Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. Like him, I served on the Select Committee on fraud, ably chaired by my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes, that produced a very substantial document indeed. After we produced our report, the Government published a consultation document headed Preventing the Use of SIM Farms for Fraud. In December 2023, the Government published their response to that document. I want to quote briefly from three paragraphs of that response.

Referring to the responses they got, the Government said:

“A few responses noted that banning physical SIM farms alone is likely to result in displacement to eSIM farms”,


which is the point that has just been made. They went on:

“However they acknowledged that if eSIMs were included to the proposed ban, the Government’s definition of SIM farms should be adapted to ensure it excludes smartphones that can hold more than four eSIMs”.


The Government’s response to that section was:

“Responses noted that the definition could also include eSIMs and mobile apps. However, we did not receive sufficient evidence at consultation to include them in a proposed ban, due to their complexity and ongoing pace of development. This could be further addressed by the proposed powers to extend the ban to other forms of telecommunications equipment and articles used to perpetrate fraud”.


They referred to a further final paragraph headed “Government response”:

“The Government considers it important to ensure that the ban is flexible and can be used to rapidly prohibit other types of technology where these are identified in the future. Some such technologies are mentioned above, whilst others may emerge in future and the Government will continue to review fraud methodologies closely for changing patterns and new technologies being used, such as eSIM farms and others. However, the Government agrees with respondents that any powers to ban through secondary legislation ought to have clear parameters for their use”.


That was the last Administration, of course, and it would be helpful to know whether the Government agree with that line.

The question I want to ask the Minister is this. Referring to the clauses on SIM farms, Clause 114(4) says:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this section (other than this subsection)”.


Is that in effect giving the Secretary of State powers to introduce by secondary legislation something that the previous Government said should not be done by secondary legislation? I leave that question hanging in the air while the Government seek advice from the Bench to see what the answer is.

[Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will briefly speak to Amendment 358. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Young of Cookham. Because we are going to be discussing this and a later amendment on fraud, I declare my interest as a director of Santander UK.

It was a huge pleasure and privilege to chair the Lords inquiry into online and digital fraud, which reported in 2022, and I would like to think that we had some impact in raising the issues, which are of huge importance to the public. Fraud is one of the crimes that people are most likely to be victims of. I know the Minister knows that because he is the Anti-Fraud Minister in the department.

Noble Lords have already spoken about the importance of this amendment, the need for the law to be kept up to date as the technology develops, and the fact that allowing as much flexibility in legislation as possible to enable that to happen is important. The reason we talked about the “fraud chain” in the report is that, obviously, people encounter fraud in myriad ways. Fraudsters are, as we have heard, incredibly flexible, and entrepreneurial—for all the wrong reasons. Of course, telecoms—people’s smartphones or phones—is where many people will first encounter the fraudster, who will then try, as we heard in our evidence, to get them away from technology and strike up some kind of relationship which unfortunately ends in people often losing life-changing amounts of money.

I do not want to pre-empt the debate on Amendment 367, which I hope we will also reach today, but the question, perhaps now or for later, is whether the Minister is confident that the previous Government’s and this current Government’s ask of the telecoms industry is strong enough given the frequency with which the public encounter fraud via their telephones. I will ask the question now, but I am sure we will come back to it. We are all waiting for the forthcoming fraud strategy from the Government, which we understand is—I hope—close. Can the Minister give us a little precursor of whether that will impose tougher asks and potential penalties on the telecoms companies for the reasons that we have already heard?

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

We are very happy on these Benches to support this amendment. We all know the grim scale of fraud, now our most common crime. Authorised push payment scams are driven by online platforms, adverts on social media fuelling shopping and investment frauds, and hacked accounts enabling ticket scams. Yet, as has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, platforms such as Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, can still take six weeks to remove illegal content, allowing scammers to resurface again and again—so-called “life-boating”.

This amendment is designed to cut through that inertia. It would provide a clear statutory duty of care on tech and telecom firms to prevent scams at source, using their own AI and tools. It would also require them to share the financial burden with payment providers, which must already imburse many victims of authorised push payment fraud. That seems a fair step, given that the platforms host most of the scams and profit from the engagement that keeps users scrolling. Weak voluntary charters, non-binding Ofcom guidance and even the Online Safety Act’s proportionate measures have let these firms do the bare minimum—reacting to reports rather than proactively detecting fraud through verification, AI-driven scans and systematic audits. Big tech has unparalleled know-how—the AI, software and manpower to spot fraudster patterns and take them down. Banks cannot fight this alone and nor can the police. This amendment would compel these companies to protect their users, stopping scams upstream.

We hope that the Government’s fraud strategy follows the example of this amendment and goes even further with a failure to prevent fraud offence, backed by strong fines and tougher binding Ofcom standards. Meanwhile, Amendment 367 would provide some timely backbone, giving tech and telecom firms a real incentive to act swiftly before yet more victims lose potentially everything.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, I put my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. I want to add a brief footnote to the speech that he made in support. In an earlier debate, the Minister was very complimentary about the work of the fraud committee on which we both served, and he can convert that praise into action by accepting one of the recommendations which we made in our report.

It is worth quoting the relevant sections of the report that led up to that recommendation. On page 162, paragraph 57 states:

“However, banks are the last link in the fraud chain and cannot be expected to foot the fraud bill alone”.


Then we come on to our recommendation:

“To incentivise companies to act on fraud and more accurately reflect the balance of responsibility for fraud, the Government must establish a mechanism by which fraud-enabling sectors—in addition to the outgoing and recipient PSP—are required to contribute to the costs of reimbursement in cases where their platforms and services helped to facilitate the fraud”.


That is a very clear recommendation. We came to that conclusion after taking evidence from, for example, TSB and academics. They all made the point that there was absolutely no incentive on the part of the telecommunications companies to do anything, because their business case rested on generating revenue and they faced no penalties. That was our recommendation.