Legal Advice: Prorogation

Luciana Berger Excerpts

Wednesday 25th September 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

As to my hon. Friend’s first question, I say that, plainly, if one re-examines the historical records, there is no doubt that there would have been some—possibly quite a few— Prorogations that, under this test, might have had difficulty in passing. For example, Ramsay MacDonald prorogued this Parliament in 1930 for some months, during the course of a minority Government, at a time when the great Wall Street Crash had happened in 1929 and when I have no doubt that some would have said that the House should sit to determine the onset of the great depression and debate those important matters, but the courts looked on—they looked on impassively—as that Labour Government decided to prorogue. It happened again in 1948 and right up into the 1990s when it was said that a Parliament had been prorogued in order to avoid an embarrassing Select Committee inquiry. From now on, when a Prime Minister has to prorogue Parliament, he will have to look at all the Select Committees, see what inquiries they are doing and which Chairmen of which Select Committees might say in a mortally wounded and offended manner, “Why, to prorogue and not to allow my Select Committee to report is a matter of public importance, for which I will go to court and stop the Prorogation.” I do think that this test set by the Supreme Court invites quite a number of significant questions.

[Luciana Berger (Liverpool, Wavertree) (LD)]

The Attorney General has told us that he does not agree with the judgment and that he argued against it. If that is the case and the Attorney General was so convinced that Prorogation was lawful, why did not he and the Government provide a witness statement to the Supreme Court to make that case?

[The Attorney General]

There are all kinds of reasons why, in judicial reviews, witness statements are not given in cases of this kind. I cannot discuss the internal counsels of the preparations of a legal case because, as I am sure the hon. Lady understands, they are covered by the wholly appropriate legal professional privilege.

Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

Luciana Berger Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Jane Ellison]

That is a useful point to draw out about other parts of this important Bill.

It is for the House to decide whether it wants to place the commitment to a further review on a statutory footing by supporting new clause 25.

As is the convention with such issues of conscience, as a Government we do not take a position either for or against new clauses 1 and 25. If the matter is pressed to a Division, Government Members will have a free vote. However, I hope that it has been helpful to hon. Members in forming their own opinion on these two new clauses for me to set out the Government’s actions to date in this area, the facts in relation to the gestations at which most abortions are performed, and the concerns raised by professional bodies. As I have said, it is for the House to decide whether it wants to support either of the new clauses, or indeed both or neither of them, but I reiterate that abortion of a foetus on the grounds of gender alone is already illegal.

[Luciana Berger (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab/Co-op)]

The impassioned speeches that we have heard in this debate are testament to what a sensitive and complex matter this is. New clause 1 would amend the Abortion Act 1967 and proposes that a pregnancy could not

“be terminated on the grounds of the sex of the unborn child.”

New clause 25 would require a review of the evidence relating to abortion on the grounds of gender alone and for this to be followed by a strategic Government plan that addresses concerns about the prevalence of termination on the grounds of the sex of the foetus in England, Scotland and Wales.

I am in favour of new clause 25 as the best way to address concerns about sex-selective abortions. Outwardly, the intentions behind new clause 1 might seem reasonable. However, a wide range of well-respected organisations and experts have raised concerns, pointing out a number of unintended and troubling consequences. The organisations include the Royal College of Midwives, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the British Medical Association, the TUC, the End Violence Against Women Coalition, Genetic Alliance UK, Imkaan and the Southall Black Sisters, among many others.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Luciana Berger]

I am going to continue because we have a lot to get through and many Members wish to speak.

New clause 1 represents a significant departure from the current principles on which abortion law in this country is based. Given that this is a matter of huge significance, the new clause deserves fuller debate and scrutiny than we have the opportunity for in the remaining 24 minutes of this debate.

Choosing to terminate a pregnancy simply because the foetus one is carrying is not the sex one wishes for is a notion that most people find abhorrent. As the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) confirmed, sex-selective abortion is already illegal under the Abortion Act 1967.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

Will the hon. Lady give way on that point?

[Luciana Berger]

If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I am not going to take his intervention.

The Government, along with the chief medical officer, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, and the Royal College of Midwives, have said that abortions carried out on the sole premise of foetal sex are illegal. As we have heard, updated guidance and instructions to doctors published within the past 12 months have clarified this. All independent sector providers have also agreed to follow the revised guidance as part of their licensing agreements. Let me be clear: we do not need new clause 1 to make sex-selective abortion illegal. However, it is right that we should send a strong message from this Parliament that gender-selective abortions are wrong. We can do that today by requiring the Government to carry out a thorough assessment and produce an action plan to address the root causes of this practice. That is what new clause 25 would do.

The change to the law proposed in new clause 1 would not only fail to address the root issues that lie behind the problem but have serious unintended consequences. I listened closely to the hon. Member for Congleton and to the former Attorney-General, the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), but I point to the text of new clause 1, which it is worth reading out:

“Nothing in section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 is to be interpreted as allowing a pregnancy to be terminated on the grounds of the sex of the unborn child.”

It says that nothing is to be so interpreted, so that includes medical grounds, the well-being of the mother, and gender-specific abnormalities. At best, this would create uncertainty and doubt for doctors who administer abortions in these situations and a legal grey area for women who are already facing a very difficult decision. I heard the former Attorney-General’s intervention, but I have listened to many legal experts who have written on the pages of many papers—

[Mr Grieve]

I appreciate that there may be policy arguments and all sorts of good arguments to make, but it is simply incorrect to argue that the new clause would have the consequences that have been claimed of preventing, for example, abortion from taking place where, because of the gender, there was a likelihood of disability. The Minister confirmed that. She was a bit hesitant about it, but she eventually did so when I intervened on her, so I repeat her assurance. My view is that this argument is completely groundless.

[Luciana Berger]

I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his intervention, but, as we have heard, many legal experts dispute that position. I refer to the specific text of the new clause, which says nothing about, and is in direct conflict with, paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 1(1) of the Abortion Act.

The Genetic Alliance has said that

“the consequences of this amendment could be devastating to women and couples at risk of having a child affected by a serious x-linked condition.”

I have heard from one family where two sisters were carriers of x-linked severe combined immunodeficiency, a disease that affects only boys. After years of thinking, one sister decided not to have any children, because she did not want to risk the chance of having to choose between having a very poorly son or a termination. Her sister decided—also after many years of consideration—to have children and went on to have three healthy daughters. Those were the choices that those women made after much consideration and deliberation with their families. How can Parliament take that decision away from them? I am sure that no one would wish to deprive their daughter, sister or partner of that choice. It is surely not for Parliament to rush this through in the short time available and deny families the opportunity to have children or a healthy baby.

Another serious concern is that new clause 1 is not just a clarification of the law, but a fundamental reform of the essential principles on which existing abortion law in this country been based for 47 years. The Abortion Act 1967 places the physical and mental health of the woman as the overriding concern of a doctor authorising abortion. Our current legislation refers to the foetus rather than the unborn child. That is because, across our legislation and common law, children are accorded a wide range of protections and rights that Parliament has previously agreed should not be accorded to the foetus.

Changing the language of the Abortion Act, as this new clause would do, would send a very different signal to the courts and open up different judicial interpretations of abortion or new consequences and restrictions that would go far beyond the issue of sex selection. For the first time since legislation in 1929, new clause 1, if passed, could afford the foetus rights that would be in conflict with those of the mother and it could seriously jeopardise the future of safe, legal abortion in the UK.

[Fiona Bruce]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Luciana Berger]

I am not going to give way. I am going to wrap up, because I am conscious of the time and Madam Deputy Speaker wants me to conclude.

There are many other points that I would have liked to address, particularly the issue of custom and practice and why new clause 25 addresses the issue of coercion in communities, which is something we all want to deal with.

Voting against new clause 1 is not an indication of support for sex-selective practices, but an acknowledgement that it would do nothing to address the causes or reduce the incidences of sex-selective abortion and that some serious negative unintended consequences would result from enacting this proposed change to the Serious Crime Bill.

Few people would support the idea that families should be able to have abortions on the grounds of gender alone. That is why it is illegal under our current law. New clause 1 represents a significant departure from the current principles on which abortion law in this country is based. Instead, new clause 25 would require a review of the evidence relating to abortion on the grounds of gender alone, to ensure that we have a full understanding of the practice and the extent of the problem, and for that to be followed by a Government strategy to tackle it accordingly, based on the evidence of what works. I sincerely hope that Members on both sides of the House will vote against new clause 1 and in support of new clause 25.

[Mr Burrowes]

It is important that we try as far as possible to develop a consensus on subjects such as this. Everyone across the House is against abortion on the grounds of gender alone. We have communicated that view, the Government have written it in guidance and we want to make it clear in statute. It is as simple as that. We do not seek to have a Trojan horse or to upgrade the status of the unborn child. On that point, one simply needs to look at section 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967, which refers to “child” as a legal term, so that definition is not unknown.

We could support new clause 25, which aims to develop further research and have a plan, but it is not an alternative to new clause 1. Yes, we should develop more understanding and evidence, but we should not ignore the main point of this debate, which is what brought together more than 50 Members from both sides of the House—whether they were pro-choice or pro-life—when they signed a letter in 2013. Some of them have now signed different new clauses and are seeking to divide one another when we should be coming together to show that we want to clear up the law.

We have talked about different legal experts. Why not take one, Keir Starmer, the then Director of Public Prosecutions? On 7 October 2013, he said:

“The law does not…expressly prohibit gender-specific abortions”.

That no doubt came as a surprise to many members of the public. To put it simply, that is what new clause 1 is about—it would expressly prohibit such abortions. What does the law do? As Keir Starmer went on, rather the law

“prohibits any abortion carried out without two medical practitioners having formed a view, in good faith, that the health risks of continuing with a pregnancy outweigh those of termination.”

Kevin Williams

Luciana Berger Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd February 2012 Westminster Hall

[Luciana Berger (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab/Co-op)]

I pay tribute to Anne Williams, Kevin’s mother, for the incredible courage and determination that she has shown in the pursuit of justice for her son. All of us here hope that today marks the beginning of the end of what has been a long battle for her and her family. I congratulate the hon. Member for City of Chester (Stephen Mosley) on securing the debate and my hon. Friend the Member for Sefton Central (Bill Esterson) on the important role that he played in ensuring that it took place. I also pay tribute to the 118,000 members of the public who signed the petition. I echo the comments made by some of my hon. Friends; this debate should be taking place in the main Chamber this afternoon.

Much of what I wanted to say has already been said by the hon. Member for City of Chester in his forensic remarks at the beginning of the debate and by many other hon. Members who have spoken before me. Like all of them, I welcome the fact that the Attorney-General has agreed to look at the applications made to his predecessors, and to consider whether to support an application to the High Court for a new inquest into Kevin’s death. I urge him to make that application, please.

To many of us here, the evidence is conclusive. We have heard the chronology of events on 15 April 1989 in detail from the hon. Member for City of Chester, and from the BBC tapes, we have heard from PC Michael Craighill, Mr Bruder and WPC Debra Martin. It is clear that their visual evidence alone contradicts the original verdict, and when it is added to the evidence that discredits Dr Slater’s conclusion at the inquest—evidence that has already been mentioned—the strength of the case is overwhelming. I sincerely hope that the weight of all this evidence, along with the clear inaccuracies of the original inquiry, will convince the Attorney-General to recommend a new inquest.

It is sometimes suggested by some in the media or by those who are not connected with the terrible events of Hillsborough that it is time to draw a line under what happened on that fateful day in April 23 years ago, that it would be better not to rake up the past, or that the families of those who lost their lives that day should he spared from reliving their trauma. However, those of us here today who have met the families of the 96 victims, or who knew people who were at Hillsborough or who were even at the ground themselves, know the deep sense of injustice felt by so many people about what happened then and afterwards. We know that it simply would not be right to draw a line, not while families still have questions that deserve to be answered, not until the full truth of what happened at Hillsborough is known, and not until justice has finally been served.