Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLuke Evans
Main Page: Luke Evans (Conservative - Hinckley and Bosworth)Department Debates - View all Luke Evans's debates with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Professor Tomkins: The states in the United States that have pursued anti-BDS legislation have probably gone further than anybody else I am aware of, although perhaps there are jurisdictions that I am not aware of; my research has been restricted to the United States, France and the UK. There would be, I think, significant human rights implications for the United Kingdom, given its commitments under the ECHR, were the UK to pursue the sort of anti-BDS policy that we see in some of those states. I think some significant article 10 issues would arise in relation to that sort of policy. I cannot speak for the Government, but that might very well be why the UK Government have elected not to proceed with that sort of policy.
The approach that the French authorities have been taking is very different, again, from what the present Bill envisages. The French seem to have seen the issue much more as one of public order and freedom of assembly, and are going directly after those who engage in anti-BDS demonstrations and protests in France. What we have in front of us is a Bill that is much more carefully—certainly much more narrowly—targeted on the two specific areas where public authorities in the UK, unfortunately in my view, have engaged in anti-BDS campaigning targeted at Israel and the occupied territories with regard to investment and procurement decisions.
This is not a general “Let’s ban BDS” Bill, or even a specific one with regard to public authorities. It is specifically and carefully targeted at the two core areas where, historically in the UK, public bodies have engaged in anti-BDS activities with regard to Israel when it comes to procurement and investment. Because it is carefully targeted for the UK, my answer to your question is that for the UK this is the best Bill.
Q
I have a wider question for the whole panel. This is written in the negative, in the sense that it indicates political or moral disapproval for foreign states. Do the panel have any thoughts about writing it neutrally, so that neither the pro nor the anti side fit in? In other words, a public body should not get involved in these kinds of arguments at all. Is that a position you agree with, Professor Tettenborn?
Professor Tettenborn: That is a very good question. Speaking as a professor in an ivory tower, I would immediately agree with you; speaking as a practical man, I would say that you are making a rod for your back if you start imposing abstract legal obligations of neutrality. I think it makes enforcement far easier and life far more difficult for clever lawyers if you do what is done in this Bill: “Thou shalt not say that you disapprove of a particular regime.” I do not think there is a problem of local authorities saying, “We think Venezuela is the best thing since sliced bread, and we will do whatever.” The Bill does answer the mischief.
Q
Francis Hoar: There is an argument, and you have made it, but I do not think that it is a good enough argument for legislating, because you need to be very careful when you are legislating in respect of what is enforceable. Adam has given some examples of quite extreme—I think very extreme—classically American approaches that go very far down the line in terms of enforcement in another direction, in respect of companies that have or do not have dealings with Israel. To require and enforce neutrality would go far further than is needed. The mischief that the Bill addresses is the divestment campaign, based on political objectives that are potentially contrary to UK foreign policy, and that is where it should lie.
I just want to put down a marker that—if you will allow me, Dame Caroline—I have something to say about legal professional privilege.
Yes, but do keep an eye on the clock, because there are two more Members who have indicated that they want to ask a question, and we have only 10 more minutes.
Francis Hoar: Thank you. On legal professional privilege, the answer is not quite as straightforward as has perhaps been represented. I think that the Government’s line is that the answer is in clause 7(9), which is to defer to the data protection legislation. The Data Protection Act 2018 has various provisions that restrict the requirement to provide legally professionally privileged information. For example, schedule 11 has a tailor-made restrictive provision:
“The listed provisions do not apply to personal data that consists of…information in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege…could be maintained”.
I think legal professional privilege is extremely important; I entirely agree with Mr Norris about that. Obviously local authorities and other public bodies will be receiving advice on what could be quite complicated circumstances. I think it would be far more straightforward, though, to mirror that legislation in clause 7: you could just add a provision copied straight from paragraph 9 of schedule 11 to the 2018 Act. That is what I suggest that Parliament should do.
Professor Tettenborn: You will get exactly the same answer from me—he has taken the words out of my mouth.
Q
Professor Tettenborn: That is a very interesting point, if I may say so. There might be a simple way around it: we could have an extra subsection in clause 4 that said, “Nothing in this Act affects the right of any member of a public authority to speak in a private capacity.” Just saying it out loud provides a safe harbour; it means that people do not have to go to a lawyer to look up a law, or at least they do not have to go to so many lawyers. I think that might be helpful.
Professor Tomkins: I share everybody’s concern that we must take freedom of speech very seriously—I think that that is a very important set of concerns to raise—but there are two things to say.
First, what Professor Tettenborn has just described is already the state of the law. The way in which we approach rights under the Human Rights Act is that rights are stated generally, and any exceptions to those rights must be narrowly tailored and stated specifically. If there is doubt or ambiguity, it falls on the side of the right, not on the side of the exception. That is already, in broad terms, the legal position through the United Kingdom—as it should be, in my view. Adding extra words to clause 4 to deliver that effect will not have any effect, because it is already the legal position.
I remind the Committee that clause 4 is very narrow in scope: all it says is that somebody who is subject to section 1 may not say that they would have made a procurement decision or an investment decision different from the procurement decision or investment decision that they have made, by force of this legislation. It seems to me that all the members of this panel are of the view that that is perfectly compatible with article 10 of the ECHR, for all the reasons that we have rehearsed; and if it is compatible with article 10 of the ECHR, it is also compatible, I think, with our domestic standards with regard to free speech. For all those reasons, and notwithstanding the fact that I take free speech incredibly seriously, I genuinely do not think that there is a free speech issue with regard to this Bill.