Royal Marines

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Tuesday 28th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, on securing this timely debate. Rumours abound about possible cuts to the Armed Forces. We were told this autumn that there needed to be minor adjustments to the defence programme, but it is clear that defence is in such a mess that, far from minor adjustments, the Government are considering significant cuts. We are witnessing a defence review by stealth. The impact on service morale is huge. Those of us who know the services talk to people who know that to be true, yet we have been told again and again that, far from being in difficulty, the defence budget is growing and all in the garden is rosy. Clearly, it is not.

Why should this be? Despite claims by their detractors, the new carriers are certainly not to blame for the problems in defence funding. First, the spend of 2% of GDP on defence has been achieved by smoke and mirrors. Secondly, the funding of the future equipment programme depends on the services finding substantial efficiencies, which are becoming increasingly unfeasible. Lastly, the falling value of the pound against the dollar presents a new slew of difficulties with many US equipment buys in the pipeline. In short, there is a growing black hole in the MoD budget.

Particularly under fire, it seems from the rumours, is our invaluable amphibious capability. Others will talk in detail about the Royal Marines—indeed, we have heard already what amazing fighting men they are and how important they are for the Special Forces—but I will focus on amphibious shipping and why that impacts on Royal Marine numbers.

Britain’s security and prosperity require unimpeded maritime access and transit. As an island nation, the country needs a broadly maritime strategy: one that has sea control at its core but which enables power and influence to be projected inland. Indeed, being an island—although, amazingly, the national security strategy failed to mention the fact—all operations beyond our shores are expeditionary and demand theatre entry. Strike carriers and amphibious forces are the enablers of this theatre-entry capability. The true fighting power of a navy is its ability to ensure entry around the world using carrier air and amphibious forces and to cause sea denial using carrier air and nuclear submarines.

Since 1945, this entry capability has been used more than 10 times but, despite its significance, there was pressure to remove our amphibious capability after our withdrawal from east of Suez in the 1970s. It was retained primarily for the important reason that Soviet Union war plans included the invasion of north Norway, and it was vital to show our capability of defending that region. With the resurgent Russia, that is still important today.

In 1981, the removal of our amphibious capability was mooted again. At the last moment, an element of it was reprieved and, by very good fortune, nothing had been removed before the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands. Every scrap of amphibious shipping and the Royal Marine Commando Brigade in its entirety were crucial to recapturing the islands, as were 76 British manned merchant ships. Post the Falklands conflict, it was decided that the UK needed to maintain amphibious capability of a full commando brigade, two helicopter landing ships capable of ensuring a simultaneous two-company lift—a lesson from the Falklands, although only one, HMS “Ocean”, was built—two landing ship docks capable of complex communications and command and control, very heavy lift and carrying large landing craft, four logistic landing ships, or the equivalent, a number of smaller landing craft and the ability to take up merchant ships from trade. However, it has been nibbled away at. Post SDSR 2010, the decision was made to reduce the commando brigade to a commando group. Of the four new landing ship dock auxiliaries to replace the landing ship logistics, one was sold to Australia for a knockdown price, after we had paid full price in this country.

In addition, one of the landing ship docks was put into reserve status—only one would actually run. More recently, the Royal Marines have lost another 400 men and the newly refitted HMS “Ocean” , having just had a £57 million refit, is up for sale—an almost incomprehensible decision in strategic capability terms. The latest rumours talk of cutting the marines by a further 1,000 and selling the two LPDs. This would effectively mean the end of the UK amphibious capability and with it, the end of the Royal Marines. Without large amphibious shipping—we are already eating into it—the demand for sea soldiers would switch and drop down below the level of one commando: one battalion in other words. The decision to get rid of the shipping would effectively get rid of the Royal Marines in the form that they are at the moment as a key part of the naval service and as sea soldiers.

Has there been any change to the strategic environment that has provoked this decision? Of course not. This is nothing more than a possible savings measure. We urgently need more spending on defence. The Government should be as robust about this as they are about foreign aid, which now equals 38% of the defence budget. The decline in capability is a choice and not one which our nation should make in today’s chaotic, unpredictable and dangerous world. Our nation would live to regret the loss of our hard-won amphibious capability and the Royal Marines that go with it. Once gone, it will be extremely hard to recover.