Malcolm Rifkind
Main Page: Malcolm Rifkind (Independent - Kensington)Department Debates - View all Malcolm Rifkind's debates with the Cabinet Office
Justice and Security Bill [Lords]
Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Mr Clarke
The practical effect of the Bill is exactly as my hon. Friend recommends, although it may have been drafted with a few too many provisos and provisions because of the deep suspicion with which these things are regarded. Essentially, however, we do not think that Norwich Pharmacal should apply to intelligence material provided in confidence to the British security services.
I will not take too long on this because the argument is perfectly straightforward, but I want to tell the House that these are not false fears. Over the past year, we have picked up concerns from human agents. They have always been concerned about the degree to which their relationships can be protected, of course, but they are now becoming really concerned about disclosure to the British courts. Sir Daniel Bethlehem, a former legal adviser to the Foreign Office, told the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the flow of intelligence from the United States was being limited. He said that he did not want to exaggerate, but the point was that the trust of the United States had been weakened and that trust needed to be restored.[Official Report, 8 January 2013, Vol. 556, c. 3MC.]
Arguments tend to break out as to whether agents have any reason to be fearful, but that is not totally the point. As long as, as a result of hearing about the extraordinary process called Norwich Pharmacal, other intelligence agencies and our agents think that there is always a risk of disclosure by the British courts, the damage is done. To follow the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field), what on earth are we running that risk for?
Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)
In support of what my right hon. and learned Friend has just said, I should say that the Intelligence and Security Committee has taken extensive evidence on the matter in both the United Kingdom and Washington in respect of the likelihood or actuality of damage to very important information that prevents or might prevent terrorist incidents in the United Kingdom. We are satisfied that my right hon. and learned Friend’s point is entirely valid and that the House should take it into account.
Mr Clarke
I close my case, as they say; there is no need for me to carry on addressing the House about Norwich Pharmacal. We wait to hear what points might be raised about it.
I move on to part 1 of the Bill, to which I think the House should have much more regard. It deals with the important issue of parliamentary oversight of our security and intelligence agencies. I suggest to both sides of the House that if we wish to be reassured about the accountability of our security services and really try to guarantee to ourselves that they are not misbehaving, we should look to stronger parliamentary oversight as well as to more accountability to the courts.
It is time to put the Intelligence and Security Committee, chaired by my right hon. and learned Friend, on a much stronger footing and to enhance its independence to strengthen the valuable work it has done so far. We have to give Parliament more effective oversight of the intelligence and security agencies.
The ISC operates within arrangements established by Parliament in 1994, but the nature of the Committee’s work has changed dramatically. In the past 18 years, particularly since 9/11, the public profile, budgets and operational demands on the agencies have all significantly increased, but there has been no change in the statutory arrangements for oversight. In the past, the ISC has overseen operational matters but has done so relatively infrequently and generally at the direct invitation of the Prime Minister. The ISC has no statutory powers to oversee such matters. Its statutory remit is also limited to oversight of the security and intelligence agencies, although it has long heard evidence from the wider intelligence community.
At the moment, the Prime Minister receives its report and appoints its members. Currently, the heads of the security and intelligence agencies are permitted, in certain circumstances, to withhold information from it. We can certainly improve on that. We need to give the ISC greater teeth to ensure that we can continue to have confidence in those who oversee the agencies on our behalf.
The Bill provides that the ISC will in future be able to oversee the agencies’ operations, within appropriate constraints. The Committee will also in future report to Parliament, as well as the Prime Minister. Its members will be appointed by Parliament, after nomination by the Prime Minister. The power to withhold information from the ISC will move from the agency heads to the Secretary of State responsible for that agency—a Minister accountable to the House. It will be a parliamentary Committee. We are greatly strengthening our powers to hold accountable those who do such vital work for our country.
Mr Clarke
I have the greatest respect for the Wright Committee and we will consider the matter further, although I am not instantly attracted by that proposal. We are moving to a situation in which the Chairman of the ISC will be elected by the Committee and the Committee itself will be elected by the whole House from a list approved first by the Prime Minister. On reflection, I think that the problem with a system whereby the House could elect whoever it liked, subject to a prime ministerial veto, is that it would be an Exocet that was hugely embarrassing to use. It is not impossible—I hope that it is not too fanciful—to envisage a case where the security services have satisfied the Prime Minister that there is some problem with a particular Member of this House of which the wider world is completely unaware. [Interruption.] That is not unknown; I am sure that it has happened in the experience of the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). The idea that the Prime Minister must suddenly issue a veto on the result of an election carried out in this House is probably a step too far, and I think that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), the Chairman of the ISC, agreed with me when we discussed this very matter not too long ago.
Mr Clarke
My right hon. and learned Friend nods his head in approval.
The arrangements that we are proposing for a stronger Committee will in some cases be underpinned by a memorandum of understanding between the Government and the Committee. The MOU will set out the arrangements at a level of detail far beyond that which need be put in this Bill. We have reached the stage of discussing the terms of that MOU with the Committee. I have had some extremely constructive discussions with my right hon. and learned Friend and other members of the Committee about the Bill. We will bring forward other amendments if necessary to make clear the ISC’s increased connection to Parliament and provide it with some statutory immunities to assist in this work.
I apologise for the length of time that I have taken in introducing the Bill, but I have given way generously. It is the kind of Bill where there should not be serious argument about the principle, but the details are extremely important in a country which has high regard to the rule of law and does not to want to risk abuse of process in any proper case. That is why I commend its Second Reading to the House. To reject it and stay with the status quo would be to continue a quite intolerable situation that is not only unacceptable to the agencies, which cannot defend their reputations, but should be unacceptable to the taxpayer, who has to pay for some of these settlements, and to any citizen who wants a judge to have the chance to make a judgment on the issues.
In my opinion, for all the reasons I have given, the Bill strengthens the accountability of our intelligence agencies and GCHQ to the courts and to this House. It supports our belief in justice, the rule of law and the liberal, democratic principles that underpin this country. I trust that the House will therefore be content to give it a Second Reading.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)
As Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I will concentrate my comments on the proposed reforms of the ISC in part 1 of the Bill.
It is easy for me and the Committee to welcome part 1, because 95% of it is exactly what we recommended to the Government many months ago. We pay tribute to them for being willing to accept such a radical change in the powers relating to independent oversight in the United Kingdom. The system has been imperfect since 1994, as has been commented on in the past. I can say with confidence that if the proposals in part 1 are implemented, the United Kingdom will have a system of independent intelligence oversight with the powers that are necessary to make it effective. It will be one of the most powerful systems of independent oversight in the western world.
It is worth remembering for a moment why independent oversight is crucial in an open society. Our intelligence agencies have and need to have powers which, if used by other citizens, would be a breach of the criminal law. Given that situation, the agencies are the first to acknowledge that it is essential in a parliamentary democracy for there to be not only Government accountability, but accountability to Parliament and the public. The agencies use some £2 billion of resources. That is a lot of money and it has to be justified, particularly in difficult times.
From time to time, it will be necessary, as it has been in the past, to criticise the agencies when something foolish, unwise or unacceptable takes place. However, the agencies also appreciate that the power of genuine, independent oversight means that they can be defended if, as happens occasionally, they are unfairly criticised or attacked and cannot defend themselves. For obvious reasons, if the Government try to defend them, there is seen to be a potential conflict of interests. That does not apply in the case of genuine, independent oversight. For example, in the 7/7 bombings inquiry, the Intelligence and Security Committee was able to point to some of the unfair accusations that were being made.
What are the reforms that are crucial in transforming the role of independent oversight in the United Kingdom? First, until now—including as I speak—the Intelligence and Security Committee has been a committee of parliamentarians, but not a Committee of Parliament. That is going to change. For the first time, the last word on whether the proposed members of the Committee are acceptable will be with the House of Commons and the House of Lords. As has been said, the Chairman of the Committee will in future be appointed not by the Prime Minister, as I was, but by the Committee itself.
The Committee will report to Parliament. At the moment, it reports to the Prime Minister and only through the Prime Minister do its reports reach this place. Some redactions will, of course, be necessary. There will be occasions, as there have been in the past, when the ISC reports on such sensitive matters that it will, in practice, report only to the Prime Minister because the material overwhelmingly cannot come into the public domain. Nevertheless, for the first time, we will have a parliamentary Committee that is parliamentary in the sense of other Committees, except where the need for the respect of secret information continues to require some differences of treatment.
The second major change is in relation to operations. I will differ slightly from my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister without Portfolio in saying that the extent to which the Intelligence and Security Committee has already been involved, through agreement with the agencies, in looking at operations and sensitive material is not exceptional or occasional, but substantial. Nevertheless, there has been no statutory basis to it. That is crucial, because operations are what the agencies are about to a considerable degree and are where parliamentary and public concern can be most manifest. It is profoundly unsatisfactory that, until now, there has been no meaningful statutory role for the Committee in relation to operations.
Sir Alan Beith
I point out to my right hon. and learned Friend that that situation means that refusal is possible and is too easy in circumstances where embarrassment is involved. I can think of at least one case in which I feel that that happened during my time on the Committee.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
I agree with my right hon. Friend. There has to be an ultimate right for the Prime Minister to decline to allow the Committee to receive certain information. However, until now, the agencies have been able to exercise that power. To be fair to them, they have rarely, if ever, tried to do so.
On operations, the statutory basis is crucial. The Committee has accepted that our oversight of operations should be retrospective. We do not wish to interfere in ongoing operations. That would be unreasonable and would put an intolerable burden on the agencies. As long as the oversight is retrospective and there is a significant national interest—we will have debates over what that phrase means—I believe that there is a sound basis.
Thirdly, until now, the Intelligence and Security Committee has been able only to request information from the agencies, not require it. To be fair to the agencies, they have not, for all practical purposes, ever refused us information, but they have been in control of the information that has been provided. Real problems have emerged over the years. On some occasions, it has been found, subsequent to the publication of a report, that important documents had simply not been made available to the Committee. That may not have been done in bad faith, but the consequence was embarrassment for the agencies and for the system of independent oversight. That cannot be allowed to continue.
We have also found that when the agencies have responded to a requirement of the courts, the resources and the time that they have devoted to finding every relevant document have been slightly greater than for a Committee that can only request information and not require it. That is going to change. I pay tribute to the agencies for accepting the need to make this change. The Committee will now have the power to require information from the agencies, including information on operations, subject to one or two important safeguards.
I come now to the crucial difference. Until now, the problem has been that although the agencies hold vast amounts of information on any given subject, we do not expect them, when we request information, to fill several forklift trucks with information and dump it at our offices. That would be absurd, and we will not expect that when we require information in the future. However, until now, the agencies have done the editing themselves. Even if it is done entirely in good faith, that does not enable the Committee to be confident that it has seen all the information that it would wish to see before it brings forward its proposals.
We have proposed that we will appoint additional staff—assistants to the Committee, who will be our employees and be answerable to us—who will go to the agencies when we require information on a particular subject from them and discuss all the information, including the raw material, that they have in their files. I pay tribute again to the Government and the agencies for agreeing to that. I hope that there will be a process of agreement and discussion, but at the end of the day, it will be our staff who decide which parts of the available material the Committee is likely to want to see. We, Parliament and the public will therefore be able to have confidence that the decision will be taken by the Committee itself, not by the agencies, however much they would be trying to do their best in good faith.
That is an enormous culture change for MI6, MI5 and GCHQ to accept. For the first time in their history they will be not just providing information to people who are not employees of the agencies or part of the Government—we are not part of the Government, and in future we will be part of Parliament—but allowing them to come into their offices, see material and discuss what the ISC would like to evaluate. I pay tribute to the agencies for accepting that. Of course they have some reservations and concerns, and a memorandum of understanding is being discussed. It is referred to in the Bill and will be published in due course. It will explain in greater detail how the system will work on a day-to-day basis. We may have to review it in a year or two in the light of experience.
I pay tribute also to both Her Majesty’s Government and Her Majesty’s Opposition, because such a change is not just a potential rod for the back of the agencies but will occasionally create problems for the Government of the day. Both Front-Bench teams know that the Bill will mean that intelligence oversight will have the teeth that it has not had in the past, because it will be on a statutory basis and include the real powers that I have described. That is why I and the Committee feel confident in saying that we will have a tougher, more effective and more reliable system of oversight than we have ever had in our history or than can currently be found in almost any country in the western world or globally.
Hazel Blears
I pay tribute to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his leadership of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I do not think we would have quite such robust proposals had it not been for his work.
May I remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman of one small point? As the Bill is drafted, it would prevent the Committee from examining ongoing operations. If the Government were to ask us to consider a matter that was ongoing and not retrospective, that would be forbidden. The Bill therefore needs to be amended on that point.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
I must first reciprocate the right hon. Lady’s compliment. She has made an enormous and much-respected contribution to the Committee’s work.
The right hon. Lady raises an important point. Of course we accept that our oversight of operations must be retrospective and on matters of significant national interest. However, there have been circumstances in which the Prime Minister of the day has invited the Committee to examine an ongoing operation on some specific matter. In addition, there are sometimes occasions when, because of leaks and press awareness, an ongoing operation becomes a matter of public discussion and debate. There must be flexibility in the Bill to allow the Committee to examine such matters. The House should feel confident that, although we wish a number of improvements to be made in Committee, we are entering a new phase of intelligence oversight.
I want to say a few words about part 2 of the Bill. A number of my right hon. and hon. Friends who serve on the Committee will undoubtedly wish to speak about it as well. It goes without saying that closed material proceedings are not very satisfactory, but in the imperfect world in which we live, the choice is sometimes between good solutions and bad solutions but more often between bad solutions and worse solutions. As has been said, public interest immunity is not a feasible alternative. The £2 million settlement that was made just a couple of weeks ago was a case to which intelligence material would have been central if it had gone to court. There could not have been PII, because that would have excluded all the material. That leaves us to introduce a system that, as the former Lord Chief Justice Lord Woolf has said, is certainly preferable to PII. I say to hon. Members who still have their doubts that the system is not perfect, but it is a lot better than the one we have at the moment. That is why it is in the national interest to support the Bill.
Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)
Having served on the Intelligence and Security Committee for more than a decade after it was first established, I warmly welcome the action of Ministers in introducing these new provisions. I have some slight reservations about improvements that are needed, but the measure is a good indication of the importance that the Government attach to the effective oversight of intelligence.
Much of my time on the Committee was deeply rewarding, and gave me a great deal of respect for the people who work in our intelligence services or assist them. Sometimes, however, it was like drilling into hard rock, and the drill had not got through the rock by the time I left the Committee. There were still many areas where the Committee did not have the information that it ought to have had to make the right kinds of judgment.
The value of the Committee rests only partly on its reports, which it makes to the Prime Minister. In future, it will make reports to Parliament. There has been reference to an annual report: the Committee makes numerous reports on different matters, and occasionally it has to make a report exclusively to the Prime Minister because none of the content can be revealed, so provision is made for that. The Committee’s value also rests on the fact that it gives confidence to the House and to colleagues that there are people who have enough access to know whether there is likely to be incompetence, illegality or unacceptable behaviour going on. The Committee provides reassurance that if that were the case, it would challenge it. To do so, it needs depth of knowledge, which means being aware of what is going on operationally.
Some of the definitions in the Bill are capable of benign use, but could also be put to hostile use, and could be used to restrict information. I do not think that that is the intention, but they could be improved significantly. The right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) made a point about ongoing operations, and I think that that is a limiting provision. When does an operation end? Many of our operations against terrorism are ongoing for as long as we think there is a threat, but we have to know what is happening. If we look back to the period leading up to the Finucane murder, for example, it would have been wrong, if the ISC had existed then, for it not to have had some understanding of the relationship between the Security Service and military units such as the force research unit and the basis on which information might be released by agencies and get into the hands of paramilitary organisations. The Committee needs that level of understanding to meet the test I described, so the wording needs to be adapted. It would be wrong, and a terrible mistake, if the Committee knew who was serving as agents and what handlers were finding in particular cases at particular times. That information should be kept as narrowly as possible, but allowing understanding of the operation, why it is being conducted and on what lines is significant.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
My right hon. Friend may like to know that part of the intention of the reforms is to ensure that we receive regular—probably quarterly— reports on the spectrum of agency activity, including operations, subject to retrospection and significant national interest. That gives us a broader awareness of the totality of agencies’ activities than has been possible in the past.
Sir Alan Beith
That is very helpful. There is a success story here: the Committee is still building the relationships necessary to give the confidence I described earlier. I pay tribute to those who have been involved in this on the Committee side as well as on the Government side. There will be occasions, as there have been in the past, when the public fear that power within the intelligence sphere is being used inappropriately or, indeed, not effectively. A democratically elected body must therefore be able to provide reassurance that if something goes wrong it will know about it and try to do something about it.
The other part of the Bill deals with closed proceedings, which are also closely related to intelligence. I emphasise that we are discussing civil proceedings, not prosecutions. Closed material proceedings are unwelcome, but it is difficult to see an alternative. They are necessary to protect the operational effectiveness of intelligence services, including the secrecy of sources. The control principle of foreign intelligence is fundamental to intelligence operations: people do not give away their country’s intelligence unless they know it will not be misused.
That is not a one-way process—other nations sometimes forget the control principle. I recall a rendition case in which our US allies did not observe the principle. Indeed, the Committee reported on it because the intelligence was provided on the basis that action would not be taken, yet it was used to provide the basis for an action. That was an example of the control principle not being applied, but we must apply it; otherwise, we will not gather the intelligence we need to protect our citizens.
I pay tribute to the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which the Justice Committee decided was doing the work and should be allowed to get on with it. Boundary lines between our two Committees are often drawn, but the Joint Committee’s excellent work contributed hugely to their lordships making the Bill more acceptable to those of us who come at it from a more liberal standpoint. Their lordships made it quite clear that although the Executive apply for closed material proceedings, the judge decides.
The original subsection (2) of clause 11, which would have allowed the extension of closed material proceedings into other areas, was removed by a welcome Government amendment. Their lordships passed an amendment on considering alternatives such as public interest immunity and a strict necessity test. The amendment appeared to be desirable, although my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) today indicated that it could lead to some cumbersome processes, so it will be appropriate for the Committee to look a little more closely at it.
A court will be required to balance national security with fairness, transparency and the need for open justice. The amendment that was unsuccessfully proposed to bring that process continuously into closed material proceedings was unrealistic—it is pretty difficult to satisfy foreign allies that we will apply the control principle if the question is being reopened in proceedings daily. The Government have indicated that they will accept the provision under which either side will be able to invoke closed material proceedings. I find it hard to envisage the circumstances in which a plaintiff would do so, but equality of arms requires that provision. I do not know why the Government resist the amendment proposing an annual report on the use of closed material proceedings—a fairly simple requirement—but perhaps such proceedings will not be so frequent and only a biennial report will be necessary.
As a result of proceedings in the other place we are now close to achieving a reasonably satisfactory balance in using difficult and unwelcome powers to ensure that information can be put before a court. None of us would want to have to use the process, but without it we will not be able to decide cases on the evidence available.
Another matter with which the Bill deals is the more general application of the Norwich Pharmacal principle to intelligence, on which the Government are right to act. I note the Intelligence and Security Committee’s suggestion, which the Justice Committee can look at, on how we limit its application so that we more specifically refer to foreign intelligence and the control principle or information that would impair the effectiveness of our security operations. The Government must act to defend our ability to acquire intelligence from elsewhere.
Further improvements might be possible to make it clear that a gisting process can work in cases where the special advocate realises that he cannot effectively challenge or assess evidence without more information that is in the possession of only the plaintiff. We must find some way of resolving that. We cannot allow the present position to continue, but we must get the Bill into the best state possible.
Mr Davis
A defence lawyer has the role of challenging the evidence, but I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman’s point later.
The Bill is, in the words of Lord David Pannick, a leading barrister—indeed, he is the Government’s leading barrister of choice—“unnecessary, unfair and unbalanced”. He said it is unnecessary because we already have the public interest immunity system.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
My right hon. Friend has chosen to quote Lord Pannick, but in the debate in the House of Lords on 11 July, he also said:
“I recognise that there may well be a need in some exceptional cases for a…closed material procedure, but…this should be a last rather than a first resort.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 July 2012; Vol. 738, c. 1176.]
Mr Davis
If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I have run out of injury time.
If a case involves sensitive information, the Secretary of State asks the judge’s permission to keep documents away from the court. The judge examines the evidence and makes a decision that balances national security with the interests of justice. Under the PII system, evidence can be shown in an edited form, and witnesses, whether spies or special forces or whoever, can speak from behind screens. Suspects can be given the gist of the case against them, and the court can sit in open session or in camera. All those operations are possible under the PII system, which has served British justice well for decades, not just against the current threat of terrorism, but against the Soviet threat, which in many ways was much more professional, and the previous Irish terrorist threat. The proof of the PII system is that no Government, including this one, can point to a single court judgment that has undermined national security—not one judgment.
Mr Buckland
We do not know that, and that is the problem with the current system. I would accept my hon. Friend’s argument if we had a system in which such issues could be properly tried, or at least tried in some second-best scenario; I accept that closed material proceedings are very much a second best to the principles of open justice in which my hon. Friend and I believe. However, we will never know—we will never be privy to whether the British state infringed principles of justice and international convention when it came to unlawful rendition.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
I reassure my hon. Friend that once the current police inquiries are complete, the intention of the Intelligence and Security Committee is to continue our investigation, which we had already started, of the allegations about United Kingdom complicity in Libyan rendition and to publish our conclusions to the extent that we can.
Mr Buckland
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend, and commend him and his Committee for their work in that area. It is something that I would like to know more about, as would many people in this House and outside. Sadly, the Gibson inquiry had to be terminated, or postponed, because of ongoing criminal proceedings. I very much believe that wrongdoing should be exposed, but, as has been pointed out, in the case of this civil proceeding we do not, and will not, know the precise merits or otherwise of the claim that was made against the British Government.
Much has been made of the views of Mr David Anderson QC, the Government’s independent reviewer on terrorism. I will spare his blushes. It is absolutely right to say that he, like me, is very much a reluctant convert to the limited use of closed material proceedings in certain cases where national security is very much at the heart of the claim. He makes the very important point that in referrals made by Her Majesty’s Government, we must put our trust in our judiciary to come to fair and balanced decisions on the material before them and to apply fairness not only to the Government but to claimants, because these questions apply equally to both parties in any such case.
Their lordships’ amendment to clause 6 opens up the limited discretion in the clause as originally drafted. I welcome that. It is wrong to say that there was no discretion before, but it was limited. They have expanded that discretion by the use of the word “may”. It is a much wider discretion than many of us in criminal practice have got used to. For example, in the sort of discretion that sentencing judges have in dealing with mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, the word used is very bald. “May” cannot put it any more simply. The amendment is very significant, and the fact that the Government have rightly accepted it eases many of the concerns that I and others had about the extent of the power of Ministers, in effect, to limit the court’s ability to disagree with a reference from Ministers.
That is the trigger, but it does not end there. The hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) said that a blanket then comes down on the use of closed material proceedings. I have great respect for him, but I do not think he is right. It is not a question of a blanket coming down, because the judge has a duty to look at each individual piece of evidence to determine whether it should be the subject of open proceedings or closed material proceedings. The judge will retain that important check and balance in looking at the evidence.
We need to put firmly to bed the notion that closed material proceedings are a silver bullet that will allow the Government always to be able to win—to successfully defend—these cases, because they most certainly are not. The recent decision by SIAC which had the effect of allowing the release of Abu Qatada is a notable example of that. CMPs were used in that case. The result was perhaps not popular in many quarters, but it is an example of the court being able to cope with the second-best solution and to reach an outcome that was, on a neutral interpretation, a fair one. CMPs can be a way for claimants to ensure that all the issues they want to see raised are properly considered by the court as part of the case.
Public interest immunity has been prayed in aid as a substitute for the process, but it is not; its function is different. PII relates to the extent and quality of disclosure, which occurs at a different stage from the fact-finding process itself. Material that is successfully subject to a PII certificate remains undisclosed to the party seeking it. There is no gisting or anything else. Redaction of documents may well happen, but that still means that the material sought by the party who wishes to see it remains undisclosed. PII has a practical effect, whether it is on the continuation of a prosecution in a criminal context or, as in this context, the continuation of a defence in a civil case. The choice for those at the receiving end is either to disclose the material or to stop the case. That means, as we have already discussed, that cases in which genuine allegations of wrongdoing are made will never properly be dealt with by the court. It is the justice gap that has been spoken about not just in this place but by eminent Members of the other place, most notably Lord Woolf, Lord Mackay and Lady Manningham-Buller, who all support the use of closed material proceedings in restricted circumstances.
As other Members have said, there is nothing groundbreaking about the use of closed material proceedings in English law. They have been used for some years, in both SIAC and the regime of terrorism prevention and investigation measures, and in a way, as I have said, that cannot be regarded as resulting in manifest unfairness or injustice.
I would welcome clear and continued assurances from Ministers that, if future consideration is ever given to further extending the use of closed material procedures to other areas of law, it is this House that will deal with the issue and that there will be strong grounds to justify any further extension before we allow it to happen.
We live in an imperfect world. It is a troubled world where sometimes grim reality invades noble principle. This Bill is an exemplar of that, which is why I support its Second Reading.
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
The Bill has implications for liberty, security and justice. The fact that those are serious matters has been reflected in the number of reasoned and considered contributions that we have heard today. We have heard 22 speeches, in addition to those from the Front Benches, many of which have been informed by Members’ experience in government and on the Intelligence and Security Committee. The whole House welcomes those contributions. In particular, I would like to mention those made by the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind); the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis); and the Chair of the Treasury Select Committee, the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), as well as those made by several former senior Ministers, including my right hon. Friends the Members for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and for Knowsley (Mr Howarth). The leader of the Welsh nationalists, the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), also made one of his usual considered contributions.
The Bill has already been the subject of considerable debate in the other place, where many Members were able to draw on their considerable experience to scrutinise it and suggest improvements. We in this House are grateful for their efforts and the improvements that have been made. In particular, I want to pay tribute to the work of my noble Friends Baroness Smith and Lord Beecham. I am also pleased that the Minister without Portfolio said today that the Government would not seek to overturn some of the amendments made during the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords, and I look forward to hearing further details from the Minister in Committee as to why they disagree with certain others.
The matters in the Bill are sensitive and complex, and the Opposition will work with the Government to reach consensus, wherever possible, based on the evidence available. The introduction of closed material proceedings is undoubtedly the most controversial part of this legislation, and the Opposition accept that there are rare occasions when their use will be necessary. We cannot continue to accept a situation in which the Government are forced to settle claims because they are unable to adduce evidence without compromising vital national security evidence.
In the other place, the noble Baroness Manningham-Buller spoke passionately about the need for the security services to be able to protect their standing in the eyes of the public and for dedicated security staff not to have their reputation traduced because there was no mechanism for challenging allegations. However, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) explained earlier, we had serious concerns about the scope of closed material proceedings as proposed in the Green Paper and again in the Bill as it was first presented to the Lords. We are pleased that the Government have listened to the strength of feeling expressed in the other place and by the Opposition, and that they have now indicated they will not seek to overturn all the Lords amendments. As I said earlier, we look forward to the debate in Committee.
The Bill also introduces limits on the courts’ ability to demand the release of information, following on from the principles developed in the case of Norwich Pharmacal. That case established the principle that an innocent third party could be forced to disclose information to enable an action to be taken against another party. In the case of Binyam Mohamed, this principle was extended to cover issues of national security. We know that the then Foreign Secretary stated that the release of such information was likely to cause real damage to both national security and international relations. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism, David Anderson, QC, has now presented several examples where evidence has not been freely given to the United Kingdom because of the danger of its being released into the public domain. Several members of the Intelligence and Security Committee have raised this and confirmed that it is a problem, too.
I think there is an acceptance on both sides of the House, although not by all Members on either side, that this situation is unacceptable. The Opposition accept there is a pressing need to reassert the control principle, to ensure that foreign Governments can be confident that any information passed to the UK Government will remain in the hands of the Executive. We will therefore support the Government in their attempts to prevent the disclosure of information under the Norwich Pharmacal principles where the information is sensitive, and where its release might compromise our relations with foreign allies. The Opposition have concerns, however, about the breadth of the current definition of sensitive information and we hope to persuade the Government in Committee that the control principle can be protected within a narrower definition.
Finally, let me return to part 1. Although it is perhaps not as controversial as part 2, it is equally important, strengthening both the oversight and the public standing of the security services—aims behind which the whole House can unite. In emphasising why public support is so important to the security agencies, I refer again to the noble Baroness Manningham-Buller who drew on her own considerable experience to say in the other place:
“The support of members of the public is necessary not only in terms of general support for the organ of government but because, to do their work the agencies require that support every day of the week. They need the public to join them as recruits…they need them as sources of information, and they need them to help in whatever way possible...Therefore, when we talk about public opinion, the services require the help of the public to do their job and, in my experience, they get it.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 9 July 2012; Vol. 738, c. 932-33.]
Like the noble Baroness, the Opposition believe that public support for the security agencies will be enhanced by greater openness and scrutiny. For this reason, the Opposition support the Government in what they are attempting to do in strengthening the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Indeed, we would like to see the Government be far bolder in recasting the role of the ISC to improve public understanding and scrutiny.
Let me deal with two further issues. One is about the Bill’s wording in respect of ongoing oversight, and I am sure we will spend some time in Committee looking at whether that wording is correct. The second is the call for further resources to allow the ISC to take on these additional roles. We also hope that we will be able to work with the Government in Committee to extend the Bill’s provisions in three ways.
First, we would like to see annual public hearings with the head of each security agency. In the US, such hearings are a well-established part of the congressional oversight of the security agencies, and perform a vital role in educating the public about the work the intelligence services carry out. I do not see why the same role could not be performed in the UK.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
The hon. Lady and the House may be interested to know that the ISC has decided—it has the agreement of both the Government and the agencies—to hold its first public hearing, probably some time in the early part of next year. If it is seen to be successful, it should indeed become a regular event.
Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee for giving us that information. It seems very positive that the first item on our shopping list is going to happen.
Diana Johnson
Ah! Secondly, we would like to see the ISC hold pre-appointment hearings for the agency heads. The Labour Government pioneered such hearings for other public appointments, including permanent secretaries, and we now feel it is right to extend these hearings to security agencies.
Thirdly, we would like to see the ISC operate under the protection of parliamentary privilege and be able to take evidence under oath. The Opposition believe that the only way to guarantee parliamentary privilege is to make the ISC a Select Committee. To confer parliamentary privilege by means of an Act of Parliament would make it subject to legal challenge. That is unacceptable, particularly as witnesses might divulge sensitive information to the Committee, believing it to be subject to privilege, only for that to be overruled by the courts.
We accept that there would be practical problems in the creation of the ISC as a Select Committee, and that foremost among them is the need for its members to be vetted and approved. We hope to work with the Government to find a solution to that problem during the Bill’s Committee stage.
In the other place, the Government’s further reasons for opposing the creation of the Select Committee were unconvincing. Lord Taylor’s arguments seemed to focus on the difference between statute and Standing Orders. If the ISC were recast as a Select Committee, the rules and procedures needed to safeguard the special nature of its proceedings would be determined by Standing Order. If it were created as a new type of quasi-parliamentary entity, its rules would be enshrined in statute. The Minister said that that extra protection was essential, as a Standing Order could be amended by a single vote in the House. The implication seemed to be that that would enable the rules to be altered on a whim.
I think that it does Parliament a great disservice to suggest that either House might make such a serious decision without proper consideration. On the basis of my experience of pushing for the modernisation of Parliament and for reform of its sitting hours, I can say that I have found it extremely reluctant to alter any of its Standing Orders without very good reason and evidence; and I hope that the Minister has been convinced by the serious nature of today’s debate, and the series of debates in the other place, that it cannot possibly be said that Parliament does not afford these matters the full seriousness that they deserve.
Let me finally reiterate the Opposition’s support for the aims that the Government are pursuing. We think that the Bill is far better as a result of the amendments made in the other place. In Committee, we will work to extend the provisions of part 1 to protect the amendments to part 2 that were made in the other place, and to restrict the definition of sensitive information. I look forward to working with the Minister. I know how seriously he takes the views of other Members, and I hope that we shall be able to reach a consensus on the best way to proceed.