Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment. He made some important points in his contribution, including his reference to the Kicks programme. He also pointed out an event in his area where he was able to see the Premier League trophy; that is a fantastic tour involving lots of grassroots and other clubs. I was really pleased to visit one such club in Mr Speaker’s Chorley constituency, and I will take this opportunity to wish Mr Speaker a very happy birthday. I am sure that other Committee members will join me in putting that on the record.

We do not believe, however, that the change in amendment 137 is necessary. I will outline why and respond throughout my speech to some of the hon. Gentleman’s points. As drafted, the Bill gives flexibility to a club to detail what action it is taking to contribute

“to the economic and social well-being of the local community with which it is associated”.

This provision was introduced through a Government amendment made in the other place to allow the regulator to include clubs’ community contributions in its corporate governance code. The regulator will work with the industry to design the code to ensure that it is relevant to clubs, the challenges they face and the unique nature of the responsibilities associated with custodianship of a football club.

If a club details, in its statement, its work with or through its official charity, that would of course be accepted by the regulator. That is the opposite of what the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup said. He referred to scaling back charity work, but that is absolutely not what we will see as a result of the proposals.

Let me detail some of the specifics. If a club is donating to or funding bodies that are not its official charity, that is also a contribution to the community and could be included. We have tried to keep this as broad as possible. To share something from my constituency and town, Barnsley FC Community Trust is a great example of a charity that is closely connected to a club. The community trust held its conference on Monday, and I was pleased to send them a message. One purpose of that conference was to raise the charity’s profile across Barnsley. It helps between 10,000 and 15,000 people each year, who range in age from two to 100 years old. I will not detain the Committee by outlining the work that the trust does, but it ranges from education to health, social inclusion and sports participation, not just in and around the centre connected to Oakwell, but across the whole of Barnsley and my Barnsley South constituency.

Barnsley FC could use their work with the trust to show how they contribute to the economic and social wellbeing of their community, and I put on record that they very much do that in my area. But it is not just Barnsley FC that do such work; many clubs carry out great work in their communities, whether through their official charities or not. Portsmouth FC’s Pompey in the Community and the Sheffield Wednesday FC Community Programme are just two examples; I am sure that hon. Members across the Committee have examples from their communities. It is important to shine a light on those contributions to the local community, and that is why a club’s report on their corporate governance will be published online to allow public scrutiny, so that they can be held accountable for their actions, or inaction. We believe that this will encourage transparency and, as with the approach to corporate governance more widely, encourage greater action in this space.

Above all, that approach will allow flexibility for each club to comply in accordance with their resources and size in a way that is suited to the needs of their local community. Additionally, when the regulator publishes its corporate governance report on clubs, best practice can be shared with the industry. We therefore believe that the Bill, as drafted, sufficiently allows clubs to demonstrate the actions they contribute to their communities. I hope that the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw his amendment.

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

It is a privilege to speak again under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I congratulate you and the city of Hull on the Challenge cup victory at the weekend, which probably does not please Mr Speaker on his birthday, but such is sport.

Moving back to football, before the lunch break, I explained why the Opposition felt the need for amendment 137. It is a technical amendment that would make it very clear that the official charities and trusts of the clubs would count towards the corporate governance structure. I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and appreciate the feedback that she has given. However, we would still like to see the amendment made to provide clarity to clubs, so we will press it to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment 131. Football is a worldwide industry, and the activity of football agents continues to be a significant contributor to the financial pressures on English football, as well as internationally. We recognise that this is a key issue, which is frequently raised by the industry. Agent fees are a significant cost pressure, particularly on clubs in the Premier League and the Championship. The largest fees are often paid in international transfer activity, where regulation is especially difficult without a global framework. There are also concerns about dual representation and conflicts of interest, which can further inflate costs.

However, the regulator cannot be the solution for all of football’s woes. The Bill establishes a club licensing regime with a tightly defined scope, in which agents are not included. The fan-led review recognised that and recommended pursuing an international and game-wide solution to football agents, rather than trying to address the issue in isolation. Acting unilaterally may end up being disadvantageous to English football. It is right that we follow the review’s recommendation not to try and address the issue in isolation, which reflects the unique scale and complexity of English football’s place in the global game.

I want to make it clear that the Government acknowledge the importance of this issue, and will continue to work with the industry on agents and fees. We will work closely with governing bodies to support full compliance once legal proceedings conclude in the courts, and to drive forward our shared ambition for transparency, integrity and best practice across the game. We will keep this issue under review, but for those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and acknowledge a number of the points that she made. The purpose behind the amendment was to have the discussion about the impact of fees on the game. I accept some of her points about the international nature of the transfer market. I would like to continue discussing this with her and the regulator once in situ, because I think there is something we can do here, either formally or informally, to move the game along so that it stops losing so much money to agents’ fees. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I beg to move amendment 64, in schedule 5, page 103, line 18, after “specified” insert

“from time to time by the IFR”.

This amendment clarifies that the IFR may specify certain elements of the mandatory licence conditions from time to time.

The regulator will attach four mandatory licence conditions—the financial plan, the corporate governance statement, a fan consultation and an annual declaration—to the operating licence, both provisional and full, of each club. This means that all licensed clubs will need to comply with those requirements.

While the mandatory conditions are basic requirements that apply to all licensed clubs as standard, elements within them can be varied. For example, the regulator can specify when a club must submit and update a financial plan, or require that a plan contains additional information. As another example, the fan consultation condition can require that clubs consult plans at specified periods, which speaks to a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East raised earlier.

Government amendment 64 simply makes it explicit that the regulator can respecify these elements to the mandatory licence conditions from time to time. The licensing regime is designed to be flexible and proportionate, and the mandatory licence conditions are no different. For instance, a Premier League club’s financial plan is likely to be more detailed than one for a National League club. If a club’s circumstances change—for instance, if it gets promoted or relegated—the regulator should have a chance to respecify the mandatory licence condition to ensure that it remains proportionate.

The regulator also needs to be able to keep pace with developments in the industry and changes in best practice —for example, if there are innovations in financial plans or mechanisms for fan engagement. Government amendment 64 simply makes that explicit in the Bill.

Amendment 64 agreed to.

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.

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[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause relates to the discretionary licence conditions. Where needed, the regulator will use discretionary licence conditions to bring a club up to the required level of compliance with the threshold requirements. That will mean that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently operate sustainably, and will be able to continue to continue to do so, in the financial, non-financial and fan engagement areas. Those conditions will be in addition to the standardised mandatory licence conditions. When applied, they will be tailored to the club’s specific circumstances and identified financial risk.

If a club is already meeting the threshold requirements set by the regulator, there will be no need to attach any discretionary licence conditions to that end. That means that the regulator can be light touch where appropriate, and that it does not need to directly intervene if a desired outcome is already being met.

Discretionary licence conditions could also be used to protect and promote the financial resilience of the football system. They will be used to resolve risks that might not threaten any one club significantly, but whose aggregated, correlated or multiplied effects may pose a significant risk to large parts of the football system or the pyramid as a whole. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

The clause formally sets out the regulator’s powers to attach, amend or remove discretionary licence conditions, which could bring a club toward meeting a threshold requirement or mitigate financial risks. It raises some concern about mission creep, so I hope the Minister will assure us that the regulator’s powers do not extend beyond those objectives. Should the regulator use the powers to effectively create new burdensome regulatory requirements, that would significantly change the purpose of the regulator.

Will the Minister please clarify what engagement the regulator will have with clubs to ensure they are aware of the discretionary licence conditions? Will there be any consultation or engagement with clubs prior to attaching or amending a discretionary condition? Will clubs have the ability to request a variation or removal of a condition? In what timeframe will that be processed?

If a club feels that a discretionary licence condition has been placed arbitrarily or punitively, how can it appeal or challenge the condition? What will the process look like, and what timescales will be used? Will the timescales be standardised, or will they be at the regulator’s discretion? Although some larger clubs may have the resources and budgets to appeal a condition, what support will be given to smaller clubs? Have the Government considered the potential merit of a tiered application based on the club’s size?

Aside from the concern about mission creep, it is important that these powers are exercised proportionately and based on evidence. Will there be any oversight of their use to ensure that happens? Subsection (4) states:

“The IFR may vary a discretionary licence condition where…the IFR considers that the condition is no longer effective, or…there has been a material change in circumstances”.

However, it fails to define what constitutes a material change in circumstances. The lack of such a definition leaves the door open for the Independent Football Regulator to vary conditions without sufficient reasons or evidence.

We ask those questions now because we are concerned about future legal cases if there is a lack of consistency and transparency surrounding how the conditions are applied. I would appreciate some answers from the Minister.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions. Throughout this process, we have been keen to reiterate that discretionary conditions must be proportionate to the club’s size and the league it plays in. We absolutely expect the regulator to engage thoroughly with a club before applying any discretionary licence conditions. Perhaps I could just draw on the conversation that we had in the previous debate in terms of fan engagement: I am hesitant to get into hypothetical scenarios, but it might be that, if a club is not effectively engaging with fans, that could be a discretionary licence condition if there is an obvious gap in what the club is doing. If the club does not believe the regulator has made a correct decision, it does have recourse through the appeals process, which is set out in part 9.

We want this to be a flexible regime so it can be light touch where appropriate. If the regulator does not need to attach extra conditions, it will not, but it will have that ability to make sure that all clubs are meeting the conditions they need to.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Scope of powers to attach or vary discretionary licence conditions

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 22, page 14, line 35, leave out subsection (a).

This amendment prevents the IFR from being able to set licence conditions relating to internal controls.

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[Mr French]

I rise to speak on clause 22 of this important Bill, which provides the Independent Football Regulator with powers to attach, amend and remove discretionary licence conditions for individual football clubs. At face value, this clause offers the regulator flexibility to respond to particular risks or circumstances on a case-by-case basis. However, as with all regulatory discretion, the true implications lie in how such powers may evolve over time, be interpreted, or be expanded.

In this Committee, it is our role to ensure that what begins as a sensible framework for tailored intervention does not become the thin end of a wedge that risks overreach, centralisation and, ultimately, the erosion of club autonomy. I believe strongly that English football does need reform in certain areas, but I also believe in restraint, clarity of purpose and fidelity to the principle that football clubs, however commercial they may have become, are civic institutions first and foremost. They belong to their communities, not to Whitehall, not to arm’s length bodies, and certainly not to ministerial discretion.

Clause 22, as drafted, gives the Independent Football Regulator a wide and open-ended ability to impose additional conditions on individual clubs—conditions that are not part of the baseline threshold requirements in the Bill, but which the regulator may, in its own judgment, decide are appropriate. We should acknowledge that there are circumstances in which such powers might be necessary. For example, where a club has narrowly avoided insolvency, has a particularly opaque ownership structure, or is operating under unusual financial pressures, the regulator may wish to impose temporary conditions to help safeguard the public interest, protect creditors or ensure better transparency.

That flexibility has its place. However, it must be anchored in the principles of proportionality, accountability and predictability. It is for that reason that I want to speak to three amendments that have been tabled in my name, each of which I believe would help materially improve the Bill by preventing mission creep, protecting the distinct role of the leagues, and ensuring that Parliament, not the Executive, retains the ultimate authority over the scope of regulation.

The first amendment would prevent the regulator from imposing discretionary conditions relating to a club’s internal controls—that is, the systems and procedures by which a club governs itself, monitors risks, approves spending and safeguards assets. These are matters properly for the board of directors, who have legal duties under company law, are accountable to shareholders and fans, and must answer to independent auditors.

To allow the regulator to second guess those internal arrangements and dictate how a club structures its finance team or risk-management processes would be a significant intrusion into corporate governance territory. Let us be clear: there is a distinction between requiring that a club has adequate systems and mandating the precise nature of those systems. The former is reasonable; the latter, we believe, is excessive.

We must also be mindful of the danger that the regulator could, perhaps with good intentions, begin to substitute its own preferred model of governance over the perfectly legitimate models that clubs themselves decide to adopt. For example, what works for a large Premier League club with international operations may not be appropriate or affordable for a League Two club or a community-owned side. Discretionary licensing conditions must not become a one-size-fits-all instrument that penalises innovation, tradition or diversity in club structures.

I support this amendment because it would help ringfence those areas of internal decision making that are rightly matters for the club’s board—subject to transparency and good practice but not for centralised prescription.

The second amendment that I have tabled would prevent the regulator from imposing licensing conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. Amendment 108 would prevent the regulator from imposing licence conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. This is a fundamental issue. English football operates within a competitive ecosystem, as we have discussed. Decisions about how much to invest in players, infrastructure, academies or commercial operations are matters of strategic importance for clubs. They should be driven by ambition, fan demand and commercial opportunity, not by the regulator’s view of what is appropriate spending.

We must not fall into the trap of conflating good financial regulation with financial central planning. The role of the Independent Football Regulator should be to monitor solvency, ensure robust business plans, enforce transparency and intervene when there are clear risks of harm. It is not the regulator’s job, and it should never become its job, to determine how much a club is allowed to spend. There is a world of difference between assessing whether spending is sustainable and attempting to control outright the volume of that spending.

Let us remember that the leagues themselves already impose cost controls. The Premier League has profit and sustainability rules. The English Football League enforces squad salary caps and financial fair play frameworks, and now has the new financial review panel. The regulator is not meant to replace those roles. It is not a shadow competition authority, nor should it seek to override club investment decisions, which often have complex justifications and long-term returns.

Amendment 108 would help to ensure that the regulator cannot use its discretionary power to micromanage investment levels. Such a step would go beyond the spirit and the letter of what the Bill intends to achieve. The goal is to protect clubs from existential risk, not to homogenise them or stifle ambition.

Amendment 109 would remove the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of discretionary licence conditions by regulation. This is not a technical point; it goes to the constitutional heart of the Bill. The Independent Football Regulator must be just that: independent. Its scope, duties and powers must be defined by Parliament and subject to oversight. We cannot accept a model in which future Secretaries of State, by regulation and with minimal scrutiny, can expand the areas the regulator may interfere with. That would allow a future Government of any colour to alter the regulatory perimeter at will. Today, it might be internal controls; tomorrow, it might be club ticket pricing, political messaging or hiring policies. The clause must be narrowed to ensure that any expansion of discretionary licence conditions comes through primary legislation that is debated and approved by both Houses.

Regulatory stability is vital not only for clubs but for fans, leagues and the broader football economy. Clubs, particularly those in the lower leagues, need to be able to plan over multiple seasons. Uncertainty about what new regulatory burdens might be imposed, or fears that the regime could be altered mid-season by ministerial decree, will have a chilling effect on investment, sponsorship and ambition. Regulation must be predictable and principled, not politicised or ever-shifting. Amendment 109 would safeguard its integrity.

Clause 22 presents a risk of regulatory overreach, however well-intentioned it may be. The amendments would not strip the regulator of useful tools. They would simply place guardrails around its discretion and ensure that decisions of fundamental importance to club governance, financial independence and regulatory scope remain where they belong: with clubs, fans and Parliament.

We need a regulator that enforces minimum standards, upholds transparency and ensures financial resilience. What we do not need is a regulator that micromanages club affairs or displaces the judgment of boards and owners. Football clubs must remain free to compete, to innovate and to fail or succeed on their own merits—within a fair framework, yes, but not under constant intervention.

The amendments reinforce that principle. They are not ideological; they are practical, measured and consistent with the values that underpin the Bill. I urge the Committee to support them and, in doing so, to send a clear signal that we are legislating not to control football but to support it firmly, fairly and with the long-term interests of the game at heart.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling the amendments, which I will take in turn in responding to the points that he made.

Broadly, amendments 107 and 108 concern integral powers for a financial regulator. Limiting those powers by reducing the scope of the regulator’s discretionary licence conditions would jeopardise its ability to achieve its objectives. On internal controls, the conditions cover areas such as the completeness and accuracy of reporting and information from a club, and continued compliance with the rules and regulations. If the regulator had no power to intervene to improve those areas where it was deemed necessary, it would not be able to bring a club up to its non-financial threshold requirement, and therefore the club would be unable to obtain a full operating licence.

Similarly, not allowing a financial regulator to require a club to limit its future expenditure to a sustainable amount, for example, would be self-defeating. This is a financial regulator, and it should have the power to intervene in a club’s finances if necessary, but—to respond directly to one of the points made by the shadow Minister —while it can direct the club to reduce expenditure, it cannot specify exactly how that is done, which is for the club to decide.

The regulator may only set licence conditions in such areas if a club is not meeting its threshold requirements. Any condition must be proportionate to the issue identified. The regulator must also have regard to whether the requirement or restriction is necessary and to whether a similar outcome could be achieved by a less burdensome means, as per the principles.

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[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 23 sets out the procedure for attaching or varying financial discretionary licence conditions on clubs, which ensures that clubs and competition organisers are notified and given the appropriate opportunity to engage in advance when the regulator considers that a discretionary licence condition is needed. Where appropriate, the regulator will look to allow the relevant club and league to address identified issues and risks, so that the regulator does not have to formally intervene itself. That will allow the potential for the football industry to respond to issues, reducing regulatory intervention and producing a better regulatory response and outcome. The industry may be best placed to address specific issues within the overall context of a league’s own regulatory framework.

Before any action is taken by the regulator, there will be a period in which leagues and clubs are able to make representations, and the competition organiser will also be able to give a commitment to take action in lieu of the condition being attached or varied as proposed by the regulator. Clause 24 explains in further detail the mechanism for commitments in lieu of discretionary financial licence conditions. It is a final, formal opportunity for competition organisers to offer a self-regulatory solution to a problem identified by the regulator, so that the regulator does not have to step in. It is another important aspect of the regulator’s approach, which emphasises engagement and working with the industry to minimise formal intervention where possible. The regulator will still have powers to step in if the issue is not resolved, but the mechanism will give a competition organiser the chance to present a football industry-led solution to an identified risk.

The regulator can accept a commitment if it concludes that it should achieve the same results as the proposed discretionary licence condition and it does not conflict with the regulator’s objectives. The regulator does not have to accept the commitment, although, if it does not, it must provide reasons why. If a commitment proposed by a league will not achieve the regulator’s desired outcome, the regulator can reject it, and it will retain the power to intervene directly by imposing a discretionary licence condition on a club where any accepted commitment proves ineffective.

Schedule 6 expands on clause 24 by outlining the procedure where a competition organiser gives a commitment that the regulator is minded to accept, or requests a variation to a commitment in force, in lieu of the regulator’s attaching a financial discretionary licence condition to a club. The intention, as I referenced earlier, is for commitments to provide a less burdensome solution for all parties and still address the identified risk. However, for that to be the case, it is important that there is a clear procedure for interaction between clubs, the relevant competition organisers and the regulator, and the schedule sets out that procedure in further detail. Clubs can make representations to the regulator before accepting a commitment from a competition organiser, as well as before a competition organiser is released from a commitment.

Clause 25 sets out the procedure for the regulator to attach or vary a discretionary licence condition relating to the non-financial resources threshold requirement or the fan engagement threshold requirement. The regulator must notify the club and give it a period of no less than 14 days to make representations, but the clause allows the regulator to take more immediate action in situations that are more urgent and serious: if it thinks that giving a club notice and allowing a period for representations will jeopardise or risk jeopardising one of its objectives, it can apply the discretionary licence condition immediately and without prior notice. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Clause 23 sets out the process that the Government’s new regulator must follow when it wishes to attach or vary a financial discretionary licence condition, which are by definition additional obligations that the regulator may impose on clubs that go beyond the mandatory licensing framework. In doing so, the clause confers on the regulator considerable further discretion. As with other discretionary powers in the Bill, the risk is not merely that the regulator uses its discretion, but that it does so inconsistently, unpredictably or in a way that strays beyond its core remit. Given that the powers provided by the clause relate directly to the financial obligations of clubs, the implications for competitiveness, investment and long-term planning are significant.

Although it is welcome that the clause does not set out a consultative process for how the financial conditions are imposed or amended, the process must not be a box-ticking exercise. Clubs should be able to challenge unreasonable conditions, and the regulator should be required to justify in clear terms why any new financial burden is necessary to meet the threshold requirements. It cannot become the case that discretionary conditions are routinely imposed as a back-door method of raising standards in areas for which Parliament has not explicitly legislated.

The risk of regulatory mission creep is particularly acute in a sector like football, in which the boundaries between finance, governance and culture are easily blurred. That is why we will be looking closely at whether there are sufficient checks, balances and transparency mechanisms in the clause to protect clubs from arbitrary financial conditions. Will the regulator issue any guidance on financial discretionary licence conditions, and will that guidance be made public? Will the Minister consider requiring an annual report to Parliament detailing how many clubs have had such discretionary financial conditions imposed, varied or removed, and on what grounds those decisions were made?

Without such checks, there is a real risk of an unequal competition taking place without fans and Parliament knowing, until it is too late and UEFA and FIFA have ejected us from their competitions. That is what I most fear may happen by accident. As we have discussed at length, the Bill is already flawed in this respect, and UEFA and FIFA would intervene if the regulator caused any impact on competitiveness. I only have to highlight the example of Crystal Palace, which is currently in the press, to demonstrate that UEFA and FIFA will stick to their rules rigidly, whether we like them or not. As I said when speaking to my amendment 97, any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and international frameworks.

Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a voice in the development and implementation of these requirements? As the clause stands, her new regulator will be able to attach or vary financial licence conditions that would that mean one club becomes more competitive than another. She has said that she intends for the regulator to be able to adapt to the circumstances of each club. However, we must be mindful that that would mean changing the level of competitiveness between clubs. That is the key risk. That is not a political point; it is sadly a risk and a fact of which we have to be mindful.

Let me stress-test that with a hypothetical question for the Minister on the Bill’s impact. Brighton & Hove Albion and Aston Villa will both compete in the Premier League next season, both have been in that league for a number of years, and both also compete for European football. If her regulator decided, for whatever reason, that Brighton required stricter or simply more financial licensing conditions than Aston Villa, there would be a competitive imbalance between the teams. Does she accept that fact, which is plainly obvious, and recognise that such club-by-club tailoring of rules and licence conditions is potentially a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules on fair competition? To give her a bit of time, I ask her to respond to that concern after I have spoken about the other provisions in the group.

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[Mr French]

I thank the hon. Member for speaking to the new clause on behalf of his colleague, the hon. Member for Wokingham. The point that he made is very interesting and I have great sympathy with fans of Reading football club, who he referred to, and with fans of other clubs around the country that have fallen foul of their owners, who, I think it is fair to say, did not have the club’s long-term interests at heart. I say that as someone who has already referred to Charlton a number of times in this Committee—been there, done it, got the T-shirt. As I say, I have a lot of sympathy with fans of Reading and I hope that the future looks brighter for that club.

Even before the election, I publicly supported strengthening ownership tests. I believe them to be part of one of the most fundamental roles that the regulator should play. We should ensure the consistency of those tests between the leagues, and we should ensure that up and down the country we have the best people in charge of such community assets, and that they have the long-term interests of clubs at heart, as I believe the overwhelming majority of club owners do.

Those examples of where problems came to a head and caused significant damage to communities have proven that there is a difference in some of the tests applied by the leagues historically, with gaps and loopholes that individuals have looked to exploit. Such examples have also highlighted the need for ongoing review by the regulator about how it manages the information that comes to light. An owner might be deemed an appropriate and fit person to run a club in 2025, but changes to their financial circumstances—assuming that they have other business interests—could mean that they become more stretched, and they might be involved in other activity that comes to light, so it would be right for the review to take place as early as possible to minimise the potential damage to clubs.

My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East posited a number of important legal challenges around this point of duty. I have sympathy with the broader objective of new clause 15, but this issue of duty poses a number of risks for people who are not board-level employees or in significant roles of influence. I think that all Members would seek to avoid a situation where people disengage from a process because they are concerned about that word “duty”, and what that could leave them exposed to legally if they were to come across information, for example, but did not feel confident in passing it on. That might arise in a variety of circumstances, but I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on new clause 15 in particular and on how we can seek to deliver the broader objective of strengthening ownership tests, without having to go down the rabbit hole of this duty element.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for Wokingham for tabling new clause 15 and the hon. Member for Newbury for speaking to it, but it is already open to anyone, including all those listed in the new clause, to share relevant information with the regulator. That is in addition to the existing requirements on clubs, owners and officers, which the new clause unnecessarily duplicates.

I assure the Committee that the regulator will take credible reports about unsuitable owners or officers very seriously, whether they come from a whistleblower inside the industry or any other source. We do not need to create a separate obligation in the Bill for individuals to report information to the regulator. In fact, new clause 15 would place regulatory obligations on new individuals and organisations, thereby extending the effect of the regulator’s regime. It would take things a step further and create a duty—beyond the relevant owner, officer or club—for club employees, competition organisers, supporters trusts, the FSA and Fair Game to notify the regulator. As matters stand, anyone including owners, officers, club employees, competition organisers, the Football Supporters’ Association, trusts and supporters can notify the regulator if they have information regarding an individual’s suitability to be an owner or an officer. There is no need for any specific legislative provision to enable that. As the regulator will only regulate clubs, owners, officers and competition organisers, we believe that it would not be appropriate to obligate other persons to report any changes to the regulator. The new clause would extend the scope of the regulator.

The key point is that we do not think that that should be a duty. It is of course open to all those whom I have listed, and indeed any others, to approach the regulator, which as I say will take any reports seriously.

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[Stephanie Peacock]

The regulator’s owners and directors test has been designed to prevent unsuitable custodians from running or owning clubs. Therefore, the regulator needs to know who a club’s prospective new owners and officers are before they buy or join a club so that they can be tested.

Clause 27 places duties on a person to notify the regulator when there is a reasonable prospect of them becoming a new owner or officer of a regulated club. This will ensure that the regulator receives advance notice that an application should be coming, and it will help the regulator prepare to act quickly when it receives the application. The clause also places the same duty on regulated clubs themselves, as another means of ensuring that the regulator will be notified.

The regulator needs to know a person’s role at the club so that it can prepare to assess whether they are suitable to be an owner or officer of that club. That is why, where the notification relates to an officer, the notification must state their proposed job title or job description, and any senior management functions they will carry out.

Enforcement measures, such as censure statements or financial penalties, are available to the regulator should it determine that this requirement has not been complied with without reasonable excuse. That will deter those who do not wish to comply with the regime. I commend clause 27 to the Committee.

[Mr French]

As the Minister just outlined, clause 27 requires regulated clubs to notify about prospective new owners and officers if there is a reasonable prospect of such a change. It also requires an officer’s proposed job title, job description and senior management functions. If the football regulator is not notified before the change, the club must notify as soon as practically possible.

I am slightly concerned that this could be a burdensome requirement on some clubs. Any large organisation, such as a football club, will often cast a wide net when considering such appointments, with people on the radar long in advance. I therefore ask the Minister to enlighten us on what she believes constitutes “a reasonable prospect”. For example, would media speculation that the right hon. Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson) might move to the Minister’s Department be considered “a reasonable prospect”? There are non-political examples of how that might work too, but it would be interesting to hear what the Government believe to be a reasonable prospect.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. As with everything throughout this Bill, we would expect the regulator to act proportionately. Where there is a reasonable prospect, it is obviously very helpful for the regulator to be informed of that, because that will, of course, allow them to move as speedily as possible. We therefore think this is an appropriate provision. The hon. Gentleman tempts me to get into other examples, but I will resist that, if he does not mind.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Determination of suitability required for new owner

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As we have heard throughout the passage of the Bill, football clubs hold unique importance to their fans and local communities, and it is these fans who lose out when clubs are exploited or mismanaged by unsuitable owners and officers. Clause 28 prohibits a person from becoming a new owner of a club unless the regulator has determined they are suitable to own that club beforehand. Prospective new owners will be required to provide an application containing information about how they propose to run a club and where club funding will come from. This will better ensure that prospective owners are clear from the outset about how they would deliver their plans for a club.

Once a complete application has been provided, the regulator can only pass the individual owner if the following requirements are met. First, the individual must meet the individual ownership fitness test. This means that they have the requisite honesty and integrity and are financially sound. Secondly, they must have sufficient financial resources. Finally, the regulator must not have grounds to suspect that the individual has any source of wealth that is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking and fraud. This will better mitigate against illicit finance in the game by requiring new owners to undergo the regulator’s test. Clause 28 will prevent unsuitable custodians from ever becoming owners.

Clause 29 prohibits individuals from becoming a new officer of a regulated club unless the regulator has determined that they are suitable beforehand. Once the prospective officer has provided a complete application to the regulator, it will assess them to ensure they meet individual officer fitness criteria. That means they must possess the requisite honesty, integrity and competence, and be financially sound. If the regulator is satisfied that the individual meets those requirements, it must find them suitable to be an officer of the club; otherwise, it must find them unsuitable. When making this determination, the regulator will take into account the matters listed in clause 37. By requiring new officers to undergo the regulator’s test, this clause will stop unsuitable individuals from becoming officers.

It is possible that someone might take up a position at a club without first having undergone the owners and directors test. That may be a blatant and deliberate breach of the requirement to undergo the test before joining the club. A prospective owner may act in bad faith, hoping that once they are “in”, the regulator would be more hesitant to fail them. However, in some circumstances a person may fall within the definition inadvertently or have some other relatively innocent reason for the breach. This may occur, for example, when a person inherits significant equity in a football club. Alternatively, a person may dispute in good faith whether their actions bring them within the Bill’s definition of an owner.

Therefore, where a person becomes a new owner or officer without the regulator having determined their suitability, clause 30 gives the regulator the power to respond decisively but flexibly. When the regulator becomes aware this has happened, it has two options: to either notify the new owner or officer that they are automatically treated as unsuitable, or require them to submit an application as though they were a prospective applicant. The regime cannot be allowed to be abused; the regulator must have the discretion and the teeth it needs to address harm to the sector. Clause 30 is an important step to achieving this aim.

If the regulator is minded to fail a new or prospective owner officer, clause 31 requires the regulator to give that person and the relevant club the opportunity to make representations. This must take place before the regulator makes its final decision. That will allow a new owner, officer or relevant club an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable. This ensures the regulator has all relevant information available to it, allowing it to make better decisions so that the regime is more effective.

Football is a fast-paced industry where clubs operate within constraints such as league seasons and transfer windows. Timely decisions about the suitability of new owners and officers is important for clubs’ financial sustainability. Without deadlines, we have seen league determinations drag on, unable to reach a decision. The regulator will need to conduct a thorough level of scrutiny of new owners and directors, but it also needs to make decisions in an appropriate timeframe to ensure clubs are not unnecessarily impacted.

That is why the regulator will be subject to a statutory deadline when it tests the suitability of new prospective owners and officers, which clause 32 sets out. When a complete application is provided, the determination period starts. By the end of that period, the regulator must find an applicant suitable or unsuitable. As well as providing certainty to the industry, the deadline will incentivise new owners and officers to provide the necessary information the regulator needs to assess suitability in a timely manner.

If the regulator cannot decide before the initial deadline is met, it can extend the determination period, and this will provide it with the necessary flexibility to gather more information to make well informed but timely decisions. The determination period, including the maximum amount of extra time, will be set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation. This will ensure the regulator is bound by it—but there is still flexibility for the deadline to be amended in the future. If the regulator cannot make the decision before the period expires, the person is automatically determined to be unsuitable. This means that only owners or officers that the regulator is confident are suitable will be allowed to get involved with clubs.

The measures set out in the group of clauses will form a key part in ensuring our clubs have suitable custodians, which in turn will help to safeguard the financial sustainability of football over the long term. Therefore, I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Clause 29 prohibits any person from becoming an owner of a regulated club without first applying to the independent football regulator and being determined suitable for that role. It requires any applicant to provide information on the proposed operation of the club, estimated costs, how those costs will be funded and the source of funding, which is a point that is been raised already in this Committee.

The football regulator must make an affirmative determination regarding the application if the potential owner is considered to have sufficient financial resources and meets the individual ownership fitness criteria. I already spoken about why I believe it is important that these fitness tests are strengthened wherever possible, but there are a couple of questions I would like to ask the Minister on this clause first.

What assurances can the Minister provide that this process will be completed swiftly and will not unnecessarily delay any ownership changes which, as we have already discussed, may need to happen very quickly when a club is under significant financial stress—to ensure wages are paid and to prevent further hardship when seeking a change of ownership?

Clause 30 sets out what should happen in the event that a person has become an owner or an officer of a regulated club without first obtaining the suitability determination from the football regulator. The clause assumes that the football regulator “becomes aware”; is the expectation that there is a disclosure from the club, or will the IFR be probing clubs, looking at news reports, Companies House and so on? It would be helpful for Members to have an insight into how that might look, because this clause does not offer a specific timeframe within which the football regulator must act at once if it becomes aware of an unauthorised appointment at a club.

It also seems that the football regulator can indefinitely extend the deadline for submitting such an application; the clause fails to clarify how many times and under what conditions. I therefore wonder whether the Minister has considered the potential effects on the stability of the club of the football regulator deeming an individual unsuitable: would that open clubs to legal or operational risk, and would there be financial consequences of those risks? It is vital that decisions taken by the regulator are independent and impartial, as already discussed, so what safeguards will there be to ensure that neither media nor political pressure is exerted on the football regulator to deem an owner unsuitable?

Clause 31 states that the football regulator must “have regard to” representations from affected clubs or individuals. What does that constitute in reality—a response, or simply a consideration? Must the football regulator provide written reasoning if it rejects the arguments made in the representation? Does this clause not lack basic safeguards and, without a framework for how representations should be made or evaluated, does it not risk leading to inconsistent decision making? Again, I fear there would be various legal challenges, given the financial implications of such decisions.

There is also no requirement, it appears, for the football regulator to consider other external stakeholders, which could include other directors or supporters’ trusts involved with the running of a club. Should an individual receive a negative determination, the legal and financial resources to make a strong representation within a specified timeframe might be considerable. Does the Minister envisage many applicants seeking legal aid or other advisory support mechanisms in such a scenario?

Clause 32 outlines several points about the football regulator’s determinations after an individual makes an application under clauses 28 and 29. The IFR seems to be able to extend its determination periods several times, but the clause fails to outline for what reason an extension might be justified and how long it should or could be. Can applicants, for example, challenge or appeal those delays, if the reason for them lay with the regulator rather than the individual club? A delay by the regulator would risk unfairly penalising applicants who were not personally at fault for it. Will there be an obligation on the football regulator to inform applicants of approaching deadlines, to ensure that they know when the determination period is nearing its end, and what oversight will there be to ensure that extensions are not routine?

Lastly, will there be monitoring of how often extensions are used and how long determinations typically take, so that clubs can start to plan for such instances where they occur? That would also give greater certainty to the leagues because, as I highlighted earlier, it is not just individuals, but clubs themselves at risk. If we think about not just the financial penalties imposed, but the points that can be deducted, there are major implications for the competitive nature of the league. I look forward to the Minister answering a few of those questions.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions. I reiterate, as I said in an earlier intervention, that the licensing is separate from the ownership. On some of his points about the extension, we have talked throughout proceedings about being collaborative and working with owners and clubs; if the regulator needs more information, it has the ability to provide an extension. Of course we would expect it to provide appropriate information of approaching deadlines or expected timelines. I will not repeat what I said in my main contribution on this group, but I did try to set out some examples where a breach is a genuine accident or someone has inherited equity, versus somebody trying to circumvent the regime. The regulator has that flexibility and a regime with teeth so that it can respond to both scenarios.

The shadow Minister posed a number of questions, so I will double-check Hansard and, if I have not answered them all, I will write to him.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 to 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Yes, absolutely. That goes back to the discussion that we had earlier on new clause 15. The regulator will take credible information seriously.

Clause 34 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent owners—those already in place—of clubs, where there is a concern about their suitability. It will allow the regulator to tackle any risk to clubs from unsuitable owners within the industry, while recognising that there are suitable owners already in the system who do not need to be tested. We want to ensure that the approach is not overly burdensome for the regulator, and we do not want to deter investment in the game. Incumbent owners can be assessed to ensure that they have the requisite honesty and integrity, and are financially sound enough, to own a club. If the regulator has information that gives it grounds for suspicion, incumbent owners can also be tested on their source of wealth. The regulator will need to establish if wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking or fraud. The regulator will not remove incumbent owners because of a mere suspicion about their source of wealth. Rather, an incumbent owner must be treated as unsuitable if the regulator is more sure than not that their source of wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct. The clause will ensure that the regulator has the appropriate powers to test incumbent owners where a risk of harm arises.

Clause 35 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent officers—those already in place—of clubs, where a risk of harm arises. As with the provisions for owners in clause 34, testing of officers is limited to cases where there is concern about suitability. It allows the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable officers already in the industry. Incumbent officers can be tested to ensure that they have the requisite honesty, integrity, competence, and are financially sound enough, to continue in their role.

The Government are aware that finding an incumbent owner or officer unsuitable would bring about significant consequences for that person, and may cause concern for clubs or fans. That is why, when the regulator is minded to fail an incumbent owner or officer, clause 36 gives the individual and the club concerned an opportunity to make representations before the regulator makes its final decision. That allows an officer or owner an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable. The regulator has the ability to test or re-test incumbent owners and officers, which will prevent unsuitable custodians from harming clubs over the long term, not just at the point of entry. That will help to ensure the sustainability of clubs over the long term, benefiting football now and into the future. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

Clause 33 places a duty on clubs to notify the Government’s new regulator of any change in circumstances relating to the current owner or an officer that could impact their suitability under the regime set out in part 4 of the Bill. On one level, it is an understandable provision. To fulfil its statutory duties, the regulator must be kept informed of material changes, as ensuring the fitness and propriety of owners and officers is a core part of its remit. However, the clause as drafted raises a number of serious and practical concerns about how such a duty will be defined, interpreted and enforced.

The first issue with the clause is its vagueness. What exactly constitutes a “change in circumstances”? The explanatory notes prepared by the Government give a small indication of what such circumstances might include, stating that

“Relevant material changes could include, for example, an officer becoming subject to criminal proceedings or regulatory action”.

That is somewhat clear, but what qualifies as “regulatory action”? Could it be an Ofcom investigation, for example? The explanatory notes add that

“new information coming to light regarding whether an owner’s source of wealth is connected to serious criminality”

also qualifies as a material, relevant change. What qualifies as “new information”? Does it mean a full-blown criminal investigation or spurious claims, potentially made by activist groups against foreign owners? How the provision will work needs to be clarified.

The Government and the new regulator must be up front, open and honest with fans and Parliament as to what those terms actually mean. We fear that the Government are deliberately muddying the waters around what the regulatory environment would look like under the Bill, and around the rules that the regulator will seek to apply. The Minister must answer whether a “change in circumstances” is limited to formal legal developments, such as bankruptcy, a criminal conviction, or something as small as a parking fine. I hope not the latter. Could the definition extend to more subjective matters such as personal, reputational issues, media allegations, or ongoing investigations? If so, I fear that the Government and their regulator would be on very shaky ground, not just because clubs would find themselves in the near-impossible position of having to second-guess what the regulator might later deem to be relevant, even when no formal wrongdoing has occurred, but because it would open up the regulator to spates of judicial reviews. As we see already, the wealthiest clubs would be able to hire the best lawyers, and those clubs that are already struggling would be subject to the personal diktats of the chairman of the Government’s regulator. That is not a sustainable, appropriate or moral way to regulate, and it is totally incompatible with the principle of legal certainty that should underpin any new statutory regime.

Furthermore, clause 33 requires that the Government be notified

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

after a change has occurred. Again, the language is open to wide interpretation. What is “reasonably practicable” for a large Premier League club with extensive legal support may be entirely different for a National League side with minimal back office capacity. We must ensure that smaller clubs are not disproportionately penalised because they lack the administrative infrastructure to track and report such changes with the same immediacy as those international brands that sit atop the English football pyramid. We must also ask whether the sanctions for failing to report, which could be very serious, potentially leading to licence revocation, are proportionate to each breach. Clubs cannot become the regulator’s enforcement arm, expected to carry out continuous due diligence on their own officers and owners, with the threat of regulatory action hanging over them if they get it wrong.

Clause 33 touches on a sensitive area: the relationship between clubs and their owners, and the role of the state in policing suitability. It is right to expect clubs to act responsibly and keep the regulator informed, but the duty must be clear, proportionate and fairly enforced to avoid lower-level staff being put in extremely difficult situations. We do not want to create a culture of regulatory paranoia, where clubs feel compelled to notify the Government’s regulator of every minor development just in case it is later deemed relevant, nor do we want smaller clubs punished for failing to meet standards that are de facto only achievable for the top tier. The Government must ensure that the clause is not a trapdoor for arbitrary enforcement, and that it supports predictability, stability and confidence in the regulatory framework. We understand the underlying principle, but we will continue to press the Minister to ensure the practical operation of the clause does not give rise to legal ambiguity, unjust outcomes or unaccountable discretion.

Before moving on, I have a number of questions on clause 33. Could the Minister clarify what sorts of events would qualify as a “change in circumstances” under clause 33? Will guidance be issued by the football regulator to ensure consistent interpretation? Will the definition be limited to formal, objective legal changes? What level of evidence or certainty will clubs be expected to have before reporting a change? Will clubs be required to report allegations or media speculation? Will the football regulator consider good-faith failures to notify or take a strict liability approach? How will the regulator account for differences in club size, structure and resourcing when judging what is “reasonably practicable”? Will there be any threshold or scaling in terms of compliance expectations for clubs of differing means?

What appeal or review mechanisms will be available to a club if the football regulator finds that it failed to notify as required? Will there be a formal process for representations or challenge before any enforcement action is taken? How does the clause interact with the broader principles of legal privilege and privacy? Will clubs be expected to disclose internal HR issues or ongoing internal investigations, even if there is no conclusion yet? Have the Government assessed whether the clause is compatible with UEFA and FIFA expectations of non-interference in the running of football clubs? I had a written response from the Minister this morning regarding her last meeting with UEFA and FIFA, which was 1 November. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, so we are still concerned about the broader point regarding UEFA. I would appreciate a response to that point today.

Moving on to clause 34, it empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent individual owner meets the fitness criteria or has wealth associated with serious criminal conduct, if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. If passed, more than 100 English football clubs will be subject to the regulation. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding incumbent owners. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by reviewing multiple existing owners, causing unease in English football. What level of information is required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will the regulator ensure that the threat does not needlessly hang over existing owners?

Clause 35 empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent officer meets the fitness criteria if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. As I said regarding the previous clause, more than 100 English football clubs will be regulated if the Bill passes. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding officers, of which there are even more to consider. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by the need to review multiple existing officers for each club. I ask the Minister again: what level of information will be required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will it ensure that this threat does not needlessly hang over existing officers?

Lastly—you will be pleased to know, Mr Turner—clause 36 requires the football regulator to give advance notification to an incumbent owner or officer if it is minded to find them unsuitable. Before making a final decision, the clause requires the person and club in question to be allowed to make representations, which must then be taken into account. The clause stipulates that the regulator must inform incumbent owners and officers only that it is minded to find them unsuitable, not of the reasons why. Given the vital importance of these representations, should there not be a requirement for the regulator to disclose the reasons to the person and club so that they can fully engage? I would appreciate the Minister picking up the point about the reasons, because it is important.

There is a broader point here about clubs that may be listed on the open market. My understanding of this clause is that, before a final decision is taken, the club would effectively become an insider from a trading perspective. It will be interesting to see how the Government will seek to manage that risk in terms of financial compliance, given that an issue with a particular owner or officer could have significant financial implications for a club and therefore potentially leave individuals inside that loop at risk of being involved with inside information from a dealing perspective. As we all know, if anyone is found to be in breach of inside information, it has very serious consequences. It will be interesting to see how the mechanism in this clause to inform clubs and individuals first will work with the broader notifications in the market where clubs are listed.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will begin with the subject of UEFA. Once again, I can reassure the shadow Minister that UEFA is content with the Bill as drafted. He will note that, in answer to his written question, I detailed my last meeting with UEFA, which was after the Bill was published, and said that we continue to engage with officials on a regular basis.

The shadow Minister asked a long list of questions to which I will respond in writing to ensure accuracy, as I did not get a chance to note them down. We have spoken about some of the points he touched on around appeals and enforcement and will come on to debate them in further detail.

I draw the shadow Minister’s attention to the fact that, as I said in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, the bar is set differently for existing and new owners. I outlined points on new owners, grounds to suspect, incumbent owners, the balance of probabilities and the higher bar given existing owners’ property rights.

The shadow Minister also asked a number of questions on what information would be relevant. A parking ticket, certainly, would not be relevant, but serious legal issues or an investigation or action by a regulator—things of that nature—would be relevant. The regulator will not immediately test information in every case just because it comes in. It will make its own decision about whether the information reaches a high enough threshold for it to take action.

Information that gives the regulator grounds for concern could come in lots of forms. It does not need to be new information, as I outlined in my response to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, but it has to call into question whether the individual is still suitable to be an owner or officer of a club. The information may be relevant if the club gets into difficulty or fails to comply with the regime. Information that is in the public domain or held by external organisations about incumbent owners could be considered grounds for concern to test an individual. It will be up to the regulator to decide whether the information meets the threshold for the incumbent to be tested.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 34 to 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr French]

I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. I must admit, as a long-term football fan, that I have never heard a player say that he kissed the crest of his club when celebrating a goal. The footballing term is as accurate as the legal one, as he highlights.

This may seem a modest amendment, but it speaks to something bigger: the importance of precision, respect for history and an understanding of football not just as a product but as a tradition. If we are going to regulate the game, let us do it properly with the right words and the right respect.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Member’s amendment follows the extensive debate regarding heraldic terminology in the other place. I can reassure him that the Government have worked closely with the College of Arms to ensure that the term “crest” is used consistently with heraldic law, and with the FA to ensure accuracy and cohesion with industry norms, as the term “crest” is the key term within its existing heritage rules. The Government amendments made in the other place make sure the legislation remains in step with both the FA and heraldic law, and that is in addition to changes to the explanatory notes, to further clarify the point.

Although the word “crest” is used colloquially in the industry, “crests” have a very specific meaning in heraldic law. Crests can only be granted by the College of Arms and only a select few clubs have been granted one. For that reason, the legislation refers to crests, but also needs to capture other clubs and circumstances. That is why the Bill uses “emblem”.

When making these changes, the Government explored the use of “badge” instead of “emblem”. However, it was felt that “badge” would risk unintentionally only capturing the image on shirts. In examples such as Arsenal or Liverpool, the shirt features only one element of the club’s emblem, such as the cannon or the liver bird. In those instances, “badge” might capture only those elements and thereby not deliver on the policy intent of protecting the heritage associated with the entire emblem. Given those comments, I ask that the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

The two I mentioned are the basic points. The regulator has the ability to ask for further information should they want it. I think I gave the example that if the regulator is unsure about the source of funds, or whether there is enough, it could ask for more information. That will be at the discretion of the regulator—we had a well-rehearsed debate on that point last week.

We think that the requirements for a provisional licence are basic requirements that any club should be able to complete. As I was really keen to stress in the debate last week, the regulator will be keen to work with clubs to do everything it can to help them to meet those requirements.

The regulator needs to be satisfied that a club will be able to meet the mandatory licence conditions and duties on clubs once it has been granted a licence. This is a forward-looking “would comply” test. The expectation is that the provision of information and documentation, as well as the engagement with clubs as part of the application process, will be sufficient to satisfy the regulator. It should be straightforward for all clubs to obtain a provisional licence. Once they are in the regulatory system, a club will have time to improve standards up to the necessary requirements for a full licence, with the support of the regulator as needed.

[Mr French]

One of the points we were slightly unclear about when we had the discussion of provisional licences before was what would happen if a club decided it did not want to apply for a provisional licence. There are several clubs that are very publicly concerned about the regulator. What would happen if they were to form, say, a union and go against the regulator and refuse to apply for a provisional licence? How would that work in practice? Would they be kicked out of the league?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend makes an important point; it will be proportionate. I have met with all the leagues a number of times, and this was of particular concern to the National League. It will be proportionate, and the regulator will take that approach when dealing with the different clubs and leagues.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the Minister’s comments about proportionality; we will look to review that as the Bill goes forward. One question I have is about how the regulator will interact with the existing rules. The most obvious ones that come to mind are the financial fair play rules that are already in existence in the Premier League. What analysis of, and crossover with, the existing league investigations and restrictions to clubs will there be?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Those will be an issue for the leagues; where the leagues have rules, clubs will continue to comply with them. That is not something that the regulator will be involved with. Where there are league rules, that is for the leagues to enforce. I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman to outline that further.

[Mr French]

If the Minister could outline that further, it would be really helpful. At the end of the day, we are keen to ensure that there is no confusion in the regulations for clubs, nor any duplication of purpose for the regulator. We would like to understand how that will work in practice, and I would appreciate that in writing.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will give way to the hon. Member for Spelthorne.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate that point. We will come on to discuss that in relation to schedule 5, and I will give a fuller response then.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 4 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 19

revocation and cessation of operating licence

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 106, in clause 19, page 13, line 19, at end insert—

“(c) inviting the club to make representations about the proposed revocation, and

(d) specifying the means by which, and the period within which, such representations must be made, which must be a period of not less than one month beginning with the day on which the notice under subsection (3) is given.”

This amendment allows clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence.

Clause 19 concerns the revocation and cessation of an operating licence granted to football clubs. That is understandably a crucial provision that goes to the heart of how the Government’s new regulator will exercise its most serious power, the ability effectively to remove a club from the regulated football pyramid by taking away its licence to operate. Let me clear from the outset that we support an independent regulator that can intervene when standards are seriously breached but, as with all powers of this kind, the devil is in the detail. Our task in this Committee must be to ensure that the regulator’s powers are proportionate, transparent and accountable.

Clause 19 provides that the regulator may revoke a licence if the club in in breach of licence conditions or if there are grounds to believe that the licence should never have been granted. In principle, that is entirely reasonable, but the consequences of revocation, for clubs, fans and communities, are potentially devastating. This is not the revocation of a licence to sell alcohol or to host events late into the night; it is the revocation of a licence to participate in the life of a community—in many cases, the cultural soul of a town or city. That power should not be exercised lightly, so I must raise several matters with the Minister.

First, what thresholds and safeguards are in place to ensure that revocation is used only as a last resort? Will the Government’s regulator be required to consider less draconian alternatives—such as conditional compliance periods, fines or a change in ownership—before resorting to the total revocation of a licence? Secondly, what procedural protections exist for clubs facing this threat? As it stands, there is no right of appeal, which is why I tabled amendment 106, which would allow clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence.

These are serious matters. The Government’s regulator is empowered to act in the interests of the game and to uphold high standards of governance, transparency and financial responsibility. But with such powers must come robust safeguards, and that is where the clause as drafted falls short. As it stands, there is no explicit requirement for the regulator to notify a club of its intention to revoke the licence, or to invite the club to make representations, before such action is taken. In effect, the regulator could move straight to revocation, without a formal process that allows the club to defend itself, explain its actions or offer remedial steps. That is not due process, it is not natural justice, and in any other regulated sector such an approach would be wholly unacceptable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

The Minister has outlined the initial process before revocation is determined by the regulator. As I explained in my lengthy speech, which I will not seek to repeat, the amendment would give clubs a say if they believed a decision reached by the regulator was wrong. The Minister was clear about the tribunal approach if a club is not happy with a decision, but as I have outlined previously, my fear is that clubs will end up spending more time in court than they will focusing on the pitch and on the game. The official Opposition believe that an appeal process at that point would be more beneficial than a legal route.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As I said, clubs can make representations to the regulator and ask the regulator to look again, and beyond that there is the appeals process. As with all aspects of appeals process, the key considerations are the expertise of the judiciary, the tribunal’s experience and familiarity with the policy, speed and cost. We think the Competition Appeal Tribunal is the best option for balance. It is an internationally well-respected tribunal which offers time and cost-efficient options, with flexible case management to expedite urgent cases and bring in appropriate expertise. We believe that that avenue and the internal review process make adequate provision in the Bill and that the hon. Gentleman’s amendment simply is not needed.

[Mr French]

I thank the Minister for that lengthy response. To be blunt, I disagree, and rather than delay the Committee any longer, I will press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 19 details revocation of a club’s provisional operating licence for failing to progress to a full licence, and a licence ceasing to have effect. For the revocation to occur, the regulator must satisfy itself of three things: first, that the test for a full operating licence is not met; secondly, that the club in question has persistently and without reasonable excuse failed to take reasonable steps to meet the test; and finally, that there is no reasonable prospect of the club meeting the test within a reasonable period, even if given more time. The regulator should engage with the club throughout this period. We expect that, through constructive dialogue, a solution can be found that avoids this drastic step in all but the most serious of cases.

The regulator must notify the club of its decision and provide its reasoning. Revocation must not take place before the end of the current season, to reduce as much as possible the impact on ongoing sporting competitions. A licence automatically ceases to have effect only when a club stops operating a team in specified competitions, the most likely cause being that the club is relegated from the specified competition and is therefore no longer in scope of the regulator.

[Mr French]

I am trying to get clarity. Again, I will happily accept it in writing if the Minister does not have the answer today. Waiting until the end of the season before revoking a licence is entirely sensible, but what would that mean for relegation and promotion? For example, if a club is mid-table and the regulator decides its licence should be revoked, that will have a direct impact on the competitive nature of the league. Has any thought been put into whether, for example, that may mean only two teams are relegated that season, because one has lost its licence? How might it work in practice?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Where possible, we want to reduce any impact on ongoing sporting competitions. The hon. Gentleman presents me with a hypothetical scenario. I think it would be best if I respond in writing to him.

Regarding the circumstances when a licence automatically ceases to have effect, it will only happen when the club stops operating a team in specified competition. The most likely cause of that is a club having been relegated and therefore no longer being in scope. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

I will not rehash the debate we have already had on the amendment. We were seeking greater transparency and a greater say for clubs at risk of losing their licence, which, as I have explained, is the ultimate sanction and would cause enormous damage to clubs and the communities in which they operate through job losses, and impact on the game and on fans. I would appreciate the Minister giving more clarity on how this will work in practice. These situations are hypothetical, but realistic, and would have serious consequences for not just the individual clubs, but the leagues and how they operate.

We believe strongly that promotion and relegation should be based on competition on the pitch. However, in the extreme example of a club breaching the licence so significantly that it is revoked, which might more realistically happen at the lower end of the pyramid, we need to have a greater understanding of what that means for relegation. All clubs deserve transparency in that regard. We have seen much speculation in recent years around change of ownership—I will not mention the clubs involved as some of the legal cases are ongoing—what that might mean for relegation and the significant financial consequences it may have for other clubs. It would be greatly appreciated if the Minister provided guidance on that in writing so that all Members can have a greater understanding of how it will work in practice.

[Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Minister say whether a good licensing regime and, if necessary, revocation of licences would prevent clubs from going into full administration—as in the example of Derby County that my hon. Friend the Member for High Peak described—and the knock-on effect of that on supporters, suppliers and the local community? A licensing regime should prevent full administration and be able to deal with problem clubs at a much earlier stage.

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend raises an important constituency point. I do not want to comment on particular clubs and predict the action the regulator may or may not take. We hope that the Bill will raise the bar across the board and prevent clubs from getting into difficulty, but I do not want to be drawn on the specifics.

We have been clear that this is not a zero-fail regime. I will endeavour to write to the shadow Minister regarding the complex, but important, hypothetical situation he has proposed.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the Minister committing to that. The example just mentioned by the hon. Member for Derby South needs fleshing out as well, because clubs get into financial difficulty as a matter of course; points are therefore deducted mid-season, as we have seen, or, in the worst cases, the club goes into administration. The tests for the licence are about financial prudence and sustainability, so the hon. Gentleman makes a fair challenge.

What would happen if a club went into administration? Would the regulator seek to change the owner to allow the operating licence to continue, for example, or would the club, having lost the licence, then reapply via a new owner? The consequences would be dramatic. One would automatically assume that a club that no longer had a licence would have to start at the bottom of the football pyramid and come back up again, as we have seen in the past. Can the Minister add clarification of that important example to her letter?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Absolutely. We will come on to the owners and directors test later in the Bill Committee; perhaps we can explore this further at that point. The one point I would make to the shadow Minister and to my hon. Friend the Member for Derby South is that the aim of the regulator is always to minimise disruption to ongoing sporting competitions. I will add clarification on that when I write to the shadow Minister about the complex scenario he proposed.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Mandatory licence conditions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause requires the regulator to attach full mandatory licence conditions to the provisional and full operating licences for all licensed clubs. These are basic and fundamental requirements of the whole regime and so apply to all licensed clubs, regardless of their individual circumstances.

The mandatory conditions vary in their aims. They are set out in schedule 5, so we will cover them in more detail, but to summarise briefly, the conditions on financial plans and annual declarations are about ensuring that the regulator has the relevant and timely information it needs to regulate effectively. That includes financial risk assessments, plans for managing financial risks, details on income and expenditure, and contingency plans in the event of a shock such as relegation.

The corporate governance condition introduces basic requirements to report against the club corporate governance code of practice published by the regulator. This reporting mechanism will mean that clubs are transparent about board structures, decision making processes and equality, diversity and inclusion.

The fan consultation condition establishes a baseline level of fan engagement that requires clubs to consult fans on specified matters. This will ensure that clubs have a framework in place to regularly meet and consult a representative group of fans on key strategic matters at the club, and on other issues of interest to supporters. This will work in tandem with the freestanding duties, such as those protecting club heritage and other key areas.

The annual declaration condition requires the club to submit a declaration on any matters that should have previously been notified, or to confirm that there are no such matters. I commend clause 20 to the Committee.

[Mr French]

As outlined by the Minister, clause 20 requires the IFR to attach four mandatory licence conditions to the each club’s operating licence, whether provisional or full. This includes a requirement for the club to submit a financial plan, either annually or at more frequent intervals. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on how frequent she believes is reasonable; is that semi-annually, for example?

The club must also submit and publish a corporate governance statement explaining how it is applying the IFR’s corporate governance code, and regularly consult its fans. I think we need some clarity about how that will work in practice. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East raised the example of Sheffield Wednesday and multiple fans’ groups claiming to represent the club. I think that that needs some fleshing out so that the regulator is clear about what that consultation looks like. Obviously, that will be different for each individual club, which should, hopefully, know its fans better than anyone else.

Last, there is a requirement to submit an annual declaration of any material changes in circumstances affecting the club. Again, we would argue that that needs to be very clear to clubs, particularly if there is any—

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend for tabling the amendments. I know we have discussed this issue a number of times; it has always been a pleasure to do so, and I recognise its importance. Home grounds are often the most important asset that a club owns, so that is why I want to thank my hon. Friend for placing a real focus on them.

The significant financial and heritage value that grounds hold is why the Bill has strong protections to prevent home grounds being sold, used as collateral or relocated without the necessary considerations. Asset of community value status is another mechanism that a number of clubs and supporter groups have obtained for their home grounds. We would expect the regulator to welcome any club that wishes to gain community value status for an asset as another way to protect their home ground.

However, we are confident that the legislation will provide the necessary protections to address fan concerns and keep these important assets protected without mandating this status. Additionally, while assets of community value have proven beneficial for many clubs where no other protections have been in place, these amendments may place an unnecessary burden on clubs. As currently drafted, they would require clubs to either go through what can be a lengthy process with the relevant authority or make structural changes to the constitutional document of a club. Given that significant protections are already in place in the Bill that deliver the necessary safeguards, it is difficult to justify any additional measures for all regulated clubs, especially as a mandatory licence condition.

I really want to reassure my hon. Friend, as I know that home ground protections are of particular importance to him, that the Government have already committed to asset of community value reform in our manifesto, and this is something that the recent English devolution White Paper from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government commits to.

[Mr French]

I have a lot of sympathy for the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. The Minister argues that this does not need to be addressed through the regulator, but will guidance be published for those fan groups who are keen to ensure the long-term future of their grounds? What guidance will be published to ensure that any fans in this situation have clear advice from the Government on the best routes to protect their ground?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am saying that I am confident the legislation will provide the necessary protections to address fan concerns, but I also draw the Committee’s attention to the work of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government on the specific issue of assets of community value. Of course, that does not fall into my portfolio, but I am very happy to commit to speaking to my relevant counterpart and adding to the letter that I have earlier committed to writing. This is something that I am sympathetic to, but I do not have the ability to make that commitment today. I believe that the work the Ministry is doing is very interesting and relevant to what we are discussing. For that reason, I am unable to accept my hon. Friend’s amendment, and I ask that he withdraws it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

As I have made clear, we believe that some of these issues are important, but we believe that they should be addressed on a voluntary basis, which is what has driven progress in the game. We do not believe that it should be mandated in statute at arm’s length by the Government. I have been clear in making that distinction in my comments.

Requiring clubs to report annually on their EDI action is not a proportionate or effective way to achieve those broader aims. It amounts to moral licensing, encouraging clubs to go through the motions rather than to take meaningful steps to foster a welcoming culture in ways that make sense for them.

My amendments would restore clarity to the regulator’s remit. They would ensure that schedule 5 is focused on what really matters: clear lines of accountability, proper oversight of directors and owners, and a robust governance structure that protects clubs from the kind of catastrophic mismanagement that we have seen in the past. Football has always been about community; it is in the dressing rooms, on the terraces and in the shared heritage of our towns and cities that the game’s values are lived. Let us not fall into the trap of thinking that they can be legislated for by line item in a regulator’s reporting requirements. It is for that reason that I tabled these amendments. I urge the Minister to reflect seriously on whether this part of schedule 5 is truly consistent with the aims of the Bill and the traditions of our national game, which is inclusive by default.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the amendments, but I disagree with the attempts to remove the references to EDI from the Bill. I will outline why and then, towards the end of my contribution, I will respond to his specific questions.

The Government believe that equality, diversity and inclusion is a key part of good corporate governance. As my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes outlined, it is common practice. Research shows that diversity on boards and in organisations promotes better governance, decision making and transparency, all of which, in turn, contribute to improved financial sustainability. The relationship between diversity and better corporate performance is recognised by the Financial Reporting Council and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants.

The industry is already taking action in this space, and the shadow Minister shared some examples, which I will not repeat. In November 2024, the FA published its four-year equality, diversity and inclusion strategy, titled “A Game Free from Discrimination”. It set out a long-term commitment to celebrate and promote diversity in English football, as well as an ambition to tackle all forms of discrimination in the game.

At a club level, in May this year, Chelsea’s incredible work in that area was recognised, with the Premier League awarding them the advanced level of its equality, diversity and inclusion standard—the highest level that can be awarded. All clubs in the Premier League, and some that have since been relegated from it, engage with the Premier League equality, diversity and inclusion standard initiative.

The Bill does not put EDI in football—it is already there and it is being celebrated by the industry. It is therefore right that, as a regulator that will be introducing a corporate governance code and requiring clubs to report against that, it covers EDI. The regulator will look to work co-operatively with stakeholders, draw on the expertise of the sector and add industry initiatives.

As with fan engagement, this will be a statutory baseline. Clubs that already champion equality, diversity and inclusion will not have an additional burden placed on them, other than having to periodically report on those things. Under the corporate governance code, clubs will simply be required to explain how they are applying the code and what actions they are taking to improve equality, diversity and inclusion—and nothing more. That is not onerous; it is a very helpful transparency measure, and it speaks to the question that the shadow Minister posed. I want to be very clear: the regulator is not going to prescriptively micromanage each club’s board or set targets and quotas on EDI. That is simply not the role of the regulator and would cause a significant burden to both the regulator and clubs. Ultimately, this is only a reporting requirement that all clubs should be able to meet.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the clarity provided by the Minister in outlining what she believes the regulator should or should not do. On quotas, can we be absolutely clear that the Government’s intention is not for there to be a mandated quota for clubs to have certain elements and different parts of the community on the board? Is that the clear intention in what the Minister is saying?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Absolutely. I will repeat the wording I just used in the Committee: to be very clear, the regulator is not going to prescriptively micromanage each club’s board or set targets or quotas on EDI. We will have that in Hansard twice now, so the intention should be very clear. Therefore, I hope that the hon. Member will seek to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the clarity that the Minister provided on quotas, because that particularly concerns Opposition Members. As I have mentioned—I will not seek to repeat my comments—we are concerned about mission creep and scope creep of the regulator and what the Bill is designed to do. I made it clear earlier that I believe that football is inclusive and that it has done amazing work, when we compare the state of football 20 or 30 years ago with where we are today. We see that on the terraces at most clubs every single week, and we certainly see that with the national team, which most of the country comes together to support, particularly in big tournaments.

Mandating EDI reporting and turning it into a bit of a tick-box exercise—that was highlighted in some of the Minister’s comments—moves away from what we believe to be the valuable part of this work, which is to drive forward inclusivity in clubs and increase the fan base, which is good for clubs, by expanding beyond some of the traditional support of the game. We fear that having this provision in the corporate governance code, in the way it is written, will lead to unintended consequences. It will drive certain agendas, and we fear that clubs will walk into a number of traps accidentally.

We have tabled these amendments because we believe that EDI reporting, especially in certain areas where it is contested, should not be put on clubs in this way. The voluntary scheme in football has worked much more powerfully over the years, and that is proven in the experiences at football grounds around the country.

Football Governance Bill [Lords] (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Thursday 5th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler—a half-time substitute in today’s proceedings. I will speak briefly to the amendment. I completely understand the objective that he is seeking to nudge the Government towards, which he explained well. The obvious question for the Minister is whether more frequent reporting—three years rather than five years—would mean additional costs. I await the Minister’s response, but I understand that the hon. Member is not seeking to press his amendment to a vote.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair and to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Ms Butler. I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment.

The state of the game report will be a key study into the structure and dynamics of the industry. It will help to build an evidence base to inform the regulator’s approach and decision making. I therefore recognise the intent behind my hon. Friend’s well-meaning amendments.

The state of the game report needs to be produced promptly, but it also needs to be a robust study. The timeframes set out in the Bill balance the importance of a timely first report with giving the regulator time to undertake the necessary in-depth analysis. The regulator will need to publish its first report as soon as possible or, as my hon. Friend outlined, within 18 months of the competitions in scope of regulation being specified by the Secretary of State, as an absolute maximum. For subsequent reports, a maximum of five years between publications will encourage the regulator to take a more long-term look. That should minimise unnecessary burdens on the industry and better align with the timelines for existing industry processes, such as commercial agreements. The regulator will still have the discretion—as my hon. Friend anticipated—to publish subsequent reports sooner if it considers it appropriate to do so.

I cannot accept my hon. Friend’s amendments to reduce the timings further. He asked me to go away and reflect on them, but I do not want to give him any false hope. We have put careful consideration into the time limits, which were changed from the previous Bill. They are an absolute maximum. We have had a number of conversations with the various leagues and stakeholders, and we are confident that they are the right time limits. We have made it clear that the regulator has the power and discretion to publish sooner, and we would very much hope that that would be the case for the first report in particular. For those reasons, I cannot accept his amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

The state of the game report will allow the regulator to better understand the finances and economics of the industry and its individual clubs. This, in turn, will inform the regulator’s approach and decision making across the regulatory framework.

Clause 10 requires the regulator to publish the report and sets out the topics that it must cover, including an overview of the main issues affecting English football and whether any features of the industry are jeopardising the regulator’s ability to deliver its objectives. These are deliberately broad and non-specific topics, affording the regulator some discretion as to what to cover. In essence, this means that the regulator can cover any matter that it considers relevant at the time, providing it relates to the functions of the Bill.

I would like to take this opportunity to provide further reassurance to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East on his earlier amendment. We would expect at this stage for it to include distributions, and powers lie within the Bill for the regulator to do that. I want to put that on record once again, further to our earlier debate. It will depend on which issues and features of the market are relevant to its objectives and the regulatory regime at any given time. However, the report is still constrained by its link to only matters relevant to the regulator’s function, so I reassure the Committee that this cannot be an avenue for scope creep.

The clause also requires the regulator to publish its first report no longer than 18 months after the competitions and scope of the regulation have been specified by the Secretary of State, as we have discussed. Subsequent reports must be published at least every five years after this but, as we have just debated, they could be more frequent if the regulator considers it appropriate. These timeframes balance the importance of a timely first report with giving the regulator time to undertake the necessary in-depth analysis.

Finally, the clause sets out clear consultation requirements, including an open process of inviting suggestions about the issues to be included in the report, as well as targeted consultation on a draft report, which I hope speaks to some of the comments from the hon. Member for Newbury on his previous amendment.

[Mr French]

I do not want to rehash the debate we had before the lunch break. We will press amendment 122 to a vote under a future clause, but we are disappointed that the Government are not willing to accept amendment 123. As we explained before the break, Conservative Members are very concerned that the regulator may impact ticket prices even further. We were calling for transparency in the state of the game report for fans and for Parliament so that they could understand the impact of the regulator on ticket prices for fans. We are disappointed that that amendment was not accepted. I appreciate the further comments that the Minister made, but I would like her to consider that in the future.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman said that he would not rehash the debate, but somewhat did. I have made my argument clear: ticket pricing is a commercial decision, and the Government have gone further by adding a consultation. We have nothing more to add on that topic; it has been fully debated.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Football governance statement

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 113, in clause 11, page 7, line 41, at end insert—

“(7) No football governance statement may have effect unless approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.”.

This amendment would require the football governance statement to be approved by Parliament before it could have effect.

As we know, clause 11 makes provision for the Secretary of State, whoever that may be in the coming months, to issue a statement on issues related to football and, specifically, to the Government’s regulator. While the statement is not a binding one, it walks a very fine line and could be interpreted as political interference in the governance of football. As we have already heard when deliberating on clause 7, that is a very real issue with real-life implications for English football and English clubs.

I do not want to get bogged down in the earlier debate, but I ask the Minister to accept the fact that, aside from the context of the Bill, if UEFA or FIFA deem the Government to be exerting influence on how football is run in a way that compromises the independence of football associations and clubs in line with their statutes, they can, and perhaps will, take action to exclude the nation’s teams and clubs from competition. Irrespective of the Bill, if FIFA or UEFA believe that there is Government interference in football, there is a risk that clubs could be kicked out of European competitions.

[Stephanie Peacock]

No one is disputing that. We are clear that the Bill does not stray into that. As I said to the hon. Gentleman, in his Government’s iteration of the Bill, the regulator had to have due regard to foreign and trade policy. We took that out, further strengthening the independence of the independent football regulator.

[Mr French]

I genuinely thank the Minister for clarifying. We have to understand the context in which the Bill is operating. As I said earlier, the Bill is being made not in isolation, but in a complex international football ecosystem. We have to be mindful of that in everything that we do in this Committee and in the legislation that goes forward. Will the Minister therefore accept that, even if she does not believe that it will happen, if her regulator is perceived to be exerting influence and undermining the independence of English football, both international governing bodies will exclude English teams? I want to confirm that the Government understand those risks.

Much like the Secretary of State’s failure to declare her interests in relation to her appointee to the chairmanship of the regulator, who we know donated to her, this is about the perception of undue influence and the impact that will have on how the independence of English football is viewed internationally. If UEFA and FIFA perceive that there is undue influence from whoever the Government of the day may be, they will act, as I explained already with the example of Greek football in 2006. I hope that, as the Secretary of State has now done, the Prime Minister will make sure to declare any relevant interests, as we know that the chairman also donated to his campaign.

I believe that the Minister confirmed that she understands that there is a real risk that we have to be mindful of and that if the regulator breached independence, the entirety of English clubs’ participation in Europe, and the jobs and significant revenues that come alongside that, would be at stake. That is why I have tabled amendment 113, which would require the football governance statement prepared by the Secretary of State to be approved by Parliament before it could have effect. That is a vital safeguard to prevent the perception that any Government of any colour have direct influence over the regulator.

[Mr French]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the intervention, but I am speaking very clearly about the interference of Government in football. That is very different from how Parliament acts in creating this statute and being able to check that the regulator is not putting clubs at risk, as I have said before. It is about Parliament having its say, rather than just delegating powers to the Secretary of State of the day.

By requiring that Parliament approve the statement, my amendment would ensure two things. First, there will be proper scrutiny of the Government and their policy. Mr Speaker has recently had to remind the Leader of the House, because of the way the Government have continued to ignore it, of paragraph 9.1 of the ministerial code, which states:

“When Parliament is in session, the most important announcements of government policy should be made in the first instance in Parliament.”

The amendment would require the Government to come the House to present and defend their policy, instead of hiding behind media briefings or social media posts.

Secondly, the amendment would help to mitigate UEFA’s and FIFA’s concerns about the direct influence of Government over the independence of English football. Accepting the amendment and inserting Parliament into the equation would make the regulator much more palatable for the international governing bodies.

I hope that members of the Committee will accept the amendment for what it is: an attempt to ensure that no Government of any colour can be the cause of English football’s exclusion from European or international competitions. There will come a day—the sooner the better, in my opinion—that the Labour party is no longer in government. Labour and Liberal Democrat Members must therefore be realistic, practical and honest about the situation. When there is a different Government in place, will they accept the risk of that Government being the reason that the Three Lions cannot play in the World cup, or the reason that English clubs—from Cheltenham to Barnsley or Welling, or perhaps Sheffield Wednesday —cannot compete in European competitions? That might seem a remote prospect at the moment, but it is the ultimate aim of every club to be in such competitions. That is at risk without this amendment.

If hon. Members are being honest with themselves, their constituents and football fans across the country, the answer will be clear, and they should support my amendment to help to protect English football and give Parliament a greater say.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his amendment, but I am not sure that his remarks spoke much to the detail of it. I remind him that this part of the Bill has not been changed since its previous iteration under the last Government. He has once again made his well-rehearsed argument about UEFA, but there is no risk in that regard. We have been very clear. UEFA and FIFA are happy with the Bill as drafted, and the FA has made that clear to Members of both Houses.

The purpose of the clause is to allow the Secretary of State the power to prepare a football governance statement that sets out the Government’s policies on issues related to football governance, where these are consistent with the regulator’s statutory remit. We believe that this is an important tool that the Government can use to set out their priorities in football governance, similar to the way that the Government give a strategic steer to the Competition and Markets Authority and other regulators.

We drafted the provision with appropriate deference to Parliament. Any statement must be consistent with the purpose of the Bill and the regulator’s objectives as set out in the Bill. The Committee has already considered that purpose and those objectives and has approved them. Parliament has set out the statutory remit, but it is appropriate that the Government of the day are able to set out their policy priorities within that well-defined remit without requiring parliamentary approval each time. There are also restrictions on when statements can be made, to ensure that they are not overused. Any statement must be published and laid before Parliament, so Parliament can hold the Secretary of State accountable for its content. Requiring the Secretary of State to gain approval for this statement would add an extra burden to Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. He was new to this place at the election, so he perhaps is not familiar with the previous Bill, but as I have said, this Bill is the same as the Conservative version. On the specifics of the statement, I do not want to pre-empt what may be in there, but it could be, for example, the idea that the Government focus on growth; we have that in the objectives. I do not want to anticipate what could be, but let us be clear: this is about broad objectives, not specifics or operations, and any statement that is not consistent with Parliament’s intention in passing the Bill, as set out in the regulator’s statutory objectives and in the purpose clause of the Bill, could be challenged legally. Similar discussions have taken place in both the House of Lords—the other place—and the House of Commons, and we expect the statement to reflect the Government’s position on the regulator’s use of its powers.

[Mr French]

The Minister, I believe, just said to the Committee that one of the objectives that this Committee and Parliament have set out for the regulator is growth.

[Stephanie Peacock]

No, I did not say that.

[Mr French]

I stand to be corrected; we will look at Hansard, but one of the votes that we have had already in Committee was on an Opposition amendment to make sure that growth was clearly defined in that objective in the Bill, and it was rejected by the Government, so I am slightly confused. My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne has asked for clarification of what might be in the report, and the Minister seems to be contradicting a vote that has already happened. Could she clarify what she means?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I can absolutely. I said I did not want to be drawn on the specifics of the statement; I do not want to pre-empt what is in there, but I tried to give an illustration without being drawn into the specifics. If, say, there is a general election and a new Government take power, a new Secretary of State may want to give broad direction. We as this new Labour Government have made it very clear that growth is a focus. We know that is in the Bill, so that is why I thought it was a sensible illustration to give in answer to the question from the hon. Member for Spelthorne, but I want to be very clear that I do not want to be drawn into specifics, because this could cover the approach with regulation in, for example, minimising burdens on clubs, which would tie in with that.

I simply do not think this amendment is necessary. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw it.

[Mr French]

I must admit I am slightly confused by the answer that was given. I expected the Government to refuse my amendment, but I am genuinely confused about the direction of travel now. I explained the causes of the amendment. The answer that the Minister has just given to my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne seems to contradict—other Members are nodding—votes that have already taken place on this Bill. Without rehashing the whole exchange, we wanted to put in as an objective of the regulator economic growth and growing the game of football, for very plausible reasons. The debate was around the word “sustainability”—I appreciate that you were not in the Chair at that point, Ms Butler. To hear the Minister describe the objective that was voted down by the Labour party as a key part of Government policy—that was the argument we made earlier; we could not understand why the amendment was voted against—is confusing. We are genuinely confused, so I will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

To ensure that the regulatory regime is as effective and efficient as possible, the football industry needs to understand what is expected of it. That is why this clause empowers the regulator to prepare and publish guidance on the exercise of its function. The guidance will be crucial to translate the legal framework in the Bill into a detailed and practical explanation of the regulator’s regime. It will ensure that the industry understands the regulatory system, what to expect from the regulator and what is expected of it. Not only will that reduce burdens, but it should improve compliance.

The clause sets out that the regulator must publish guidance about the exercise of its functions under specific sections of the Bill. It also commits the regulator to publish guidance about the exercise of any of its other functions. The regulator must consult any persons that it considers appropriate before publishing guidance for the first time and before revising guidance in the future, unless the revisions are minor. This will ensure the regulator is taking into account the views of all relevant stakeholders and experts when preparing its guidance.

Clause 13 permits the Secretary of State to prepare and publish guidance on the regulator’s functions. If needed, this guidance offers an opportunity to provide some additional detail on the regime that was not included in the Bill.

The industry and fans alike have been clear that they do not want to see ongoing Government involvement in football, as we have debated in this Committee. That is why the regulator must have regard to the Secretary of State’s guidance, but is not obliged to follow it. That is also why the Secretary of State may not revise this guidance any more frequently than every three years. This will deliver an appropriate arm’s length role for the Government, but avoid any risk of the regulator becoming a political football. The Secretary of State must consult both the regulator and anyone else they consider appropriate before publishing or revising any guidance, and must lay the guidance before Parliament. I beg to move that these changes—I mean clauses—stand part of the Bill.

[Mr French]

The Minister will be pleased to know that I will not pick her up on that slip of the tongue, given I made a few of my own this morning with some of the tongue twisters that my assistant put into my speeches.

As we have just heard, clause 12 requires the Government’s regulator to publish guidance about the exercise of its functions as set out in clauses 21 to 25 and the outcomes it seeks to achieve, and to consult appropriate persons before publishing that guidance.

I have a few questions. Will the Minister clarify when she expects her regulator to have translated its powers and duties into a detailed, cohesive and practical explanation of the IFR regime, and what she believes detailed and practical mean for the clubs, so they can understand that?

Clause 13 permits the Secretary of State to prepare and publish guidance on the Government’s regulator’s exercise of its functions under the regulatory regime. This guidance would aid the Government’s regulator in interpreting the intention of legislation when designing and implementing its regulatory regime. It would be non-binding, but the Government’s regulator must have regard to it when exercising its functions.

There was an interesting debate between two lawyers on this Committee about where those lines are drawn. They have both made their arguments for the record, so I will not go back into that, but the clause does stipulate that revisions to guidance may not be made

“more frequently than every three years”

unless there is a revision to the Bill, or the revision is pre-agreed upon between the Secretary of State and the Government’s regulator. It also requires the Secretary of State to consult both the Independent Football Regulator and any appropriate persons before publishing or revising any guidance and laying it before Parliament, unless the revisions are minor.

The Minister will be aware that in the previous sitting I pressed her about that parliamentary role; I will now do so again. Might we have some insight into where, when the reports come back to Parliament, the Government plan to publish them? On Tuesday I asked the Minister whether that would be the role of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, or of the Public Accounts Committee, given the financial aspects and the costs, and the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General, or whether that would be on the Floor of the House. We really would appreciate, as the official Opposition, some guidance on where the Government plan to publish those reports, so that everyone in the House may have a clear understanding of the direction of travel and where those reports will be available to be read.

While the guidance may not be binding, the clause highlights the blurred lines between Government and regulator, particularly when the appointee was a political appointee, as we know. How will the Minister ensure that any guidance published by the Government is not interpreted as Government intervention, and that the regulator remains free to act independently while not bringing in those risks that we have discussed today?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clubs may well do that, absolutely, but the amendment goes further than is needed and I will continue to make the case as to why I simply do not think it is necessary. It could involve the lengthy and onerous process of identifying and separating compliance costs from their overall operational costs. Reporting on compliance costs would drive up those costs unnecessarily. The regulator and Department will already be required to undertake monitoring and evaluation of the impact of regulation; that includes the review of the Act by the Secretary of State as per clause 96. For those reasons, I cannot accept the amendment and I ask the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw it.

[Mr French]

We tabled the amendment because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East explained, it is in the interest of driving transparency for fans and clubs, and for Members to see the effectiveness and impact of the regulator. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne explained, it is highly likely that most clubs captured by the top five leagues of the regulator will have reports in their board rooms that explain the costs of regulation and compliance costs. As I said earlier, they have to report on a variety of functions for their league credibility, so it is not unusual to expect them to be able to account for how much this extra regulation will cost, nor is it unusual to expect us to have transparency on the impact of the Government’s football regulator on the football pyramid from the bottom to the top. We will press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 14 requires the regulator to report annually to Parliament on its activity for that year. As with all public bodies, the regulator must arrange for the report to be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State for purposes of transparency and scrutiny. The Secretary of State will have some flexibility to direct additional material to be included with the annual report. That will help ensure that the regulator captures all relevant information in a year, and allow the Government and Parliament to properly scrutinise its performance.

[Mr French]

I appreciate that the Minister said earlier that she has written to me to set out where the report will end up and how Parliament will be able to scrutinise it, but will Parliament have a vote on it?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I do not believe so. I have written to the shadow Minister and will double-check the correspondence. The report will help to ensure that the regulator captures all relevant information in a year, thereby allowing the Government and Parliament to properly scrutinise its performance. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Operating licences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

That was a strange intervention.

New clause 2 and new clause 6 would require the independent football regulator to provide assistance to regulated clubs seeking to obtain a provisional licence, clubs with a provisional licence seeking a full licence, and unregulated clubs that are reasonably likely to become regulated in the next football season. The new clauses would also require the independent football regulator to provide reasonable and proportionate assistance to regulated clubs in their efforts to continue to comply with their licence conditions.

The sentiments behind both arguments are not bad ones. We have made strong arguments already about our concerns regarding costs for clubs lower down the pyramid. I do, however, question the contradiction of being concerned about clubs in National League South and North, but wanting to get them in the scope of the regulator—we disagree with that. I have a few questions about the new clauses that I hope either the hon. Member for Sheffield South East or the hon. Member for Cheltenham might be happy to answer, just so the Committee can understand.

Given that the new clauses would require the independent football regulator to provide reasonable and proportionate assistance, we would be interested to know what assistance those hon. Members think might be reasonable or proportionate for clubs to require, and whether the independent football regulator is to provide them in the different instances covered by the new clauses. How would the independent football regulator’s liabilities towards clubs under the new clauses be determined and enforced? How would it be funded? That would be a question that all clubs would ask.

In a feedback loop that I am sure the hon. Member for Sheffield South East is aware of through his chairmanship of the football all-party parliamentary group over many years, one of the arguments that a number of clubs make is, “Why should I pay for someone else to come and try to take my place in the league that I am in?” That is part of the competitive nature of football. Although there is cross-club working in a number of areas trying to help clubs, often, the same clubs are competing against each other. We would need a bit of clarity on how the additional provision of help would be paid for. Would the cost be passed on to other clubs? Leaving aside those questions about what that may look like in the future, we understand the sympathies expressed in the new clauses to try to help clubs further down the pyramid, so that they are not excluded based on the fact that they cannot afford to apply for a licence.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East and the hon. Member for Cheltenham for tabling new clauses 2 and 6. The Government recognise the intent behind them, and we agree that the regulator should help clubs to comply with regulation as much as is reasonably possible. It is in everyone’s interests for clubs to become compliant quickly and with as little additional burden as possible. It is vital that the regulator helps clubs get to grips with its regulatory regime, which is why we have been very clear that the regulator will operate an advocacy-first approach, and why provisions for a collaborative approach are already in the Bill.

For example, the regulatory principle of clause 8(b) encourages the regulator to co-operate and constructively engage with clubs. Regulatory principles (c) and (d) encourage the regulator to ensure that any action is proportionate to the benefits expected from it.

In relation to the specifics of the new clauses, we disagree with any provision that would require the regulator to provide financial assistance to clubs to comply with requirements imposed by the regulator. That would amount to redistribution by the back door, given that the Independent Football Regulator would be levying some clubs in order to provide financial assistance to others. That is not the regulator’s role, and we do not believe it should be. On training, the regulator can work with clubs to ensure that they fully understand the regulation and what is expected of them. Of course, in cases where this is necessary, the regulator can appoint a skilled person to assist the club in resolving issues in respect of a relevant infringement. For the reasons that I have outlined, I am unable to accept the new clauses and I hope that they will be—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

The Minister is trying to suggest that everything is the same, but the Secretary of State has literally nominated a Labour donor who donated to her and the Prime Minister to chair the regulator, so the situation has clearly changed. The appointment is now the subject of independent inquiry; they are under investigation for the appointment. The Minister has been landed the role because the Secretary of State has recused herself, so the situation has clearly changed and it is clearly a political appointment.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman can make that well-rehearsed comment, but I specifically said there are no changes to this part of the Bill. I am focused on what we are talking about, and the parts of the Bill that amendments 99 and 100 relate to have not been changed. He also said that he would not oppose just for the sake of it, but that does seem to be what he is doing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Indeed, a number of Conservative Members are on record as supporting this policy; it is just sad that the ones sitting opposite seem to have forgotten the manifesto they stood on.

[Mr French]

I do not want to go on about this too long, but the argument that seems to be coming from the Opposition Benches is—

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful, Ms Butler. I completely appreciate the point the shadow Minister is making, but he seems to be missing the point I am making that this part of the Bill has not changed from the previous one. I will now outline why we do not think amendments 99 or 100 are appropriate.

We do not think it is right to remove the ability of the regulator to require additional information from clubs during the application process for a licence. It is only right that the regulator can specify any further information or documentation it may need in order to properly assess whether a club needs the test for a provisional operating licence. It may require further information to assess a club’s circumstances and whether it will need to tailor any mandatory licensing conditions, or attach any initial discretionary licence conditions to the club.

Specifically on amendment 100, the criteria listed in the Bill are non-exhaustive, and the regulator should have the flexibility to request additional information from a club regarding its business plan when necessary. In line with the regulator’s principles, any request for information will, of course, be proportionate, and the regulator will co-operate and engage practically with the club. The regulator will not be asking for any information that is not in the scope of the provisional licence; there would be no reason for it to do so. However, there is an appeals process.

To end with an example, if a club puts forward a business plan and something seems out of the ordinary, the regulator may wish to ask where the funds are from. We think that that is perfectly reasonable, and it was in the previous iteration of the Bill.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the points that the Minister is making. Another point that I made—this is not political—was about the standardisation of requests, which would allow clubs to prepare on the basis of what they expect the regulator to ask and ensure consistency between clubs. Will the Minister tell us how that might work?

[Stephanie Peacock]

Standardisation is not appropriate in this context, because the extra information may relate to discretionary licence terms, which will be tailored to a club. It is therefore not relevant.

For the reasons I have given, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

[Mr French]

We are concerned about unchecked powers, as we have explained at some length, and believe that the House should be able to check those powers. We are concerned about the lack of standardisation. I fear that, by treating clubs differently depending on their circumstances, the regulator will be left open to legal challenge. Some clubs have the financial resources to challenge a league, and will have the resource to challenge a regulator. We have seen that with certain clubs in the Premier League—I will not mention the cases, for legal reasons. Some football clubs are willing to challenge their regulation in court. We fear that, without standards for what is asked of clubs, there could be more legal challenges down the line. For those reasons, we will press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I thank the hon. Member for that point. Transfers are a key aspect. If a club is in limbo, it could arguably be at a much bigger disadvantage when the season starts if it had not been able to make transfers because it was uncertain about whether it could compete in the competition. The point is well made.

Secondly, the absence of a defined period creates a lack of accountability within the regulator itself. As we have discussed, the regulator cannot be scrutinised in the way that we would have hoped. We know that the Government do want it to be strong, but with strength must come accountability and transparency. If it is to command the trust of fans, clubs and local communities, it must be seen to act with purpose, not with delay.

We know from numerous examples across different industries that when regulators are left without timetables, backlogs just build up. I will not name examples because I am conscious of time, but we know that it happens. My amendment proposes a time limit of one month—a full 30 days—for the regulator to determine whether a provisional licence should be granted. That is not a rushed timetable; we believe that it is a reasonable one, especially considering that when a club applies for a provisional licence, the key facts will likely already be known by the regulator. Again, this is not designed to be a forensic financial autopsy, but a short-term stabilising mechanism.

Let me also be clear that the time limit does not bind the regulator to approve an application within a month; it simply requires a decision one way or another within that time. That allows the Government’s regulator to reject unsuitable applications if needed—hopefully not—but it removes the damaging uncertainty of a process that otherwise could drag on indefinitely. We must not forget who bears the cost of delay. It is not just the club executives and directors, but the fans, players and staff. We have just heard about transfers, which are a great example. It is about the people who turn up on a Saturday afternoon come rain or shine, the people who run the club shop and the ticket gates, and the people whose local economies benefit from having a club that is alive, operating and secure.

The amendment also supports the broader aim of stability in football. A system without timelines invites inconsistency and subjectivity. One club might be processed in a week, and another in six. That cannot be right. We owe it to clubs at all levels, from the top of the Premier League right the way down to the National League, to create a system that is predictable and fair.

Finally, good regulation is not just about the rules but about responsiveness. It is about a regulator that can act promptly, efficiently and in partnership with the people it is overseeing. Our amendment does not weaken the regulator; it makes it better. It strengthens the trust between the regulator and the regulated. It gives clubs the certainty that they need to plan, invest and survive. After all, that is what the Government say is the intention of this regulator. I hope that hon. Members will support the principle behind the amendment. We have heard some of the issues that may arise if not.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendment 101. I will outline the reasons why we will not accept it, and then I will respond to some of the questions that he raised.

The Bill ensures that the regulator has the necessary flexibility to ensure that all clubs that meet the test for a provisional licence will be given one. Introducing an arbitrary statutory timeframe of one month for the regulator to make a decision on a club’s application would remove that flexibility. Only the regulator can know what the process of assessing applications might entail or how long it might take, so it should have the ability to set in rules the period within which it will make a decision, the period of any potential extension and the circumstances in which an extension will be granted. The regulator will engage with all clubs prior to the application for a provisional operating licence to ensure that the process is as smooth and efficient as possible, and its regulatory principles encourage it to act in a timely manner.

I turn to some of the specific points that the hon. Member made. There will be no requirement to restructure the board to get a provisional licence. As I outlined in my opening remarks, the regulator will take an advocacy-first approach. Clubs will be asked to submit basic information and documentation, and to show a readiness and willingness to work with the regulator. I draw the hon. Member’s attention to clause 17(4)(b), which says that if, for whatever reason, the regulator does not give a licence, it would have to give reasons. Even in that scenario, which I highlight is hypothetical, enforcement might take place, but it would not prevent the club from playing. For these reasons, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

I do not plan to speak again at length. I appreciate the Minister’s comments, but we are concerned that without a set timetable on the regulator’s granting of a provisional licence, the uncertainty would create a number of issues.

[Mr French]

I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. That is not my understanding of how the Bill works, but the Minister may want to clarify that.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Of course. The shadow Minister referred more than once to clubs not being able to play. As I said, this is an advocacy-first approach; the regulator will work with clubs to make sure that they can reach the provisional licence requirements. It is a basic set of requirements, and they do not have to meet it to receive the provisional licence; they just have to show a willingness and an ability to do that. In the hypothetical scenario that they do not, enforcement may happen, but they will not be prevented from playing. However, we do not anticipate that happening, because at the provisional stage, the regulator will work with them to make sure that they can do that. I want to be very clear—perhaps the hon. Member for Spelthorne misunderstood what I said—that the regulator will work with teams to make sure that they can get that provisional licence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

We do not anticipate that happening. Enforcement would take place, but we do not want the regulator to stop clubs being able to play. I am outlining how the regulator will do everything it can. The information is fairly basic, and the aim is to move as quickly as possible, so we anticipate clubs being able to receive that provisional licence.

Clause 18 establishes the second step of a two-step licensing process designed to ensure a smooth transition to regulation. Being granted a full operating licence should be the aim of all clubs in scope of the regulator. The full licence means that the regulator is satisfied that the club meets all relevant requirements, including the threshold requirements. For a club to pass the test for a full licence, the regulator must be satisfied that the club

“meets the threshold requirements set out in Schedule 4”

and is complying with and

“would continue to comply with the mandatory licence conditions”

and the free-standing duties on clubs set out in part 5. Finally, the regulator must not have determined

“that any person who is an owner or officer of the club is not suitable”

for the position they hold.

The clause also details the power that the regulator has to extend the provisional operating licence for a club. That will be done only if the regulator believes that the club does not meet the bar for a full licence at present, but will do if given more time. Clubs will have had time and support, while provisionally licensed, to ensure that they can meet the higher bar for a full licence. Once the club has a full licence, it will not have to be periodically reviewed. Instead, the regulator will continue to monitor and supervise the club. There will be an annual touchpoint in the form of an annual declaration, in which the club will notify the regulator of any relevant changes. That will minimise burdens while still ensuring that the club continues to adhere to the necessary requirements, including requirements that ensure that fans’ best interests are at the heart of the club’s decision-making process. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Mr French]

The Minister has outlined clauses 17 and 18 at some length. We had a lengthy debate on clause 17 in relation to our amendment 101. We are naturally disappointed that the amendment, and the time limit that we seek for the provisional licensing, was not agreed to. However, in the interests of time, I will move on to clause 18.

Clause 18 sets out the process by which the Government’s regulator may grant the full operating licence to a club, which is a crucial stage in the proposed licensing regime, with significant long-term implications for the structure, stability and future of the English game. This clause is where the Government’s regulator transitions from assessing provisional eligibility to giving a formal stamp of approval for a club’s longer-term competition and compliance. However, the clause raises several questions that the Committee must interrogate, and that I hope the Minister will be able to answer—not least whether it achieves the right balance between regulatory assurance and operational flexibility.

Under the clause, the regulator may grant a full operating licence only if satisfied that a club meets the relevant conditions of eligibility. That is right and proper, and clubs should be expected to operate on a stable financial footing, meet appropriate governance standards and protect the game’s integrity. But I am concerned about the breadth and, in some respects, the open-ended nature of what those conditions of eligibility might come to mean in practice.

We must be alive to the risk of regulatory overreach, as the Opposition have highlighted, and we should all recognise that bad regulation is worse than no regulation at all. If clubs are to be subject to vague or ever-changing thresholds, with little recourse or clarity on what is required, we risk imposing a level of uncertainty that could deter vital investment, discourage long-term planning and undermine the very sustainability that the regulator seeks to ensure. That is why the Opposition will—as we already have done in Committee—continue to press for greater transparency around the costs and cumulative burdens that flow from the action of the regulator; and it is why we believe that the regulator should not have unfettered discretion to shift the goalposts without clear parliamentary scrutiny and approval. As I have said, we should not write blank cheques to a politically led regulator.

Another issue with the clause is timeliness. As we have explained, clubs will need to plan ahead, financially, structurally and operationally. If the licensing process drags on, it risks becoming a bottleneck and not a safeguard for clubs around participation. We tabled amendments that would ensure timely decision making on provisional licences, and the same principle must surely also apply to full licences. However, we appreciate the different context within which a full operating licence will exist. That is why we have not tabled an amendment to this clause with a specific deadline. We understand that full licences will take slightly longer.

Moreover, there is a danger that the full licence becomes a tool for undue influence. We have spoken about our concerns about the impact that that may have on the statutes of UEFA and FIFA—in the interests of time, I will not go into that again. If clubs feel under pressure to comply with this new licensing regime to be able to play in English football, there may be a concern about them breaching other regimes, such as UEFA and FIFA, and, again, they may fear expulsion from those competitions.

One club asked me this question, although it was a tongue-in-cheek comment, so I will not name them. If a Premier League club decided not to apply for a licence, would the Government look to exclude it? There is the risk that, if a club feels that it will not be able to compete in Europe, for whatever reason, it may choose what this Bill was originally intended to stop: the European breakaway league.

I am not sure that the club would do that, as it was a tongue-in-cheek comment, but what would happen if a club says, “We are not going to meet these conditions, and therefore we will not apply for a licence”? Would the Government or regulator be willing to kick that club out of the Premier League? Even though that question is hypothetical, we need to know where this might lead, because we are talking about a regulation that will have an impact. If the Minister can answer where she thinks that club might go, I would be particularly interested in that.

We are also concerned about the future interpretation of eligibility and how that may veer into what we believe to be subjective decisions, or where the Government’s regulator will take on new powers as it enters mission creep. As such, I would appreciate it if the Minister will confirm that there will be no demands, for example, on clubs to provide diversity quotas, net zero targets or enforced political campaigns, all of which stray beyond the regulator’s core remit of financial sustainability and good governance. Let us not forget that football clubs are not franchises, as they are in the American sport system. Our clubs are community institutions with long histories and unique identities. They are not all cut from the same cloth.

[Mr French]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, but that is not the point I was making. I am talking about quotas, which is a slightly different thing. We do not think that the regulator should be insisting on quotas, and that is very different from Kick It Out, which has made incredible progress for football over the years. The hon. Lady has raised a very different point, so I will not go down that rabbit hole.

I am sure that the Minister would agree that what is best for Barnsley FC is not necessarily best for Bromley FC or Bristol Rovers. Each club has unique characteristics and should be treated as such. However, we feel that the Bill, as drafted, could lead to clubs being lumped in the same direction. We believe in the equalisation of treatment, but each club should not be treated exactly the same when there are clear differences, whether that be in league structures or financial positions.

We are concerned about parts of clause 18, but we believe that it is an important part of the licensing structure that must be implemented with care, proportionality and consistency. It is essential that the Government’s regulator operates with discipline, sticking to those statutory objectives, resisting the temptation to micro-manage and always keeping front of mind the importance of stability, continuity and respect of football’s unique heritage. We support the principles of the clause, but I would appreciate it if the Minister answered some of my questions about what may come in the future and what the Government would do if a club decided not to apply for a licence.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his comments. A number of the points that he made have been well debated over the last few days in Committee, so I will not be engaging in them. I will not be engaging in hypotheticals either. We have been very clear that we simply do not want scope creep. The two-step process of the provisional and full operating licence means that clubs do not need to make substantial changes in a short space of time. We absolutely appreciate that it could be difficult for some clubs to meet threshold requirements, and the regulator will very much work with them. The regulator will have a balanced and proportionate approach, centred around advocacy first.

[Mr French]

I appreciate that I was asking about a hypothetical situation, but it is an important hypothetical. We are talking about a structure going forward in which clubs will be required to have a licence, and we have had some exchanges on that. This is a serious question: what would the football regulator do if a club said that it did not want the licence, and it did not believe it had to have one? Where would that legally leave the club and regulator? Even though it is hypothetical, it is very important to what we are debating in the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I disagree that it is an important hypothetical. We can come on to talk about enforcement later on, but we are talking now about the regulator’s approach, which will be balanced, proportionate and centred around advocacy.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Thursday 5th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment. I understand that its intent is to put beyond any doubt that the Bill and the regulator will not breach UEFA or FIFA statutes, and so will not risk English clubs or national teams being banned from international competitions. I will set out why we do not think the amendment is necessary, and then I will respond to some of the questions that hon. Members posed during the debate.

I assure the Committee that the amendment is not necessary. UEFA and FIFA statutes require that the FA manages its affairs without undue influence from third parties and remains independent of political interference. The regulator will be operationally independent of the Government and will not exert undue influence on the FA’s ability to govern the game.

The shadow Minister asked about consultation. Through the observer role on the regulator board, there is an explicit requirement to consult the FA. The extent of its statutory powers and duties will not allow it to undermine FIFA’s or UEFA’s statutes. That is why—to answer the question from the hon. Member for Spelthorne—UEFA has confirmed in writing to the Secretary of State that the Bill as drafted does not breach UEFA statutes. The FA has also confirmed that directly to Members of both Houses, and it is of course publicly supportive of the Bill.

Rather than protect English football, I am afraid that the amendment would have serious unintended consequences. It would put the regulator in a position of deference to a private international organisation—a point the hon. Member for Cheltenham made eloquently a number of times. That would not only undermine the sovereignty of Parliament, but leave English football in a very weak position. UEFA has confirmed that the amendment is not needed, and it would undermine parliamentary sovereignty; for those very straightforward reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

Although I do not doubt the Minister’s sincere belief in the assurances she has given, I am afraid that unless we have evidence that gives the Opposition certainty about them, we will not withdraw our amendment. We are very concerned about the future participation of English clubs in Europe and of the national team in European and world competitions for reasons that I outlined in my speech—in the interest of time, I will not repeat them now.

I note that the Minister was very careful in her wording when she talked about what was said in the letter from UEFA. She talked about the Bill “as drafted”. The Opposition are extremely concerned about scope creep from the regulator, and much of our contributions have focused on the fact that the future regulator may take a decision that is not in conformity with the rules of FIFA and UEFA, which this House would then have few means to change. That would put at risk clubs, investment and jobs in clubs up and down the country. That is why I will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I understand the Lib Dem spokesman’s point, but in my understanding, that would be the responsibility of the leagues. That is not what we are trying to block with this amendment; we are trying to block club-to-club forced redistribution. That is an important distinction, and I will come on to explain why.

I do not believe that this is a theoretical concern. The regulator’s objectives include financial sustainability. One can easily imagine a future regulator interpreting this objective to mean that it should balance resources across the pyramid, effectively redistributing funds to prop up weaker clubs. Without this amendment, nothing in legislation explicitly prevents such a scenario.

Some may argue that redistribution is needed to make the game fairer—I understand that point—but fairness in football has always been earned through competition, not imposed through central control. We must be very cautious about importing the language and logic of equalisation into a sport that depends for its vitality on aspiration, competition and merit. Sporting competition is a hill that I am willing to die on.

It is also worth noting that forced redistribution between clubs would create perverse incentives. It would reward financial mismanagement and punish prudence, and it would create a moral hazard where clubs are less motivated to balance their books if they believe that the regulator will require others to bail them out. That is not a path to sustainability; it is a recipe for mediocrity, or worse, disaster.

The principle at stake is clear: the role of the regulator is to set standards, ensure compliance and uphold integrity, and not to act as a central accountant deciding who deserves what. If clubs wish to strike revenue-sharing deals through their leagues, they may do so. The amendment draws a line: it protects club autonomy and supports continued investment in the game, and it ensures that the Government’s regulator—whatever its remit ends up being—respects the rights of clubs to manage and retain their own finances.

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the shadow Minister for the amendment and the chance to clarify the Government’s position on the redistribution of revenue. Let me be clear: the backstop process will apply only to revenue received by the leagues. That is already explicit in the definition of “relevant revenue” in clause 56. It does not allow the regulator to include individual club revenue that is not relevant for distribution agreements—for example, shirt sales. The amendment is not necessary to ensure that. It would call into question the regulator’s powers under the backstop process. Although that process is about resolving distribution disputes between the leagues, not individual teams, the money received by the leagues is ultimately distributed to their member teams.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause sets out the general duties of the regulator to define when and how it can act. The regulator must act in a way that, in so far as is reasonably practicable, is compatible with the purpose of the Bill—to protect and promote the sustainability of English football—and that advances one or more of its objectives. As part of that, the clause requires the regulator to, where appropriate, take certain things into consideration when it acts. As the regulator is required only to “have regard to” these things, it is not strictly bound by them, and so its operational independence is not undermined.

The regulator must consider some key outcomes in the football market, beyond its primary objectives. Specifically, where possible, it should have due regard to the desirability of avoiding indirect impacts on: the sporting outcomes of regulated clubs; the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs, which includes overseas competitors; and investment into, and growth of, English football. That recognises that there are other features of the market that should be protected. We want a sustainable football pyramid, but not at the expense of the exciting, competitive product that continues to attract so many viewers and investors. We have explicitly added growth to this provision. The regulator will not actively pursue these outcomes, but it will be mindful of unduly harming them while it advances its statutory objectives.

The regulator must also have regard to five further things when exercising its functions. They include its regulatory principles, which guide how it should operate, its own guidance and the guidance from the Secretary of State, the most recent state of the game report, and the most recent football governance statement from the Secretary of State. We will discuss some of those points later today. I commend the clause to the House.

[Mr French]

It is disappointing that our amendments, which were tabled in a constructive manner, not a political one, have not been accepted. We remain concerned about some of those risks to the future of English football, but we will not seek to divide the Committee on this clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

The IFR’s regulatory principles

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The regulatory principles outlined in this clause are designed to guide the regulator to exercise its functions appropriately and in the manner intended by Parliament. The regulator must have regard to those principles when acting. The first principle encourages time and cost efficiency in everything that the regulator undertakes, encouraging swift action and value for money. The second principle encourages the regulator to co-operate with both those it regulates and those who will be impacted by its decisions. That reflects that the ideal regulatory environment is one where all stakeholders are working towards the same goals. Therefore, where the Bill says that the regulator should consult other relevant persons, we would expect that those affected by its decisions, such as fans, players, and representative groups, would be included when appropriate.

The third principle encourages the regulator to consider, before acting, whether the intervention is necessary, and if the same outcome could be achieved in a less burdensome way. That steers the regulator to take a light-touch approach to regulation where appropriate. The fourth principle encourages proportionality. The regulator should always look to choose the least restrictive action that still delivers the intended outcome, and be able to justify why any burden is worth it for the benefits expected. The fifth principle encourages the regulator to acknowledge the unique sporting context in which it is regulating. For example, it should consider the existing rules and burdens that clubs are subject to, and that market features such as transfer windows impose unique constraints on clubs.

The sixth principle encourages the regulator to apply regulation consistently, while still ensuring that requirements are appropriately tailored to a club’s specific circumstances. A Premier League club and a National League club operate in very different ways and face very different risks, and the regulator should and will take that into account when regulating, as I heard when meeting representatives of the Premier League, the EFL and the National League. The seventh principle encourages the regulator to hold the individuals responsible for making decisions at a club accountable for the actions and compliance of the club. For too long, clubs and fans have suffered the consequences of bad actors and mismanagement by the individuals calling the shots.

The eighth and final principle encourages the regulator to be transparent in its actions. It is important that the regulator and its regime are open and accessible to the industry, fans and the general public. I commend the clause to the House.

[Mr French]

I will not seek to repeat all the objectives that the Minister outlined for clause 8, but I will make some comments on each principle, and pose some questions to which I hope she can provide answers.

As the Minister described, clause 8 outlines the eight operating principles that guide the regulator’s approach. First, the Government’s regulator should be on time and cost-efficient, which is why I have tabled amendment 101 to clause 16. Secondly, the Government’s regulator should take a participative approach to regulation, helping to co-ordinate and co-operating with clubs and competition organisations, as well as engaging with players, fans and others. That relates to an amendment that we will come to shortly.

Thirdly, the Government’s regulator should be light touch in its approach to regulation, wherever possible. Sadly, we Opposition Members believe that that is now highly questionable due to some of the new parts of the Bill, which we raised concerns about in the first day’s sitting. Fourthly, the Government’s regulator should be proportionate in everything it does. Again, we have concerns about that and we have outlined some of those already.

Fifthly, the Government’s regulator should acknowledge the unique sporting context in which it is regulating, aiming to minimise any potential disruption to sporting competitions. I will not go through the debate we just had around UEFA international competitions, but I again highlight some of my earlier questions that I put to the Government on Tuesday about how this regulator is benchmarked against other regulators, because, in a sporting context, it is the first of its kind. It is very difficult for us to understand where the Government are moving towards, whether that is about resources, the size of the regulator, or the future direction, and we would like some clarity on that.

Sixthly, the Government’s regulator should apply the regulation consistently. We all hope that the regulator will do that in the future. Seventhly, the Government’s regulator should, where appropriate, hold individuals responsible for the actions of the club. That is absolutely right. There are clauses that seek to do that, and, as we have heard, to identify the appropriate officers and senior directors for different components of the club.

Eighthly, the Government’s regulator should be as transparent as possible in everything it does. Disappointingly, Government Members voted against the transparency amendments that we tabled, which, again, were not political; they were aimed to future-proof the transparency regarding how the regulator operates. I fundamentally believe that Members, regardless of what party they belong to, should be able to have all the information to make informed decisions on the benefits to their constituents.

Many of the principles in this clause are generally welcome, but I seek clarity from the Minister on a few matters. Does she think that these principles are strong enough to prevent the regulator from jeopardising the future participation of English clubs, particularly abroad? The fifth principle states that the regulator “should” aim to minimise disruption. Surely—we believe—it “must” avoid disruption, because of the risks that I outlined in previous amendments.

Lastly, none of the principles reference or reinforce the regulator’s independence. Why is there no principle regarding the regulator’s independence from the Government and politics at large, for the reasons we have outlined?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for broadly welcoming the principles. I will address a couple of those points, but without rehearsing this whole debate. Independence runs throughout this Bill; it is very clear that it is an independent football regulator, and we will talk about some of the safeguards for that in future debates.

The principles that we are debating are the same as they were under the previous Bill, with one exception: the third principle has been added, which is about making this less burdensome and which steers towards a light-touch regulator. I think that Members across the House would welcome that.

I will not rehearse the conversations we had on the make-up of the regulator—on staffing and so on, which we spoke about that the other day—but the shadow Minister touched again on UEFA. I gently remind him that we removed the need for the regulator to have regard to Government’s foreign and trade policy when considering club takeovers. We took that out of the previous Bill, and that is clearly welcome in the context of that UEFA debate. We are therefore confident that these are the right principles to guide the regulator to do a good job.

Question put and agreed to.  

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill 

Clause 9

Transfer schemes

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

We are committed to establishing the regulator as quickly as possible post the passing of this Bill. To that end, the regulator is currently operating in shadow form in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport in parallel to the passage of this Bill. This is a precedented approach; for example, the Trade Remedies Authority was run as a shadow function out of the Department for International Trade before it was formally established by the Trade Act 2021.

The shadow football regulator has started work to develop the regulator’s policy and guidance, engage with stakeholders, and undertake the necessary corporate activity to build an organisation, such as recruitment and procurement. That will enable the regulator to hit the ground running once it is legally established. The shadow regulator, of course, was established by the previous Government, as they clearly also recognised the importance of the regulator being ready to operate as soon as possible once the Bill receives Royal Assent.

On the creation of the regulator, it will be necessary for the property, rights, liabilities and staff held by the shadow regulator within DCMS to be transferred to the regulator. The most appropriate vehicle for effecting these transfers will be a statutory transfer scheme, as has been used in similar situations involving the transfer of assets following the transfer of functions between public bodies. The details of such transfers will be determined at the point of transfer.

[Mr French]

As we heard from the Minister, the clause relates to the transfer of staffing, resources and property to the Government’s regulator in the future. I would like to ask her—this goes back to an earlier conversation on the potential direction of travel, size and scope—how many staff will be transferred? What resources or properties are we talking about, so that taxpayers can understand, and what cost will there be to the taxpayer? Hopefully, those are fair questions.

We did seek to put an employee cap into the Bill to help to maintain value for money for taxpayers. I think that was a fair proposal, but Members did not agree with it or with the number of 50 that we put forward. However, the principle of trying to cap the size of the regulator is fair, especially given the size of some of the regulators that were described in comparison—I believe one had 900 members of staff. Most members of the public would be alarmed if the football regulator ended up anywhere near that, let alone a tenth of it. We are concerned, so I ask the Minister again, given the impact on costs to football clubs linked to the regulator, how big the Government expect it to grow. Can she also answer the questions that were raised about what will be transferred on day one?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions, which somewhat rehearse the previous debate on the staffing of the shadow regulator. He should have received an answer to the written question, and we spoke about this last time; as of 1 June, it has 42 staff. I cannot comment on exactly how many staff there will be at the point of Royal Assent. In my remarks, I said that upon the creation of the regulator, property rights, liabilities and staff will be transferred. I am happy at that point to write to the shadow Minister, but I will not speculate now.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 10

State of the game report

[Mr Betts]

I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 10, page 7, line 6, at end insert—

“(d) an assessment of any existing and effective financial distribution agreement against the principles set out in section 62(2);”

This amendment would require the state of the game report to make an assessment of any existing and effective financial distribution agreement against the principles set out in distribution orders for the resolution process.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. We are finally starting to get on to the football issues in the Bill. The state of the game report is obviously a key element. It will shape how the regulator operates, and eventually, the financial distribution, which we will come to later in the Bill. So the report is really important.

Amendment 2, without undermining what is already in the Bill in any way, simply ensures that the financial distribution as it exists, and as it might exist according to the principles laid out in further clauses of the Bill, is taken into account when developing the state of the game report. It brings a symmetry to the whole process, so that the state of the game report looks at the financial distribution, and when we come to the financial distribution, it goes back to look at the state of the game report. It is a simple amendment that makes the Bill coherent as a whole. I hope that the Minister might at least consider it when looking at how the Bill might be improved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

The amendments from the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup regarding ticket pricing touch on an important issue that I recognise is very important to fans. I reassure fans that the Bill will increase clubs’ overall accountability, including on this important issue. However, the annual report is not an effective place to address ticket prices.

Ticket pricing is fundamentally a commercial decision, and it would not be appropriate for the regulator to interfere with the commercial decisions of a private company. That is why the regulator will not intervene on this issue, aside from ensuring that clubs consult their fans on ticket pricing. It may well be that the regulator chooses to look at ticket pricing as part of the state of the game report, but mandating that it reviews the effect of its regulatory activities on ticket pricing as part of the report would be unnecessarily prescriptive.

Ticket pricing is ultimately a matter for clubs and is driven by many factors, but we do think it vital that fans are consulted and can have their voices heard. That is exactly why this Government amended the previous Government’s Bill to add an explicit requirement that clubs must consult their fans on ticket pricing and take their views into account as part of fan engagement. That is the way to ensure that fans can have their voices heard on such an impactful issue.

The amendment seems to assume that the cost will be passed on to fans in the form of higher ticket pricing. I want to be clear, as I was on Second Reading, that that would not be a proportionate response by clubs. If clubs increase ticket pricing, it will not be because they cannot otherwise afford to pay the regulator’s levy. As mentioned before, the cost of the regulator will be tiny compared with the vast revenue of the game, and the cost of the levy will not be among any club’s top area of expenditure.

Every measure has been taken to ensure affordability. No club will be charged to the point of needing to increase ticket pricing, and no fan will be subject to price rises without having their voice heard—I associate myself with the comments of the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cheltenham. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

It is rather disappointing that the Liberal Democrats and Labour seem to be against the principle of transparency for fans of the impact on ticket prices, given that the issue is so pertinent to fans across the country. As Conservatives, we want to stick up for those fans. We understand the costs of going to a game, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said—I will not criticise his choice of club. Going to games and season tickets cost a lot of money for the average fan, and we have seen the impact of that. One example was the cost for Man City fans of coming down to the semi-final. Part of Wembley was empty because fans were saying that they could not afford the costs, because of the times of fixtures, although that is a slightly different point. We have to be mindful of the impact on ticket prices.

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

Thank you, Sir Jeremy. I appreciate your work and that of the Clerks to get some further information on the point. Just so that all Members are aware of the part of “Erskine May” to which I was referring, it says that

“a document which has been cited by a Minister ought to be laid upon the Table of the House, if it can be done without injury to the public interest.”

I appreciate your comments, but I think that the spirit of the House is quite clearly outlined there. I would like the Minister to publish the document so that Members can have a view.

I would also argue strongly on your last point, although I appreciate that this is a point of debate rather than one of fact, because I believe that the document in question is not a private letter but a piece of correspondence from a key international regulator to His Majesty’s Government. I believe that Members of this House deserve to have all the information available to make informed decisions about a regulator that will be of the utmost importance to football, as well as to this House.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)]

I know that there have been requests to see the letters that UEFA has sent to the Government. As a matter of course, the Government do not share private correspondence, as it would undermine the ability to have open, honest and frank discussions with key partners. It is worth stating that we wrote to UEFA asking whether it would be content for it to be published, but it confirmed that it would rather communications were kept private.

Paragraph 21.26 of “Erskine May” states:

“A Minister who summarises a correspondence, but does not actually quote from it, is not bound to lay it upon the Table. The rule for the laying of cited documents does not apply to private letters”.

“Erskine May” is fairly clear that the Government are not bound to publish the letter, as I have not quoted from it. I refer the House to my earlier comments on the letter.

[Mr French]

I thank the Minister for her confirmation of her position. I appreciate her clarification of her perspective, although obviously I disagree with it; that is why I raised the point. I am concerned about this, and I will pick up the point with Mr Speaker afterwards, because there is a general theme here. This is not aimed at the Minister—I have a good relationship with her, and I respect her—but there is an ongoing issue, which has been expressed in this House in recent days, about the Government not being open and transparent with the House in other announcements that have been made.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I say gently to the hon. Member—this is a point that has been made by my hon. Friends behind me—that his Government did not publish any private correspondence from UEFA. There will be letters in existence similar to the one to which he refers. The right hon. Member for Daventry (Stuart Andrew), whom I like a great deal—indeed, I respect both gentlemen—did not publish those, so I am a bit confused about why the hon. Gentleman is making this very well-rehearsed argument, which is contrary to what his Government did.

[Mr French]

It is not well rehearsed—it is not in my speaking notes at all. It is just a general point of principle that this House should be able to hold the Government to account with full information. I appreciate that I am testing your patience, Sir Jeremy, so I will get back to the amendments. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I have lots of support from Government Members.

Schedule 2 sets out the constitution of the Independent Football Regulator for an initial period when it is first being established, and for subsequent periods thereafter. It contains detailed provisions about the appointment of the chairman, deputy chairmen and non-executive members of the board, and the rules by which somebody may be appointed to the board in relation to conflicts of interest. On conflicts of interest in particular, the Government have left much to be desired, so we seek to correct some serious omissions.

As we have seen in recent weeks, the Labour Government have politicised what was supposed to be an independent football regulator by appointing a crony. That is nothing short of a disgrace—such a disgrace, in fact, that the Secretary of State has been forced to recuse herself from any further part in the appointment of the chair. As I said this morning, that is now a point of independent inquiry, so it is not just my opinion. There is clearly a concern, which is why the Commissioner for Public Appointments will be looking very closely at it.

That is why I tabled amendment 117. As we know, although only because of his revelations at the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, the Government’s appointee donated to the Secretary of State’s leadership campaign. We believe that she did not declare that in line with the ministerial code. We also believe that it was not disclosed earlier. Does the Minister think it acceptable that the Secretary of State concealed that information from Parliament? We believe that there was no reference to that donation on Second Reading. Did the Minister know that the proposed chairman had donated to both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State? Will she confirm whether she or any other member of this Committee has received any donations from the chairman of the regulator? Is she concerned about what the independent inquiry that was announced yesterday might mean for the future of the regulator, if it is found that the process has been breached?

Those are really fundamental points, because a breach of the process will have direct consequences for a lot of what we are discussing today. It will throw English football up in the air and bring it into disrepute if the first chairman of the regulator is found to have been appointed without the Government following due process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I have heard the points that the hon. Gentleman has quoted. I do not have the quote in front of me, so I will paraphrase, but I believe that the Select Committee also praised, or acknowledged, Mr Kogan’s candour and transparency—the fact that he was open with them—and of course the Committee did endorse him. I will heed your yellow card, Sir Jeremy.

[Mr French]

The amendment is quite clear that it is not about the individual but the process going forward for transparency on donations. I will not mention the gentleman, but the other question that the Minister was answering before the intervention related to the rules and duties on Ministers and Members of this House. She made the point about disclosure thresholds within the code, but the spirit of the rules makes it quite clear that any perceived conflicts of interest must be disclosed. It is my understanding that that had not happened, which is the point that I was trying to make.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman gets ahead of himself; he is somewhat excited this afternoon. That was my second point—I have numbered my points one and two, and I have a third to make. He asked about members of the Committee. It is for hon. Members to declare relevant interests, and when we began the sitting this morning hon. Members did indeed refer to their entries in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I do not want to be drawn any further on the details of the process as that would not be appropriate. I have made all the comments I can within the confines of the topic and the yellow card you very kindly gave, Sir Jeremy. I will therefore move on to talk briefly about the amendments.

I will explicitly state that the independence of the regulator is paramount. The Bill is, as the hon. Gentleman said, designed to create an independent football regulator free from any undue political or industry influence. That has always been and continues to be our aim. In the service of that, we have already strengthened the Bill further, now requiring the regulator to establish and maintain a register of relevant interests of members of the board. That already includes the chair, so any further amendment is not necessary.

The definition of relevant interests in the Bill is already broad enough to include political donations if they are relevant to the regulator’s functions. The appointment of the chair is subject to the governance code on public appointments, which clearly sets out that any political activity

“should not…be a bar to appointment”,

as well as the requirements in relation to the declaration of political activity. That point has been well rehearsed; indeed, the Liberal Democrat spokesman made it earlier, as have other hon. Members.

The chair of the regulator is already required to undergo a pre-appointment scrutiny hearing, which we have debated at length. Pre-appointment scrutiny is reserved for the most significant roles, including those where demonstrable independence from the Government is required. The chair and other non-executive members of the board would also be bound by the code of conduct for members of public body boards, which sets clear expectations around political impartiality once in a role. I reassure the Committee that the Bill is robust in ensuring the independence of both the chair and board members more widely. The amendments would not in any substantive manner increase the level of protection in the Bill against undue political influence over the chair.

I turn to the amendments 118 and 119 about conflicts of interest for the board and the expert panel. I reassure the Committee that the Bill, supported by public law principles and non-legislative measures already in place, already sufficiently makes certain that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest, irrespective of sector. It is also important that the widest possible range of people are encouraged to apply to contribute their skills and experience so long as any and all conflicts of interest are managed appropriately. That point was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North.

Government amendments made in the other place have strengthened those protections even further, and beyond doubt. Paragraph 17 of schedule 2 requires members of the board to declare their interests in any matters that fall for consideration by the board, and for that declaration to be recorded. The board member would not be permitted to take part in any discussions related to a matter if they have a significant direct or indirect interest in it.

With specific regard to the expert panel in amendment 119, the Bill already places an onus on the chief executive officer to check for conflicts of interest at the point of making an appointment to the expert panel and on an ongoing basis from time to time. The Bill sets out that the chief executive officer must ensure that the expert panel has all the relevant range of skills, knowledge and experience. The amendment might limit the ability of the chief executive officer to do that, as it would restrict the pool of potential members of the expert panel. It may well be appropriate for the expert panel to have expertise in media or broadcasting, but the amendment would outright preclude that, and so might hinder the regulator’s ability to fulfil its objectives.

All in all, the Bill contains comprehensive safeguards to examine and manage genuine conflicts of interest appropriately. I therefore urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Mr French]

I have heard the Minister’s comments clearly and I am afraid that I am not filled with confidence, not necessarily because I doubt what she says or her intentions but because of the proven experience of the situation in which we find ourselves. I appreciate the yellow card, so I will not go fully back into that, but it does bring into question the judgment of Ministers and individuals and whether we can have certainty in these steps and measures. The Opposition think these amendments are not party political at all. We want to ensure that we have transparency and absolute security that whoever is appointed to these positions will act with complete neutrality and independence, and avoid any perception of bias. I will not repeat the arguments of why that is so important for sport and the independence of sport. We will press our amendments to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 138, in schedule 2, page 88, line 37, at end insert—

“(1A) But the number of persons in the employment of IFR (including any persons seconded to the IFR) must at no time exceed 50.”

As always, you are keeping me on my toes today, Sir Jeremy; I thought we were about to vote on amendment 119. We always learn something new in Bill Committees. Amendment 138 raises a serious and growing concern, so I will be very clear about what the amendment would do. We seek to limit the number of employees of the Independent Football Regulator to a maximum of 50. We think that is quite fair. I could have proposed 20, 10 or some other number, but I thought 50 was fair, based on the conversations that we have had with the football world.

Our serious and growing concern is about not just what the legislation says, but the consequences of the way this Government have chosen to structure the regulator. The amendment uncovers and seeks to prevent the key problem with the Government’s regulator, which we believe is purely that it will ultimately put up prices for fans. This morning, the Minister said that her Government have not claimed that the regulator will solve all the problems, and while that may be true, we believe that her regulator will actively create more problems for clubs and for fans. I will come on to the problems that we believe it will cause for clubs later in the Bill, but, to be clear, we put fans first and that is what this amendment seeks to do.

The creation and operation of the Government’s regulator and the burdens it generates will impose a very real cost on clubs. I suspect that will not have a massive impact on the billionaire owners of the big clubs, or the executives, consultants and lawyers employed in the football industry, but it will significantly affect clubs that are already subject to serious financial constraints and those lower down the pyramid.

Let us begin with the principle. I do not believe that anyone here disputes the need to protect the long-term sustainability of English football and the need for English football to be sustainable, even if definitions of “sustainable” differ. However, if the Government genuinely intend to safeguard the game for future generations, creating a vast and costly bureaucracy is not the way to do that—yet that is what this regulator will do. It will increase the costs on clubs, which will ultimately have no choice but to pass them on to fans. That view is accepted by those in the industry that I have discussed this with. This Government have chosen bureaucracy over the beautiful game and its fans. It is the ever-present home and away supporters who will end up bearing the brunt of the costs of this regulator.

Turning to the specifics of amendment 138, last week I submitted a written question to the Secretary of State to ask how many appointments had been made to the shadow football regulator already and how many of those appointed were previously employed in her Department. I know from conversations I have had with the EFL, the National League, the Premier League and the FA that the shadow regulator has already begun to scale up. When my noble Friend Lord Moynihan asked the Lords Minister a similar question in the other place in December, the answer, which was received in January, stated that the number of IFR employees already stood at 38. As it happens, the answer to my written question is due today. Can the Minister save me the trouble of waiting for that response to come through online and tell us here and now how many full-time equivalent staff are currently working on the shadow regulator and how many of those were previously employed in her Department as employees, advisers or appointees?

[Stephanie Peacock]

There were 42 employees as of 1 June; 11 joined having previously been employed by DCMS and two joined having formerly advised DCMS. The answer is due by 6 o’clock today and I will make sure that the hon. Gentleman receives it in writing by then.

[Mr French]

I must admit that I am surprised to get a concise answer from a Minister; I thank the hon. Lady very much. There are 42 employees and a number of those were already in roles in the Department. That is very important because it highlights the size of this regulator already.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lincoln Jopp]

We do not know yet what the target operating model will be. I think the Government can do that work, as they have a pretty clear picture of the functions of the regulator that are envisaged in the Bill. The shadow Minister asked the Minister to give some indication of the limits on money and structure, because we have the powers and the functions. I, for one, welcome the opportunity to hear the Minister’s answers.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment. I note the irony of him saying he does not want to oppose the Bill for the sake of it, given our discussion today and the fact that the Bill began its life under his Government. I completely understand the intent to ensure that we do not end up with an overstaffed regulator that is not delivering value for money. That is exactly why there are appropriate controls over the regulator’s expenditure.

Proportionality is key to the point about costs. We will have a further debate today or on Thursday about the regulatory principles, which are really important, but the operational cost estimate is between £77.4 million and £106.8 million over 10 years. That was based on the impact assessment signed off by the previous sports Minister, the right hon. Member for Daventry. Those costs have not changed—with the caveat, of course, that that is an estimate.

[Mr French]

The Minister referred to an impact assessment based on the previous Bill. Given that there are changes in this Bill, will a new assessment with estimated costs be published for hon. Members to understand?

[Stephanie Peacock]

We do not believe that the changes are significant enough to lead to a significant increase in costs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am not going to be drawn on figures. I will say that we think that the regulator should be as light touch and slim as possible. We do not think that it should be unwieldy and we do not think there should be staff for staff’s sake. It is not for me as the Minister to prescribe a specific number. I do not agree with that. For those reasons, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup should withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

I have listened very carefully to contributions from hon. Members on both sides of the Committee and to the answers provided by the Minister. I am concerned that the Government will not publish a refreshed impact assessment because, as I have highlighted, the costs to businesses and football clubs around the country have increased since the impact assessment was published. The regulator designed by the current Government also differs from the previous Government’s. We believe that it is bad practice for Members not to have all the information to hand for a live discussion about the expected costs of the regulator or concise information about what the size of the regulator may be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I absolutely agree, and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson puts an important point on the record.

We expect a significant benchmarking exercise to be undertaken in determining the appropriate level of remuneration for the CEO of the regulator. That should be consistent with other regulators of a similar size and regulatory remit. We believe that an arbitrary constraint would be problematic. Safeguards are also in place already requiring approval for any public sector salary that exceeds £150,000, as per the senior pay controls process.

[Mr French]

I thank the Minister for her comments, and I am listening carefully. On the point about markets, we are not talking about the market dictating the level, but Members of Parliament. The hon. Member for Cheltenham is in for a rude awakening if he believes that this is what the market looks like, if he goes down to the City of London. But on the argument that the Minister is making about the size of the regulator, what is that comparable size? We have tried to get an answer on what size the Government are looking at. So on the point that she just made about the salary being appropriate and reflective of other representative regulators, what is the size of the regulator? My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East made the point about the salary that has been advertised only being a part-time salary, so what are the expectations in relation to that compared with the size of the regulator? That is fundamental to the Minister’s point.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As I have outlined, a benchmarking exercise will be done thoroughly on that. I am intrigued by the mock outrage from the Conservative party, who did not in any way put in a staffing cap or a salary cap when we were in this room previously. To take some examples of other salaries, they are much higher: at the Financial Conduct Authority, the salary is £400,000, at the Competition and Markets Authority, it is £200,000, and at Ofcom, it is £350,000. This is the current salary now but it was not wildly different under the last Government. I did not see them making these amendments to their Bill.

[Mr French]

Again, there is this deliberate conflation regarding what I am asking. The Government are arguing that this regulator is light-touch and different from those other regulators, and that the salary has been benchmarked against those at other regulators of a similar size and nature. This is the question I am asking the Minister: what is that other regulator, and how big is it? That determines what is an appropriate level of salary. This is about not only the Government’s arguments and our understanding, but the cronyism argument. I will not go into this but the reality is that a Labour donor is in the process of being appointed to a part-time job on a six-figure salary. Members of the public have a right to know what analysis the Government have done to determine that level of salary on a part-time basis.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I do not know if the hon. Member is wilfully misinterpreting what I am saying or not. I have made it very clear that there will be a benchmarking exercise. I have given a number of examples of other regulators whose salaries are much higher and were so under the previous Government.

Senior pay controls allow the Government to ensure that senior pay is set at an appropriate level to enable the public sector to recruit, retain and motivate the best people, while also ensuring value for money for the taxpayer. That means that if the regulator sought to set the CEO’s salary above £150,000, it would need approval from the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw his amendment.

[Mr French]

I appreciate the Minister’s comments, although I think they were more confusing than they were an answer to the questions. We have tried to be clear, and I do not mean this disrespectfully. I am not wilfully misunderstanding; I am asking a really clear question about the comparison the Government are making. What does the benchmark look like? That is not a theoretical question; we already know that someone has been appointed, and they used a benchmarking exercise to make that appointment. That is the point I am trying to make: a benchmarking exercise must have already been carried out, if the Government have done their due diligence in making that appointment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

As the Minister set out, Government amendments 61 and 63 are consequential on the insertion of new clause 3, so I will limit my comments on this part, because I agree with her that it would be better placed at that point. However, I want to ask her about a couple of points. My understanding is that new clause 3 replaces what was clause 61, which set out the final proposal stage under the resolution mechanism. Again, I will save my substantive comments on that for later.

Government amendment 62 provides that the board may only delegate the functions of deciding whether the resolution process should be triggered under clause 59 or of making a distribution order under new clause 4 to another committee of the board. I would like to ask the Minister the rationale for making this change at this stage in the process, given that the Bill has gone through the other place. We had a discussion on Second Reading and, as she just acknowledged, the leagues were not happy with the mechanism as it was designed previously. It is a fair question to ask why the Government are seeking to change this part of the Bill now. Why does the Minister think that the decision on whether to trigger the resolution process or to make a distribution order should be delegated to a committee rather than taken by the board itself?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his questions. On the broad question of why we are making the change, to be quite blunt, it would be easier not to. We have a big majority in this place, but we spoke earlier about parliamentary scrutiny and we genuinely listened to the debate in the Lords, where there was quite a lot of discussion around the mechanism of the backstop.

It is important to make it clear right now that the backstop is a backstop. I often quote Dame Tracey Crouch, to whom we all owe a huge debt of gratitude. In the previous Bill Committee, she made a very succinct speech—it is worth reading—about how the backstop should be a backstop. Understandably, a lot of the debate has focused on the backstop—that is not a criticism—but it is genuinely meant to be a backstop. To be quite blunt, it would be easier not to make the change, but we think that it is the right thing to do. I could understand the previous Government’s pendulum arbitration and why it could be successful, but it was more risky, and that prompts more nerves from stakeholders. I am straying into debating the backstop, which I do not want to do because we will debate it later on.

On the question about specifying that the board can delegate these decisions to a committee, hon. Members will correct me if I am wrong, but we are not changing the way that the backstop can be triggered— again, we are straying into the backstop. There is a set of criteria for when the backstop can be triggered by a league, and the state of the game report must have been written and the regulator must agree with that. That stays the same.

I am straying into a future debate, but I think that the hon. Gentleman was saying—he can correct me if I am wrong—that under the previous mechanism it was pendulum arbitration, where party A would put forward a proposal, as would party B, and an expert panel would decide on one or the other, in a completely binary way. This changes it so that there is informal mediation and then a proposal stage. Because the regulator is more involved in saying, “We like that but go and speak a bit more about this,” or, “Seek some more evidence on that,” it makes sense that they do not then delegate that decision. That is the point that I am making, though it is quite difficult to debate this outside the backstop, as I acknowledged in my remarks. I am happy to take his comments away, and when we come to part 4, I believe, and we debate the backstop and the changes more thoroughly, I am really happy to go into more detail.

Amendment 61 agreed to.

Amendment made: 62, in schedule 2, page 91, line 41, at end insert—

“(da) the function of deciding whether the resolution process should be triggered under section 59;

(db) the function of making a distribution order under section (Distribution orders);”—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment provides that the Board may only delegate the functions of deciding whether the resolution process should be triggered under clause 59 or making a distribution order under NC4 to another committee of the Board.

Amendment proposed: 119, in schedule 2, page 93, line 2, at end insert—

“4A No member may be appointed to the Expert Panel if they currently have any broadcast or media interests or any role in a television or media broadcast that relates to football.”—(Mr French.)

This amendment prohibits any person who currently has any interests or roles in a television or media broadcast that relates to football from being appointed to the Expert Panel.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 121, in schedule 2, page 94, line 34, at end insert—

“31A (1) The Expert Panel must publish any decision that it makes relating to any of its functions under this Act.

(2) Any decision published by the Expert Panel must include—

(a) the number of members of the Expert Panel who supported the decision;

(b) the number of members of the Expert Panel who did not support the decision;

(c) the reasons for the decision;

(d) the reasons why those who did not support the decision decided not to.

(3) The Expert Panel must publish any records of its committee proceedings as recorded under paragraph (30).”

This amendment requires the Expert Panel to exercise its functions transparently.

The amendment seeks to ensure that the panel must publish any decision that it makes relating to any of its functions under the Bill, and that any decision published by the expert panel must include the number of members of the expert panel who supported the decision, the number of members of the expert panel who did not the support the decision, the reasons for the decision, and the reasons why those who did not support the decision decided not to. The expert panel must also publish any records of its committee proceedings as recorded under paragraph 30 of schedule 2.

The amendment is all about transparency of the decisions made by the expert panel. As it stands, paragraph 30 requires that the expert panel

“must act independently of the Board”

when exercising its functions, without preventing the two-way exchange of information between the board and the expert panel. It is clear, however, that that needs to go further, which is why we tabled amendment 121, which requires the expert panel to exercise its functions transparently. I hope that the Committee agrees that no regulator should hide behind closed doors, and the Government’s football regulator should be no different.

That being said, the Bill lacks detail on the expert panels, and I would like to ask the Minister to clarify the following. How many people does she expect to be on the panels? How many of the panels does she expect to be needed in the first year of operation, and then in subsequent years? What is the cost expected per panel, and is there a specific cap on the cost that can be incurred by an expert panel to the regulator? Finally, how will each member of the panel meet the qualifications of the experience, skill and knowledge we have discussed already, while not incurring a conflict of interest?

To be clear, amendment 121 seeks to ensure that the regulator, a world-first in sports governance, and not in a good way for many of us, will maintain transparency with the fans it is intended to protect and support. We in this House have a great many tools at our disposal to hold the Government to account. It is only right that fans who do not have such tools can see what those deciding the future of their clubs and English football are doing. Sunlight is the best disinfectant and my amendment seeks to let the sun shine on the Government’s regulator.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will address some points on amendment 121 and then respond to the hon. Gentleman’s questions. The Government recognise it is vital that the regulator is transparent and able to be held accountable by Parliament and others. That is why, for the expert panel, the legislation already sets out a number of requirements to publish decisions and give reasons for them.

Transparency in decision making is important, but it is also important that individual panel members can act without fear or favour and that ultimately the regulator as a whole stands behind the decisions it makes. It will also be necessary in some instances for details to remain private for commercial, personal or other sensitive reasons. We absolutely agree that transparency around the regulator’s processes and decisions is important, particularly in football, where fans often complain of being out of the loop. That is exactly why the Bill already contains extensive publication and consultation requirements and the regulatory principle encouraging the regulator to be transparent. However, the amendment goes further and risks undermining the operation of the expert panel. Some details may be commercially sensitive, as I have outlined. Equally, individual panel members should not necessarily be singled out for their contributions to decisions; the panel as a whole makes decisions and is held accountable as a whole.

I am at risk of comparing apples with oranges, but we spoke earlier about the Select Committee. In this place, we will have minorities on Select Committees, and I do not believe that those Members who do not agree have their names published. I acknowledge that I am not comparing like with like, but I make a gentle point about how members should be able to make decisions without fear or favour.

The hon. Member asked some specific questions about the expert panel. For the panel to take a decision, it must form a committee of at least three members. If that decision is appealed, three new members will be needed to form a committee to take a new decision, so the minimum number of members required for the expert panel is six. There is no cap on the maximum number of members as the regulator should have flexibility to react in the event of a high workload. Obviously, different panels may be required for different issues. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am sorry; I have just finished.

[Mr French]

My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne just missed the Minister, but if he is minded to intervene on me, I am happy to accept an intervention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

Unfortunately, based on the earlier deliberations, I do have something to say. I will try to be succinct and not rehash the debates we have had already, although I am happy to carry on taking interventions, as I have done all day.

I will set out why the Conservative party will be opposing schedule 2. The Government have missed the opportunity to tighten up the transparency of the regulator. Instead, they have allowed it to operate under a shadow, and they have not ensured that it will be transparent to fans, who are the ultimate stakeholders in this process. There is a lack of transparency in the decision-making processes. The regulator is granted broad discretionary powers with limited obligations to publish detailed reasoning for its decisions, as we discussed in the debate on amendment 121. Clubs and stakeholders may be left unclear about how rules are interpreted and applied, undermining confidence in regulatory fairness.

A number of times today, I have made the point that there is to be limited parliamentary scrutiny. Because of the amendments that have not been accepted, there are limits in the Bill on how Members of Parliament can have their say on what the regulator will look like. The regulator’s rules and standards are not subject to the affirmative procedure or meaningful parliamentary oversight.

I know that the Minister did not wish to make any comments, but I am interested in her view and the Government’s view on where reports on the regulator will end up. Will it be at the Culture, Media and Sport Committee or, given the costs involved, at the Public Accounts Committee? It is important that Members understand whether they will be at least able to see the reports, even if the Government are not willing to make votes available. There is no requirement to consult publicly before issuing or revising key regulatory frameworks, which again limits external input. We have already brought up the issue of some people not being consulted and others being consulted.

On the opaque appointment and governance structures, we have highlighted the Opposition’s concerns about how the selection process has taken place and how it will take place in the future. We need strong safeguards to ensure that political interference does not impact the perceived and the realised work of the independent regulator. It is a fundamental risk to the future of football and the future of sport.

We believe that the duty to disclose key information is insufficient and that the regulator should be disclosing information on a regular basis, so that Members of Parliament and fans can have clear sight of what it is doing. That is a completely fair thing to ask for. It is not a political request; it is about transparency.

On costs, which we have discussed at length, the Opposition are concerned that we do not have transparency about the cost of the regulation. We are unclear on what the Government’s end goal is for the regulator. We have heard different arguments about what its size may be in the future and comparisons with regulators that I think would scare most of us. Hearing the cost of 900 members of staff should scare all football fans, if that is the direction of travel the Government are going down with the regulator, which is supposed to be light touch.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister, just to give her a bit more time. How will Parliament scrutinise the regulator’s spending, as set out on page 96 of the Bill? Can she tell us whether scrutiny will come from the Culture, Media and Sport Committee or the Public Accounts Committee? There is also mention of financial assistance being provided, based on the Secretary of State’s judgment. Can the Minister tell us what the Bill means by “appropriate” and whether taxpayers will be bailing out failing clubs or even the regulator?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments. To take the final one first, taxpayers will not be bailing out failing clubs. This is not going to save every single club; to make it very clear, it was never intended to do that.

The provisions in the schedule ensure that the regulator has the necessary structures in place to function effectively and efficiently, with appropriate accountability as a public body, which is an issue that we have debated extensively. It ensures that an agreed and transparent process is adhered to when establishing a governance framework, including its board, committees and expert panel. We have made provision for the regulator to appoint a board observer from the Football Association, and as the national governing body for English football, they will get an insight into the operation of the regulator without having voting powers. Ultimately, the regulator will be accountable to Parliament. As we have spoken about throughout this debate, it will be operationally independent and free from undue political or industry influence. The provision in this schedule is central to creating that framework, and I commend it to the Committee.

[Mr French]

As I referenced in the question, I was deliberately trying to be specific because we have not really got into what part 4 of the schedule says. The Minister has just made a point about scrutinising the spending of the regulator. How will Parliament be able to scrutinise the regulator going forward? I am happy to have it in writing, if the Minister does not have the answer on her today. Will it be the role of the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, the Public Accounts Committee or both? Will reports be laid on the Floor of the House, for example, for hon. Members to look at, or in the House of Commons library? That is the question that I am trying to ask the Minister today, and I would appreciate it if the hon. Lady gave us a bit of certainty on that.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am absolutely happy to do that. It is obviously up to the Select Committees, and they can scrutinise if they want to—it will be up to individual Select Committees to decide. The IFR has to publish an annual report, and there is a review clause in there, too. We are happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with more detail if that would be helpful.

Question put, That the Schedule, as amended, be the Second schedule to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I will make my comments brief, because the hon. Member has made a number of excellent points that need to be addressed by the Minister rather than by me. The objectives under clause 6 are the promotion of the financial soundness of regulated clubs; protecting and promoting the financial resilience of English football; and the safeguarding of heritage assets, which is the main point the hon. Member for Sheffield South East just made. He spoke well about how those different issues interlink between clubs of different sizes, and the impact it has on lower league clubs that value the financial benefits of a replay.

I remember, as a Cheltenham fan, when we were in what was League One then, but now is the Championship, going to Bolton, where we lost in Bolton’s new stadium, and going to Coventry where we beat a Premier League team. It is incredible for fans to go to grounds that they would not normally get to experience. We must not lose that aspect of this. There is also the financial impact of the smaller club getting a replay, which is absolutely crucial. Welling United, one of my local clubs, has sadly just been relegated from the Conference South. I remember—I think they had got to round two in the cup a few years ago—Carlisle had come to visit. Welling United fans would never normally have had the opportunity to watch them play that club, or to visit their stadium and see all the characteristics of stadiums at that level and professional players perform there. That is an important part of the fabric and the love of the FA cup, which we all share.

I am talking about the EFL cup as well, but the FA cup in particular is incredibly powerful. I spoke about the soft power asset of English football around the world—people understand the value of the FA cup and what that means for competition across the whole pyramid. We know clubs in the lower leagues play a number of qualifying rounds to try to get to round three when the Premier League clubs normally come in. We must not lose sight of the impact of replays, and I would be genuinely interested to see what the Minister says in response to the point made by hon. Member for Sheffield South East on those.

We had a long debate earlier about what we thought were good ambitions to try to expand the scope of the objectives of the IFR in clause 6, and I appreciate that Committee members have had their say already on whether that is the wrong thing to do. I encourage the Minister, again in good faith, to consider the point about the growth of the game. We are concerned that, as drafted, the objectives of the regulator do not fulfil the potential it could have to try to look at the growth of the game. In other Departments I know the Chancellor has urged Ministers to write to their regulators to ask for growth examples, but at this point in the Bill we can mandate that to be a part of the regulator’s considerations. I urge the Minister to think about that point.

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is a pleasure to once again, and possibly finally for today, serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy—but we will see. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for all his work in the all-party group and for his long-standing interest. I completely appreciate his points. I would say that the regulator will have a number of ways to safeguard heritage, including to be able to prohibit competitions, and require consultation on matchday operations. Clause 8 encourages the regulator to engage with both players and fans on relevant matters. The regulator has a tightly defined scope and purpose focused on protecting and promoting the long-term financial sustainability of the game for the benefit of fans and local communities. It will not intervene on sporting competition matters, such as the footballing calendar.

To address the point by my hon. Friend for Sheffield South East about the FA cup and replays, I remember that just as the previous Bill was published, it was in the news and a real debate. I completely appreciate that one could argue that it is very much part of the heritage of the game, but it is also a competition matter, and therefore it is out of scope of the Bill. I will take away the comments by my hon. Friend, and I appreciate Members from across the House for putting theirs on the record.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I begin by welcoming the Committee; it is a real pleasure to be here. It is just over a year since I was sitting on the other side of the room debating the Bill’s previous iteration. I look forward to working with Members from all parties. The Bill was in both the Labour and Conservative party manifestos. It is an important piece of legislation and we will spend a lot of time on line-by-line scrutiny.

I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for tabling amendments 95 and 96. I will also respond to some of the points made by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East and my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford.

Amendment 95 was debated at length in the other place. Unsurprisingly, the Government’s position on it remains the same. We do not agree with its intent to narrow the purpose of the entire Bill specifically to financial sustainability, or to add to its purpose the vague and undefined words “success of English football”. I was a little confused by the contribution from the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. He said he was concerned about “narrow financial metrics”, but the amendment in the shadow Minister’s name actually would narrow the purpose simply to financial sustainability. I will outline why we do not agree with that.

The Bill’s purpose is sustainability, as defined in clause 1. It is about the continuation of service. I draw Members’ attention to subsections (3) and (4), which say that sustainability means continuing to serve the interests of fans and to contribute to the wellbeing of the local communities that regulated clubs serve. Of course, financial sustainability is an important part of that. If a club suffers financial collapse, it cannot continue to serve its fans and the community. However, we believe there is more to it. If a club’s balance sheet remains healthy, but it ups sticks and moves 60 miles away, or changes its name, badge and shirt colours, that is not continuity of service. That is precisely why the Bill covers aspects such as fan engagement and heritage, as well as financial issues, and why the Bill’s purpose needs to be overall sustainability, not just financial sustainability.

I understand the desire to ensure the continued success of English football as one of this country’s greatest exports—Members from throughout the House have outlined the huge contribution that it makes globally —but that is already achieved in the Bill. As part of its secondary duties, the regulator must have regard to avoiding impacts on important outcomes in football. That includes domestic sporting competitions, the competitiveness of our clubs against international clubs, financial growth, and investment in football. Rather than the undefined concept of “success”, those specific elements represent the building blocks on which English football’s success has been built. Actively pursuing those outcomes will remain the responsibility of the industry, rather than the regulator, but the regulator will avoid unduly harming them while it strives for sustainability.

If, as part of the Bill’s purpose, the regulator were required to protect the success of English football as well as its sustainability, there would be a significant widening of its scope. The regulator would need to be actively involved in anything that relates to the success of English football, such as the commercial and sporting sides of the game. Government Members have been clear that we do not want scope creep, which brings me to the question from the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East about the National League’s three up, three down campaign. I have met representatives of the National League a number of times and I am completely sympathetic to their aims, but that does not fall within the Bill’s scope. I think we can all agree that it is not something that we, or organisations such as the Football Association, UEFA and FIFA, want the regulator to interfere in.

Amendment 96 seeks to add further detail to the definition of “sustainability” for the purposes of the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for largely copying and pasting the Government’s explanatory notes to clause 1; however, the purpose of the explanatory notes is to provide that sort of additional, illustrative detail about the intention behind the legislation that is not appropriate for the face of the Bill.

The amendment also seeks to add criteria on TV viewership, match-day attendance and international competitiveness to the definition of “sustainability”. We have significant concerns that that would expand the scope of the regulator and put in place a much more interventionist regime than this Government propose and, indeed, than the previous Government proposed. The regulator would be required to concern itself with issues such as match-day attendance and TV viewership, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford mentioned. It would not be able to have a direct impact on those issues without actively intervening on issues such as ticket prices and broadcasting. At best, we would have a regulator without the powers to achieve its purpose, and at worst, we would have mission creep into areas that do not warrant statutory regulation. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw his amendments.

[Mr French]

I wish to press the amendments to Divisions.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause sets out the Bill’s purpose, which is to promote and protect the sustainability of English football, as well as summarising what each of its parts provides for. It explains that English football is sustainable if it continues to serve the interests of fans of regulated clubs and continues to contribute to the economic or social wellbeing of local communities with which regulated clubs are associated. The Bill’s purpose is crucial as the regulator will be obliged to act in accordance with it at all times, so far as is reasonably practical.

The fan-led review made clear that the pre-eminence of failure in the market is unsustainable, with football clubs unable to continue to provide their service. It is unacceptable that fans and local communities could witness their clubs no longer operating. We know the huge impact and contribution that clubs make to communities up and down the country, which is why we are making good on our manifesto commitment and have introduced the Bill.

The clause defines “sustainability” for the purpose of this legislation as the continuation of service in the interests of fans and for the wellbeing of local communities. We will debate and explore the Bill’s purpose in detail over the course of the Committee. At a basic level, the Bill asks clubs to consult their fans, to be a fit and proper owner and to have a business plan. In essence, clubs should continue to belong to their fans and communities now and in future, which means there should not be financial collapse, relocation of stadiums or new breakaway competitions.

[Mr French]

It is an honour to speak again under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy—I promise the Committee that I will not say that every time.

The Opposition do not disagree with much of the sentiment as we are all passionate about football and understand the role of clubs in our communities, as I acknowledged earlier. Our concern, which is why we tabled the amendments, is that the opaque definition of sustainability could have significant unintended consequences for the regulator’s direction of travel.

The Minister said of our amendments that the considerations we were trying to put in the Bill were secondary—or words to that effect; I apologise if I have slightly misquoted her—but my concern is that those considerations are primary in their focus. It will take many months to get the new regulator up and running, but if it does not understand the message that the House is sending it—that it should be focused on trying to improve football—it could be a lost cause before it has even got started.

Our concerns are clearly articulated in our amendments. We accept that we have lost the vote—the Government have a massive majority, so that is not surprising—but we urge Ministers, in their work going forward, to be clear with the regulator and the people who work for it that the ambition of this House is not to limit the scope of the regulator to just the clauses before us today.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for his comments, but I simply do not recognise their premise in terms of the definition of sustainability being vague. In the Bill’s previous iteration, the Government did not make the amendment that the hon. Gentleman proposed. I will not repeat my previous speech. We think that sustainability is much broader than simply finances. There is a procedural issue around not necessarily secondary considerations; the explanatory notes provide additional illustrative detail, and obviously what we say in Committee will give a clear indication to the regulator, and indeed to clubs.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Key definitions

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 132, in clause 2, page 2, line 31, leave out subsection (3) and insert—

“(3) For the purposes of this Act a ‘specified competition’ includes—

(a) the Premier League,

(b) the English Football League, and

(c) the National League.

(3A) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament amend the competitions specified in section (3).”

This amendment would specify the leagues that are to be classed as “specified competitions” under Act.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution; I will come to debate some of the points that he has made later in the Bill. We are very clear that UEFA and FIFA have no issue with the Bill and that the England national team do not fall foul in any way of this legislation.

I move on to the amendments. I understand the desire for up-front clarity in the Bill about which competitions will initially be in scope. There is a sound policy rationale for the approach that we have taken in clause 2. By delegating to secondary legislation, we are merely following the precedent established by other, similar, sport-related legislation, including the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 and the Football Spectators Act 1989. The delegated power ensures that the competitions in scope can be amended in a timely manner and that the scope of the regime remains relevant. It future-proofs for future innovation and protects against circumvention by ensuring that clubs and competition organisers cannot simply reconstitute, rename or establish new competitions to avoid the regulator’s regime.

As mentioned, the intended scope of the regulator is well known and has involved extensive consultation with the clubs and leagues that will be in scope. Any changes in the future would again require consultation and would be subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny under the affirmative procedure.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments about why she believes we should not specify the leagues, but what is unclear in her language is whether she believes that the Committee should have the opportunity for scrutiny; these measures have been scrutinised in the other House and by a previous Parliament. I believe passionately that when it comes to future-proofing the Bill it is the role of elected Members on the Committee to scrutinise and have a proper debate. I appreciate that the issue has been debated elsewhere, but we need to have a proper debate here, and that is what I am trying to do. I am trying not to be too political in my comments.

My other point is about the consultation exercise with clubs. From the feedback we have had from clubs, it is unclear why they were not invited to give evidence to the Committee. Will the Minister explain why the Government did not want clubs to give evidence to the Committee?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for those points. I very much welcome parliamentary scrutiny, and hon. Members will know that we intend to make some changes to the Bill following the debate in the House of Lords. Of course, it is the role of the Committee to scrutinise the legislation, but we must recognise that calls for change date back to 2011 in this place, with the cross-party Select Committee report and the fan-led review. We had extensive evidence sessions a year ago where we heard from clubs, fans and lots of different stakeholders, and indeed over the last year as the sport Minister I have done extensive consultations. The Bill remains largely the same as the one we previously debated. We believe that we have made some changes to strengthen it, and that is what we are here to debate.

[Mr French]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephanie Peacock]

No, I will make some progress and then take another intervention in a moment.

On the point about consultation and it being appropriate for parliamentary scrutiny—this comes to the point made by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson—currently, National League North and South are not in scope, but clearly it would not be feasible for the regulator to oversee the entire pyramid and place requirements on clubs all the way down to grassroots.

On the basis of extensive consultation, we believe that the top tiers are the most sensible and proportionate place to draw the line; below that, the regulatory burden would outweigh the potential benefits. However, if circumstances change and the Secretary of State feels that the National League North and South might benefit from being within scope of the regulator, the Secretary of State could conduct an assessment and make regulations to include them.

[Mr French]

I might have jumped the gun, particularly given what the Liberal Democrat spokesman said, but I want to understand the Government’s thinking about that exact classification and the difference between the National Football League and the National Leagues South and North. What are the Government fundamentally looking at in defining what leagues should be in scope of the regulator?

[Stephanie Peacock]

It is a fair question, but there was exactly the same cut-off under the previous Bill.

[Mr French]

I am asking for your opinion.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am going to answer the question. It is largely—not exclusively—about where teams tend to be full time. It is not a perfect cut-off, and the Liberal Democrats have made a perfectly clear argument, but there has to be a cut-off somewhere and we believe, as the shadow Minister’s Government did, that the top five tiers is the best cut-off.

I want to respond to the shadow Minister’s points about the women’s game and how it could be brought into scope. Karen Carney’s review of women’s football recommended that it be given the opportunity to grow and self-govern rather than move immediately to statutory independent regulation. We are not saying in any way that it should be brought into regulation; we are simply giving that option so that we would not have to return to primary legislation. For those reasons, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendment.

[Mr French]

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments, but in the feedback we are receiving there seems to be inconsistency not only about what leagues should be under the powers of the regulator to ensure certainty and clarity, but about the powers of the Secretary of State. As I said, there is a massive issue about the role and power of Parliament to hold the Government of the day to account, which we all should believe in regardless of what party we represent.

I note to Labour Members that their party will likely not be in power for ever—I am not making a point beyond that—but this legislation will be in place until another Parliament seeks to change it. Whatever the colours of the Government of the day, Members should have an opportunity to scrutinise what they bring forward. Our amendment 132 seeks to ensure that that happens, by giving hon. Members a clear ability to have a vote whenever the Secretary of State wishes to expand powers.

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[Stephanie Peacock]

This clause, as is standard procedure, sets out the key definitions used throughout the Bill. It gives the Secretary of State power to make a statutory instrument to specify competitions, as we have just debated. Those specified competitions can then define the regulated population.

Defining the scope in this way is an important part of future-proofing the Bill, as was seen when the old First Division became the Premier League in 1992. Before making any changes to the specified competitions, the Secretary of State must carry out an assessment on whether it would be appropriate to do so. In carrying out that assessment, the Secretary of State must consult the regulator, the FA and any other stakeholders who the Secretary of State considers relevant. A report of that assessment must also be laid before Parliament. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

I will pick up on a couple of my previous comments that have not been answered by the Minister, as we will shortly conclude debate of this clause. Why have the Government decided to specify the FA in the clause but not the other leagues? That point has been raised with me by those other leagues. Why are the Government not specifying the other regulatory bodies involved in football? I am interested to hear the Minister’s response, and will happily give way if she would like to give it.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As the hon. Gentleman will know, the FA is the national governing body of the English Football League, and that is why it is specified.

[Mr French]

I welcome that comment, but the FA has a quite different role than the leagues themselves, which are currently responsible for various regulatory aspects of English football—whether in the Premier League, the EFL or the National Football League. The FA’s role is alongside those bodies. That is why—these are not my words—there is uncertainty about why the Government have decided to only specify the FA, given that there are clearly other governing bodies involved in English football. That is currently a bit of a mystery.

On the Minister’s other comments, the Government are unclear on the direction of travel of English football and on what the Bill will and will not do. It has been suggested that the regulator will be able to solve all problems, but we have to be honest with the public and say that that is not going to be the case. If a club is badly managed—and I know we are about to discuss ownership—there is little that the regulator will be able to do to stop a club from going bankrupt, as an extreme example. We all have to acknowledge that that is a real risk for football, regardless of what the regulator looks like. I will end my comments there.

[Stephanie Peacock]

As I said in my intervention, the FA is the national governing body: there is only one governing body, and that is why it is specified. We expect the regulator—this provision is in the Bill—to consult all relevant parties, including leagues and fans. In the previous debate, we were clear that the leagues will be specified by statutory instrument.

The shadow Minister just said that it has been claimed that the regulator will solve all problems, but that absolutely has not been claimed, either by this Government or the previous one. We are debating the purposes of the Bill this morning; it is about the sustainability of the football game, having not been able to do that itself over the last decade. There have been calls for change in this place dating back to 2011—the ill-fated super league, the fan-led review and his Government’s previous Bill. This Bill will not solve all problems, but we hope it will put football on a sustainable footing.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Meaning of “owner” etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephanie Peacock]

Clause 3 is about the owners of football clubs, who play a pivotal role in the sport. Without their efforts and investment, English football would not be the success it is today. Owners have an immense responsibility to not just their club, but fans, local communities and businesses in the surrounding area. Although current league rules outline a requirement to declare who controls a club, there are concerns with their application. That applies particularly when clubs are owned or controlled by offshore entities or complex company structures.

Fans have also expressed concerns about the opaque nature of who owns their clubs. They deserve to know who has ultimate responsibility for the club they support, and the clause ensures just that. The clause signposts to schedule 1, which defines when a person is an owner of the club. The clause also defines a club’s ultimate owner or owners. The ultimate owners of a club are those who have the highest degree of influence or control over the activities of the club. When a club applies for a provisional operating licence, it has to identify its owners and ultimate owners to the regulator in a personal statement. Defining the ultimate owners of a club and requiring clubs to declare them will be a crucial step to improving transparency and accountability in the game.

Schedule 1 defines owners for the purpose of the Bill and equips the regulator to apply that definition in different real-life circumstances. It is crucial that owners are suitable so that the sport is placed on a more sustainable footing. An ownership chain may be long and complex, with many links; to ensure clubs have sustainable custodians, the regulator needs to identify the human being with actual control at the very end of the chain—rather than the holding companies or other legal structures, which are just links along the way. That is why, under the Bill, the definition of an owner focuses on identifying individuals, except where clubs are owned by registered societies.

Registered societies are specific legal structures defined in clause 91; they must be run as co-operatives or for the benefit of the community. When used for ownership of football clubs, they are typically one-fan-one-vote organisations where control is split equally among hundreds or thousands of members. That is why ownership chains can end with registered societies, without needing to identify named individuals behind them.

The Bill’s definition of an owner draws heavily on precedent from other legal regimes where ownership can be complicated or opaque, including the “persons with significant control” regime in the Companies Act 2006. The Bill’s definition is designed to capture those who have significant shares or rights, or other forms of significant influence or control over the club. It also includes owners who meet one of these conditions at arm’s length, such as via a trust or a similar body. That approach means that owners cannot simply evade regulation by creating ever more complicated ownership structures. Having a clear definition of an owner means that owners can be identified, tested and held to account as custodians of the club.

Clause 4 is about officers and senior managers. The Bill will introduce two key things: transparency for fans and accountability for decision makers at clubs. The clause defines an officer and a senior manager of a club for the purpose of the Bill. Those definitions have been drafted in recognition of the existing legislative precedent, including the Companies Act 2006 and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as well as the definitions currently used in the football industry. The clause’s purpose is to appropriately define the people who run, or have a significant level of direct influence, over the day-to-day running of a club.

Officers of a club are subject to legislative requirements, including the owners and directors test. The regulator may take enforcement action against a senior manager— a subset of officers who carry out specific management functions at the club. If a club commits a relevant infringement connected to a senior management function carried out by that individual, the individual can be held liable. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

I will start with clause 3, which deals with the broad definitions of an “owner” within the context of this legislation, as the Minister has just set out. While it may appear technical on the surface, this clause lays the groundwork for the regulator’s ability to properly identify and engage with those who hold real power and influence within our football clubs. Getting these definitions right is absolutely essential. For too long, fans have felt that football governance has been undermined by opaque ownership structurers, shadowy investment vehicles and individuals who exercise effective control without proper scrutiny or accountability.

The clause also ensures that the regulator is not hamstrung by narrow or outdated definitions of ownership. It gives clarity on who can be held responsible, whether through legal ownership, executive authority or de facto control. That clarity is vital if we are serious about improving transparency and strengthening the fit and proper person test regime. At the same time, it is right that this is done in a proportionate and legally precise manner. We must avoid unintended consequences that could dissuade responsible investment or penalise legitimate business structures. Definitions must be robust but not overly broad.

On that point, I will pause for a second. As Members, we have to recognise the international nature of club ownership, both in the EFL and the Premier League. We are talking about English football, but there are only four or five clubs in the Premier League that have an English majority owner these days. We have to be very clear in our work, and in our discussions on the Bill, that we do not want to deter inward investment in the game. We need to understand that there is increasing international competition for these owners to effectively move their assets into other countries. In particular, there is the rise of the Saudi league, which is growing in competition versus the more traditional heavyweights of the European sector.

In seeking to strengthen the ownership test, which I support, we have to be mindful of not deterring investment. Could much of this work on ownership structures and tests have been done appropriately through the current governance structures of English football? Yes, I think it could have been done better already, and I personally would have preferred that to be the direction of travel, rather than through the Bill. However, we are where we are, and I will not oppose clause 3 for the sake of it.

Clause 4 defines the roles of an “officer” and “senior manager” within football clubs, and again seeks to improve transparency on accountability, roles and responsibility. This provision, as outlined by both the Minister and the Premier League in some of its comments, seems to mirror banking regulations, which I was familiar with before coming to Parliament nearly four years ago—time flies when you’re having fun.

The language used in this provision is similar to that used by the Financial Conduct Authority. When the Minister speaks again, I would be quite interested to understand why the Government have chosen banking regulations as the model for football, because I want to understand their thinking on the future of the regulator and football. We are talking about both a business and a sport that differs in many ways to financial services and in the positive impact that it has on this country. While football creates many jobs, it also has an impact on communities around the country and grassroots clubs, where we like to see young boys and girls participating in football.

Schedule 1, like clause 3, is foundational to the Bill and thus to the future of English football in providing a detailed meaning of an “owner”. Where the clause provides the broader meaning of an “owner”, this schedule details the conditions for being an “owner” and rightly looks beyond just legal shareholders. It captures those who influence clubs through formal or informal control, whether that is through a boardroom presence, financial influence or complex ownership structures.

The inclusion of the 25% ownership threshold is rooted in established legal standards, but equally important is the provision to capture those who may fall below that line but wield significant power. We have seen far too many clubs come to harm because of murky ownership arrangements and a lack of transparency. I am confident that other hon. Members will speak to the goings-on at Reading in recent months and years, if previous debates are anything to go by. I know more about Reading than I ever thought I would, as a football fan, but a lot of hon. Members have mentioned the example already.

That said, I must also raise the example of Charlton Athletic, a proud and historic club just outside my own constituency of Old Bexley and Sidcup. It operates in the Greenwich borough next door to mine, with the training ground literally on my constituency boundary and the home ground, the Valley in Charlton, a bit further away.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will attempt to respond to the various questions from the Opposition spokesperson, my hon. Friends the Members for Portsmouth North and for High Peak, and the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. The Opposition spokesperson broadly welcomed the provisions, but he asked some specific questions. He made points on financial regulation, and I think he used the word “banking-style”. The Bill draws on precedent from a range of previous regulation. Some elements are from financial regulation. A previous amendment of his dealt with financial sustainability, and the Bill, as drafted, is all about that. We would not term it as “banking-style”, but it does draw on previous legislation and existing regulation.

The hon. Gentleman broadly welcomed the provisions on owners and directors. He mentioned that it has been four years since he was elected to this place, and in 2023, he asked the then Sport Minister to strengthen the ownership test, so I am really pleased that he welcomed the changes that we have made. He also said that he would prefer this to have been implemented without legislation. Of course, we all would, but we are where we are, and that is why both parties stood on a manifesto to introduce a football regulator Bill.

The Opposition spokesperson made some broad points on the owners and directors test, and we will have a further debate on that when we come to part 4. ODTs have to be applied clearly and consistently. If the owner has appropriate financial resources and meets other aspects of the test, our ODT would not prevent multi-club ownership. Concerns around multi-club ownership are to do with conflicts of interest and competition, which is why the leagues and UEFA have rules around multi-club ownership. Clubs competing in those competitions will be required to abide by any applicable rules, but we can come back to that point on part 4 when we will debate this issue at length.

[Mr French]

I want to flesh out the point that I tried to make, although I appreciate what the Minister said about coming to this later. Why this is not defined at this point is key, because, as I am sure all Members will agree, we do not want to accidentally create an open goal for wealthy clubs to get around the Bill. There is a real risk coming through from the football community that, if we do not tackle the issue of multi-club ownership up front, the Bill will create just that open goal.

In the comments from across the Committee today, there has been a consensus about what we hope the future of football will look like and around fairness; I think that that is all we can seek to achieve as a House. However, I am concerned that we are not putting the multi-club issue in the Bill. It is difficult to understand the reason why, because it is so pertinent to the ownership test. I accept that the Minister has said that she does not want to block it—that would not be wise, given that a number of clubs have that structure already—but I urge her to address the point about the risks to football. There are major risks, as we have seen already. The Minister’s reference to leagues and competitions was pertinent; we saw the press story yesterday about Crystal Palace and its European future. How will the Minister define the multi-club issue and how will it interact with the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

This clause formally establishes the regulator as an independent corporate body and refers to schedule 2, which contains further details on the structure, set-up and governance of the regulator. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Mr French]

The clause formally establishes the Independent Football Regulator as a statutory body, providing the legal foundation for the IFR’s existence and marking a significant moment in English football governance and our constitution. The clause gives the Independent Football Regulator its own legal personality, allowing it to operate independently of Government and the football authorities.

We will come to the issue of independence, so I will not hold up the Committee too much on the point. I will not make this personal to the Government’s proposed choice of chair. It is rather about the structural integrity of independence, which is crucial to what we do as a House and how sport operates across this country, as it has done successfully for a number of years. The last thing that sport fans want is politicians involved in the regulation of football. We all welcome being supporters—a number of Members are supporters of clubs—but we must be clear that there should not be political interference in the running of the game.

The clause ensures that the regulator can exercise powers conferred elsewhere in the Bill, including around licensing, enforcement and oversight functions. We have a number of concerns about how the details in schedule 2 will work in practice, and the rules around making the independence of anyone involved in football regulation clear as we move forward.

More broadly, I seek clarity from the Minister on a few matters. Does she believe that clause 5 provides sufficient clarity and authority for the IFR to act decisively and independently when enforcing breaches of licensing conditions or financial rules? What safeguards are in place to ensure the Independent Football Regulator’s independence from political or industry pressure when taking enforcement action against powerful clubs or owners?

Will the IFR have the necessary investigatory powers from the outset to underpin robust enforcement, or are those powers dependent on secondary legislation or guidance? How will the IFR balance its role as a regulator with the need to maintain constructive relationships with clubs, especially when initiating enforcement proceedings?

On that point, I again highlight the importance of independence—not just independence from this place, but independence from other leagues and experiences that might bring into question any judgment that the IFR makes. That is a concern I have around the choice of chair, which I know we will come on to. I have concerns about leagues and any bias—known or unknown—in decision making, and the questioning of that. Going forward, that would generally be very unhelpful for the game.

Lastly, to what extent will the IFR be held accountable for the consistency, transparency and proportionality of its enforcement decisions under the powers established in the clause?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will deal with the comments specifically on the chair in the next group—I am not avoiding the question, but I think we are going to have a more substantial debate on the next group. Let me answer some of the other specific points that Members have made. The shadow Minister asked about finance, and the levy will be proportionate to the size and level of the club. We absolutely value the independence of the regulator. That means all sorts of different things in terms of leagues, Governments, clubs and so on.

On how the independent regulator operates and what will guide them, I draw Members’ attention to clause 8 in part 2 on the regulatory principles. We will go through those later so I will not go into any detail now, but they are a useful guide to help the independent regulator in their functions and in carrying them out. I will pause there, because I think we will have a more substantial debate in a moment.

Question put and agreed to. 

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Schedule 2

The Independent Football Regulator

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 117, schedule 2, page 87, line 12, at end insert—

“3A Any political interests of, and political donations made by, the prospective chair of the Board, must all be declared as part of the appointments process, and published before the chair’s pre-appointment hearing with the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee.”

This amendment would ensure that the political interests of the Secretary of State’s preferred candidate for the Chair are made public before the appointment is confirmed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. He is a very well-respected Member of this House and of the football APPG. Obviously I was not a Minister in the previous Government, so it would not be possible for me to publish correspondence. I can speak only on my own behalf, and I do not have any UEFA correspondence. Again, I understand the basis of the hon. Gentleman’s question, but, on the question of what I have urged the Minister to do, I am happy for that to be done on a private basis, so that we can have those reassurances as Members of this House.

This situation is clearly pertinent to the Bill, because, as Members of this House, and as football fans—a number of people have outlined their local clubs and who they support—we surely have to have confidence that what we are putting into law through this House does not conflict with the ability of English clubs to participate. This is not me trying to scaremonger; I just need to know the information.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am interested about the shadow Minister’s idea of “publishing” something privately; that is a new concept to me. I have said in this House more than once—in this Committee, on Second Reading and in Westminster Hall—that the letter from UEFA to the Secretary of State makes it very clear that there are no concerns with this Bill. I am obviously confidently saying that in Parliament; I am very much not going to mislead Parliament. As my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East pointed out, the shadow Minister’s Government did not publish any correspondence. I sat in a room like this with the right hon. Member for Daventry, and he did not publish it, so why is the shadow Minister asking us to when he knows that Governments do not publish private correspondence?

[Mr French]

I recognise what the Minister is saying, and I understand the comparison she is making, but my understanding is that, if a Minister refers to a letter between the Government of the day and an international body that has important structures, there are rules within “Erskine May” that would allow—and sometimes force—the Minister to table that letter in the House of Commons Library for all Members to see, so I would urge the Government to do that.

Sir Jeremy, because this is very important, I seek your advice on whether, now that the Minister has referred to that letter, it should now be published under the rules of “Erskine May”. Can the Clerks clarify that, because the Minister has referred to it in her comments? It is in “Erskine May”—I checked on Second Reading—but I just want the guidance of the Clerks on whether that letter should now be published so that Members of this House can have an informed discussion about the risks to English football linked with the independence of the football regulator, because that is critical to all the work that we are going to do today.

English Football: Financial Sustainability and Governance

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Thursday 6th March 2025 Westminster Hall

[Stephanie Peacock]

My hon. Friend is right: the Government are on the side of football fans. That is why we have introduced the Football Governance Bill: to put fans back at the heart of the game.

[Mr French]

Given the last intervention and the ongoing auditions for Parliamentary Private Secretary roles among Labour Members, I must push the Minister: at what point will introducing a regulator and the measures that she is discussing lower ticket prices for football fans?

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman should know that that is a commercial decision, but we have made a change so that fans will be consulted. We think that it is the right change. Our Football Governance Bill will put fans back at the heart of the game. It will protect club heritage, take on rogue owners and secure the financial sustainability of English football.

Gambling Harms

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Wednesday 5th February 2025 Westminster Hall

[Mr French]

The Minister will be well aware that the reason that we voted against the levy was not the principle of it—as she just acknowledged, it was designed by the previous Government—but how it has been changed by the new Government and the risks that I outlined in both my questions today.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I will come on to answer some of those points, but in the interests of time, I will endeavour to get the Minister for Gambling to write to the hon. Member with a full response.

The shadow Minister also asked about operators paying more in the first year. That is simply not correct. The levy is charged at a flat rate based on previous years’ profits. We believe that is the fairest and most sustainable way forward. Operators’ first levy payment will be based on profits reported to the Gambling Commission via regulatory returns. The commission changed the returns process for non-lottery licences last July. As such, operators’ first levy payment is based on three quarters’ worth of data multiplied by 1.33 to get the full year.

On the assessment the Government have made about anyone losing out on treatment in the transition period, we are clear that operators must maintain the level of contributions to the National Gambling Support Network to ensure that it has the funding it needs. We have received reassurances from the industry that that will happen. As I have just said, I or the Minister for Gambling will write to the shadow Minister. In the interests of time, I will move on to make some progress on the question before us.

We know that the vast majority of people who gamble do so safely—indeed, half of adults gamble each month. The shadow Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame Morris) spoke about the contribution the industry makes economically and in terms of jobs, and I will not repeat those comments. However, 300,000 people in Great Britain are estimated to be experiencing problem gambling. It is clear from today’s debate that many of us share the commitment to do more to protect people who are suffering that harm, especially given the significant changes that we have seen in the sector in recent years.

In that context, the Government are committed to taking forward White Paper measures such as new protections on marketing and bonuses, financial risk checks to prevent unaffordable gambling, and allowing consumers to seek redress from gambling operators via an ombudsman, which has been discussed today. We will continue to work with the industry, the third sector and the Gambling Commission to ensure that the reforms are proportionate, targeted and effective.

Draft Gambling Act 2005 (Operating Licence Conditions) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 Draft Gambling Levy Regulations 2025

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Wednesday 29th January 2025 General Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

This has been a useful debate. The statutory levy has previously had cross-party support. I will respond to some of the shadow Minister’s questions, and then I will respond to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green. In response to the shadow Minister’s opening point about the Minister for Gambling sitting in the other place, I think it was unkind to refer to her as working part time; she merely sits in the other place, and I gently remind him that the previous Government’s Foreign Secretary did the same. Perhaps we could put the political point scoring to one side.

[Mr French]

I was the Parliamentary Private Secretary to the former Foreign Secretary, so I understand what the Minister is trying to say. I am not questioning the motives of the Minister for Gambling; the point is that she is tied up, as we all know, on the Football Governance Bill, because the Government have decided to put the Bill through the other place first. Hence, she can only work part time on the gambling reforms. That is the feedback we are getting consistently, and that is the challenge I am trying to make.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I do not recognise the logic of that argument. I do not believe the hon. Gentleman served as a Minister. He perhaps does not know that a Minister has to juggle a number of pieces of legislation, and a number of different issues. The Baroness is committed to being the Minister for Gambling, and she engages with a range of the sector, and as indeed did I when I was the shadow Minister, and I continue to speak to the sector when appropriate.

As for the economic picture, I will take no lessons from the official Opposition, given the state they left the economy in. Now I want to move on to discuss the actual statutory instrument.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Louie French and Stephanie Peacock

Thursday 16th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)]

The previous Conservative Government invested over £400 million to support grassroots sport, recognising the vital contribution of sport to our communities across the country. The Minister will already be aware of our concerns about the impact of Labour’s national insurance hike, and the impact that the schools tax will have on community access to sporting facilities. Equally concerning is Labour’s decision to quietly cut the £57 million opening school facilities programme from March. Does she understand why grassroots sport organisations are so concerned about access to school facilities, and schools potentially having to close them to the community? Has she raised those concerns with Cabinet colleagues, and what measures are her Department taking to support access to grassroots sport for the more than 200,000 people who previously benefited from Conservative programmes?

[Stephanie Peacock]

I think that was six questions rather than one. I will take no lectures from the hon. Gentleman on the state of the economy and the inheritance that we received. The Government are a huge champion of grassroots sport, and will continue to be one.