Independent Financial Advisers (Regulation)

Lord Walney Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that this issue is not clear cut? Surely it is right that there is some concern about the idea of a commission. Is it not the case that the concern over not wanting to pay fees is about paying a fee up front? Could the fees not be back-ended in the way that commission effectively is, making it a flat rate?

[Mark Garnier]

The issue of commissions is complex and is surrounded by several other issues, one of the simplest of which is that the Office of Fair Trading has deemed it right that the providers of the products should be able to charge or incentivise IFAs and salespeople in a variety of ways. The difficulty with allowing different levels of remuneration to IFAs is that it creates some of the problems we have talked about, but the OFT will not allow a flat rate of commission, which is one solution that could have dealt with this issue.

The risk in being an IFA is a major issue. All professions carry an element of professional risk, which is covered by professional indemnity insurance. In pricing that risk, underwriters take into account the fact that there is a so-called long-stop of liability, which is usually about 15 years, but that is not the case for IFAs. It has been deemed fair for IFAs to have an unlimited period of liability, such that an 80-year-old retired sole trading IFA might be liable for a product sold half a century earlier. It might be that the claimant has a legitimate claim, but in our compensation culture it might be that he does not feel satisfied with what he has got and is just having a go.

In practical terms, for a limited liability company, as the business gets older it becomes less saleable as it accrues a large pool of risk on the products it has sold since it opened its door to trading. Is it fair that an IFA could be chased to the grave in a manner that no other profession allows? Will that indefinite level of risk be an incentive to newcomers coming into the profession? I think that the answer to both those questions is no.

The cost of implementing the RDR is high. Currently, a firm of IFAs with up to 25 advisers is required to put aside only £10,000 by way of regulatory capital. That minimum will double under the RDR, but there is a new element to come in. Under the new rules, firms may be required to put aside 90 days’ worth of operating costs. For the better-run firms with sophisticated systems and offices that could be a significant increase. It is not inconceivable that a firm employing 10 qualified IFAs supported by high-quality support staff could see its regulatory capital rise from £10,000 to £200,000, £300,000, £400,000 or even £500,000. That rule alone is an incentive for firms to go from providing a high-level service to a cut-price one.

But what does all this mean for the cost of the RDR to the consumer? The original estimates for the cost-benefit analysis of the RDR gave a net present value of £600 million for the first five years including one-off costs. That has now risen to a truly staggering £1.7 billion in order to address an unsubstantiated cost of mis-selling £250 million. Moreover, it is by no means the responsibility of the IFA community alone. In 2009, according to the financial ombudsman, just 2% of complaints in this area related to the activity of IFAs, while 61% related to banks, but 65% of the market share is held by IFAs.