Strategic Defence and Security Review Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord West of Spithead
Main Page: Lord West of Spithead (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord West of Spithead's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is somewhat poignant that five years ago today the newly refitted HMS “Ark Royal” entered Portsmouth harbour for the last time to pay off, accompanied by her doomed Sea Harriers. It was just one of the very poor decisions in SDSR 2010, which has resulted in a 30% reduction in our nation’s military capability since 2010.
Turning to today, the analysis of Britain’s changing strategic environment in SDSR 2015 is, I believe, largely sound. However, surprisingly, it fails to point out that we are an island, which seems fairly important in grand strategic terms. But SDSR 2015 remains replete with the tensions that are inherent in Britain’s taut defence budget. The slightest shock and/or commitment beyond what are now very limited defence planning assumptions could bring the entire SDSR edifice crashing down. Plus, everything is predicated on the assumption that the economy will continue to grow.
Our uniformed leaders are so relieved that there were no cuts in SDSR 2015 that they welcome it as a triumph. Indeed, it is their duty to do so—that is their job. But much of the trumpeted new money is existing resources re-tagged. If one compares the 2015 defence accounting model with the 2009 defence accounting model, one sees that British defence expenditure is 1.7% of GDP. This is because it includes so-called other, mainly non-military, items of expenditure that are within NATO’s definition of defence expenditure but not within the traditional British definition.
The much-lauded £12 billion increase in the defence equipment budget will include up to £11 billion of efficiency savings. It involves cutting 30,000 MoD civilian posts, many of which were created after SDSR 2010 to replace military personnel. Presumably, that will have a considerable impact.
SDSR 2015 is still clearly resource driven, rather than strategy, threat or interest driven. It makes us marginally stronger but fails to recover the capability lost since 2010. Debt reduction is clearly still more important to the Government than defence, and the Treasury’s continued grip on Britain’s defence strategy reinforces the “how much threat can we afford?” culture that still permeates Whitehall. That is somewhat surprising when one looks at an increasingly dangerous and chaotic world and thinks of things such as the decision made in the Commons last night.
SDSR 2015 imposes considerable constraints on the Royal Navy. The surface fleet is already down to 19 escorts. As I have said, that is a national disgrace. SDSR 2015 claims to want to preserve that number. However, it reduces the planned Type 26 frigates from 13 to eight, with five less capable further down the track, but there are no actual orders. What is the drum-beat of ship orders to ensure stability in our shipyards? I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Sterling, will today mention the study he put in hand showing the value of orders and the need to maintain these sorts of orders. Will we run all the OPVs? I believe that we are heading towards a two-tier Navy by default. Is that what we want? Force projection does not escape, with the disgraceful withdrawal of HMS “Ocean” at only 20 years’ life. My plea to the Minister is that we must keep her in PxO and not get rid of or scrap her. It would be a disgrace to do that at that age.
I am delighted by the commitment to the deterrent and to replacing the submarines. However, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said, there is a very real risk in running these boats on to 40 years old. That is presumably why there is such an increase in cost for the deterrent replacement: running 40 year-old submarines is dangerous and very costly. If we are having to do this, there is a gap in the build programme. Let us put in another Astute class—we can effectively get one for less than £200 million. Let us think laterally; that is the sort of thing that we need to do.
Even to crew the modest planned force, the Navy needs an additional 3,000 personnel—it has only 450. So SDSR 2015 scores six out of 10 in my book and the nation needs to spend more money on defence if we are to meaningfully support international security and stability.
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for tabling this timely debate. I think we would all agree that we have had a really interesting few hours. I congratulate the Government on the full-spectrum approach to our security taken in the SDSR. The complexity of every security issue that we face means that we need to take a more strategic and co-ordinated approach to using our military, intelligence, diplomacy, international aid and soft power resources to contribute with other like-minded states to our international security. Others on my Benches who are more expert than I have addressed aid and diplomacy. Here, I welcome my noble friend Lord Bruce of Bennachie and his maiden speech. He will be a welcome and great addition to our Benches.
On defence, the equipment announced in the SDSR and the posture that Future Force 2025 will deliver will, once set up, enhance the UK’s ability to support international stability and security with Her Majesty’s Armed Forces when required. The UK has never demurred in its commitment to working with our allies and partners to deliver international security. This SDSR acknowledges the important role that Britain plays. We can explore this further in Monday’s debate in the name of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire.
When considering our ability to support international security and stability and work with our allies, one of my concerns is the personnel levels in Her Majesty’s Armed Forces and in the supply chain, and our ability to deliver sovereign capabilities—more specifically, our ability to recruit and retain expertise in high-skill trades, such as nuclear engineers, avionics and also cyber specialists. I will return to cyber shortly. Having the equipment to deploy in support of international security is one thing; it is quite another to have the requisite personnel so that military capabilities can be fully used when directed by HMG.
The increase of the UK’s expeditionary capability to 50,000 personnel will mean that one in three of the defence force will need to be deployable at any one time, compared with the current overall ratio of one in five. This narrows down to one in four for the RAF and one in three for the Royal Navy. What impact will this have on harmony time? There will be a division for high-intensity combat, drawing from two armoured infantry brigades and two new strike brigades. The strike brigades will use the Ajax armoured vehicles and the new mechanised infantry vehicles. Regulars and reservists will work on strategic communications and hybrid warfare alongside one another in the two new brigades. They will deliver better battlefield intelligence.
In addition to the stupendous new carriers, which will form the platform for the F35s, three new logistic ships will be purchased to support them, along with a mix of Astute submarines, Type 26 and Type 45 frigates, plus the yet-to-be-designed all-purpose light frigate. Many of us wait with bated breath on that one. The Royal Marines will also be available to use the carrier’s amphibious capabilities.
As far as the RAF is concerned, the announced purchase of nine P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft is welcome after the cancellation of Nimrod in 2010. While these aircraft have an important role monitoring the UK’s sovereign maritime area, they also have a vital role working with our allies to hunt submarines in the Atlantic—an activity that the UK unilaterally removed itself from fully participating in in the 2010 SDSR.
It has been said that the RAF has had a good SDSR—some might say not before time. Its pilots will fly the C35s off the two new carriers, two new Typhoon squadrons with added capability and 20 new Protector RPAS, as well as a recapitalised air transport fleet.
Will the noble Baroness agree that the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force will both fly the Sea Lightnings off the aircraft carrier?
The noble Lord and I might hope that, but that is not what the briefing that I have been to said. Time will tell.
All this paints an exciting future, but it is very much a future picture. The noble Earl the Minister will remember a question asked at the excellent Peers’ briefing on the SDSR about the timeline from 2015 to 2025, so that it is easy to follow the implementation of each capability. If it were to exist it would be hugely informative and very helpful.
I turn to personnel issues. On cuts to the Civil Service working within MoD, will the Minister acknowledge the general fall in morale? The loss of their expertise will be considerable and, once gone, it cannot be recovered. Will he confirm whether redundancy will be strategic or voluntary? With a restriction of 1% on salary increases, does this send the right message to those who are staying, when outside pay rises for the same skills are 4%? What estimate has been made of lost skills and experience, and what packages might be made available to those who would pose a strategic loss?
We face a range of threats, some state led. The return of Russia to the SDSR should come as no surprise—five years out is a long time. Some threats come from rogue players, such as Daesh and al-Nusra. Some, like cyberthreats, could come from someone's bedroom—that of a terrorist or a bored student. Cyber is real and poses a serious threat to the workings of our machinery and to civil society. I am sure that any recently purchased equipment or systems have built into their commissioning a detailed cyberdefence specification. Retrofitting is another issue; it is less straightforward and poses a far greater risk.
The commitment and realisation in the SDSR that cyber is a real and daily threat is welcome. The investment of £1.9 billion in defensive cyber over five years is to be applauded, as is the publication next year of the national cybersecurity strategy. There is a huge need to be fleet of foot in this as the picture emerges and new tools become available on the dark web. Change is the norm; it is rapid and without notice. The decision to base cyberthreat analysis and detection at Cheltenham is interesting. Where will the policy direction be determined?
Cyber is the future. We need to develop a large cohort of all manner of cyber expertise, working with operatives and with our trusted allies and partners. The recently announced Institute of Coding is a great initiative. I sincerely hope that applicants reflect the pattern in the Middle East and in India for similar courses, where more women than men apply.
During the last 20 years or so, we have seen the growth and importance of soft power alongside military hard power. I liked the “soft plus military equals smart” that was said earlier in the debate. I welcome the move to expand our presence in our embassies worldwide—an extension of deep country influence. We should never underestimate their influence and ability not only to be the face of UK plc, but also to be our eyes, ears and voices in country.
In a previous debate, I also welcomed the addition of the British Council and the BBC World Service to the SDSR. Having lived in the Middle East for some years and worked in the British Council, I have seen its activities and impact at first hand. It is the envy of many and if it did not exist we would have to invent it. I have just received a letter from the Minister and I am fairly sure that the question I am about to put to him had not been checked in that letter. If I repeat a question, then I forgive him—or perhaps he will forgive me.