Higher Education and Research Bill

Debate between Lord Watson of Invergowrie and Baroness Fookes

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 18th January 2017 Lords Chamber

122: Clause 10, page 7, line 15, leave out from beginning to “limit”;”

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My Lords, before I call the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I must point out to the Committee that there is a mistake on the Marshalled List. It should read: “page 7, line 15, leave out from beginning to ‘see’”, not “limit”.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

My Lords, I am speaking to the various amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Stevenson, including Schedule 2 stand part.

Schedule 2 is about linking the case for a fees increase to the teaching excellence framework. It provides a mechanism for the setting of fee limits, permitting providers to charge fees up to an inflation-linked cap according to their ratings for teaching quality established through the teaching excellence framework, which is referred to—though not, of course, by name—in Clause 25. The Explanatory Notes reveal the name of the TEF, which is supposed to enable the impartial assessment of different aspects of teaching, including student experience and the job prospects of graduates.

We believe it is important to break the proposed connection between measuring teaching quality and the level of fees that can be charged. Increasing fee limits in line with inflation is of course nothing new. It was introduced in Labour’s Higher Education Act 2004 and was routinely applied between 2007 and 2012, until ended by the coalition Government. What is new is linking fee limits to teaching performance, and that is what has alarmed so many people and institutions in the higher education sector.

The framework is described in Clause 25 as a system for providing,

“ratings … to English higher education providers”.

Schedule 2 sets out the meaning of a high-level quality rating, which will be determined by the Secretary of State. Our Amendment 122B seeks to ensure that the high-level rating is established by regulation so that it can be subject to proper scrutiny by Parliament. That rating will be the gold standard, irrespective of whether we have a traffic-light system, and, as such, will be of crucial importance in the future of higher education in England—too important, we would argue, to be left to the Secretary of State alone to decide.

Universities are rightly concerned about the use of proxy metrics, including statistics on graduate earnings, in a framework that is supposed to be about teaching quality. Also of concern is the fact that a gold, silver and bronze rating system is proposed to differentiate the sector based on those metrics. This will undermine the sector’s reputation both within the UK and overseas because universities deemed to be bronze will have been independently quality assured and have met all expectations of a good provider, but that is not how it will appear to those outside, whether in the UK or, indeed, further afield. That is why we have submitted Amendment 195, which seeks to ensure that the scheme has only two ratings: meets expectations and fails to meet expectations. That has the benefit of being simple to operate and, perhaps as important, simple to understand for those considering whether to apply to a particular institution. It also sends a clear message beyond these shores and enables comparisons to be made with providers in other countries without the confusion of a bizarre system of three categories.

Where metrics are used, they have to be much more securely evidence-based than those suggested. Our Amendments 196 and 198 contain proposals that would oblige the OfS to make an assessment of the evidence that any proposed metric for assessing teaching quality is actually correlated to teaching quality and would ensure that, prior to making that assessment, the OfS consult those who know first-hand what is needed to measure teaching quality namely, academic staff and students. Having carried out those requirements in the interests of full transparency, the OfS should publish the assessments. Surely any inconvenience that the Minister may point to in terms of administrative burdens on the OfS would be more than counterbalanced by the benefits accruing in terms of the much more robust nature of the metrics produced.

We also believe it is necessary for the OfS to demonstrate the number of international students applying to and enrolled at higher education providers that have applied for a rating. It is important to protect the number of international students that providers are permitted to recruit; and to ensure transparency on that, the OfS should be obliged to lay a report before Parliament each year. My noble friend Lord Stevenson has added his name to that of the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, on Amendment 200 to emphasise that we believe it is essential that the TEF must not be used as a determinant when providers seek to enrol international students, and I look to the Minister to confirm that, even if he is unable to accept the amendment itself.

Those faced with a wide range of institutions from which to choose when considering their course of study have a right to the fullest possible information on which to base that choice. That is why our Amendment 176 seeks to alter the wording of Clause 25, in much the same way as is proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, in his amendment, to ensure that all the relevant information is made easily accessible to staff, students and parents and that the information is made available in a consistent form in order to facilitate meaningful comparisons between providers.

Noble Lords on all sides of the House made clear at Second Reading their opposition to statutory links between teaching quality and the level of fees being charged for that teaching. Since tuition fees were increased from £3,000 to £9,000 in 2012, there is no evidence to suggest that there has been a consequential improvement in teaching quality. Indeed, the National Union of Students has said that there has been no change in student satisfaction with the teaching on their course, while institutions have, in some cases, been shown to spend additional income from the fees rise on increased marketing materials rather than on efforts to improve course quality.

Why do the Government now believe that there is a link between fees and teaching excellence? Indeed, which should come first or be expected to come first? This is a clear example of the Government’s view that the Bill is as much a question of consumerism as it is about education. As I said at Second Reading, we on these Benches reject the concept of students as customers or consumers in higher education. Many universities have said in their response to the Bill that there is no evidence to point to fee increases improving the quality of teaching. The University of Cambridge stated in its written evidence that the link between the TEF and fees is,

“bound to affect student decision-making adversely and in particular it may deter students from low income families from applying to the best universities”.

Another point of concern in relation to the fees link is that in further stages of the TEF, the Government are moving to subject-based assessment. We do not take issue with that, because universities are large institutions within which there are a huge range of subjects and a great diversity of teaching quality, but linking a fee with an institutional assessment cannot do other than mask that range of teaching quality. People studying in a department where the teaching quality is not as good as in others will also pay higher fees. This flawed proposal does not enhance the Government’s objective, and we believe it should be rejected.

What Schedule 2 would do is introduce the provision that only those providers that can demonstrate high-quality provision can maintain their fees in line with inflation. The specious reasoning behind this proposal, based on metrics that are widely seen as an inappropriate method in which to take such decisions, would lead to a skewed outcome because, as we heard at Second Reading, several high-performing institutions would lose out on a high-level rating through no fault of the actual quality of their teaching.

We of course welcome any means of improving teaching quality in higher education, and we do not oppose a mechanism to measure such improvement if a reliable one can be found. But the TEF as proposed is not that mechanism, for reasons that I have touched on already and shall expand on when we come to debate what is currently group 17. Schedule 2 introduces the whole area of the fee limit and fee regime, a link which we believe is without merit. As such, Schedule 2 is not fit for purpose, and that is why we believe it should not stand part of the Bill. I beg to move.