Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Luke Evans and Alex Ballinger

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

In answer to the intervention by the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp), there is more than one veteran on the Labour Benches. I wonder what the veterans from the Conservative party who went through 11 rounds of negotiations under the previous Government were saying; they clearly supported this decision at that point, and there were clear reasons for doing so.

This is not an exercise in process; it is about whether this House chooses to protect on firm, enforceable terms an overseas base that is fundamental to British security and our closest alliances. Diego Garcia is a critical asset for the UK and our allies. It supports counter-terrorism, monitors hostile state activity, and enables the rapid deployment of UK and US forces across regions that matter deeply to our national interest. Those opposing the Bill need to be clear about what they are opposing. They are opposing a treaty that secures the base for 99 years with full operational freedom, one that is backed by our allies and was negotiated substantially under the previous Government.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman be supporting Lords amendment 1, given that he has just specified that the base needs to be used for military purposes? If that use becomes impossible, because the islands go under water, for example—which is a real risk—would he want to carry on paying for the deal?

[Alex Ballinger]

I will not be supporting Lords amendment 1, because it would require renegotiation. We already have a joint commission to deal with issues that arise, and international treaty law would provide routes to termination if we were in that sort of situation, so the amendment is not necessary at all. I will come back to this question later in my speech.

If we refused to comply, others—international organisations and partners—would not ignore any provisional measures that were put in place, undermining the practical operation of the base. That is the same reason that negotiations were started under the last Government, and the treaty contains safeguards that are not decorative, but operationally vital. The UK will control installations and the electromagnetic spectrum; we will control a buffer zone of 24 nautical miles, within which nothing can be built without UK consent; and there will be a strict ban on any foreign military or security presence on the outer islands. Those are precisely the kinds of protections that make the base secure, usable and resilient against interference.

As we are in the Chamber today to consider the Lords amendments, I will go through each in turn. Lords amendment 1 would require renegotiation so that the UK can stop payments if it cannot use the base. On the surface, as others have mentioned, this may sound prudent, but it is a recipe for uncertainty and delay at the very moment that we need clarity. The treaty already establishes a joint commission to deal with issues as they arise, and international treaty law provides routes to termination if an indispensable object for execution permanently disappears. The amendment adds risk, not security, undermining confidence in the treaty framework that we need to keep the base operational.

Lords amendments 2 and 3 were rejected by Mr Speaker. Lords amendment 4 deals with the procedure for orders under clause 6 of the Bill. It is a Government amendment; responding to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, it provides appropriate parliamentary procedure. It strengthens scrutiny and is a sensible refinement to how the Bill operates, and this House should support it.

Lords amendment 5, which deals with the publication of the total costs and methodology, is duplicative. The Government published full details of the financial arrangements on the day that the treaty was signed, including the relevant explanatory material. The methodology is clear: it uses the Office for Budget Responsibility’s inflation forecasts to calculate the average annual figures, and those figures have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department. The House of Commons Library reached the same conclusion, and the Office for Statistics Regulation has welcomed this approach. The amendment is not about transparency; it is about rerunning an argument we have had time and again in this House, including through I do not know how many urgent questions.

Lords amendment 6 deals with Commons votes to cease payments if Mauritius breaches the treaty. This would require additional parliamentary steps on anticipated expenditure.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Luke Evans and Alex Ballinger

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his speech earlier, although he is no longer in this place. We have heard clearly from those on the Opposition Benches that they are opposed to this deal, so it is first worth outlining what sort of deal they are opposed to. They are opposed to a deal that secures our vital national interest on probably the most important base in the country’s history in the Indian ocean. They are opposed to a deal that is supported by every one of our Five Eyes closest security partners. As we have heard from many of them, they are opposed to a deal that they spent 11 rounds negotiating over two years, and we have not quite heard from them why they started negotiating that deal in the first place. They spent 11 rounds negotiating it, but they have not yet told us—the shadow Minister or otherwise—why they felt it was necessary and why they think this Government might have come to the same conclusion as they did at that time. I believe, as many of us do on the Government Benches, that that dangerous rhetoric puts the security of our base in Diego Garcia at risk. It is playing politics with our national security.

I want to take us back in history for one moment to look at a similar situation. During the second world war, the UK established another airfield in the Indian ocean known as RAF Gan. RAF Gan was the southernmost island in the Maldives, and it was secured in 1942 by the Royal Navy, and then taken over by the Air Force, to secure our operations all across the Indian ocean into the far east, combating the Japanese threat we were facing there. It was such a successful base that the Japanese did not even discover its existence until close to the end of the war, once their expansion plans had ended. Later, in the cold war, it became a vital staging post for the UK and our allies to get our forces across to Singapore and other bases in the far east. In fact, my father served there in 1974, and it was a great shame that two years later we closed that base and handed it over to the Maldivian Government at the same time that we secured our base in Diego Garcia.

I mention that case in particular because it was a vital strategic secure base of ours in a similar situation to Diego Garcia. As soon as the Maldivian Government took possession of that base, the Russians began to exert influence to try to take it over. They were attempting to take over the base that we occupied—that we spent decades developing—and turn it into a secure base for the Soviet Union. They are doing exactly the same thing again on Diego Garcia. They are trying to influence the Mauritian Government to claim the base for their own use.

[Dr Evans]

Is this not the point that we have heard time and again from Government Members? This deal runs out in 99 years, and at that point Mauritius can simply close the base or hand it on to the biggest offer. We get first rights on it, but if the Chinese decide to invest hundreds of billions, we may not be able to match that. We are over a barrel. In 100 years’ time, people will be in this place having this exact debate saying, “How do we solve this problem?” Is the hon. Member as concerned about that as I am?

[Alex Ballinger]

I go back to the example of RAF Gan. The Maldivians refused the Soviet Union back in 1976, because the UK had a good reputation with them. We honoured our agreements and respected international law, and they felt that it was inappropriate for them to be seen to be supporting a country that had not done the same.

In the case of Diego Garcia, this is a situation that has been negotiated for many years. The Conservatives recognised that there was a threat to our sovereignty, because they started the negotiations. As we have heard from my hon. Friends, if we are unable to conclude a deal soon, there is a serious risk that our operations at the base would be thwarted. It would not be in 99 or 140 years after the deal; it would be in weeks or months.