Armed Forces Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I associate these Benches with the tributes paid by the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to the expertise and professionalism of the British forces in the recent withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In February 1997, Lance-Sergeant Alexander Findlay of the Scots Guards, a veteran of the Falklands campaign and the Battle of Mount Tumbledown, successfully appealed to the European Court of Human Rights against his conviction for assault. Suffering from PTSD, he had held members of his own unit at pistol point and threatened to kill himself and them. The court held that the constitution of courts martial in the UK was such that they were not an independent and impartial tribunal, as required by Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The march to reform the system had begun. I declare my personal interest as chair of the Association of Military Court Advocates.

This Bill means that we have nearly reached the conclusion of that march. I pay tribute to the excellent review of His Honour Judge Lyons, who comprehensively covered the ground and made recommendations on the composition of the panel that tries these cases, including on numbers, on the need for more than a simple majority to convict and on the extension of membership to chief petty officers and their equivalent. He also proposed that a board need not be of single service composition in general discipline matters. I raised all these issues as amendments to the then Armed Forces Bills of 2006, 2011 and 2016, in step with the evidence given to the Commons committees by the highly experienced former Judge Advocate-General Jeff Blackett. Something once bitterly opposed by the Ministry of Defence, under Governments of every stripe, is now seen as uncontroversial and commonplace; I am grateful to the Government for that and to the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for the way in which she opened this case and has been open to discussion and consideration of these proposals.

The one recommendation of Judge Lyons that the Government rejected is that court martial jurisdiction should no longer include murder, manslaughter and rape when these offences are committed in the UK except when the consent of the Attorney-General is given. The judge thought it important enough to make it his first recommendation. In 2006, I moved an amendment to negative this novel extension of jurisdiction, introduced in the then Bill. My excuse for quoting myself is that my remarks were quoted in Judge Lyons’s review. I said:

“The purpose of my amendments is to maintain the present position. The present position traditionally has been that if a serious offence of treason, murder, manslaughter or rape is committed in the United Kingdom, as opposed to abroad, by a soldier or serviceman or a civilian subject to service discipline, those offences cannot be tried by way of court martial but can be tried only in the Crown Court”—


that is if the offences are committed in the United Kingdom. I continued:

“That is the position today. For some reason, which has not been adequately explained, although I have pressed the matter both in Committee and on Report, the Government think that it is right to extend the jurisdiction of the court martial court to encompass any criminal offence.”—[Official Report, 6/11/06, cols. 599-600.]


I lost the Division by 63 largely Liberal Democrat votes to 165 Labour votes. The Conservatives abstained.

What, then, is the reason given by this Government to reject Judge Lyons’s primary recommendation to restore the pre-2006 position: that cases should normally be heard in the civilian courts, as they always used to be? If a really exceptional case arose, an application could be made to the Attorney-General to transfer it to the court martial system; I suggest the possibility that a manslaughter case involving the failure of equipment or the exigencies of training might be such a case. I had a look at the justification given by Mr Leo Docherty in the other place in answer to the Labour amendment. He suggested:

“If the AG had to give consent, the process would be slower … there would be no easy way to transfer that case to the civilian system.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/7/21, col. 251.]


The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, tried to expand on his explanation by suggesting that it shows confidence in the service system if it can try everything. I do not think that is the right position. I am not aware of any case of a murder committed in the United Kingdom and involving service personnel that has been tried by court martial since 2006.

However, on rape, the Government’s position has been completely undermined by the Defence Sub-Committee’s report Women in the Armed Forces, published on 25 July—barely a month ago—and to which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred. As it happens, the review was chaired by my own Member of Parliament, Sarah Atherton—the only Conservative in recorded history ever to represent the constituency of Wrexham. She said:

“Sexual assault and rape are amongst the most serious offences committed against female service personnel … It is difficult not to be moved by the stories of trauma, both emotional and physical, suffered by women at the hands of their colleagues. A woman raped in the military often then has to live and work with the accused perpetrator, with fears that speaking out would damage her career prospects … From our evidence, it is clear to us that serious sexual offenses should not be tried in the Court Martial system. It cannot be right that conviction rates in military courts are four to six times lower than in civilian courts. Military women are being denied justice.”


To underline those comments, Judge Lyons’s review contains a telling statistic: in 2017, of the 49 charges of rape preferred before a court martial, there were two convictions. This means that up to 47 victims and their families have been failed by the system. What does that do for the recruitment and retention of women soldiers? I leave it to your Lordships’ imagination. It undermines the trust and public confidence on which the whole criminal justice system, whether military or civil, depends.

Here, we have a number of factors coming together. Giving jurisdiction to courts martial to try murder, manslaughter and rape charges for offences committed in the UK was an aberration introduced by the Labour Government in 2006. It is not a hallowed part of service history. The Conservative Party did not support it at the time. In considering this Bill, the Labour Party has called for its removal in the other place. The jurisdiction has not been utilised, save for rape cases in a highly unsatisfactory way. As I said, the Conservative chair of the Defence Sub-Committee, after the investigation, stated:

“Military women are being denied justice.”


She is right. The Government, which cannot give a sensible explanation for its retention, should heed the voices from Wrexham and follow Judge Lyons’s recommendation.

Another issue that remains is that of sentencing. I have argued during the passage of each Bill that sentencing is a complex process resulting in varying disposals. I suggest again to your Lordships that it should be left to a professional judge to determine sentence, not to a panel whose members may well be making such a decision in respect of a defendant for the one and only time in their lives. Whereas they can impose sentences of up to life imprisonment, magistrates with lengthy experience of the judicial system can do no more than pass a sentence of 12 months. It is true that, these days, a judge sits in on and participates in the decision, but he does not have a casting vote.

Of course I pay tribute to our armed services—they are very close to all our hearts in this House—but we must have a justice system that is perfect. We have moved strongly in that direction. My noble friends Lady Smith of Newnham and Lady Brinton will deal with the important aspects relating to the military covenant, while the noble Baroness, Lady Garden, will deal with pensions. I fully support what they will say.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to join you in Committee this afternoon to discuss amendments to the Armed Forces Bill. Without further delay, I shall speak to group 1, which comprises government Amendments 1, 2 and 4 as well as Amendment 3, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, dealing with the constitution of the court martial.

Clause 2 will fix the number of lay members on a court martial board at either three or six. The amendment will give judge advocates the power to direct that a fourth lay member be sworn in to what would normally be a three-member court martial board. The court martial rules will set out the circumstances in which such directions can be made. If a four-member board loses a member, it will be able to carry on with the remaining three members and reach a verdict.

We are making this amendment because the Covid pandemic showed the need for greater flexibility in the service courts as board members were taken ill or had to self-isolate, particularly following the “pingdemic” earlier this year. This measure is a practical arrangement that seeks to future-proof the service justice system against this type of situation, or any other unforeseen circumstances that may arise in future. It will introduce flexibility to the system and ensure that more trials are effective and that victims and witnesses are not subjected to delays in the system. If we do not make the amendment, when a panel member is lost from a three-member board, the only options open to the judge advocate would be either to adjourn the proceedings until that lay member is available again or to halt the trial altogether. This would introduce an unwelcome delay to the administration of justice, which would especially affect victims and witnesses, and in some cases could actually mean that a retrial was required.

The approach that we have taken is based on the current legislation for the court martial. When a trial is likely to last more than 10 days in the UK, or five days when overseas, there is an existing arrangement whereby the judge advocate is able to direct that there should be one or two more members than the current minimum number of lay members for a trial. Where a four member-board remains in place until the end of the trial, at least three members of a board of four must agree on a finding. If it is reduced to three members, at least two out of three must agree.

We have consulted the Judge Advocate-General on this amendment, and he supports it as a means to improve service justice system efficiency and provide flexibility to deal with unexpected events in future. I hope that your Lordships agree that this is a sensible measure that will allow the court martial to continue to operate in difficult times and prevent unnecessary delay for victims and witnesses of crime.

I turn Amendment 3, which would create a statutory requirement for the judge advocate to determine the appropriate sentence alone, having consulted the military lay members of the board. This would reverse the current position whereby the military members of the board and the judge advocate together discuss and vote on an appropriate sentence.

Interestingly, the change sought by noble Lords is not something that His Honour Shaun Lyons recommended in the service justice review. The Armed Forces community is different from the civilian community and it is important that we recognise that. It is obviously the one with which we are familiar, but it is a very different environment within the Armed Forces community.

The board votes on sentence because it is best placed to fully appreciate the context of the offending, the background of the offender and the deterrent effect of any sentence on the wider service. Moreover, some sentences, such as demotion or detention for corrective training, are specific to life in the services. The board has the expertise to judge whether they might be appropriate or effective.

It is worth emphasising that members of the military are governed by a more stringent set of rules and restrictions than those of us in civilian life. These rules are designed to maintain discipline and promote operational effectiveness so that they can get the job done. Many of these additional rules and restrictions to which service personnel are subject apply regardless of whether they are on or off duty. An in-depth understanding of these rules and the context in which they apply form a key part of reaching an appropriate sentence.

To give a simple example, a civilian turning up late for work in a supermarket does not have the same impact on operational effectiveness as the same situation with a marine engineer on a nuclear deterrent submarine that is about to leave port. Members of the Armed Forces will have a broader and deeper understanding of the implications of this type of behaviour.

I reassure noble Lords that the sentencing process is already subject to stringent legal controls and oversight. The court martial is required by law to have regard to the Sentencing Council’s sentencing guidelines, which must be followed by the civilian courts. It can depart from these guidelines only if this is justified by the service context.

The Judge Advocate-General also issues guidance and sentencing for the service courts. The judge advocate makes the decision on sentence with the board, so everyone involved is fully aware of the relevant legislation and guidelines. Judge advocates also regularly sit in the Crown Court and bring that experience and expertise to the deliberations of the court martial. Further judicial oversight is provided by the Court Martial Appeal Court, made up of judges who sit in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal.

The current system is both legally sound and ensures that sentences take account of the service context. This amendment would not add any significant legal safeguards to those that already exist. It would move the emphasis away from the court martial being a part of a service justice system in which discipline is maintained by and for the Armed Forces and service personnel. It also diminishes the importance of the service context in sentencing and places a barrier between the service person being sentenced and those with whom they serve.

I hope I have managed to explain fully why the Government have a reservation about this amendment. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw it, and I beg to move the amendment standing in my name.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for seeing me and my noble friend Lady Smith yesterday, when we had a full and fruitful discussion of these issues. I very much support the thrust of this Bill, in particular, bringing the service justice system up to date and having majority verdicts at the heart of it.

Sentencing is a difficult and technical business. I suspect that I am the only person in this Room who has actually seen the judge in a case in which I was appearing put on a black cap and sentence my client to death. That was in Hong Kong. He was not actually executed but it is a solemn moment. Sentencing in the old days used to follow the verdict but not anymore. In any serious case there is an adjournment for sentencing to enable the judge to consider the sentencing guidelines, the pre-sentence reports, the technicalities which he or she must say in the sentencing remarks, the statements of relatives and the public interest in the whole matter. A balancing exercise is carried out.

Importantly, the guidelines may give the recommended range of the sentence, but the judge has to consider the aggravating and mitigating features of the case, which will increase or decrease the recommended sentence in the sentencing guidelines. If I can give an illustration, because it is apposite for next Saturday when Wales play the All Blacks, in rugby, a referee, with his touch judges or assistant referees and the television match official, will discuss something that might have happened. They talk together and they have the advantage of a replay of an incident from various angles so that they can actually see what happened, which does not happen in a court. But it is the referee who takes the decision, not the people who assist him in his decision.

In the court martial system, it is the panel that takes the decision on the sentence with the judge participating and advising. It is only if the board are equally divided that the judge has the casting vote. To take another example, in the magistrates’ court it is the decision of the magistrates, as advised by the clerk, who may or may not be legally qualified. The judge advocate is not a clerk advising; he is central to a trial. He controls the proceedings. He gives directions to the board and rulings, including dismissing the charges altogether, as happened in the 3 Para case in Colchester in 2005. There is an anomaly as well: if the defendant is a civilian subject to service discipline and thereby liable to court martial, the judge advocate sentences alone.

Of course, the panel could and should advise on any particular military facet of the case, but from my experience it should not be assumed that the members of the panel have any direct front-line operational experience comparable to that of the defendant before them. They might have, but there are many units and many roles in which modern British forces are involved. Very frequently, the officers on a court martial do not have anything like the same experience as the defendant and the pressures he has been under. On the other hand, the judge, who sits regularly as judge advocate in a military court, has considerable experience of the operational conditions from the cases that come before him.

Under the current system, an officer or warrant officer is summoned to be a member of the board, probably with no or limited experience of courts martial, save for the president. He might never have been near a court or a court martial, but he becomes a judge with very considerable powers. He will be given the responsibility of determining sentence in a difficult case. That is a power that has never been given to civilian juries in the history of the common law. But it can be only history which retains this unique power for the board in courts martial. Perhaps it is a throwback to when there were no civilian professional judges, but, as I said in opening in my remarks, we have advanced so far. The civilian judge advocate is so important to the system.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, in the light of the very full observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I want to add three observations. First, over the years the practice of sentencing has become much more complicated and difficult. From the early 1980s onward, the way in which you sentence in the criminal courts has been the subject of guidance from the Lord Chief Justice and the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. It was then followed by the Sentencing Advisory Panel and the Sentencing Guidelines Council. Now it is contained in very complicated and detailed documents drafted by the Sentencing Council.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I admire the loyalty expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, who is concerned about weakening the identity of the single service, and I understand it. It was an argument advanced in 2006, when the wholesale reform of the court martial system took place, bringing the three service justice systems together into one—something widely accepted at the time. I remember at that time proposing an amendment that the board should be drawn from the three services and not from one to deal with a particular defendant. After the rather heated debate, I met an air marshal, a field marshal and an admiral of the fleet in the corridor. I said that I hoped I had not upset them with the suggestion, whereupon one of them, who shall be nameless, said to me, “You should be shot”. So, at that time, the same sentiments were widely abroad and discussed.

The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, said that the defendant should be able to look into the eyes of the jury and know that he is among people who understand him. There have been some very serious trials recently involving policemen. Should a policeman be looking into the eyes of a jury composed of senior policemen because they will understand the pressures that he is under? It is just not the British system to take particular people in the community, who may have loyalties one way or the other, and have them tried by their peers in that sense.

I welcome and understand what the noble Lord said, but I think we have gone beyond that. Indeed, the report by Sir Richard Henriques that we will be discussing later takes the matter even further, with the defence units that he proposes, and which the Government now propose, where any concept of different services is abandoned.

I return to my argument on the judge sentencing. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for his support on that, and shall return to it when we get to Report, because it is an important matter of principle that should complete the considerable reform of the criminal justice service system that we are undertaking. I shall not move my amendment.

Amendment 1 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

5: Clause 7, page 4, line 27, at end insert—
“(4A) Guidance under subsection (3)(a) must provide that where offences of murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, child abuse, rape or sexual assault with penetration are alleged to have been committed in the United Kingdom, any charges brought against a person subject to service law shall normally be tried in a civil court unless, by reason of specific naval or military complexity involving the service, the Attorney General consents to trial by court martial.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure the most serious crimes – murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, child abuse, rape and sexual assault with penetration – are tried in civilian courts when committed in the UK unless the Attorney General has specifically consented for such crimes to be tried by court martial by reason of complexity involving the service.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, prior to 2006, charges of murder, manslaughter and rape committed in the United Kingdom were tried in the ordinary courts, rather than by court martial, when a person subject to service discipline was involved. At that time, in 2006, the Labour Government gave concurrent jurisdiction to courts martial to try these matters. The Conservatives opposed the change, as did the Liberal Democrats. I suggested at the time that the purpose was merely to bolster the credibility of the new courts martial system, which was being totally reformed.

I am not aware of any murder or manslaughter case involving a person subject to service discipline that has been tried by court martial arising out of incidents in the United Kingdom, but rape and sexual offences are very different. A significant disparity in conviction rates in rape cases where courts martial have been employed was found by the statistics before Judge Lyons: 16% were convicted in a court martial, as opposed to 34% of defendants in the ordinary courts. That is an unacceptable disparity.

It was referred to in Sarah Atherton MP’s Defence Sub-Committee report published in July and entitled Protecting Those Who Protect Us. Paragraph 175 of that report, which is now only three or four months old, says:

“We do not believe that the problems highlighted by the Lyons Review in the handling of sexual offences in the Service Justice System have been fully resolved. While we accept there is a limited set of circumstances where it may be appropriate for the Service Justice System to be used for UK-based sexual offences (for example when there are offences both in the UK and overseas), this must require the Attorney General’s consent. There may be other compelling reasons, such as the young age and vulnerability of the victim, when it is more appropriate for the civilian justice system to hear these cases. In our view, the fact that a UK case may involve a victim and a perpetrator who are both Service personnel is not a sufficient reason for the Service Justice System to be used.”


Sarah Atherton’s report went on to call for the implementation of the very first recommendation of Judge Lyons’s review—he made a large number of recommendations—in which he said:

“It is … recommended that the Court Martial jurisdiction should no longer include murder, manslaughter and rape when these offences are committed in the UK, except when the consent of the Attorney General is given.”


The Atherton report also called for the implementation of the Lyons recommendations to place all domestic violence and child abuse cases in the civil jurisdiction when committed in the UK.

Why is that recommendation from Judge Lyons, repeated by the Defence Sub-Committee chaired by Sarah Atherton, a Conservative Member, resisted? The Government may now feel that reverting to the pre-2006 position may be seen as a vote of no confidence in the court martial system. I do not believe that to be so, and I do not think it a proper justification. In 2006 it was not seen by the Conservative Party to be a sufficient reason to support the Labour amendment of this historical common-law position that service personnel who commit offences in the United Kingdom will be tried in the ordinary courts.

It is a breach of the basic principles that a person subject to service law is still a citizen and that a British citizen has a right to be tried for serious offences by a randomly selected jury of 12 ordinary fellow citizens. That was a point strongly urged by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, at Second Reading and in the extension of that in his amendment linked to this, which I fully support. I shall leave it to him to explain the purposes of that. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I fully support the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, on the first of these amendments but, before explaining my reasons, my primary purpose in tabling these amendments is to try to ensure the proper morale of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces and the standing in which they are held by the public. One has to bear in mind always that in the modern criminal justice system, where successive Governments have ensured that the victim or complainant —I will use the words interchangeably—is put at the heart of the system, that is taken fully into account. One can see this so often. For example, recently, the public look at the way in which the police investigate and they will look at the way in which people are tried. Are they being tried fairly and is there a proper balance?

It is important to realise that what I seek is, first, to achieve a much greater degree of certainty in relation to these matters and, secondly, to try to ensure that the Armed Forces are not subjected to yet more complaints about the nature of the justice system. It is evident from the report of Judge Shaun Lyons, a most distinguished Naval Judge Advocate—and a judge who is in charge of a major London criminal court—that there ought to be the change which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has so carefully gone through. I fully support his amendment but, in view of the difficulties that arise, it is necessary to go a little further.

If I may explain, I want to deal with two issues, one of which, the position of crimes committed overseas, I regret to say the Minister was not happy about last time. However, there is a serious issue and I shall take a moment or two to refer in detail to the law on this subject. The other is in relation to crimes outside the ambit of the proposal to deal with sexual offences, murder and other serious offences.

It is right to begin by recording that, particularly in relation to the most terrible crimes that have occurred, one can go back a very long way. I have seen many of these crimes myself, although the first of them occurred one year after I was born. It concerned the involvement of a battalion of the Scots Guards in an event at a place called Batang Kali during the Malayan emergency. That case was not investigated properly at the time; it is now abundantly clear and there remained a residue, which went right down to the early 2000s, about the way in which it had been approached.

In more recent times, there were the cases involving Baha Mousa and others in Iraq. There was the Blackman case, to which I regret I will have to return, and there were the points raised by one newspaper last Sunday. From what I have seen in each case, regrettably, one has to be sanguine about the fact that such conduct may well occur again. We have to deal with it in a way that is fair and just, while maintaining the morale of the Armed Forces.

We shall turn to looking at investigation when we come to consider the report of Sir Richard Henriques but, on this amendment, we are concerned with jurisdiction. Who has jurisdiction to try a case? Jurisdiction is not like deciding whether you prosecute. It goes to the fundamental position of the court and, over the centuries, it has always been the position that Parliament controls the jurisdiction of the courts. As I mentioned at Second Reading, it is also a fundamental principle that for certain offences there is a right to trial by a jury of 12 people. It is very difficult to see any justification whatever for taking that right away from one of Her Majesty’s citizens. It is fundamental; one has only to read Lord Devlin’s classic work on the jury to realise how core this principle is to our justice system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I certainly undertake to look at Hansard and endeavour to frame a response to the noble and learned Lord.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for the very careful and thorough way she addressed these amendments. I feel that she slightly misrepresents the nature of Amendment 5. I am not suggesting that in every case the Attorney-General be woken up by the telephone in the middle of the night and come to a decision in her pyjamas. That is not quite what I have in mind, which is that serious offences such as murder, manslaughter and domestic violence should normally be tried in the civil court. There is no question of protocols: that is the normal way you go about it. But in the event that there is some very specific naval or military complexity involved—I had in mind, for example, the working of a gun in a tank that causes another person to be killed on Salisbury Plain—one could imagine that there might be a case for the authorities to say, “This has a bit of a military tang to it. Therefore, we will see whether the Attorney-General will agree, in this very unusual case, that a trial by court martial would be more appropriate, because the panel might be more used to that sort of thing.”

We are talking about murder, rape, manslaughter, domestic violence, and child abuse by serving soldiers or servicepeople in the United Kingdom. It is important that that should be realised. Normally they would be tried in the Crown Court by a jury in the ordinary way.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, raised the issue of confidence. That is what this is about: public confidence in the system of service courts. That is what is needed. I repeat what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said: people will not come forward. If you have a situation where servicepeople who complain of rape find that only 16% of the complaints result in convictions, that means that 84% of victims will have gone to the court, given their evidence and found that the defendant has been found not guilty of the offence against them. Does that give confidence, not just to the victim but to the family? They will leave the service; this is the sort of situation in which a person says, “I’m not going to stand for this. I’ve gone before a court martial; they don’t believe me.”

This is an extensive problem in the United States. Four or five years ago I gave evidence to a congressional committee in Washington on what the British system was because they were considering sexual assaults in the military over there. I was in the unlikely company of Senator Gillibrand of New York, a Democrat, and Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, who is known to have certain right-wing views. They were all on the same side. Nothing happened. President Biden has within the first six months of his Administration set up a commission to deal with sexual offences in the military. This is a very important point and it is very necessary that we deal with it properly.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, pointed out to the judicial review that took place in the Blackman case that our protocols for overseas jurisdiction have not worked. His proposal that parliamentary approval of any protocol should underpin that protocol is entirely correct, sensible, right and common sense, because it would prevent the bringing of judicial review against whoever is in charge—the Director of Service Prosecutions or the director of prosecutions in another jurisdiction—as the protocol would have parliamentary approval.

I support the noble and learned Lord in that. The fact that it does not exist at the moment is neither here nor there; what we are concerned about is having something that does not give rise to parades and demonstrations in Parliament Square, as happened in the Blackman case. That is an important point, and I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, will pursue it.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Grand Committee

Overall, we support the establishment of the defence security unit. There are a number of important questions to be asked about it, but the Committee is seeking to ensure that when we end up with the defence security unit—we hope in April next year—it will be as effective as we all want it to be. It has an important job of work to do, not least ensuring the public confidence that we need.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, we on these Benches are very grateful to Sir Richard Henriques for his report and recommendations. We understand why, in the three months since they were published, they have received only light-touch consideration from the Government. Perhaps I can be forgiven for giving some historical context to the role of the chain of command in courts martial, because it appears in Amendment 43 and in the Bill.

In 1757, Admiral Byng was convicted not of personal cowardice but of failing to do his utmost to engage the enemy in an attack upon French forces besieging the British garrison in Menorca. The truth was that his fleet of ships had been hastily assembled by the Admiralty. They were in poor condition and he had to retire to have them repaired, but he was convicted by court martial under the Articles of War and, despite pleas for clemency, even by the Prime Minister William Pitt himself, George II refused to commute the sentence. Admiral Byng was shot on the quarterdeck of a British ship by a firing squad. Your Lordships will recall that Voltaire, in his book Candide, commented that in Britain, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time to encourage the others—“pour encourager les autres”.

Courts martial were seen then, and for 200 years afterwards, as an instrument of discipline rather than justice. It is undoubtedly the case that men were shot for cowardice in the First World War to encourage their comrades to go over the top. Discipline was seen to be a function of command, and the commander must achieve discipline to secure cohesive action and singleness of purpose.

It was the Labour Government of 1946 who appointed a commission to examine the administration of military justice. It advised the appoint of a civilian judge-marshal but made no change in the way the board and the prosecuting officer were appointed. So it was that in 1996, the structure of courts martial was still within the chain of command. The convening officer, who was the field officer in command of a body of the Regular Forces within which the person to be tried was serving, was the person who decided the charges against the defendant, appointed the board and the prosecuting officer and arranged the trial. He—the convening officer—could dissolve the court martial during the trial, in the interests of the administration of justice, and could comment on its findings publicly, in the interests of discipline. He confirmed the findings and could reject or change the sentence, so the board was still subject to command influence.

A fair and impartial trial is obviously difficult in an atmosphere of command control. All the personnel connected with the trial are dependent, or were at that time, on the commanding officer for assignments, leave and promotion. A member of the board could not deviate too far from his commander’s views of the case if it might affect his career. That is why, following the criticisms made by the European Court of Human Rights in Findlay, we brought about such significant changes in 2006. Justice is now the dominant element and in a volunteer army, this is vital to morale and to the retention of personnel, as Sir Richard Henriques himself comments.

Despite this history, the Government have rejected Sir Richard’s recommendation 14. In paragraph 5.4.1 of his review, he says:

“An investigating body, charged with the responsibility of investigating serious crime allegedly committed by members of the Armed Forces, must be hierarchically, institutionally and practically independent both of the chain of command and of those whom they are under a duty to investigate.”


The wording that he uses—“hierarchically, institutionally and practically”—comes from the judgment in Jordan v United Kingdom, 37 EHRR 2. Explicitly, the European court was following Lord Steyn in 2003 in the Appellate Committee of this House, where he said:

“Public perception of the possibility of unconscious bias is the key.”


That issue of public confidence was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, at the last hearing of this Committee.

However, instead of following that wording and explicitly breaking away from the chain of command, the Government have put forward the existing wording taken from the 2011 Act, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, pointed out. New Section 2A, proposed by the noble Baroness’s Amendment 42, would impose a duty on the provost marshal to ensure that all investigations are “free from improper interference”. That in no way matches the language of recommendation 14 of Sir Richard Henriques’s report, which makes an explicit break from the chain of command.

In recommending a strategic policing board for civilian governance and oversight of the provost marshal for serious crime, in paragraph 5.6.13 of his report, Sir Richard Henriques looked around the world. He looked to New Zealand, Australia and Canada. He also considered the function of the independent advisory group, which was formed for Operation Northmoor in this country. It appears that he agreed the composition of the strategic policing board with the Chief of Defence Staff and the Chief of Defence People.

Today, the noble Baroness told us that the Government have accepted the strategic policing board’s structure, but it is something to be put into the future. The strategic policing board is the person who stands behind and is the instrument of governance of the proposed provost marshal for serious crime. You cannot have one without the other, so perhaps the noble Baroness will explain how you could appoint a person to a position and give them responsibilities without first having the strategic policing board of civilian governance and oversight that Sir Richard Henriques called for.

Finally, I add my support to Amendment 66 and its requirement for a report to ensure that Sir Richard Henriques’s recommendations are carried out.

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, I support this amendment, but I have a number of questions for my noble friend the Minister.

The tri-service serious crime unit is definitely a good idea but, given that the Armed Forces Act brought together the three single-service Acts back in 2006, I have for some time questioned why we do not have a joint service police force, given their relative sizes. The Royal Air Force Police is commanded by a group captain; the Navy, by a commander; and, of course, the Army provost marshal is a one-star brigadier. Who will own this organisation? If it is not going to be linked to one of the other service police forces, how can we ensure that it will not wither on the vine in time? For example, what will happen to the SIB, which has a proud operational record over the past 40 years? What will its role be vis-à-vis this new organisation? Equally, as we create what will be a fourth provost marshal, who will sit on the National Police Chiefs’ Council? Currently, the three single service provost marshals do. Does this mean that now there will be four? How will that look? Will defence be speaking with a single voice?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

Perhaps I might draw to the Minister’s attention her amendment, which states in subsection (3)(b) of the proposed new clause:

“The Provost Marshal for serious crime has a duty, owed to the Defence Council, to seek to ensure that all investigations carried out by the tri-service serious crime unit are free from improper interference.”


Does she not agree that that is miles away from the formulation proposed by Sir Richard Henriques, as stated in Amendment 43, that the duty is to

“ensure all investigations are operationally independent from the military chain of command”?

I have tried to point out that we have got away from the military chain of command in the justice system and that justice comes first, before discipline, in that area—individual justice. Does the Minister not see the difference in the wording, and how much stronger is Sir Richard Henriques’ formulation?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I say to the noble Lord—and I do not want to reprise everything that I have said—that we recognise the different characteristics within the service justice system that are not necessarily a part of the civilian system. We have to acknowledge that, as I indicated, it is not easy to just place things in silos. If something happens on an overseas operation, the chain of command may have to take action. That is why we talk about “improper interference”. I think that is an important distinction. What we are placing upon the provost marshal and the Defence Serious Crime Unit is the obligation to be independent and to seek to ensure the independence of the investigation.

However, we also have to acknowledge the reality of the environment in which these individuals are operating. That is why the Government have deliberately chosen the phrasing they have. I said earlier that there is nothing innovative about that phrasing; it deploys existing text from previous Acts. But I suggest to the noble and learned Lord that it would be unwise to place on the provost marshal obligations that are beyond the wit of the provost marshal to discharge. Equally, it would be wrong to condemn the chain of command for taking action in the early stages of an incident which the chain of command may have had no alternative but to take to protect personnel, to look after safety, to preserve evidence or whatever. That is why the Government prefer the phrasing they have adopted.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

I believe that every soldier, sailor and airman—and their female counterparts—should have the same rights as civilians to a trial by a jury of 12, with all the statutory protections for majority verdicts, which time has proved work well in ensuring both just and timely verdicts. There is no such provision in court martials. It may well be, as the Minister said, that verdicts of two to one occur in a small number of less serious cases, but they have no place in modern criminal jurisprudence. Neither does a system whereby the most junior member of a court martial is asked to give his verdict first. This is even more important now, given the provisions in Schedule 1 for the constitution of court martials to include other ranks. Every service person should have the same protection for his or her day in court as a civilian counterpart. Our forces are now much closer to those in civilian life than they were and should have the same rights, hallowed and developed over centuries, as civilians have, and it is with pleasure that I support Amendment 2.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, for his support, and I congratulate him on the attempts that he has made over a long time to civilianise military law. I am pleased that he mentioned Lord Elwyn-Jones, who admitted me to the rank of Queen’s Counsel in the Moses Room rather a long time ago.

The issue in Amendment 2 is: should members of the Armed Forces accused of murder, manslaughter, rape or other sexual offences alleged to have been committed within the United Kingdom be tried by court martial or in ordinary courts? The Mutiny Act 1689, in the reigns of William and Mary, laid down the principle that there should be annual renewals of the Armed Forces Act. The recital to it said:

“No man may be forejudged of life or limb, or subjected … to any kind of punishment … by martial law, or in any other manner than by the judgment of his peers and according to the known and established laws of this realm.”


That is the sentiment that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, has just enunciated, and it is a principle derived from the Magna Carta.

But this recital in the Act contained an exception to that stirring principle. In respect of

“every person being mustered and in pay as an officer or soldier in their Majesty’s service, who excited, caused or joined in any mutiny or sedition in the Army, or deserted their Majesty’s service”,

the punishment was death.

The other means of disciplining service personnel was under the Articles of War, issued under the King’s sign-manual, but only for the purpose of operations abroad, particularly in the colonies, not in the United Kingdom.

The Mutiny Act applied throughout Great Britain and Ireland, so that even in peacetime a soldier mutinying or deserting would be tried and punished under martial law, not civil law, and without the protections offered through civil law procedures.

The great jurist Sir William Blackstone, writing in 1765, was incensed that soldiers should be dealt with by court martial in peacetime and regretted that

“a set of men, whose bravery has so often preserved the liberties of their country, should be reduced to a state of servitude in the midst of a nation of freemen!”

When, in 2006, therefore, the Labour Government introduced into their Armed Forces Act a provision which permitted the trial of service personnel by court martial for serious offences committed in this country—a course which I strongly opposed at the time—they were going against centuries of history. The serviceman was now open to court martial for any offence, including murder, manslaughter and rape, even when committed in the United Kingdom. Importantly, he had lost the right to be tried by an ordinary jury of 12 of his peers and was subject to the verdict and punishment of up to seven officers, arrived at by a simple majority.

That is enough history; we must look at the position now, in 2021. We have before us the strong recommendation of His Honour Judge Lyons in his review. As it happens, his first recommendation is that the court martial jurisdiction should no longer include murder, manslaughter and rape when those offences are committed in the United Kingdom, except with the consent of the Attorney-General. The Defence Sub-committee under Sarah Atherton, Member of Parliament for Wrexham, published its report in July, entitled Protecting Those who Protect Us. That report calls urgently for the implementation of His Honour Judge Lyons’s recommendation.

It is true that, in his recent report, Sir Richard Henriques accepted concurrent jurisdiction, as it is called, but the reason he gives is that there may be cases which occur both abroad and in this country, and consequently a single trial would be preferable. That reason would not have any force in respect of murder cases, where there is universal jurisdiction.

I do not believe that a murder case, for a murder committed in the United Kingdom, has been dealt with by way of court martial since 2006. However, I have been able to trace two cases where charges of manslaughter by negligence occurring in this country were tried in that way, both relating to the Castlemartin range in west Wales. In the most recent case, in 2012, a soldier was killed during a live firing exercise. That case was about the planning, organisation and running of that range and required reconstruction of the scene, with accurate grid references and bearings to establish to the criminal standard the origin of the fatal round. Three were convicted and the officer was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, with the others receiving service punishments. It follows, and I do concede, that there may be cases involving complex military issues where a court martial may be appropriate, but these are very rare—two cases in some 14 years.

In reply to the Minister’s comments in Committee, I said that she had misinterpreted this amendment. I have used the word “normally”, which means what it says: that offences committed in the UK would be tried in the ordinary Crown Courts, or in their equivalents in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That would be part of the protocol of the DSP and the DPP. It would be in only exceptional cases of the nature to which I have referred that the Attorney-General would need to be approached. I am not suggesting that he should be involved in the decision-making process of venue ab initio. Incidentally, there is no bar to the Attorney-General making a decision on venue, just as he or she may do in deciding on the commencement of proceedings. The Minister suggested the contrary in her reply in Committee.

Much more common are cases of rape and sexual offences occurring in this country being tried by court martial. It is obvious from the report of Sarah Atherton’s Defence Sub-Committee that complainants, their families and the public simply do not have confidence in courts martial. We can argue about the figures, but if the level of conviction is so low then this perception will have an effect on recruitment and, more importantly, retention. There are many victims within the armed services who will wish to leave for a civilian life if their complaints are not upheld.

The noble Baroness also repeated the justification advanced in 2006 that public confidence can be maintained in the whole service justice system

“only if the service justice system not only has but can be shown to have the capability to deal with all offending fairly, efficiently and in a manner which respects and upholds the needs of victims.”—[Official Report, 27/10/21; col. GC 166.]

That was the justification in 2006 to give a boost to the status of the partly reformed system of courts martial.

I said at Second Reading that I generally welcome the reforms in this Bill. They nearly conclude the long journey since the Findlay human rights case in 1995 towards founding the service justice system on justice rather than, as it has been historically, on discipline. We have finally buried the Mutiny Act, under which General Braddock in the Seven Years’ War could issue the order of the day:

“Any Soldier who shall desert tho’ he return again will be hanged without mercy.”


This amendment is designed to complete the journey towards justice.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

There is one brief reason that I would add to what has been so eloquently said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. We have always tried, and marked the seriousness of, crimes set out in the amendment by trial by jury. Magna Carta conferred on defendants the right to trial by jury. Today, we take account of the interests of the victim of such crimes and they have confidence only in trial by jury, particularly as so many of these cases turn on credibility. On that, the judgment of ordinary men and women, drawn from a jury, is the only way to achieve justice. For those three reasons, we should not deprive people of trial by jury in these cases.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

2: Clause 7, page 4, line 27, at end insert—
“(4A) Guidance under subsection (3)(a) must provide that where offences of murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, child abuse, rape or sexual assault with penetration are alleged to have been committed in the United Kingdom, any charges brought against a person subject to service law shall normally be tried in a civilian court unless, by reason of specific naval or military complexity involving the service, the Attorney General consents to trial by court martial.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure the most serious crimes – murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, child abuse, rape and sexual assault with penetration – are tried in civilian courts when committed in the UK unless the Attorney General has specifically consented for such crimes to be tried by court martial by reason of complexity involving the service.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for her careful reply, but I feel that I must test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 27, in my name and those of other noble Lords, which calls for an independent defence representation unit. The amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, is the principal amendment in this group, but this amendment is important and I am sure the Minister will have been well briefed on the subject. As the noble and learned Lord said rhetorically in Committee:

“I do not understand why we always expect the Armed Forces to have second best.”—[Official Report, 2/11/21; col. GC 295.]


And, in respect of independent representation, I fear that that is precisely what they get at the moment.

In Sir Richard Henriques’ fine report, he points to the fact that there is independent representation in Canada, Australia and South Africa but not for the British Armed Forces. There is talk that the present representation is a mere sticking-plaster solution. In Committee, the Minister said in mitigation of the stance that these proposals would not be accepted that,

“approximately 40 of these recommendations require policy and legal analysis … and I cannot accelerate that at the moment”

and

“we have so far been able to undertake only a light-touch analysis of some of his recommendations.”—[Official Report, 2/11/21, cols. GC 295, 297 and 288.]

I put it to the House that this recommendation is simple, clear cut and very necessary indeed. There is no reason why the Government need postpone further consideration of it. The Minister said in Committee that further consideration will be given when legislative time was allowed, and most of us know that that is usually shorthand for a long time in future. I strongly believe that a defence representation unit is urgent.

In his report, Sir Richard says he has considered the arguments carefully here, and that

“The Unit must be fully independent of the military command and act under the general supervision of the Attorney General. Any guidelines or instructions issued by the Attorney General must be published.”


He also makes the very strong point that

“there should be a significant saving on Legal Aid from the creation of this Unit. … Many of the delays at Court Martial may be avoided by the services supplied by the Unit.”

I do not intend to take up the time of the House this evening as we move through the consideration of this Bill, but I shall also read out paragraph 8.3.10 of Sir Richard’s report:

“Budgeting can only be a speculative process in this sphere. I have no doubt that there will be a saving in Legal Aid expenditure, the cost of Services Legal Aid approximating £1.8 million in the year 2019/2020. The cost of adjourned trials in the Court Martial caused by a lack of, or by delayed representation cannot be assessed. The provision of this facility to Service personnel and veterans should not be dictated by budgetary speculation, but by the moral obligation to provide proper support to those who serve or have served their country.”


His final sentence needs to be emphasised and repeated:

“The knock on the door will carry markedly less menace with the knowledge that competent legal assistance will be readily available.”


For the last couple of years, we have come to know precisely the anxiety and mental cost to serving and former members of the Armed Forces caused by that knock on the door. I therefore suggest to the Minister that Sir Richard Henriques’s recommendation that a defence representation unit be created to provide a triage service to service personnel and veterans under investigation for criminal conduct be a matter of some urgency. I look forward to the Minister saying to us tonight that that will be brought forward.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

There is no doubt that serious crimes are more difficult to investigate in the military than in civilian life due to the exigencies of service. On the other hand, serious crimes occur less often than they do in the territory of every civilian police force. That is why Sir Robert Henriques concluded that

“there should be a senior civilian appointment within the Defence Serious Crime Unit … with experience of major investigations and the ability and necessary experience to control a major incident room.”

He thought that such a number two should have the

“experience and ability to record, retain, manage and process several hundred allegations simultaneously using the most up to date technology.”

I would hope that the noble Baroness could explain, if she resists that particular proposal, that there is some system of training somebody up to the standard Sir Robert Henriques was talking about in his recommendation. How is a person going to get that experience to control a major incident room and carry out the various tasks he is referring to? It is not possible. That is the practical reason why he wanted a civilian as number two.

In recommendation 13 of his report, he said that the candidate would have

“achieved sufficient rank and recognition within civilian policing to act as an ambassador for the interests of Service police within the wider policing community.”

It is important that the service police are seen to be a first-rate service; there should be nothing second rate about the legal service provided to the Armed Forces on whichever side of a particular trial they may be. It is important that the service police should have status and expertise in all fields. I recall, for example, a court martial in Germany involving a German victim, where it was necessary to fly in a criminal pathologist from England to examine a body and later give evidence, and other scientists had to be imported as well. That was only one aspect of the case—the management of a large case is extremely difficult. I respectfully suggest that you cannot get that experience within the service police because they are scattered and do not organise themselves in that way.

I commented at very considerable length in Committee on the necessity to maintain the serious crime unit in a manner that is operationally independent of the military chain of command—for all the reasons that I gave then, and those so eloquently advanced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I do not propose to repeat those comments but very strongly support what he has said.

I emphasise the need also to set up a strategy policing board of experienced civilians—as referred to in paragraph (5) of this amendment—to which the provost marshal for serious crime and the defence serious crime unit should be accountable. That should be done now. There was some suggestion that the provost marshal for serious crime had already been chosen—that is the wrong way round. You need to get together the body of people who will provide support and to whom these various bodies will be accountable.

I will say a brief word about Amendment 27. I strongly agree that there should be a defence representation unit. There are a number of very competent and able solicitors around the country who carry out this task, but it is not well paid, and they have to travel considerable distances to do it; legal representation is frequently delayed as a result.

I remember my great friend Gilbert Blades, who was the solicitor in the Finlay case that started all this off in 1995. His method of attracting clients was to drive around in a pink Rolls-Royce, the arrival of which at an army unit would cause something of a stir. I do not imagine that a defence representation unit would pay the sort of fees that would enable a person employed there to buy a Rolls-Royce, but there we are. It is very important that such a unit be set up; I support that amendment too.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we strongly support Amendment 23 moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, to which my noble friend Lord Robertson, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and I have added our names. I thank the noble and learned Lord for the clear and concise way in which he outlined the need for this amendment and why the Government should think again with respect to it.

We welcome the establishment of the DSCU but remain concerned as to why the Government will not accept something as seemingly sensible as this amendment. It seeks only to implement Henriques’ full vision for the unit. Without it, independence is not necessarily guaranteed—a point that a number of noble Lords have made—and nor are the other recommendations for how the unit will function. If the Government accept such recommendations, why not put them on the face of the Bill?

The Minister has argued that the other Henriques recommendations remain in the mix but do not need legislative underpinning; however, there is a difference of opinion between what does and does not need legislative underpinning. For example, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has argued that there needs to be a statutory provision for the witness and victim care unit, but the Government seem to say that it is not needed. Can the Minister tell us what legal advice the Government have received to come to such a very different conclusion?

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 1B in lieu—

1B: Page 4, line 27, at end insert—
“(4A) Guidance under subsection (3)(a) must provide that where offences of murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, child abuse, rape or sexual assault with penetration are alleged to have been committed in the United Kingdom, any charges brought against a person subject to service law shall normally be tried in a civilian court unless, by reason of the circumstances, including but not limited to specific naval or military complexity involving the service, the Director of Public Prosecutions, after consultation with the Attorney General, directs trial by court martial.””

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I will start with a quotation. In the Ministry of Defence

“there is one individual who is refusing to back down from the alleyway he has found himself in.”—[Official Report, Commons, 6/12/21; col. 105.]

Those are the words of the former Defence Minister Johnny Mercer, speaking in the debate in the other place on Monday night, on the amendment that we sent. He had earlier said:

“Unfortunately, I was in the room when this decision was made. The evidence did not support the Secretary of State at the time and the evidence does not support the Secretary of State today. I cannot vote against the Lords amendment; it is not the right thing to do. Let me be clear: when the Secretary of State made that decision”—


the issue that we are discussing today—

“it was against the advice of the officials in the Department and against the advice of his Ministers.”—[Official Report, Commons, 6/12/21; col. 104.]

Unusually, the veil is lifted. Mr Mercer clearly identifies Mr Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, as the man in the alleyway who, against the advice of his officials and his Ministers, persists in resisting this amendment. The Minister knows that I have always assumed that she would not, in her personal capacity, back the Government’s position—but now we have direct evidence from Mr Mercer, her former colleague.

I could leave it at that. I could await the storm of protest from victims whose cases are dismissed at court martial, who will come forward brandishing the Judge Lyons review and the recommendations, after considerable investigation, contained in Sarah Atherton’s report, published last July, to which I have referred at every stage—Sarah Atherton being the only Conservative Member of Parliament ever for Wrexham.

I doubt that the controversy when those protests are made will improve Mr Wallace’s or the Government’s standing with the public on the highly sensitive issue of sexual offences, but I have a deep concern that the reputation of the service justice system in the UK should not be sullied.

On Monday afternoon, I took part in an international forum organised by my friend Professor Eugene Fidell of Yale University, founder and former president of the National Institute of Military Justice in the United States. The forum meets regularly. On this occasion, we considered the way that sexual offences are dealt with in the Canadian military. This is a live issue in many jurisdictions. I had hoped that the United Kingdom would show the way, but I will remind the House of some of the UK statistics that were before the other place.

The Atherton committee interviewed many in search of evidence. Some 64% of the more than 4,000 service- women who submitted evidence to the committee stated that they had experienced sexual harassment, rape, bullying or discrimination while serving in the Armed Forces. Over the past five years, the average conviction rate for rape in civilian courts, from Ministry of Justice data, is 34%. Over the same five years, from using the data of the MoD, it is just 16%. The Minister told us that it was 15% for courts martial over the last six months. If you use Crown Prosecution Service data, the figures are even worse.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for taking this point of correction. The statistic I gave him for cases of rape prosecuted in courts martial in the last six months shows a conviction rate of just under 50%.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

Obviously, I misheard the noble Baroness. I will continue. As I said on Report, I am not aware of any murders committed in the UK by service personnel that have been tried by court martial. Of course, that could have happened only since 2006, when the novel change to concurrent jurisdiction was introduced. I have noted two cases of manslaughter arising from deaths at the Castlemartin range in west Wales, in live firing exercises, which involved the organisation of training activities, but I am not aware of any trials of sexual offences at court martial in the UK where the victim was a civilian. If there were any, I shudder to think of the effect on a civilian complainant of giving her evidence in intimate detail, against a serviceman, to a panel of uniformed officers, at a court martial.

Until now, the verdict of a court martial in such a case would have been by a simple majority, but I welcome the changes in this Bill that lead to a different situation. Imagine the difficulty of a junior service woman or man making a complaint of rape to her or his commanding officer, particularly if the alleged offender is senior to them in the chain of command, as is often the case. In addition to all the stresses and strains that already dissuade many women in civilian life from complaining, she, a servicewoman, has to face the effect on her career, an appearance before a board of senior officers, very low chances of conviction and the possibility that, in the event of an acquittal, the terms of her service will keep her in contact with her attacker. At least in a civilian court, the jury, to whom she would give her sensitive and difficult evidence, is 12 anonymous people drawn from the public. They will have no effect on her career and she is most unlikely ever to see them again—contrast that with giving evidence of sexual offences before a court martial.

Sir Robert Neill, with all his experience and wisdom, pointed out in the other place on Monday that the normal safeguards that apply in these cases in civilian courts are not yet available in the courts martial, in both the investigatory and procedural stages. Again, I draw the Minister’s attention to the effect upon the recruitment and retention of women in the Armed Forces. Would you expose your daughter to the probability that she will be subject to sexual harassment and worse, without the protection of a satisfactory service justice system?

I listened to the debate in the other place, and my amendment in lieu has changes. Objection was made to the role ascribed to the Attorney-General. The Minister has made a similar objection in this House, and I have to admit that I had assumed that the Ministry of Defence and the Members in another place appreciated the constitutional position of the Attorney-General. It is one of his functions to supervise the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Service Prosecutions and to be answerable in Parliament for them and their decisions. Hence it was Judge Lyons’ recommendation that the AG’s consent should be sought for the trial by a court martial of murder, manslaughter, rape and serious sexual offences committed in the UK. I agreed with his position: it represents the correct status of the Attorney-General in this country.

However, if the consent of the Attorney-General is the problem, this amendment in lieu leaves decisions about trial venue in the hands of the Director of Public Prosecutions—but only after consultation with the Attorney-General. The DPP would naturally consult the DSP, but, as the Minister, Mr Leo Docherty, made clear on Monday evening, it is the DPP’s decision in the end.

I say to the Conservative Benches that, if they vote against my amendment, they would be voting merely for the stubborn man in the alleyway, in Johnny Mercer’s words. They would be voting against the views of the officials in the Ministry of Defence and the departmental Ministers at the time that this was first considered, against the leading recommendation—number 1—of Judge Lyons and, above all, against the passionate findings of the Conservative Member of Parliament and her cross-party committee. Sarah Atherton—the only women in history to have risen from the ranks of the Armed Forces to become a Member of the House of Commons—knows what she is talking about. I ask those opposite not to vote against this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)]

My Lords, I am disappointed that the Government are maintaining their opposition to civilianising the courts martial for serious cases, such as murder, manslaughter and rape. The conviction rate for rape alone is 16% in the military courts, as reflected in the remarks from Mr Johnny Mercer in the other place. The Minister has given certain other figures for the last six months. I am very interested in this. Perhaps she could give me the size of the sample when she is winding up? Perhaps we could have a bigger sample, perhaps of a year. I would have thought that these figures alone would cause concern that something was wrong.

Service personnel do not have the statutory protection that other people have when they are tried in ordinary criminal courts or the statutory protections that are embedded in law to ensure that, where there is a majority direction, it is made known, the numbers are made known, and everyone knows where they stand. Nothing of that kind happens in courts martial. According to the Minister on a previous occasion, in some cases—they may be small in number—a verdict of 2:1 is certainly not in conformity with modern criminal jurisprudence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, first, I thank your Lordships for, as ever, interesting and thoughtful contributions on both issues being debated this afternoon, particularly Motions A1 and B1. I will first address the comments made in relation to Motion A1. By way of preface, it is worth noting that this matter was debated and decided in the other place by an authoritative and substantial majority. Notwithstanding that, I will endeavour in my remarks to engage your Lordships and repeat why the Government hold to the position they do. I am grateful for the further comments made.

Perhaps I should clarify to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, who seemed to doubt my commitment to the matters of the service justice system, that I and the Government are convinced of the wisdom of retaining unqualified concurrent jurisdiction for murder, manslaughter and rape—I want to make that crystal clear. I remind your Lordships that, contrary to what some contributions indicated, that view is supported by a distinguished former High Court judge, Sir Richard Henriques.

I was also interested to note that remarks from a number of your Lordships with very senior and impressive legal backgrounds seemed to be addressed exclusively to England and Wales. With all respect, the service justice system that we all admire and revere has to extend across the whole of the UK and must reflect the different systems within it. Military justice must be universal across the UK and the proposal in the Bill achieves that end in a way in which the noble Lord’s amendment does not.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

Perhaps I might challenge the Minister on that. If the civil jurisdiction is to be used for an offence committed in Scotland or Northern Ireland, court martials then become immaterial—so there is no problem, as the Minister seems to think. This point has not been raised at any stage of the Bill until today. There is no problem if the ordinary courts of Scotland and Northern Ireland are to deal with offences which occur within that jurisdiction. The question of whether a person is in the military or not is then irrelevant; the offences will be dealt with as usual.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Yes, but with all respect, I say to the noble Lord that that is not the essence of the issue. The essence is instead how you create a service justice system which can operate across the United Kingdom and ensure that, when discussions take place with the appropriate civilian prosecutors, appropriate decisions are reached on the correct jurisdiction for the case. That might be, within the service justice system, convening in Scotland, but under the noble Lord’s amendment there is clearly a desire to bias the whole service justice system in respect of England and Wales to the civilian system, and I am saying that that introduces a disparity or fracture of the United Kingdom service justice system. That is what the Government find unacceptable.

The noble Lord, Lord Burnett, raised an important point—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I have to say to the noble and learned Lord that I am afraid I do not have information available. I gave him the statistics provided to me, but I will undertake to ascertain that information and write to him.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I will pursue that for a moment. The number of cases heard in courts martial is probably fewer than 10 for sexual offences, or at least fewer than 20. I cannot imagine that in six months, we deal with more than four or five cases, but no doubt we will be told in due course. Over a five-year period, the figure is 16% for convictions, as opposed to the civil conviction rate of 34%—shocking as that conviction rate is in any event.

On the point about Scotland and Northern Ireland—never raised before Monday night in the course of this Bill, either here or in the other place—the principle that this amendment sets down is quite simple:

“Guidance … must provide that where offences of murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, child abuse, rape or sexual assault with penetration are alleged to have been committed in the United Kingdom, any charges brought against a person subject to service law shall normally be tried in a civilian court”—


it does not say “in the Crown Court” in this country—

“unless by reason of the circumstances … the Director of Public Prosecutions, after consultation with the Attorney General, directs trial by court martial.”

If it is necessary to cover that by putting “after consultation with the Lord Advocate in Scotland” or whoever is the chief authority in Northern Ireland, that can be done in 30 seconds—if you let me loose for that period of time.

No answer has been given, and we are faced with what Johnny Mercer said:

“there is one individual who is refusing to back down from the alleyway”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/12/21; col. 105.]

This is not proper policy for the Conservative Party. It will face, as a party, the complaints of people who have been subjected to sexual violence but whose cases have not been upheld. It will arise, and it will be to the advantage of other parties. So, I plead that the amendment be supported in this case. I beg to move.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 14th December 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

At end insert “and do propose Amendment 1D as an amendment in lieu—

1D: Page 4, line 27, at end insert—
“(4A) Guidance under subsection (3)(a) must provide that where offences of murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, child abuse, rape or sexual assault with penetration are alleged to have been committed in the United Kingdom, any charges brought against a person subject to service law shall normally be tried in a civilian court unless, by reason of the circumstances, including but not limited to specific naval or military complexity involving the service, trial by court martial is directed by—
(a) in England and Wales, the Director of Public Prosecutions, after consultation with the Attorney General;
(b) in Scotland, the Lord Advocate;
(c) in Northern Ireland, the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, after consultation with the Attorney General for Northern Ireland.””

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, the Justice Minister, Dominic Raab, speaking on “Today” this morning, said:

“I’m proud of our tradition of freedom in this country. We believe in liberty under the rule of law … We want to reinforce our typical British liberties like freedom of speech, the liberty that guards all the others … trial by jury, that’s a common-law right, very much part of the British tradition.”


In another part of the thicket, the Defence Secretary, Mr Ben Wallace, is seemingly against trial by jury and is acting contrary to the advice of his advisers and the judgment of his departmental Ministers, as Johnny Mercer, the Minister for Defence People and Veterans until April of this year, told us last week. Mr Wallace refuses to accept that, where charges are brought against a person subject to service law for serious cases of murder, manslaughter, rape or serious sexual offences allegedly committed in the United Kingdom by a person subject to service law, there should be a presumption that the accused should have the “common-law right” to trial by jury. Let us spell it out clearly again. If you join the services, you lose the common-law right to trial by jury—which is very much part of the British tradition, as Mr Raab would have it.

In the Commons last week, Sarah Atherton, the Member of Parliament for Wrexham, who has made her way up from the ranks of the Intelligence Corps to the green Benches in the other place and to the chair of the defence sub-committee charged with studying this issue, voted against her own Government and in so doing lost her ministerial appointment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I think the noble and learned Lord overlooks the tradition of the service justice system and why we have such a system. That has been one of its characteristics over decades: that is the character of the system. It exists to serve a particular purpose, which most people in this Chamber acknowledge, and that is why it has different characteristics from the civilian justice system.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everybody who has contributed to this debate. Many fine words have been said and two issues have really come forward. The first is the denial of the right to trial by jury to members of the Armed Forces—they sign away that right when they join up. This issue will not go away but will rumble on and on.

The second issue relates to victims and the problems so clearly delineated to Sarah Atherton’s committee. She had representations from more than 4,000 women serving in the Armed Forces, all going the same way. Indeed, one person from an NGO which helps them said she was looking after 600 servicewomen, none of whom wanted trial by court martial; all wanted their right to have a trial in the ordinary courts so that the alleged transgressors could be brought to justice in the ordinary way.

This is absolutely fundamental to the constitution of this country. Regarding what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, said a moment ago, in his press release today Mr Raab talked about the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Slave Trade Act and so on, calling them to his aid in supporting the right to trial by jury. It is a simple point.

I am very conscious that there are good things in this Bill that I have worked for for ages, such as majority verdicts in courts martial. I do not want to see this Bill fail, nor do I want the military to be let loose at this particular time by this Bill falling for lack of time. Therefore, I do not propose to press my amendment, but I hope we will come back to this issue. I hope that that will not be in five years’ time with our next Armed Forces Bill but that, once statistics emerge and show us the true situation, the Government will have the guts to admit that they were wrong.

This is not a historic thing going back decades. Jurisdiction was given to courts martial to try murder, manslaughter and rape in 2006, so this is barely 15 years old. Consequently, it is not a great military tradition— if it is being presented in that way. Up until that time, the service justice system insisted that offences committed by servicemen in the United Kingdom, on the soil of this country, should be tried in the ordinary courts. I hope we get back to that very quickly. I will not press the matter and beg leave to withdraw Motion A1.

Motion A1 withdrawn.