Ajax Programme

Luke Charters Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. I congratulate the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) on introducing the debate, and thank him for his service in the Royal Yorkshire Regiment. May I take the House back to a visit I made to the NATO Forward Land Forces contribution as part of Operation Cabrit? I spent time in a Challenger 2 tank, and what was most impressive was not the size, the armour or the firepower, but the complete confidence that its crew had in the vehicle. Ajax was meant to deserve and earn the same trust. Before I come on to the failures in the programme, however, I want to say something about the workers in south Wales: they deserve credit for their graft and determination, not blame.

The Public Accounts Committee, of which I was previously a member, has made it clear what went wrong. It found that the programme was over-specified from the outset, with about 1,200 individual requirements imposed on what was supposedly an adapted off-the-shelf design. In reality, Ajax was neither off-the-shelf nor fully bespoke, and what was in between was far riskier. Never again must defence procurements over-specify requirements; that should be a red flag right from the start. Computer models were relied upon to assess vibration and noise rather than vigorous early testing. The Public Accounts Committee found that that approach had failed, and that the Department at the time did not fully understand the vehicle’s characteristics before subjecting soldiers to trials. Our armed forces should never have been used as human guinea pigs.

The independent Sheldon review is more damning: it found a culture in which bad news was softened as it travelled up the management chain. Senior leaders were left without a clear, honest picture of what was really happening. I thank all the soldiers who stepped forward to raise safety concerns. Despite the warnings that were given, the safety notices that were issued and the whistleblowers who came forward, GD repeatedly underplayed the scale of those issues, so it is reasonable to ask a simple question: if the design ultimately lay with the contractor, would the chief executive officer of GD be happy to have their son or daughter sent on to a battlefield in an Ajax? If those design failures did rest with GD, the taxpayer should not be left carrying the cost of retrofit.

I will touch briefly on defence exports. We must learn lessons from those abroad, particularly Leopard, which is a main battle tank. That platform was modular, upgradeable and interoperable, which meant it was a much stronger prospect for our defence export. When it comes to procurement, we should always bear defence exports in mind.

There are wider lessons too for the forthcoming defence investment plan, which must make a decisive break. We need a system that is capable of designing and testing earlier on, rather than one that rushes into production in the hopes that problems can be fixed later on. Ajax must be a turning point, not just for this vehicle, but for how we procure defence capability in this country in the future.

My hon. Friend the Minister is one of the most impressive forces in British politics; if he can climb Mount Everest in just five days—to raise money for our veterans, no less—I have no doubt about his ability to get to grips with one of the most challenging problems facing defence procurement today.