Ukraine

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, this new and sensible procedure of not reading out the Statement because we have all read it leaves me with the problem of how to open one’s speech. I will compromise by thanking the Minister for coming to answer our questions.

I do not really have anything new to say. To emphasise that, I am going to read out the first paragraph of the shadow Secretary of State’s reply to the Statement in the other place, because my position will not deviate from it. He said:

“I welcome its contents and make clear Labour’s full backing for the steps the Government have been taking on international diplomatic efforts to de-escalate threats, on defensive support for the Ukraine military, on necessary institutional reforms within the country, and on tough economic and financial sanctions in response to any fresh Russian invasion into Ukraine.”—[Official Report, Commons, 17/1/22; col. 63.]


So I do not believe that we differ in any significant way from the Government. However, I have some questions.

I understand that 13,000 Ukrainian citizens have been killed in the conflict so far, and many must have been killed on what I will loosely call the Russian side. The first objective must surely therefore be to stop the killing. Moving into the area of objectives, could the Minister set out what our policy is, first, on direct military engagement and, secondly, on recognising any of the Russian concerns? I hope she will reaffirm that we are overwhelmingly committed to a diplomatic solution; those diplomatic solutions do not look very optimistic but I hope she can flesh out some strands of optimism.

In 1994—I may get these things slightly wrong—the Budapest agreement was signed and Britain is the guarantor of that agreement. As I understand it, although I cannot claim to have read it, it was a comprehensive agreement that settled the future of Ukraine. It settled its boundaries and did a brilliant job of denuclearising the country, and we would all have hoped that that was how it would settle down. The agreement sought to answer all the questions. Now I have to ask the Minister whether it has any relevance today at all.

In 2014 the Normandy format was created—in Normandy, I believe, because it had its essence at the Normandy celebrations. It is a format of four countries: France, Germany, the US and Russia. On 6 January this year, it met. As far as one can tell, there was little progress, but, hopefully, we have some way of getting to the essence of what those conversations were. My simple question is: was there any progress?

A second institution is the NATO-Russia Council, which has been meeting somewhat infrequently. However, it met on 12 January. Reports from the Secretary-General of NATO seemed a bit downbeat, but does the Minister have any more positive interpretation of what happened? Are there any areas for optimism?

Like any Opposition, even when we agree with the Government, we inevitably end up saying, “You should try harder”, and I shall say that they should try harder. Should there be more diplomatic effort? I am not saying that the Government do not grasp this, but the news, for want of a better barometer, does not seem to grasp just how serious the situation is. There have been a number of efforts by UK diplomats and politicians to meet the Ukrainian Government, but should there be more? Should the Foreign Secretary visit Ukraine? Should there be something as innovatory as the Defence Secretary going to Moscow?

My experience of negotiation is somewhat depressing. One of the things that is depressing about negotiation is the success of negotiation by attrition. What I mean is, if you spend enough time talking in concert with your allies and you talk and listen to the other side of a debate, you get closer by sheer volume. Therefore, I encourage the Government to see where more face-to-face contact can take place and where there can be more conversations between different people, or different nuances. I seek an assurance that we are using our best skills to try to understand the Russian position. There must be people in Russia who recognise just how serious and dangerous this is. We have to try to find some common ground and we have to ask ourselves—I know a lot of people are concerned about it—whether we retain sufficient diplomatic capability in the Russian area. Do we have adequate Russia skills?

Our military support was clearly welcomed by Ukraine, but I do not know what it consisted of. Perhaps the noble Baroness could flesh that out. How many UK personnel were involved? How many are still in Ukraine and are they at risk? There is an interesting phrase in the Statement that I hope the noble Baroness can flesh out. It says that we are supplying Ukraine with anti-armour defensive weapons systems. I guess if you are in a tank with a missile coming towards you, it is a bit difficult to interpret why this is only a defensive system. How does one signal to the enemy that what we are providing to Ukraine is a weapon that is really only usable in a defensive situation? How many personnel are involved in the training to use this weapon? Are any left in Ukraine?

Ukraine recently suffered a major cyberattack. It is not mentioned in the Statement, but I understand that a new cyber co-operation agreement has been concluded between NATO and Ukraine. What role will Ukraine play in this? Is it already active?

Finally, on the reference yesterday to the Indo-Pacific tilt, can the Minister confirm that resources must be centred on Europe and NATO? AUKUS is a great concept, but it must not draw resources from where the threat is greatest.

As I said at the beginning, we have no fundamental criticism of the Government. We face a very grave situation. History teaches us that wars are much easier to get into than to get out of. If war breaks out in eastern Ukraine, many people will die. All efforts must centre on securing peace.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I take no issue with the terms of the Statement, nor with the remarks of the noble Lord who has just spoken, but I think it is helpful if we try to put into context the political objectives of Mr Putin. Put baldly, they are these: to break Ukraine and to intimidate NATO. Mr Putin sees a client Ukraine as essential to Russia’s interests and believes—I believe, falsely—that western capitals will back down in the face of his aggression. The overarching purpose is to create a sphere of Russian interest in eastern Europe—an objective for which, I may say, he was given some encouragement by the sometimes lukewarm support given to NATO by President Trump.

It is clear, in my judgment, that any accession to Mr Putin’s demands would break both Ukraine and NATO itself. The truth is that NATO poses no threat to Russia. If we consider the enhanced forward presence with which the United Kingdom is most closely associated, the deployment of the battle group to Estonia, it consists of some 900 men. That will hardly challenge the substance of the Russian state.

We should not forget, though, that the people of Ukraine have been under considerable stress and strain. They have been under cyberattack in a particularly personal way, and we know now that there is the threat of false flag diversions. However, I am clear in my mind that we are right to support the Government of Ukraine politically and to provide them with defensive weapons. I am clear in my mind that we are right to make it clear that the United Kingdom will be part of severe economic measures against Russia if military action is commenced. The people of Ukraine continue to show their courage and resilience in the face of provocation and imminent threat, but, increasingly, they show that they wish a future in the Euro-Atlantic community, which is their sovereign right, and one that we should be willing to defend.

I have but two questions for the Minister. What discussions have the United Kingdom Government had with other members of NATO and the European Union to ensure unity of purpose in both those organisations? In particular, why was it that RAF aircraft, two C17s, taking defensive weapons to Ukraine, chose not to fly over Germany? Was there a political reason behind that decision?