Sharm el Sheikh.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I am particularly grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way—

[Bob Stewart]

Were you there snorkelling, too?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

This is not a point about snorkelling. My hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) is making an impassioned and eloquent speech, but surely he must recognise that the reason why we are more committed to intervention in such areas—more so than in imperial times—is that we are part of a wider comity of nations. We are part of the UN and of NATO and as part of that joint venture we are committing and projecting ourselves in the region. In imperial times, such circumstances did not prevail. We acted unilaterally and, as he is right to say, in many instances we chose not to intervene and interfere in the internal politics of other countries.

[Rory Stewart]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point, but the problem is not our desire or our commitment to the multilateral system but our capacity and what we can actually do. Our engagement with the United Nations and NATO and our various grand views about globalisation and economics lead us to believe that we should be involved in all those areas, but what capacity do we have to deliver, what understanding do we have of those specific countries and what power do we have in our hands to do one half of the things that have been discussed in the Chamber today?

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[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend knows, probably better than anyone in this House, the extent to which modern media and modern technology have completely revolutionised the way in which we gather information and deploy our authority. I have listened to the debate for a number of hours now and I was intrigued to discover that people were harking back to colonial times, the empire and that sort of thing. They had nothing like the technology we have today and although I completely agree with my hon. Friend about the need for languages and cultural expertise in the Foreign Office, it is not remotely apparent to me that we should have exactly the same infrastructure today as we had in 1930 or 1880. That model is completely false in today’s environment.

[Rory Stewart]

This is a very tantalising and attractive argument and I can see exactly why it is made. Of course, we should not have the same structure as we had in 1880 or 1930—and nor do we—but the notion that technology and the related aspects of the 21st century have somehow transformed our relationship with a country such as Afghanistan is fundamentally misguided. In the recent Helmand police intake, eight out of 100 people could write their name or recognise numbers up to 10. There is no electricity between Herat and Kandahar. The notion of a Facebook revolution in Afghanistan, Somalia or South Sudan is a distant fantasy. The fact that in the British embassy in Kabul two years ago, there were exactly two people who had passed a Dari exam at an operational level and that there was not a single Pashto speaker is testimony to the fact that we believe we live in a globalised world in which it is unnecessary for us to study other people’s languages or understand their culture.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

With respect to my hon. Friend and the House, I have always said in relation to these issues that linguistic competence is absolutely vital, and it is a scandal that the Foreign Office should have turned its back on that. He must acknowledge, as I think he is doing, that the technological environment in which we operate allows us to have certain levers and information that we did not have 15 or 20 years ago.

[Rory Stewart]

I could not agree more—it certainly allows us to have a great deal of information. However, at the fundamental core of the Foreign Office’s work, which concerns politics and power, there appears to be a problem. The same problem was apparent when nobody challenged the Government’s policy on Iraq, which is the single most humiliating mess into which the British Government have got themselves since Suez. Not a single senior British diplomat publicly or even privately challenged the Prime Minister on that issue. Why? Because at the same time as we imagine that everything is manipulable through technocratic processes and technology, the knowledge and the confidence that came from country immersion and language is lacking, as is the confidence that would allow one to challenge power.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rory Stewart]

This is fundamental because we live in a world in which there is not enough challenge in the system. There are not enough checks or balances. I have mentioned that our newspapers have fewer and fewer foreign correspondents. The quality of foreign reporting in Britain is not as good today as it was 20 years ago because we simply are not investing as much in foreign reporting. At the same time, the military is increasingly preponderant in the United States, and brings with it the inherent optimism and determination to say, “We’ve inherited a dismal situation but we have the resources and the mission to deliver a decisive year,” pushing aside the civilian advice. We are flattered by English-speaking, upper-class Afghans, Iraqis and Libyans who feed our fantasies and tell us what we want to hear.

In that context, and in the context of the temptation across Europe and the United States to have more and more centralised power, we need our Foreign Office to act as a check and balance. We need it to challenge policy and to speak truth to power. Above all, we need it to say not just what the UK interest is, what our ethical limits are or what we are not prepared to do morally, but, most fundamentally of all, what we cannot do. When somebody comes forward and says, in country X, “In this failed state, we will create governance, the rule of law and civil society,” it should be the job of our Foreign Office to ask “How?”, “With whom?” and “With what money?” It should ask, “What possible reason have you to believe that you can achieve this grandiloquent objective you have established?”

We also need to explain matters to the public, because this entire rhetoric is the rhetoric of a poker game. It is the rhetoric, perpetually, of “raise” or “fold”, and of driving people to ask, “Have you met your $3 billion objective on trade this year?” or “Have you or have you not set up the rule of law and civil society?” and if not, “Why have we got an embassy in Mongolia? Why have we got to bother having any representation in Peru? Why don’t we drag it all back to London and do it down the internet?” The way to cease that is to be honest—not just internally but with the British public as well.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend raises a particularly pertinent point about the operations of the Foreign Office. He will remember that in times gone by, that was the Foreign Office’s job and it consistently said no. If we are to believe the memoirs of politicians, it consistently set itself as a roadblock to ministerial action and said, “No you can’t do that,” to Ministers who wanted to intervene or act purposively. He will also remember that a former Conservative Prime Minister once commented that she understood that the Agriculture Department looked after farmers, that the Labour Department looked after workers and that the Foreign Office looked after foreigners. It is well known that the Foreign Office has been the check that my hon. Friend describes.

[Rory Stewart]

The Foreign Office has a very distinguished tradition of doing that. With many of the things it challenged, it did so correctly. It challenged Lord Salisbury’s insane idea of launching an invasion into Afghanistan in 1879, it challenged Lord Grey’s absurd ideas about secret treaties with France in 1912 and 1913, and it challenged the absurdity of Suez. In all those ways it acted responsibly, but increasingly it is no longer performing that role.

Of course the politicians can, when they want, overwhelm the Foreign Office, push it aside and push ahead, and that is fine, but—on this, I think, we should conclude—we are now in a very strange position in this country. We are hollowed out. We are facing an enormous crisis. Europe is teetering on the edge. The German Chancellor is invoking ghosts of European destruction. The middle east and north Africa have seen more tottering regimes and dynasties than in any period since the end of the first world war. At this time we need to remember that that very modest investment in the Foreign Office—only £1 billion a year on its core costs, if we exclude the British Council and the World Service—is an extremely wise insurance and investment.

We need to remember at times like this how vital is the ability to set out our limits, to set out a strategy and vision, to explain exactly, as this Government are doing, and to continue to explain more clearly to the public, exactly what Britain believes and what our strategy is—that peculiar mixture of pragmatism and belief in rights, a belief not just in ideals but in common sense, expressed in a world that understands that today of all times a residence can be much more powerful than a regiment, a Tuareg specialist than a Tornado, an Arabist than an aircraft carrier, and that the Foreign Office is our strength, our nation, and our defence.